In Interest of Angel Lace M.

Angel 4TP In the Interest M., a Child Lace Under of 18: Age Georgina G., Petitioner-Appellant,†

v. Terry M., Respondent. [Case No. 92-1369.] Angel 92 AD 9 In the Interest M., Lace a Child Under the of 18: Age G., Annette Petitioner-Appellant,

v. Terry M., Respondent. [Case 92-1370.] No.

Supreme Court 92-1369, argument Nos. 92-1370. Oral March 8, 1994.

1994. Decided June (Also 678.) reported in 516 N.W.2d † 21,1994. Motion for September reconsideration denied there were briefs For the petitioners-appellants (in by court and court of appeals) the supreme filed Gapen Sperling Newton, Carol M. and Stafford, Judith Hansen, Rosenbaum, Rieser & oral argu- Madison and Sperling Newton. Judith by ment (in court supreme Amicus briefs were filed curiae Margaret Becker, Barbara J. court of appeals) by and Schulz, S.C., H. Becker & Schulz and for Milwaukee Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin the American Foundation. M.

Amicus curiae brief was filed Karen McGaf- by fey, Ginsberg Bogle Gates; S. & Annette L. Beth and Hayes Heller, Ehrman, & McAuliffe, White all of and Abby Abinanti and National Center Seattle, WA and Rights, CA and Leslie D. Lesbian Francisco, San Shear, for The Center for Lesbian Madison National Fund, Defense and Education Legal Lambda Rights, Gay Defenders, and and Lesbian Advocates Inc., Law Center. Northwest Women's respondent-designate there was a brief For the Amy by Skilton, Howell, F. E. John S. Roberta filed Foley Lardner, & and oral Madison Dombrowski argument Skilton. John S. following presents

STEINMETZ, This case the J. for review: issues

(1) permit adoption a the statutes Do Wisconsin party's party adopt the to the minor child of third third partner? nonmarital

(2) prohibit If the Wisconsin taking place, vio- do these statutes from rights the minor child the constitutional of either late party? or the third petition February 1992, G. a 17, Annette filed

On part- Angel daughter adopt ofAnnette's M., to Lace County, Georgina The circuit court Brown ner, G. by petition denied Dietz, Richard J. the Honorable appeals April certified 9,1992. court order dated appeal this court. We now affirm for review adoption We that this of the circuit court. hold order permissible We further hold 48, under ch. Stats. provisions do of ch. 48 not violate the relevant that rights minor or the of either the child constitutional party. third September

Angel On 10,1986. on March was born Terry adopted Angel. Georgina Geor- and M. 20,1988, Terry gina at the time of and were married February, They separated and 1990, in paying year. Aside in that same from divorced June of part support, Terry played has no court-ordered child Angel's in life late 1990. since began living Georgina Angel June, 1990,

In and equally in shared Annette. The two women have with Georgina Angel raising and Annette since that time. symbolically their commitment each solemnized ceremony marriage-like by partaking in Mil- in a other August 11,1991.1 on waukee petition February filed a 17, 1992, Annette

On Angel. county adopt Simulta- circuit court Brown Terry's Georgina petition neously, filed a to terminate place- adoptive petition parental rights a for the and petition party Angel filed a with Annette. No ment rights. Georgina's parental terminate hearing petitions Judge on Dietz a the various held Terry signed hearing, At the March 1992. on paren- consenting of his to the termination statement consent was both and testified his tal Community Adoption knowing. voluntary report recommending the filed a the court Center adoption. the center In a social worker from addition, Terry's hearing at the termination testified Angel by parental rights Annette Angel's interests. be in would best testimony and other evidence Based on the hearing, presented determined the the circuit court at Angel's proposed adoption in would be best the that interests. pur- that court also determined However, the competent Annette not 48, Stats., to ch. is suant adopted Angel competent adopt Angel to be is not peti- by of the court denied each Hence, Annette. the by April 9,1992. order dated tions 1 marriages. recognize See sec. Wisconsin does not same-sex Commission, Stats., 765.001(2), Personnel Phillips v. Wisconsin 1992). (Ct. n.1, App. 482 N.W.2d 121 167 Wis. 2d 213 Wisconsin, Hence, Georgina and Annette are under the laws stepparent. result, Angel's As a Annette is not married. 504 Georgina appealed circuit court's Annette appeal appeals for certified The court order. by accepted the certification and this court. We review order of the circuit court.2 affirm the now argue petitioners that the circuit court should adoption petition granted for because Annette's have Angel's adoption best found that the court 48.01(2), no doubt Stats.3 There is interests. See sec. inis the best a court must find that an may grant the of the child before the court interests adop petition adoption. that an However, the fact for affecting any in the a child—is other action tion—or by not authorize a interests, itself, does child's best recognized grant court as This court to Marriage custody. re In In in the context of child much Groh, 117, 126, 327 N.W.2d 110 Wis. 2d v. of Groh argument (1983), rejected a trial court is we custody long impose any as on as conditions entitled to custody of the child: in the best interests order is any make power had the If the trial court order could somehow long so as the pleased order it 'in the best of the rubric justified by recitation be attorney general court, by this Though invited of the defend the order in this review to participate declined constitutionality statutes. and the circuit court Foley and the law firm of Therefore, appointed the court Skilton, respondent- to act as Lardner, Attorney John S. those interests. designate and defend 48.01(2), Stats., provides as follows: Section (2) liberally chapter construed to effect This shall of the child The best interests

objectives in this section. contained consideration, the court shall always paramount but be of shall child, parents guardian or of the of the also consider the interest persons child has been person with whom the or the interest public. placed interests of the and the

505 children,' limits the interests custody power court's exercise of on the placed custody is meaningless. Legal would matters as sec. of court orders provisions to the subject only However, subject it Stats., is 48.02(12), states. to make. empowered the court is to orders adoption an grant a court we to allow Were interests of in the best adoption time any petition plethora need for the be no child, there would 48.01(2), "[A] Stats. sec. other than adoption any to render so as not be construed should statute Ross, 1, 2d State v. 73 Wis. surplusage." or word portion (1976). argu- The petitioners' 210 242 N.W.2d 5, for adoption a grant petition court should a ment —that interests —would in the child's best as it is long as Hence, we surplusage. of ch. 48 sections render several reject argument. that a second finding make may a court

