Lead
delivered the opinion of the court:
Dеfendants, George E. Mahin, Director of Revenue for the Department of Revenue, and Alan J. Dixon, Treasurer of the State of Illinois, appealed from the decree of the
Involved here are the Gas Revenue Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, par. 467.16 et seq.) and the Public Utilities Revenue Act (ch. 120, par. 468 et seq.), which in nearly identical language provide:
“ ‘Gross receipts’ means the consideration received for [gas] [electricity] distributed, supplied, furnished or sold to persons for use or consumption and not for resale and for all services rendered in connection thеrewith, including [receipts] [amounts received] from minimum service charges, and [shall include] [includes] cash, services and property of every kind or nature, and shall be determined without any deduction on account of the cost of the service, product or commodity supplied, the сost of materials used, labor or service costs, or any other expense whatsoever. ***” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, pars. 467.16, 468.
Contending that under the foregoing definitions the proceeds of the transactions were taxable, the Department assessed taxes on contributions made by customers tо plaintiff in aid of construction, advances received by plaintiff for construction, and sums collected by plaintiff for the rental of equipment and appliances. Under protest, plaintiff paid the taxes thus assessed, and the additional taxes allegedly due for subsequent transactiоns. Between the dates of December 1, 1972, and May 31, 1977, plaintiff had paid under protest a total of $734,350.32.
The circuit court held that payments received by plaintiff as advances for construction, contributions in aid of construction, and rentals for furnishing or renting equipment or appliances сould not be subjected to the taxes, and enjoined defendants “from collecting, assessing
The appellate court reversed, holding that under the plain language of the statutes, “gross receipts” included not only the receipts from the sales of gas and electricity but also the consideration received for all services rendered and all cоntributions, advances and rental payments. 49 111. App. 3d 713, 718.
Plaintiff is a public utility providing electric and gas service to customers in an area of Illinois encompassing approximately 15,000 square miles. It has on file with the Illinois Commerce Commission schedules of rates, and rules and regulations. It apрears from the testimony that the contributions in aid of electrical construction were most frequently required by plaintiff in connection with replacement of overhead lines with underground installations. With relation to gas sales and distribution, the advances and contributions were most frequently made in connection with the installation of excess footage to new subdivisions. Although for accounting purposes both contributions and advances in aid of construction are treated as capital and so shown on plaintiff’s balance sheet, they are not taken into considerаtion in fixing the base upon which plaintiff’s rate structure is determined. Contributions in aid of construction, whether for electricity or gas, are not refundable. Customer advances for construction are carried as a deferred credit, and if at some point plaintiff determines that an advance is no longer refundable, the item is transferred from the customer advance
Plaintiff contends that the legislative history and long-standing interpretation of the Public Utilities Revenue Act and the Gas Revenue Tax Act show that they were not intended to tax the transactions here involved. It states correctly that as originally enacted the public utilities tax act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 120, pars. 468 to 481) applied tó electric, gas and telephone utilities, that it contained in the definition of gross receipts the phrase “and for all services rendered in connection therewith” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 120, par. 468), and also provided that ‘The words ‘transmitting telegraph or telephone messages’ shall include the leasing or rental of equipment or property for the transmission of telegraph or telephone messages” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 120, par. 468). Referring to the 1945 enactments of the Messаges Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 120, par. 467.1 et seq.), the Gas Revenue Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 120, par. 467.16 et seq.), and the Public Utilities Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 120, par. 468 et seq.), it points out that only the Messages Tax Act contained a reference to “the furnishing, for a consideration, of services or facilities (whether owned or leased), or both” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 120, par. 467.1). It argues that these statutes, contemporaneously enacted, must be considered in pan materia and clearly demonstrate the legislative intent that under the Public Utilities Revenue Act and the Gas Revenue Tax Act no tax apply to the furnishing of “services or facilities.” Plaintiff argues too that the administrative interpretation over a period of 35 years during which the Department failed to assert that advances, contributions and rentals were includable in “gross receipts” must be considered of great
We do not find it necessary to resort to the techniques suggested by plaintiff for statutory interpretation. The language of the statutes must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. “It is a primary rule in the interpretation and construction of statutes that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. [Citations.] This is to be done primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. [Citations.] There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.” (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960),
We do not find persuasive the argument that the
We have considered plaintiff’s argument that the long-standing interpretation by the Department must be given consideration and find apposite the following language from Martin Oil Service, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1971),
For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
UNDERWOOD and KLUCZYNSKI, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I must dissent from the majority in this case. I believe that the statutes are ambiguous and do not clearly encompass the type of funds here involved, and I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Department of Revenue’s interpretation of the statutes for 35 years may
The statutes themselves do not specifically include either construction contributions or equipment or appliance rentals in their definitions of “gross receipts.” I think it is certainly debatable whether these types of payments are encompassed in “consideration received for [gas] [electricity] *** and for all services rendered in connection therewith ***” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, pars. 467.16,468).
The majority opinion is bottomed on the premise that the language of the statute is clear and therefore requires no construction. I cannot agree. If it is сlear that the statute imposes a tax on the transactions here in question, then it is apparent that for 35 years the Department has not been collecting millions of dollars in taxes from utilities to which the State of Illinois was “clearly” entitled. It is hard to believe that such an oversight would have gone unnoticed and that someone would not have been called to politically account for such a sizeable abandonment of State revenue.
Also, if it is clear that such transactions fall within the statutory definition of “gross receipts,” why would the legislature find it necessary to inсlude in the Messages Tax Act not only the definition of “gross receipts ” that is found in the Gas Revenue Tax Act and in the Public Utilities Revenue Act, but also language which specifically includes proceeds from leasing or rental of equipment or property (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 120, par. 467.1). The majority oрinion attempts to explain this additional language by saying that it is a recognition that telephones are ordinarily supplied by the utility. It appears to me that if providing telephones were a part of the services traditionally supplied by the utility, such a service would more likely be recognized as falling within the language, “all services rendered in connection therewith” in the definition
One of the plaintiff’s arguments is that the Department of Revenue for 35 years interpreted the statutes as not authorizing a tax of this type and should not be permitted to suddenly reverse its position. The majority rejects this contention, noting that while administrativе interpretations are usually given weight, erroneous interpretations are not binding. The majority ignores the fact that for 35 years the legislature acquiesced in the Department’s previous interpretation, and has not objected to this day. In my opinion, such a long period of legislativе acquiescence in the previous interpretation that no tax should be imposed on these payments is the strongest indication of the correctness of that construction. To allow the Department of Revenue to suddenly change its position after all this time, in the absence of any legislative action, is to allow a nameless, faceless, administrative
For these reasons I dissent from the majority opinion.