121 Ky. 138 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1905
Opinion by
Reversing.
The appellee, E. E. Allen, was at the time this controversy arose 77 years old and totally blind. He resided near White Plains, Ky., and had a brother living in Ullen, Ill., who was in declining health. Having received a letter from his brother reciting the fact that the latter did not expect to live long, and requesting appellee to come to Ullen and see him before he died, the appellee applied to the ticket agent of appellant at White Plains for information
We will consider, first, the duty of common carriers of passengers in regard to persons applying for transportation who are, or appear to be, unable to care for themselves. May a lunatic have a ticket thrust into his hand, and be delivered to the em
In the case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Jordan, 112 Ky., 473, 66 S. W., 27, 23 Ky. Law Rep., 1730, we said: “The law required of appellant that they should exercise the highest degree of care to safely transport appellee to her point of destination. 'But this duty did not require that appellant’s conductor should act as special attendant to the plaintiff during the jonrney to see that she did not leave her seat. * * * His duty was to see after the comfort and safety of the passengers generally, and not one in particular.”
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Smith, 37 South., 643, the Supreme Court of Mississippi say: “Primarily the affliction of blindness unfits every person for .safe traveling by railway, if unaccompanied. No blind person without previous experience could possibly accommodate himself to the many exigencies incident to traveling by railroad, or guard himself against peril in boarding and alighting from trains, changing from one train to another, or threading his way in safety across the railroad tracks at crowded stations. Plence the rule which provides that every blind person is presumed to be, in the absence of proof of experience, unfit to travel alone, is not unreasonable; nor do we consider such a regu
In the case of Croom v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (Minn.), 53 N. W., 1128, 18 L. R. A., 602, 38 Am. St. Rep., 557, the rule is thus stated: “Of course, a railroad company is not bound to turn its cars into nurseries or hospitals, or its employes into nurses. If a passenger, because of extreme youth or old age, or any mental or physical infirmities, is unable to take care of himself, he ought to be provided with an attendant to take care of «him. But if the company voluntarily accepts a person as a passenger, without an attendant, whose inability to care for himself is apparent and made known to its servants, and renders said care and assistance necessary, the company is negligent if such assistance is not afforded.”
And in 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 538: “While persons who are ill have a right to enter and travel upon conveyances of a common carrier of passengers, nevertheless the carrier is not bound to accept as a passenger, without an attendant, one who, be
We think it a proposition too obvious to admit of refutation that the blind man who, without an attendant, successfully makes a long railroad journey involving several changes of ears, does so either because he is especially cared for and helped on his way by the kindness of chance acquaintances or by the aid of the employes of the carrier. Let any one imagine a totally blind man alighting on a strange platform for the purpose of changing cars amid the confusion arising from the shifting of trains, the blowing of whistles, the clanging of hells, the rolling of baggage trucks, and the hurried tramp of the feet of his fellow passengers, and he will need no extraneous evidence to realize that the afflicted passenger will be totally helpless, as.well as in the most imminent danger of harm, without the kindly aid of some one who is not devoid of sight. The duty of the carrier of passengers for lure is to attend to the comfort and safety of all of its passengers alike, but not to furnish especial attention to any one in particular, unless, perhaps, under exceptional circumstances, such as accidental sickness or misfortune en route. If the carrier accepts a helpless passenger without an attendant, it will doubtless assume the additional care and responsibility commensurate with his misfortune and needs; but this is a burden it must assume for itself. The law does not impose it as an incident to the business.
The undisputed facts of the case at bar are that the appellee was, as already said, totally blind and 77 years of age. He desired to be transported for a distance of from 140 to 185 miles (depending upon which of two routes he took), involving two, if not three, changes of the vehicles of transportation;
All of this shows that what he means by going by himself, without an attendant is that he went by himself, depending on the assistance, of chance acquaintances or the help of the employes of the carrier. No one would think of disputing that a -blind man who is put on a car can sit in his seat until he reaches his destination, if no change of cars is required. This involves no greater ingenuity than sitting in his own chair at home for a given length of time; and undoubtedly, if at his destination some one (perhaps the conductor) puts him safely off onto the platform, he will lie so far all right. But this is not what we would term traveling without assistance. Certainly, if one can be sure of the attentions of chance acquaintances, or of the help of the employes of the carrier, he need not hire attendants to conduct him on his journey; but may he ask the carrier to run the risk of his getting this chance help? We think not. Suppose he should fail to meet any one sufficiently charitable to help him, and he should be injured; would it not be said with, a great show of reason that, the carrier having accepted him as a passenger, knowing his infirmity, it therefore owed him a duty commensurate with protecting him from harm? This, we think, would clearly be the correct rule of law applicable to the suppositious case. It would seem to follow as a necessary consequence that the carrier has the legal right to protect himself from this additional responsibility by requiring the infirm traveler to secure the services of an attendant prior to starting on his journey.
We do not think it important that the appellant had promulgated a rule upon the question in hand,
Wherefore the judgment is reversed, for proceedings consistent with this opinion.