"[B]efore it must interests, best is in a child's parent such to grant it has the power whether determine first statutes." existing adoption under an Crossing When Parent Adoption: Second Patt, C. Emily Interests, 3 Child's Best is in a Barrier the Marital (1987 88) 48, ch. (citing 111 L.J. Women's Berkeley — Stats.). at common unknown "Adoption proceedings, statutory and the essential origin law, statutory are of met to validate substantially must be requirements 223, 229, 32 Wis. 2d ofTopel, Estate proceedings." (1966). apply we Accordingly, before N.W.2d determine case, we must in this interests standard best satisfies Angel proposed Annette's whether statutory requirements requirements for are Wisconsin, In apply therefore the relevant in ch. Stats. We found proposed adoption. appli provisions 48 to the of ch. question given a statute to a set of facts is cation of a Co., 158, 166, 361 122 Wis. 2d v. MSI Ins. law. Tahtinen (1985). give Hence, we need not deference N.W.2d purpose court. Our of the trial Id. to interpreting decisions give is to effect to the intent of a statute plain language legislature, of the statute primary guide. acting Id. our as may adopt 48.82, Stats.,4 controls who a

Section adopt party petitioning to a minor A must sat- minor. party requirements. isfy must First, be a two Annette satisfies first of Wisconsin. resident requirement. description party must fit the Second, the 48.82(1)(&). 48.82(1)(a) Annette or sec. either sec. from 48.82(l)(q) qualify she is sec. because under does not Georgina legally who the or wife" of is "the husband not 48.82, Stats., provides as follows: Section (1) eligi- following persons may adopt. are 48.82 Who they adopt of this state: minor if are residents ble (a) jointly, the husband or wife wife or either A husband and parent spouse of the minor. is a if the other (b) adult. An unmarried (3) requested by parent, if the birth practicable and When religious the birth adoptive parents of the same faith as shall be adopted. person parents of the to be (4) subchapter person may the benefits of this be denied No spiritual through means religious in the use of of a belief because healing. prayer for (6) person qualified, shall be denied Although no otherwise deaf, person blind or has of this section because the benefits handicaps. physical other (6) person may the benefits qualified be denied No otherwise race, color, ancestry or subchapter of his or her because of this origin. national "parent of the However, minor." Annette does fit the 48.82(1)(&) description "[a]n in sec. because she is unmarried adult." only

For the valid, to be must Annette qualify party may adopt Angel, Angel as a who but eligible must also be for Section 48.81, may adopted. Stats.,5 controls who A minor must satisfy requirements eligible also adop- two to be Angel requirement tion. satisfies the first of the statute present because she was in the state of Wisconsin at petition the time Annette filed the for See sec. (2). Angel 48.81 It is less clear whether satisfies the requirement. (1), second Pursuant to sec. 48.81 a minor may only adopted "parental rights be if her have been Angel's adoptive Terry, terminated . . .."6 father, has parental rights. consented the termination of his Georgina's parental rights, on the other hand, remain intact. petitioners 48.81(1),

The claim that sec. Stats., is ambiguous. According petitioners, to the the statute Angel eligible adoption only could mean that is for if 48.81, Stats., provides Section as follows: may adopted. Any 48.81 Who be minor who meets all of following may adopted: criteria be (1) (3) (b) Except provided appoint- as under s. 48.839 or if an guardianship ment of 48.831, has been made under s. a minor parental rights whose have been terminated under subch. VIII or foreign jurisdiction. in another or state (2) present A minor who is within this state at the time the petition adoption for is filed. 6We first note that this statute poorly is worded. A minor parental does not rights may have Rather, be terminated. parents possess her rights. legislature these The must have intended may to state that a adopted minor be if "parents' her rights have been terminated ...." parents rights of of her have been terminated. both eligible adoption for that she is as it could mean

Or, parents rights long her at least one of have as the of petitioners this ask court to con- been terminated. liberally to interests further best strue the statute 48.01(2), accept Angel, pursuant the sec- to sec. of interpretation statute. ond interpretation of the stat- second

Under eligible long for as the a minor is as ute —that rights parents of her have termi- at least one been eligible for minor would be when nated —a only parents of her are terminated. The one adopted eligible to if the be be even minor would remaining parent legally raise child alone fit to Ostensibly, prefers to child a com- raise the alone. adopt plete stranger petition a minor who is a could family; pursuant to and, of this at least member stable per- proposed adoption 48.81, Stats., the would sec. could not have intended missible. eligible cir- under those a minor declare This This would be an absurd result.7 cumstances. to work absurd or will not construe a statute so as court Evans, 2d Estate Wis. unreasonable results. (1965). pur- Hence, 832 we hold that 101, 135 N.W.2d 48.81(1), eligible a is not suant to sec. minor rights parents adoption unless of of her have both Georgina's parental rights Because been terminated.8 7 may acknowledges adoption court such an This by adoption How prohibited provisions in the statutes. other ever, interpreted to allow particular this section should not be absurd result. this 8 holding obviously adop apply stepparent does not to This eligible to be stepparent adoption, the minor is tions. In a are terminated. Sec- parents if the of one of her adopted adopted by to be eligible is not intact, Angel remain Annette. in the of way also stands 48.92, Stats.,9

Section sev- This statute Angel. of proposed Annette's adopted and the parent10 the birth ties between ers the exception in clearly provide for this 48.81, Stats., does tion However, sur- it is clear from adoptions. stepparent the case of sanction legislature intended to rounding statutes 48.92(2) ("unless par- the birth See secs. adoptions. stepparent 48.835(3)(b) ("[i]f adoptive parent") spouse of ent is the stepparent"). a petition is filing the person adoption in this case. No proposed for the be said cannot same legislature intended to that the indicate neighboring unless stepparent adoptions, other than any adoptions, allow parents have been terminated. of the child's rights of both 48.92, Stats., provides as follows: Section (1) adoption is After the order of Effect of 48.92 rights, parent child and all the duties entered the relation legal consequences natural relation of child and of the and other adop- adopted person and the parent between the thereafter exists parents. tive (2) relationship entered the After the order person adoptive adopted and the parent between and child parent spouse of the parents, the birth is the person's unless birth rights, completely and all the parent, altered adoptive shall be relationship consequences cease legal shall and other duties parental rights Notwithstanding the extinction of all exist. subsection, may court order reasonable visitation under s. 48.925. under (3) by, through adopted Rights from and an of inheritance governed s. 851.51. child are (4) abrogate Nothing in this section shall be construed adoptive payments right department families to make (12). s. 48.48 under adopted person adoption of an "[t]he case involves 10This parent parent [in and birth the references to [and thus] ... 48.96, parent." Stats. adoptive See sec. statutes] are to adoption.11 after court enters the order of Pur minor 48.92(2), grants court to if the circuit sec. suant rights, Angel, petition adopt "all the duties Annette's [Georgina's legal consequences of other relation and ship added.) (Emphasis Angel] to exist." shall cease If had intended sanction partners, adoptions by it would not have nonmarital "rights, duties and other this "cut-off1of mandated parents legal consequences" in these of the birth adoptions. petitioners argue despite that, the use of the

The directory, provision this "cut-off1 "shall," word " mandatory, law.12 'Shall' will under Wisconsin carry directory necessary if out the construed as legislature." R.R.E., v. 162 2d State Wis. intent (1991). interpretation 707, N.W.2d 283 This 698, 470 interpretation. statutory ignores rules of two basic "' mandatory presumed to be when it First, "shall" is Speer, appears 1101, v. 176 Wis. 2d in a statute.'" State (1993) (quoting 429 American Fam- 1122, 501 N.W.2d ily 435 Milwaukee, 280, 285, 148 2d Ins. v. Wis. Co.

