133 Wis. 561 | Wis. | 1907
Lead Opinion
Tbe main contention of appellant is tbat equity will take jurisdiction upon tbe facts stated in tbe complaint on tbe ground of interminable litigation, occasioned by multiplicity of suits, fraud, combination, and conspiracy between tbe several defendants in maintaining tbeir defenses, and irreparable loss to tbe plaintiff. Tbe jurisdiction of courts of equity in a proper case to prevent multiplicity of suits is well established, but tbe doctrine is not always easy of application. Tbe multiplicity of suits sought to be prevented sometimes constitutes tbe inadequacy of legal remedies and calls forth tbe equitable jurisdiction. "When, however, we attempt to define tbe exact limits of this bead of equity jurisdiction, we find much difficulty in prescribing tbe exact limits of the jurisdiction. This becomes apparent from an examination of tbe numerous authorities cited in tbe able and exhaustive brief presented by tbe appellant. It is manifest without discussion tbat tbe alleged conspiracy and combination on tbe part of tbe defendants to maintain tbeir several defenses, or the great expense and delay alone, would not be sufficient to give a court of equity jurisdiction. Tbe right of tbe plaintiff to proceed in equity, therefore, upon tbe facts pleaded must be sustained, if at all, on tbe grorxnd of preventing a multiplicity of suits. This jurisdiction has been classified under four beads: (1) Where from tbe nature of tbe wrong and tbe rules of legal procedure tbe same party, in order to obtain complete relief, is obliged to bring a number of actions all growing out of one wrongful act and involving similar questions of fact and law. (2) Where a dispute is between two individuals and one institutes or is about to institute a number of actions against tbe other, all depending upon tbe same issues of fact and law. (3) Where a number of persons have separate claims against tbe same party, arising from some common cause governed by tbe same legal rule and
As appeal’s from the record before us, the present action was commenced in July, 1906. At that time eighty-four of the ejectment actions commenced by plaintiff against defendants between Eebruary, 1896, and September, 1897, were pending, and the main purpose of the present action is to sweep these ejectment suits into it and determine the rights of all the defendants in one equitable action, on the ground that there is such a community of interest between the plaintiff and each of the defendants, centering in the point in issue, as to warrant a court of equity in taking jurisdiction, and especially since one of the ejectment actions commenced has been determined in favor of the plaintiff by the supreme
“From a careful comparison of the actual decisions . . . and which are quoted under the foregoing paragraphs, the following propositions are submitted as established by principle and by authority, and as constituting settled rules concerning this branch of the equitable jurisdiction. In that particular family of suits, whether brought on behalf of a numerous body against a single party, or by a single party against a numerous body, which are strictly and technically hills of peace,’ in order that a court of equity may grant the relief and thus exercise its jurisdiction on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits, there does and must exist among the indivi duals composing the numerous body, or between each of them and their single adversary, a common right, a community of interest in the subject matter of the controversy, or a common title from which all their separate claims and all the questions at issue arise. It is not enough that, the claims of each individual being separate and distinct, there is a community of interest merely in the question of law or of fact involved or in the kind and form of remedy demanded and obtained by or against each individual.”
It will be seen that in this quotation from Pomeroy, giving it its broadest scope, there must be a community of interest in the subject matter of the controversy or a common title from which all the separate claims and all the questions at issue arise. Even this broad language does not bring the plaintiff’s case within it. Besides, the language of the first
We have examined the numerous authorities cited by appellant’s counsel, but time will not permit a discussion of them. Many of them are cases coming within the principles of bills of peace, and some fall under distinct heads of equity jurisdiction, other than to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Some of these cases are reviewed in a very able opinion in Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 244, also relied upon by appellant. This was an action by a receiver against several stockholders, where it was claimed that the cause of action against each stockholder was the same. The court, quoting and approving the language of another court, said (188 U. S. 79, 23 Sup. Ct. 253) :
“The receiver’s cause of action against each defendant is, no doubt, similar to his cause of action against every other, but this is only part of the matter. The real issue, the actual dispute, can only be known after each defendant has set up*572 his defense, and defenses may vary so widely that no two controversies may he exactly or even nearly alike. If,' as is sure to happen, differing defenses are put in by different defendants, the bill evidently becomes a single proceeding only in name. In reality it is a congeries of suits with little relation to each other, except that there is a common plaintiff, who has similar claims against many persons.”
