58 Pa. Super. 234 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1914
Opinion by
This action is in trespass and the statement filed by plaintiff brings it within the operation of the principles applicable in an action on the case for deceit, at common law. The deception of which the plaintiff complains was alleged to have been practiced in negotiations which led up to the execution of a lease, and collateral agreements, for a building in the borough of Homestead. The result of the negotiations was that the defendants and the plaintiff entered into a written agreement, on January 15, 1912, under the provisions of which the former leased the building to the latter, for the term of five years, at the yearly rental of $1,500, payable in equal monthly installments. The parties at the same time entered into a written supplemental agreement, referring to the lease, under which the lessors covenanted to permit the lessee, the plaintiff, to sell out his business after two years, and to give to his purchaser a lease for five years from date of sale, at'the same rate of rent set forth in said lease and under the same conditions; and the lessors further agreed that in case Immel was refused a license to hold him only for one year’s rent thereafter and permit him at the end of said year upon giving four months’ notice in writing to terminate the lease. There can be no question that these agreements must- be construed together and that their effect was to give Immel control of the property for practically ten years, with the right in Immel, during the first five years, to terminate the lease at the end of any year, in case he was refused a license to sell
Immel subsequently brought this action to recover the amount of the bonus which he had paid the defendants in order to procure the execution of the lease, averring that the defendants had induced him to execute the contracts and pay the money by false and fraudulent representations. The deception of which this plaintiff asserts he was the victim is thus averred in his statement: “The defendants, for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to pay1 the sum of $750, and entering into a lease for five years for the premises aforesaid, for the rent aforesaid, with Elizabeth A. Marsh, the owner of .the title to the same, did willfully ¿ knowingly, falsely
Even if the plaintiff had proved, which he did not, that the defendants had represented to him “that nothing had been done to endanger the granting of a license to the applicant for said house,” he would not have been entitled to recover. The plaintiff, in an action for deceit, can only recover in case he is deceived. The complaint of the statement is that in writing the letter of August 29, 1911, the defendants had done something to endanger
The judgment is reversed.