11 "cut parent the birth from this exempt does statute However, adoptions. provision stepparent because Geor off1 married, exception apply. does not are not gina and Annette 12 other petitioners cite to decisions from states directory. Adoption provisions similar are See have found "cut-off (Vt. 1993); Adoption B.L.V.B., A.2d Matter 628 1271 (Sur. 1992). Evan, may court look 997 While this 583 N.Y.S.2d jurisdictions interpreting when similar to decisions from other interpreting a "is to statutes, purpose in statute primary our legislative policy intent and behind stat- determine 815, 2d Hopkins, N.W.2d State v. 168 Wis. ute." (1992). decisions, they shed little take note of these Although we legislature. of the Wisconsin light on the intent (Ct. 1988)). App. petitioners' argu- 280 N.W.2d presumption. Second, ment does not overcome this legislature specifically the enumerates certain where presumes exceptions statute, to a this court that the legislature exceptions intended to exclude other based expressio rule unius est exclusio alterius. State ex on the Larson, 521, 527, 64 2d 219 N.W.2d rel. Harris v. Wis. (1974). ("Under specifies [a] maxim, this if statute 335 general specify exception to a rule or assumes to one exceptions provision, other or the effects of a certain (6th Dictionary Black's 581 effects are excluded." Law 1990)). legislature specifically the case, ed. In this by stating exempted stepparent adoptions the provision applies parent "unless the birth "cut-off 48.92(2), spouse adoptive parent..See sec. did not Stats. This is evidence including exempt adoptions, intend to other those partners. Harris, See 64 Wis. 2d at 527. nonmarital compelling "cut find more that the We evidence mandatory provision is we read the relevent off when multiple together. 48, of ch. "When Stats., sections chapter are in the and assist contained same implementing chapter's goals policy, in and pari harmo statutes should be read in materia13 and possible." 862, nized if 2d In Interest Wis. of R.W.S., added.) (1991). (Footnote this 871, In N.W.2d 16 reading together 48.81 and case, sec. 48.92 with secs. harmonizing and leads to 48.82 the three statutes pari relating 13 In. materia refers to statutes to the same subject having purpose. matter or common Black's same construction, Dictionary statutory pari 791. As a rule of Law read, and construe statutes requires apply a court materia subject together. relating to the same matter Id. provision of sec. 48.92 is the "cut-off'

conclusion that mandatory. Stats., sanctions find that ch. For this court to accept petitioners' adoption, proposed must we 48.81(1) 48.92(2). interpretation of both secs. 48.81(1) permitting interpret petitioners a as sec. long adopted of at least one as as the minor to be accept parents If are terminated. we this of the minor's parent interpretation, has one then a minor who still 48.82(1)(a) clearly "[a] adopted. allows could be Section adopt peti jointly" minor. The husband wife provision interpret the "cut-off' of sec. next tioners 48.92(2) interpreta accept directory. If we also as jointly could the husband and wife tion, then above severing adopt ties the minor without above remaining parent the minor. birth and between parents. Subse have three The minor would then of the quently, of one terminate the a court could parents could wife husband and three and a second parents. jointly adopt giving four the minor minor, Obviously, process go This petitioners' could interpretations on ad infinitum. 48.81(1) and of secs. 48.92(2), pari absurd materia, lead to could read in to so as not construe a statute results. This court will Evans, 28 Wis. absurd or unreasonable results. work 2d at 101. to harmonize and

To avoid this absurd result statutory above, we construction discussed rules 48.92(2), provision Stats., "cut-off' of sec. hold that the "rights, Georgina mandatory. lose Hence, would consequences legal her relation- of' other duties and granted Angel Annette's ship if the circuit court Angel. adopt frustrate petition This would result petitioners' alsoWe intentions. further the rather than that, hold to sec. pursuant 48.81(1), Angel is not eligi- ble for Therefore, we conclude that proposed does adoption not satisfy the essential requirements adoption is, in fact, prohibited these by statutes.14 The circuit court prop- erly denied the petitions before it its despite finding that the would adoption be Angel's best interests.

The next petitioners that if argue the relevant pro- visions of ch. 48, Stats., do not authorize a circuit court to grant for petition adoption, then these statutory provisions violate the constitutional rights of either

14Amici curiae—the National Rights, Center for Lesbian Legal Lambda Fund, Inc., Defense and Gay Education and Les bian Advocates and Defenders and the Northwest Women's Law suggest that this court could petition view Annette's Center — adoption joint petition as a Georgina filed Annette and subsequent to the parental termination of the rights of both Georgina Terry. amici, According to the pro this alternate cedure impediments would avoid the proposed presented by 48.92, secs. 48.81 and argument, Stats. At oral petitioners also argument. advanced this Supreme Court of recently Massachusetts affirmed an order of based on (Mass. argument. Adoption similar Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 1993). validity joint of a is not before this court. Georgina Annette and jointly petition did not adopt Angel. Only petition. Annette filed such a Furthermore, peti no one tioned for the termination of Georgina's parental Hence, rights. this court will not address argument. this alternate We do note previously suggested this court has validity that the of a joint adoption by two unmarried individuals is best left to the legislature. of Z.J.H., In re Interest 1002, 162 1019 n.11, Wis. 2d (1991). 471 N.W.2d 202 Presently, 48.82, Stats., sec. allows adoption only by single adult, a couple steppar married or the ent of the child.