The subject matter of each ejectment suit is not the evidence of title to the land embraced in the suit, but is entirely separate and distinct from every other ejectment action respecting other separate and distinct tracts of land. The complaint in the instant action shows separate and distinct subject matters, and the subject matter of each ejectment suit is not the evidence or any item of evidence by which the defendant attempts to prove his title, but the particular tract of land claimed and the distinct tort by which it is claimed he wrongfully withholds it, together with the alleged title of the plaintiff. The subject matter of each ejectment action must be determined from the pleadings in each action. Nor are the issues the same, as appears from the complaint. It avers that each defendant claims a separate and distinct tract, that it is claimed Muza took possession in 1872, and that each defendant claims under Muza or some grantee or successor of Muza, presumably of different parcels and at different times after 1872; so the extent of Muza’s holding, as well as the extent of his entry, is at issue in each ejectment action. How, since each defendant claims a separate and distinct tract through Muza or some grantee or successor of Muza, it is manifest that the claim of adverse possession and continuity of holding of each defendant as to his separate tract under the allegations of the complaint is separate and distinct, and the establishment of title or want of title in one defendant by adverse possession does not necessarily settle the question of other defendants’ rights. The issues, therefore, are not the same, even if it is admitted that one item in the proof be the same in all the actions, to say nothing of
“There is nothing alleged which can bring the case under that head of equity relating to the prevention of a multiplicity of suits. That does not apply merely because each of several parties jointly and severally liable may be independently sued. It applies where one party may be sued several times in relation to the same subject matter in its entirety, or in respect to some element or elements thereof.”
The statutes of this state secure to a person in possession of land two jury trials. It does not appear from the complaint that two trials were ever had in any case against any party claiming to hold under Muza, not even in the Budzipz Case, referred to and relied upon by appellant. 115 Wis. 68, 90 N. W. 1019. In the Budzisz Case the defendant recovered below, and judgment was ordered by this court for plaintiff on the ground that the evidence conclusively established that defendants made no title to the tract or part of the island claimed by them. This, however, does not establish that the defendants might not on other evidence recover upon a new trial. Much less is it conclusive upon the rights of other defendants claiming other separate and distinct tracts of the island. TTor do we see why the defendants should be precluded from mating title to their respective tracts in some other way than through Muza by the mere allegations of the complaint to the effect that they claim through him in an action brought for the purpose of sweeping them into equity, and thus depriving each of his right not only to one but to two jury trials. Upon any theory of the facts set up in the
As has often been said by this and other courts, it is difficult to lay down any definite rule as to what special circumstances will enable the injured party to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity. Each case must rest in a large degree upon its own particular facts. As said in Johnson v. Swanks, 128 Wis. 68, 75, 107 N. W. 483:
“Manifestly, whether a case does or does not satisfy the test as to whether equity jurisdiction should be afforded is not always easy to determine. It must often be a matter of judgment, and necessarily so, where the precedents are not sufficiently clear to furnish the court a certain guide. In the latter situation the decision of the trial court should not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong. Where no certain guide exists as to any particular situation, by way of the general rule illustrated by precedents, as to whether it should be dealt with by equity jurisdiction, the matter in a large degree must be solved by the exercise of judicial discretion.”
The court below refused to exercise its equitable jurisdiction and sustained the demurrer, and we cannot say that in the light of the authorities its judgment should be disturbed.
By the Court. — The order appealed from is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). It seems best to write briefly in this case, stating, without extended discussion or citation of authorities, what, to my mind, are principles firmly intrenched in the jurisprudence of this state and govern this
In determining whether a complaint states a good cause of action in equity, the paramount inquiry is: Does it on the whole come under one of the established heads of equity jurisprudence? The prevention of a multiplicity of suits is one of such heads.
When the paramount inquiry mentioned shall have been solved in favor of a pleading, the nest important inquiry is whether the pleader has been successful in his efforts to state a cause of action under the head selected with sufficient clearness to warrant equity jurisdiction in dealing with the matter.
The pleader in the case in hand unquestionably chose one of the recognized heads of equity jurisprudence as fitting the situation he desired to bring to the attention of the court. There were a very large number of pending suits and situations forming separate and sufficient grounds for judicial interference. The situation in that regard was one of the most distressing from the standpoint of the plaintiff and the judicial forum having to deal therewith that was ever presented for judicial consideration.
Where it is desired to prevent a multiplicity of suits the fact that many or all of them, if treated separately, would necessarily be legal actions each involving the constitutional right of a separate trial by jury, is, of itself, not necessarily material, nor is the fact necessarily material that in many of the controversies there are issues not common to others, or that the parties interested in some of the issues as to some controversies are not interested in others, or that the controversy as between some parties in some or many respects is in
The mere fact that by taking the multitude of controversies into one suit a very complicated matter will he presented is not, of itself, a fatal objection if, notwithstanding such complexity, simplicity is produced as compared with a multitude of separate actions requiring separate trials, each requiring more or less of the ground traversed at great expense in time and money in one to be again traversed in each of the others with like expenditures. The crowning feature of equity jurisprudence is its competency to take hold of a multitude of matters involving parties however numerous and interests however diversified, so long as they all have a common source or are connected with a single subject m&tter either directly or substantially, and treat all the issues of fact and law common to the many controversies, and those affecting them separately in an aggregation including the whole, and pronounce the right of the matter as to each of the parties interested in a single decree.
No common title as to one entire thing or community of rights in such thing, each party being interested in the one particular thing, title, or right to be settled by litigation, is absolutely essential to an action to prevent a multiplicity of suits. It is sufficient if there are sufficient common points as to title, rights, or questions of law or fact to warrant the court in the particular situation in opening its doors. The claims involved may be separate in time, and the relief required as to each may be different in kind, if there are so many common points of dispute that, under all the circumstances, in the judgment of the court, justice requires the situation to be dealt with as an entirety.
