241 Mass. 199 | Mass. | 1922
This is an action of contract to recover the rent reserved in a written lease. The lease is dated January 23, 1914, and is for the term of ten years from the first day of February, 1914. The property in question is described as “the premises numbered 207A Boylston Street, Jamaica Plain, first floor, base
It appears from the agreed statement of facts that the leased premises “were occupied after the execution of the lease for a long period of time by the defendant as a liquor store;” and "that at the time of the execution of the lease, the premises were used as a liquor store under license of the fourth class, issued by the Licensing Board of the City of Boston, and that subsequent to January 1,1920, such licenses, to wit, of the fourth class, could not be procured from said Licensing Board by reason” of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Act of Congress to enforce its provisions. The ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment “was consummated January 16,1919. That the Secretary of State did not proclaim its ratification until January 29, 1919, is not material.” By its own terms the amendment went into effect one year after its ratification and the Volstead act to enforce its provisions went into effect at the same time. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 376. The amendment provides that “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors ... for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.”
It is the contention of the defendant that, because the sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes is prohibited by the federal amendment making it impossible after its ratification longer to carry on the liquor business on the demised premises, he is relieved from the performance of the covenants in the lease. We are unable to agree with this contention. When the lease was executed, and for a long period of time thereafter, it was possible for the defendant to carry on the liquor business on the leased premises; and during that time he was there engaged in that
We are unable to perceive any distinction in principle between the facts in the case last cited and those in the case at bar. The inability of the defendant to carry on the liquor business because of the prohibition contained in the federal amendment cannot relieve him from his contract, any more than he would be so exonerated in the event that the vote of the city had been against the sale of intoxicating liquors, or the licensing board had refused to grant him a license to be exercised on the leased premises. The sale of intoxicating liquors is well known to be a subject of regulation, restriction and prohibition by statute and by constitutional amendment. If the defendant desired to have protected himself from liability to pay rent, a clause for that purpose should have been inserted in the lease. He seeks to invoke the familiar rule that a contract which cannot be performed without violating the law is void. This is a good rule of law, but it is not applicable to the present case. It is well settled that a tenant is liable for rent in the absence of stipulation if a building upon leased premises is destroyed by fire. Davis v. Alden, 2 Gray, 309. Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co. 187 Mass. 402. We cannot doubt that the defendant is
In accordance with the stipulation in the agreed facts, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of $480. The entry must be
Judgment reversed.
Judgment for the plaintiff for $¡-¡80.