514 Angel constitutionality or Annette or both. The of a question statute is a of law which we review de novo. Chappy LIRC, v. 136 172, 184, 401 Wis. 2d N.W.2d 568 (1987). reviewing constitutionality In of a statute, strong presumption legislative "there is a that a enact party challenging ment is constitutional." Id. The constitutionality prove beyond of a statute "must a rea sonable doubt that the act is unconstitutional." Id. at " 'every presumption 185. Furthermore, must be indulged possible to sustain the if at law all and, wher legislative ever doubt exists as to a enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of consti " tutionality.' (quoting Id. State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Plante, Co. v. La 58 Wis. 32, 46, 2d 205 N.W.2d (1973)). heavy

With this in mind, burden we turn to the petitioners' arguments. petitioners The claim that prohibiting adoption, 48.92, secs. 48.81 Stats., deny Angel right process, guaranteed by her to due Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu- ways. petitioners tion, First, in two claim that deprive Angel right of her to have her best paramount be the interests factor in a court's decision regarding petition Annette's requirement process applies only of due

deprivations property liberty or interests. Board (1972). Regents right Roth, v. 408 U.S. guide analysis adop- have her best interests our in this proceeding certainly qualify tion does not as one of Angel's property addition, interests. In United States Supreme jurisprudence Court makes it clear that this right alleged qualify liberty does not as a interest. only qualify liberty

An interest will as a interest if traditionally protected by it is both fundamental and society. our D., Michael H. v. Gerald 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (Scalia, plurality). right J., to have a child's paramount best interests be the consideration in the adoption proceedings is neither fundamental nor tradi tionally protected by society. Adoption our itself is not right. Lindley Lindley even a fundamental v. Sulli for (7th 1989) ("there van, 124, 889 F.2d Cir. is no right adopt"). certainly fundamental legislative It follows that a adoption directive to construe statutes with paramount the child's best interests of consideration is right. adop not a fundamental Furthermore, because relatively statutory development, tion is a recent we traditionally cannot conclude that has been protected by society. our Hence, secs. 48.81 48.92, deprive Angel liberty Stats., do of a interest. fact, In as discussed earlier, the did not right statutory intend for this to attach at all unless the requirements are satisfied. Because these requirements Angel are not satisfied in this case, never possessed this interest and secs. 48.92, 48.81 and deprived Stats., could not have her of it. We therefore reject constitutionality this initial attack on the adoption statutes. petitioners argue by prohibiting

Second, the adoption, deprive Angel the relevant statutes right Angel's her constitutional to familial association. protection freedom to associate with Annette "receives personal liberty." a as fundamental element of See Rob- (1984). Jaycees, erts v. United States 468 U.S. petitioners acknowledge, However, as the associating prevent Angel from do not merely prevent Annette and Annette. These statutes legally formalizing relationship. Angel their from This relationship, a child and her mother's between traditionally partner, is not one that has nonmarital family protection. "The unit received constitutional respect society, in our which accorded traditional we 'unitary family,' typified, referred to as the is of have family, by course, the marital but also includes parents and their children." household of unmarried Angel's H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3. While relation- Michael Georgina, constitutionally ship mother, her with "unitary family," protected the two form a her because reject relationship Thus, Annette is not. we this constitutionality challenge to the Wisconsin's second adoption do not and hold that these statutes statutes Angel's right process. to due violate curiae, Union the American Civil Liberties Amicus (ACLU), argues by Foundation of Wisconsin prohibiting adoption, the statutes at issue violate this right equal protection guaranteed Angel's to Constitu- Amendment to the United States Fourteenth argument reply petitioners join in their The this tion. petitioners that the and the ACLU claim brief. Both adoption up statutory in sets two scheme for Wisconsin purpose adop- of children classes children in in traditional families and tion—children According argument, families. nontraditional protect legislature has chosen to the best interests pro- children in traditional families while of those tecting in nontraditional the best interests of children families. argument misinterprets stat-

This has chosen utes. The Wisconsin parental "whose children between differentiate par- children who still have terminated" have been exception made for children with has been One ents. stepparents. legislative affect a scheme does not

This suspect right on a classi- and is not based fundamental the statutes must declare Hence, we fication. rationally long they to a related as are so constitutional governmental legitimate v. interest. Cleburne (1985). Living Center, 473 U.S. Cleburne rationally related to are statutes Wisconsin protecting "uni- the traditional interest the state's tary family." H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3. Michael See petitioners their ACLU have failed to overcome and the beyond proving that the a reasonable doubt burden Angel right deprive her relevant protection. equal by prohibiting

Finally, this that the ACLU claims adoption legislative adoption, scheme vio- Wisconsin's equal protection right to lates Annette's against discriminating of her sexual her on the basis According gender. ACLU, to the her and/or orientation relationship in a heterosexual Annette were involved if adopt. to man, a she would be able if Annette were or adoption Contrary claim, Wisconsin's to this orientation or on the basis of sexual do not discriminate gender. may adopt Angel Annette not because Annette legitimate argu- Any Georgina married. are not may at have should be directed the ACLU ment marriages, prohibition not the of same-sex Wisconsin's involving adoption this is not a suit However, statutes. challenged petitioners marriage not have marriages. adop- prohibition of same-sex state's right equal Annette's to do not violate tion statutes protection. eligible adopt child is "whose Annette rights parental terminated." That is not the have been married, if Annette were she addition, In here. case child(ren) spouse. adopt eligible of her would Again, legisla- here. The Wisconsin is not the case statutory adoption scheme for has enacted a ture promoting legally society's stable, interest balances recognized promoting its interest in families with the children involved. interests of best proposed not fall within the confines in this case does constitutionally legislative scheme. valid eligible Angel hold that is

We rights 48.81(1), parental Stats., her sec. because under proposed Furthermore, not been terminated. have 48.92(2) prohibited sec. would because Angel. Georgina's that the We also hold ties with sever provisions not violate the constitu- of ch. do relevant Angel Therefore, we or Annette. tional of either the three order that denied the circuit court's affirm petitions the court. before county

By cir- of the Brown order the Court.—The is affirmed. cuit court (concurring). join in the I GESKE, J.

JANINE P. correctly majority opinion ana- that it I believe because Although lyzes the dissents law. Wisconsin current 48.01(2), accurately point Stats., directs out that sec. "[t]he liberally best interests ch. 48 with construe us statutory by are still bound mind, child" in we of the Topel, requirements 32 Wis. 2d Estate for of (1966). requirements Those 229, 145 N.W.2d in case. not met are only encourage separately the Wisconsin

I write light occur- legislature of all that is ch. 48 in to revisit society. legislators, ring in our The as with children people representatives have state, of the of this both responsibility right to establish the and legal adoption, custody, requirements for and for for a only play that role. We can visitation. This court cannot interpret law, not rewrite it. purpose provide for the best of ch. 48 is to Fortunately, Angel in a lives

interests of children. currently cared for. She home where she is loved and Many happy, children are not as fortu- has a stable life. many of our live in a time when nate as she. We neglected, Many unloved. abused, are children dysfunctional children, in families. These others live will nurture do not have the benefit of adults who who angry lovingly discipline them, often become the felony courts. criminals we see our legislators Hopefully continue to work to our will protection our children advance the interests and reviewing listening constituents, our current to their debating statutory changes. laws, and wisdom legis- protect Children cannot their own interests. by vigilantly protect lature can those interests ensuring statutory overseeing the children's code and provides for the best interests scheme that indeed our kids. disagree respectfully with Justice Bablitch's

I legislature, by dissenting opinion, view, in his language Stats., has trans- 48.01, of the of sec. virtue establishing responsibility ferred its constitutional judicial statutory for to the criteria majority opinion points out, if the intent As the branch. judges legislature to create the to allow were legislative adoption, requirements we would Majority we have. need the various specifi- op. has indeed Instead, at 506. cally requirements set forth the We are apply correctly The to them. circuit court con- bound requirements that were met in this cluded those case. (dissenting).