Subject to the principle stated, whether a particular situation is one proper to be judicially handled in equity as an
When the case is laid under an established head of equity jurisprudence, as that to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and it is clear that such multiplicity exists, and there are numerous points of law or fact, or both, involved, or title, or rights, or subject matters rendering the numerous separate contro*-versies parts of one large subject matter, regardless of whether several or all of the numerous matters would, separately treated, judicially form separate grounds for separate Lgal actions with constitutional incidents, a question of fact is presented as to whether a court of equity ought or ought not to deal with the situation entire.
When a point is reached as above indicated the primary tribunal has a pretty wide scope within which to exercise judgment and its conclusion should not be disturbed on review unless it appears to be clearly wrong; so manifestly wrong as not to leave any substantial doubt on the question.
The last foregoing rule does not apply where it is plain that the court reached its conclusion guided by mistaken notions as to the legal principles involved.
ISTow we will briefly apply the principles stated to the complaint before us.
As before indicated, the complaint shows the existence of a very large number of controversies requiring judicial solution. The number is so large and the time required to* try
The claim of the appellant primarily and in its general nature as to each defendant is the same. All of the adverse claims had a common origin: the alleged adverse entry and holding of the entire tract of land by Muza. The adverse claims have many important common points of law and fact. The claim of the plaintiff as to interruptions of the adverse holding by Muza, if such adverse holding ever existed, is common to most, if not all, of the defendants. The dominant issues characterized by the most serious difficulties, both as to the law and the facts, relate to the claimed adverse holding by Muza, and the litigation in that regard must necessarily be the same as to each, or nearly so, of the defendants.
While it is very difficult to see how the trial court reached the conclusion complained of, it seems there is reasonable doubt on the question; yet the case is so near the boundary line between reasonable doubt and absence of it as to cause hesitation. There is good ground for belief that the trial court reached its conclusion by mistake of law. That belief may well be acted upon and probably ought to be. To our minds, assuming as we may fairly do that the prevailing party below contended there as to the law the same as here, it may well be that important legal principles were wholly overlooked or not adequately appreciated, and the decision complained of was the result. In our judgment, a court of equity ought, on the facts stated, to open its doors and put its strong arms around the entire situation involving all the numerous separate minor controversies mentioned in the complaint, and settle the same in one trial and by one judgment.
To that end it seems the order appealed from should be reversed and the cause remanded with proper directions.
A few words seem to be advisable directed specially to the opinion of the court to the end that if it be wrong the effect ’ as regards future cases may be minimized.
As I understand it, the discussion includes much that is not matter of decision. The conclusion upon which the final decision rests, I take it, is found in the concluding paragraphs, in which the rule of Johnson v. Swanke, 128 Wis. 68,
The reference to the language in Johnson v. Swanlce, as if it negatived the idea that when one person has a cause of action against each of several he cannot under any circumstances sue all in one action in equity and thereby prevent a multiplicity of suits, is quite misleading. It is not supposed any member of the court thought the language quoted from the Johnson Case in the court’s opinion here would be regarded as holding that one cannot sue all of a class as well as a class or any one of them in behalf of all sue one in a proper case for the prevention of a multiplicity of suits. The contrary would be out of harmony with the most familiar of elementary principles in equity. 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. (3d ed.) § 251. It is there said, the prime essential in each case is that “there must be some common relation, some common interest, some common, question,” but not necessarily any relation between the individual members of the class and their common adversary “constituting privity” as that term is ordinarily understood. In view of the quoted language and the following, in the summing up of the matter after reviewing a multitude of authorities, “the jurisdiction has been exercised in a great variety of cases where the individual claimants were completely separate and distinct, and the only community of interest among them was in the question at issue and perhaps in the kind of relief ” (1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 269), it hardly can be said that the complaint in hand is not supported by Pomeroy to the extent of presenting a question of fact as to' whether equity should open its doors or not.
I take issue most decidedly with the statement of my breth
I would not discredit, as it seems the opinion of the court does, the views of so eminent an author as Professor Pomeroy expressed in the sections above referred to, by quoting from a court, which, though of high repute, is without special prominence in the field of equity jurisprudence, since our own court has gone quite as far as the author suggests, and the criticised language has been quoted with approval by the supreme court of the United States and most of the courts of this country. An examination of the note to sec. 269 aforesaid shows that one can almost call the roll of the federal and state courts on the subject. In Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 244, it was said:
“We are not disposed to deny that jurisdiction on the ■ ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits may be exercised in many cases on behalf of a single complainant against a number of defendants, although there is no common title or community of rights or interest in the subject matter among such defendants, but where there is a community of interest among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the general controversy.”
Is it not a mistake to say that according to Pomeroy there must be some community of interest in the subject matter, or community of title from which all the claims arise, in view of the quoted language?
Erom the rules we have stated, which are fully sanctioned by the authorities, the fact that in each of the minor controversies here there may be an issue as to betterments requiring substantially independent consideration, also an issue as to
A motion for a rehearing was denied December 13, 1907.