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE in this case issue addressed is whether Wisconsin governing adoption adopt Annette to statutes allow G. Angel, already a a child whom she has functional with relationship. adoption parent-child on statutes do Therefore, face not address this issue. this their statutory employ accepted con- court must canons of meaning interpret adoption to struction about the nature of Much has been written statutes. of that the canons tory construction and the fact contradic- opposite if canons exist that would lead to results present applied case, to statute.1 In the how- same helpful guidance provided from ever, this court is appropriate canon construc- on 48.01(2), apply Section to the statutes. tion code, states the children's which Stats., adoption part, liberally con- are a "shall be objectives in section." to effect the contained strued accompanying Legislative in adoption procedure, held that the they also have law, purely is it to the common since was unknown strictly must be followed. statutory and statutes (3) in includ- sections ch. 48 provides Sub. liberally construed. ing adoption on should be those Senate 1955 accompanying Council notes Legislative Legislative in Council 444, Bill no. contained Wisconsin (case (1955) 444, p. at VI, vol. bill no. Reports, part omitted). construction of the citations Liberal employ the canon this court must statutes, then, is of the children's code.2 objectives effectuate the 48.01(2) Section adds: of always of shall

The best interests the child consideration, the court shall also paramount but of parents guardian interest of the or consider the person or child, persons the interest of the for and placed child has been whom the public. of the interests likely most to mandate liberal construc of setting powers in two when forth the tion situations: establishing economic body and social or governmental when objectives. advancing significant public policy legislation category con fit within the second —liberal light policy important public of is mandated struction statutes that fit within this the best interests of child. Other Stats, (liberal 19.81(4), category include: construc second sec. 111.31(3) (liberal statute); meetings sec. open of the tion prohibiting employment discrimi construction of the statutes 401.102(1) (liberal nation); sec. construction of the Uniform Code). Commercial considering public in the

In interests objectives adoption, three additional listed in context 48.01(1) appear applica- to be the children's code sec. ble:

(b) care, protection and provide To for the whole- children, physical development of some mental and unity family whenever preserving possible.

(f) pending adoptive To children assure in the best placed homes will be homes available adoption by persons from unfit protected responsibility raising children. have perma- in the state with provide To children (g) family relationships. nent stable "para- of the child is the best interests Because appears deems liberal it that the mount", particularly appropriate of the statutes construction best effectuates the interests such construction when outweigh the the other concerns listed the child unless interpret court the This should child's best interests. following approach by mandated legislature. agrees everyone present case involved that In the Angel's in best interests. After con- is study Angel's ducting home a social worker a Community Adoption employed Center, an adoption, place agency stated to children licensed Angel's and best interests was in that describing approved. In it that be recommended relationship Angel, report stated: with Annette's a snow fort Angel] building were and [Annette day. They play home visit on this worker's outside watching TV, as together as well games board strong a [tte] Anne indicates fire, etc. building a aware of Angel and she is well reading in interest difficulty no with in school and has progress her spending time alone with her or with disciplining busy things. other She is [Georgina] her when being patient, protec- in skills considerable shows age appropriate accepting of behaviors. tive, and limits and sees herself as willing to set She is parent. Angel's that four let- parties submitting added

The report between relationship described reference ters of loyalty, responsibility, as one of Angel and Annette be that the adoption and recommended love care and permitted. for adoption, on hearing petition

At the a member of a Angel testified worker social unit," family adding: stable, happy "very of her Angel about both questioned [sic] I Ai— her affec- very openly about and she talked mothers also talked feelings for both of them. She tionate I her if she adopted and asked her desire be about and her —her answer that meant understood what [G.] and she is that she would become to that was and of these women very affectionate toward both them. very comfortable with feels that it would ad litem also stated Angel's guardian for the adoption best interests clearly Angel's Georgina "the unit of family He stated that take place. nurturing and very loving Annette G. is a clearly would provide the adoption environment" previously than she had continuity greater with Angel known. for adoption hearing petition

The circuit court of fact: finding following made the [Annette] substantial, stable, has established a parental relationship financial, emotionaland [Angel]; something happen in that the event should [Georgina] stability- there be increased to in with ... would legal [Angel's] relationship [Annette] if had a life

this child. clearly it court concluded "that would be in The circuit [Angel] parental rights for the best interests of of [Terry] adopted to be for this child to terminated by [Annette]." opposed one

Because no when certifi- by accepted this court, was we cation undertook the extraordinary procedure appointing highly compe- of tent counsel to act as "devil's advocate" so we could posture. merits better examine the in an adversarial appointed question Even that counsel does not the cir- finding court's in cuit would be Angel's best interests.3 present case,

In the none of the other interests 48.01(2) preclude in sec. liberal construction of listed Department Justice it This court of whether asked opposing the appear given any respondent would the absence Department of Jus positions petitioners. advanced responded tice as follows: interpretation of the state's

Because the involve the cases statutes, Department of we with the Health have conferred government Services, agency administers of state which Social body concerning inquiry. law, the Court's Because this Department advised us that it and Social Services has Health requesting Department to move to intervene on its will not be writing I proceedings, am to advise court that behalf these appearing in this we will not be matter. Selk, Attorney General, from Assistant Admin- Letter Robert A. istrator, Legal Services, Department of Division Justice (on (Oct. 28,1993) file with Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan 92-1369). Court, the Supreme the Clerk of file being paramount consideration

the statute with the Angel's of cur- The interests. interests the child's best by allowing parents this would be furthered rent legal Angel's Georgina adoption. Terry are current and Terry, Angel's parents. found that The circuit court supports strongly legal and has father, rights.4 parental of termination his consented to relationship Terry's with added circuit court increasingly virtually Angel distant, was had become hearing unlikely ofthe and was at the time nonexistent Angel's legal Georgina, of mother, is one to be renewed. requesting petitioners that Annette be allowed clearly adopt Angel that the is and believes her with own interests. consistent person persons that of the or interest, The second adoption, placed for the child has been with whom being placed Angel is not at in this case. issue adop family present for outside her —if Georgina and have she remain with tion is allowed will relationship legally-recognized as well. with Annette public, is consistent interest, also shrinking per third Angel's best interests. Given two-parent centage are raised children that of shrinking percentage children families,5 minimally adequate regardless care even who receive 4 Terry, although respondent, is not a a nominal Hence petitioners. to the party adverse 5Single thirty percent of parent families constitute families single- spend all will some time in a and two-thirds of children Dowd, family reaching age eighteen. Nancy E. parent before Family Valuing Blueprint Family A Family: Values and (1993) Leave, Legis. (citing 30 J. on U.S. Bureau Harv. (1990)) Census, Family Household and Characteristics omitted). (additional citations public family structure,6 the interest is enhanced

granting legal recognition two-parent families that objective 48.01(1)(g) express in sec. do further "provid [ing] permanent in the state with children family relationships". adoption in Because the stable Angel's case further best interests while would having enhancing on or no effect additional either legislatively-recognized interests, court should legislatively-prescribed proceed employ liberally approach interpreting the of statutes light "paramount of the best in of the consideration" of the interests child.

The first section in the relevant 48.82(1), may adopt. governs who Stats., is which sec. provides: The statute adopt eligible followingpersons are a minor

The they ofthis if are residents state: (a) jointly, A or or the the husband and wife either parent spouse if the other is a husband wife minor. (b) unmarried An adult. 48.82(l)(b) require-

Annette meets sec. is an unmarried adult. ment —she Stats., 48.81, is sec. The second relevant statute governing may be criteria who sets forth the which adopted: 2.5 children approximately million indicate Statistics year Nat'l Ctr. On Child each in the United States.

are abused Research, for Prevention of National Comm'n Abuse Prevention Abuse, Reporting Trends in Child Abuse and Current Child Fifty Survey 3 the 1990 State The Results Annual Fatalities: 1991). (Deborah eds., McCurdy Daro Karen Any following meets criteria minor who all may adopted: be 48.839(3)(b)

(1) or if provided as under s. Except guardianship has made appointment an been have 48.831, parental rights under a minor whose s. subch. VIII or in another been terminated under jurisdiction. foreign or a state (2) at the present A is within this state minor who time is filed. for petition 48.81(1) stating eligible portion of sec. that an parental rights termi- have been minor is one "whose adoptee, ambiguous. prospective is nated" clearly rights parental child, have does not parental it is the to establish that statute meant parents that must be at of the minor's least one eligible adoption. The a minor is for terminated before question present sec. 48.81 case is whether requires parents parental rights termi- of both Looking eligible nated before a minor solely employ the at need not 48.81, sec. this court legislatively-mandated in liberal canon of construction requires the that order to conclude this statute only parent parental rights in of be terminated one eligible adoption in those for to be for order a child remaining parent supports the in which the situations Stepparent adoption adoption. form of is a common prohibited adoption if sec. 48.81 is read to would be but rights parents' parental require ter- must be that both adoption place. before an can take minated majority the sec. footnote, In a states 48.835(3)(b),7 stepparent expressly refers which 48.835(3)(b) provides: Section stepparent person filing adoption petition is a with whom

If the only parent reside, stepparent shall file the child the child's 48.81(1), adoption, pari materia, and sec. read in clearly adopted by stepparent. minor allow a to be I agree. preclude However, conclusion does not fur- interpretation ther of sec. 48.81 to determine whether may eligible adoption a child in be for other circum- rights only parent stances which the of one have utilizing If been terminated. sec. 48.81 is construed by legisla- canon liberal constructidn mandated may eligible ture, a child after the only parent long one have been terminated as remaining legal parent supports as the subject Such an will still be to all of the addi- statutory legislature tional criteria. Because the contrary legisla- mandated liberal construction it is strictly prohibiting tive intent to construe sec. 48.81 as only parent's rights when one have been ter- exception adoptions minated with the otherwise expressly allowed statutes. This court should guidance provided. utilize the has The third 48.92, Stats., relevant statute is sec. provides part: which in relevant adoption....

Effect of (2) After the order of adoption is entered the rela- tionship parent adopted child between the person adoptive and the person's parents, birth parent unless the birth spouse adoptive is the parent, completely shall be altered and all rights, legal duties and other consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist. interpreted prohibit

Section 48.92 cannot be adoption in this case. Section 48.92 does not establish petition parental rights parent to terminate the who does custody not have of the child. adoption

requirements met in order for an that must be legal parties ofthe rather, it defines the status occur; approved. granting adoption A court after the has been any adoption required to take action to effec- an is not This court need not determine tuate sec. 48.92. mandatory directory statute is or because whether the post- a command but rather a definition of it is not family of the that results from status argument I address the raised Nonetheless, will directory. Georgina that sec. 48.92 is Fol- and Annette lowing legislatively-mandated canon that liberally, "shall" are to be construed mandatory directory rather than be read as should legal parent applied current who is one of to a when plans petitioners to raise the child adoptive parent prospective in a nuclear fam- with the ily arrangement. legislatively-mandated canon requires interpret liberal construction us to the statute possible, way would, in a when further the best which interests of the child. Construction of "shall" as direc- tory accomplishes precisely objective. in this case legisla- contrary guidance provided by It to the strictly requiring cut- ture sec. 48.92 as construe parent legal parent's rights when that off of a current together adoptive par- plans to raise the child mandatorily of the defines the status ent. Section 48.92 adoptive parent are terminated and the whose legal steps person's parent shoes as the into that who parent of the child. legislative mandate of

Even in the absence direc- construction, the conclusion that "shall" is liberal tory circumstance set forth above is not in the limited general approach court takes inconsistent with the statutory provision to determine whether is mandatory: determining statutory provision

In mandatory directory whether a is previ- character,

or wehave ously said that a number of factors be must objectivessought examined.Theseincludethe be by accomplished history, statute, the its the conse- quences which would followfrom the alternative interpretations, penalty imposed and whether a is (Citationsomitted.) for its violation.

Eby Kozarek, v. 75, 80, 153 Wis. 2d 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990) (quoting Rosen, State v. 200, 207, Wis. 2d (1976)). N.W.2d 168

Looking objectives first to the the of stat- provided, 48.01(2), utes, the has in sec. that paramount objective the is the best interests the objective present by child. That allowing met in is the case previously the to occur. As discussed by legislature, the other interests set forth the parents public, interests of and the are consistent Angel's consequence best interests. The direc- of a tory interpretation applied Georgina of "shall" as is rights that objective 48.92 sec. would cut off her and thereby statutes could ful- consequence interpretation filled. The of that mandatory that, "shall" is were Annette allowed to Georgina's adopt Angel, Considering then would be cut off. objectives consequences, both and directory nearly accomplishes construction most legislature's intent. predecessors,

Section 48.92 its 322.07,8 sec. interpreted have occasion, been this court on but 322.07, Stats., 1953, 8The version sec. in effect immedi ately prior passage provided: 48.92 of sec. rights of challenging in cases inheritance

generally provide These do not guidance cases adopted persons.9 Reichardt, In Stickles v. us today. on the issue before (1931), 234 N.W. 728 court concluded 203 Wis. of a contract sec. enforcement prohibited 322.07 father adoptive parents a birth between father to visit child after allowed the birth prop- The liberal construction sec. 48.92 in this is with dissent consistent erly applied in Stickles in a situation such as Stickles —in into of the an the shoes adoptive parent steps which the is as to those mandatory cut-off legal parent former stat- are under other rights granted unless parties two (1) section, provided Except of the otherwise in this the effect as completely change legal of status of order is to parents adopted person of a natural to that of from that child of the person adoptive parents; adopted from of to free the a child the and parents, legal obligations on and to or account of the natural all vice versa. (2) spouse person by by or adopted or issue If not survived parent or kin of the by adoptive and there is no heir next of an adopted person adoptive property parents, the of shall descend though adoption. been no as there had and distributed (3) person adoptive adopted parent If a of the is married to the parent parent of is not altered relation the child to the natural by (4) right adopted person to from his The not lose the inherit does natural relatives. (5) adopted person adoptive shall inherit from his relatives as from relatives. in the same manner his natural 9 Zastrow, 390, 251 See 42 Wis. 2d 166 N.W.2d Estate of 223, 145 (1966); (1969); of Topel, 32 162 Estate Wis. 2d N.W.2d (1966); Adler, 250, Estate Wis. 2d 140 N.W.2d 219 Will 30 of of (1955); Rhodes, 342, of Uihlein, 73 602 Estate 271 Wis. N.W.2d Nelson, (1955); 266 170, N.W.2d Estate Wis. 269 Wis. 68 816 of Ries, 453, 49 617, (1954); 406 Wis. 64 N.W.2d Estate 259 of (1951). N.W.2d 483 brought any utes.10 No one has this court's attention interpreting case sec. 48.92 that is inconsistent with the liberal construction that effectuates the best inter- ests child this case. approach taken in this dissent is consistent only supreme that of the two state courts that Although

have addressed issue before us. the stat interpreted utes in those cases are not identical they congruent purposes Wisconsin, those of have interpretation by highly thus the those courts is rele Supreme vant. The Vermont Court concluded that the provision11 off in the cut Vermont interpreted apply not be could to a natural mother together part who intended to raise her child with her Adoptions B.L.V.B and E.L.V.B., ner. 628 A.2d 1271, (Vt. 1993). The court reasoned state's

10A granted in which by situation were another stat ute was addressed in In court the Matter Grandparental of C.G.F, 62, 69-71, Visitation 168 Wis. 2d — denied, H.F., , cert. N.W.2d T.F. v. 113 S. Ct. 408 U.S. — (1992). 48.92(1) (2) preclude This court held that sec. did grandparents seeking from visitation the child their son, subsequently adopted was by stepfather, deceased who his grandparents because sec. 880.155 allowed petition to a court privileges grandchild for visitation respect a if one or parents both were deceased. provision, (1989), The cut off pro Vt. St. Ann. 448§ in part: vides relevant parents deprived, by adoption, The natural of a minor shall be legal right minor, of all control of such and such minor shall be obligations freed from all of and obedience maintenance them. Notwithstanding section, foregoing provisions ... of this when adoption by spouse obligations parent, is made a of a natural of to, rights by through obedience inheritance natural parent adopting parent who has intermarried with shall not be affected. adoption

primary context of is the wel- in the concern interpretation of the a narrow fare of children and promote adoption Id. at not that concern. statute would protect provision purpose off was to ofthe cut 1273. The person, proscribe adopted legal not to of the by adoptions at The Mas- certain individuals. Id. 1274. Supreme best Court also focused on the sachusetts upholding joint adoption peti- the child in a interests of partner. natural mother and her the child's Tammy, tion filed (Mass. 1993). Adoption The 619 N.E.2d 315 of court stated of the child's best that the advancement primary purpose of the Massachusetts is the interests judicial adoption construction should statutes and purpose. defeat, Id. at 318. rather than enhance, legislature in did not mandate liberal construction The respective Massachusetts, or but the either Vermont necessary to was courts determined such construction need of the child. This court further the best interests that liberal construction is not make a determination necessary of the to further the best interests child—the already has reached that Wisconsin conclusion. majority construes the statutes

The legislatively-mandated strictly, ignoring canon of applying canons its own liberal construction and any providing doing choosing reasons so. without majority hypothetical sets forth facts analyzes are before court and statutes acknowledging light hypotheticals these even while may pro- that other sections adoptions. majority hypothesized also hibit the legislature's ignores clear statement that the best paramount. Although interests of the child are strict is often as an construction of statute seen exercise

534 present judicial construction restraint, in the case such legislative opposite precisely flouts the will. the is governing may interpreting 48.81, sec. who When majority employs adopted, the canon that a stat- the be construed so as to work absurd or ute is not to be Applying major- canon, results. unreasonable ity interpreted that if sec. 48.81 is to mean concludes adoption parental eligible is for after the that a minor only rights parent terminated, one have been then a of adopted by person against a second even child could be present legal parent. The of the child's the wishes majority eligible then concludes that a minor is not parents adoption both have been unless the terminated. majority's hypothetical concern about given

adoption misplaced, particularly its acknowl- edgement that other sections highly unlikely

may prohibit It seems in the an to be that a court would find such Moreover, such an interests of the child. best undoubtedly prohibited as a violation of would legal liberty constitutionally protected interest of the upbringing parent's parent of that to control child.12 Nebraska, (1923), Meyer 262 U.S. In v. liberty that the inter Supreme Court concluded

United States encompasses Clause an protected the Due Process est bring up marry, a home and right "to establish individual's liberty again in relied on this interest children." The Court (1925). Sisters, Supreme Society 268 U.S. 510 v. Pierce validity Meyer Pierce has continued to affirm Court authority. primacy parental In a series of and stress 1970s, Supreme Court clas during the 1960s and decisions rearing fundamental rights regarding child as parental sified See, right privacy. rights included within the constitutional 48.92(2), majority which, the discusses Next sec. provides adop- previously an discussed, that after as consequences rights, legal the duties and other tion "all previous legal parents relationship [between the the of Again adopted child] shall cease to exist." the and the employs majority other liberal construc- canons than mandatory stating presumed "shall" is in a tion, that petitioners pre- rebut this and that the do not statute applies majority sumption. canon, The also a second exceptions, excep- here the enumeration of certain that stepparents, legislature indicates the that tion legisla- exceptions. the to other When meant exclude employ, to has canon this court is ture indicated which the constrained to do so. I believe court is 48.92(2), majority interpreting the sets In sec. directory hypothetical if "shall" is then a forth the may grant adoption people to two without sever- court legal leaving parent, ing previous the ties between the Again, hypothetical pos- parents. the minor with three likely by precluded by majority the would the ited hypothetical pre- is also This best interests standard. 48.92(2) of sec. under liberal construction cluded directory only cut off set forth above—the remaining legal parent to be in who continues (1978) Redhail, 374, (setting e.g., v. 434 U.S. 384-85 Zablocki protected by personal the constitutional forth those decisions recently right privacy). the Court has resumed discuss- More liberty protected by the ing these as interests Fourteenth See Parenthood Southeastern Penn- Amendment. Planned — (1992) —, Casey, v. sylvania U.S. S. Ct. JJ.) (stat- O'Connor, Souter, opinion Kennedy, and (plurality contraception, family ing marriage, procreation, that matters of relationships, rearing and "are central child education Amendment"). liberty protected Fourteenth family arrangement adoptive parent nuclear the child.13 asks the to act concurring legislature opinion the best interests Wisconsin children. protect rests on the faulty premise legis- concurrence lature has not As I have discussed at spoken. length, provided guidance statutory has —each is to be construed to further best liberally provision the child. The concurring opinion provides interests of no for the decision to explanation majority's ignore in to construc- respect direction legislature's expressed tion of the statutes. in cited the

As indicated a law review article consideration in decision major any legal "a majority, child is whether that the of a concerning placement continuity the child's need for safeguards placement 13 the majority's interpretation parties did may explication. further constitutional demand appears potentially troub not brief a constitutional issue that Angel's refusing violates ling to allow —whether Amendment right equal protection under the Fourteenth to differently on being from other children because she is treated deciding, I parentage. note that fore the basis of her Without enjoying legal, the woman from closing the child of a lesbian growing up in a home with practical emotional benefits of and dis analogous to unconstitutional legal parents could be two Jeter, See Clark v. 486 against nonmarital children. crimination Cahill, Rights Org. v. (1988); Jersey Child 456 New U.S. Welfare (1973) curiam); Casualty Aetna and (per Weber v. 411 U.S. 619 (1972). Yoder, Co., 2d v. 49 Wis. Surety 406 U.S. 164 State Cf. (1972) 430, 448, (1971), 205 182 N.W.2d 539 U.S. aff'd as (Heffernan, J., dissenting) (stating of children considered). parents well as must be disregards Angel's majority

relationships."14 The parent- Angel and have functional interests. Annette majority's relationship but the conclusion child legal protection relationship accorded cannot be position. Angel who is Annette, in leaves a vulnerable right parent, already Angel's de will have facto relationship obligation their were to maintain nor the incompetent Georgina or Annette were to die or become already Georgina separate. has closed This court and Angel used Annette could have three avenues that relationship legal rights to a to obtain continued Georgina separate Annette and were event —the right right custody visita- closed, is to seek seek protecting option and the tion closed relationship through closed. In re contract is See 1002, 471 N.W.2d 162 Wis. 2d Interest of (1991). girl young named In best interests of a Angel, on her should not close door this court Shirley I am to state that Justice authorized S. join this Justice A. Bablitch Abrahamson William dissenting opinion. join (dissenting). I A. JUSTICE WM. BABLITCH dissenting opinion by Heffernan. Chief Justice the filed concurring only Respectfully, I write to address the strongly legislature opinion urges the to address which experience My the former member of this issue. as a legislature happen. me this: that will not tells legislature, recognizing legislation

In some the bring it that the future will issues the fore that 14 Crossing Adoption: Second Parent When Emily Patt, C. Interests, Berkeley Marital is in a Child's Best Barrier (1987-88) (citation omitted). 96, 102 Women's L.J. passage anticipate bill, time of at the

cannot by placing obligation the future the burden its meets those issues consistent with courts to deal with on the just expressed intent. This is such an issue. That is its by very why the Chief Justice is so correct. the dissent highlighted Legislative Council The legislation. just Council, The in as such its statutes point great care to bill, to the took out to the only, very that some of those issues would be instinct certainly thorny expe- it from knew, indeed. And most legislatures that future alone, rience would be most the thorniest of them. reluctant address legislature deliberately times, here, at as paints very ambiguous By broad and brush. design, us, it left the details to even the most controver- responsibility by passing our sial ones. We abdicate legislature, particularly back to the when we know acting ever the likelihood is minimal at best. by being deliberately legislature, ambiguous, telling courts, "We will because we cannot every

spell in detail situation out conceivable particularly very might future, in the arise sensi- Look to the of the child tive ones. best interests when eloquently these situations arise." As the dissent points everybody agrees the best interests out, what are here. notes the bill Council the children's code was introduced indicate which applicable particularly to the is liberal construction adoption statutes: discussing the Perhaps most well-known article of construction is parry" contradictory canons "thrúst Appellate Decision Llewellyn, Theory on the Karl N. Remarks Are be Con Rules or About How Statutes and the Canons (1950). strued, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (3) change the con- is intended effect Sub. Although statutes. struction of prin- statutes the said that in courts have child, interests of the the best cipal consideration

Notes

notes proposed adoption legislation legislature that major change interpre- in the area of future effected a only principle of best interest that not would tation: principle of remain but also that the strict of the child rejected be statutes would construction importance of that The of liberal construction. in favor overemphasized. legislature change was be cannot Legislative peers, of its the committee told that recommending that courts be instructed Council, was only interpret the situations this statute and light in of the best interest stan- them arise under that liberally. flag" This was "red also to do so dard but adopted legisla- legislature if it that told the that interpretation of even the thorniest of tion, future only courts, with the canon left to the be issues would being interests of the in the best construction liberal child. precisely legislature it what was knew Thus, doing into the it inserted when vague amorphous to the directives somewhat they interpreting statutes, "shall these courts objectives liberally contained effect the construed to "(t)he 48.01(2), and that Stats., section," sec. in this paramount always be of the child shall interests of best 48.01(2). . . Section consideration anticipate situations all the it could not knew certainly knew, if might It in the future. arise

Case Details

Case Name: In Interest of Angel Lace M.

Court Name: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 8, 1994

Citation: 516 N.W.2d 678

Docket Number: 92-1369, 92-1370

Court Abbreviation: Wis.