148 Ky. 473 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1912
Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
In the summer of 1911 the appellee bought from the appellant at Evansville, Ind., the right of transportation to Chicago, 111., and return. Her contract was upon a reduced excursion rate, which rate had been duly scheduled and filed as demanded by the interstate commerce statute. Her contract was for return passage not later than July 15th; but the selling agent, in supplying her with her ticket, the written memorial of her contract, by mistake furnished her with a ticket providing July 12th as the last return day. Together with a traveling companion, who had purchased a like contract, appellee journeyed to Chicago. Upon the night of the 14th she presented herself at the Illinois Central ticket office in Chicago, where her ticket was stamped and validated in due form without any question about its expiration. Upon it she was admitted by the gatekeeper through the gate to the train shed. Her train was pointed out to her and she boarded it. She went into the Pullman sleeping car, delivered her ticket to the porter and retired. The train left Chicago on the 15th about 2:40 a. m. About daylight she was awakened by the conductor, who informed her that her ticket had expired, and that she would either have to pay fare or leave the train. She had not sufficient money, but succeeded in borrowing it from a stranger on the train, paid her fare, and was transported back to Evansville. Her companion, Miss Éoberts, had a ticket with the same error in its return limit, had it validated in the same way, went upon the return train with her, delivered her ticket to the porter, and retired in the same sleeper berth. She, too, was awakened by the conductor and the same demand made of her. She
One defense interposed by the railroad company was that the ticket in possession of Mrs. Fleming by its terms expired on July 12th and that had it transported her upon that ticket it would have been guilty of an infraction of the Federal interstate commerce statute and would have been subject to a Federal prosecution accordingly. It seems clear to us that the learned counsel for the railroad company misconceive their facts. Mrs. Fleming was the beneficiary of no rebate or unusual privilege. She bought and paid for certain transportation at a certain price, the scheduled price, the lawful price, the price at which every other traveler desiring like service could have bought it. Unfortunately for the railroad company it blundered in the manner of ticket it supplied her; with the result that her written or printed ticket did not evidence the true contract. The doctrine generally received and generally fixed in Kentucky is that as between the passenger and the carrier the ticket is a mere memorandum of a contract, the real and true details of which are entered into before the delivery of the ticket. Upon the other hand, the ticket is customarily considered as evidence of the passenger’s rights as between him and that servant of the railroad company known as the conductor of the train. L. & E. Ry. Co. v. Lyons, 104 Ky., 23; C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Carson, 145 Ky., 81; Southern Ry. in Ky. v. Hawkins, 121 Ky., 415. Mrs. Fleming’s contract, as she actually made it with the railroad company, was a lawful contract, bought at a rate which met every demand of the Federal statute. If the carrier was guilty of any infraction of the Federal law it was guilty of such an infraction in delivering to her a ticket different from that for which she paid. It committed no offense in entering into the lawful contract with her. In any attempted prosecution against it for carrying her on to her destination upon a ticket which (supposedly) had expired it cannot be questioned but that the railroad company could have successfully • protected itself by
The foregoing discussion in reality is not pertinent to this case if the instruction given by the trial court be
The plaintiff plead her evidence, and complaint is made of that fact. A historical review of the whole matter was stated in the plaintiff’s petition. It unnecessarily burdened the record and was not justified by the familiar rules of our code procedure. However, there was nothing in this manner of pleading to prejudice any right of the appellant.
It is complained that the awiard of $750.00 for compensatory damages is excessive. It is well settled in this State that mortification and humiliation are the objects of compensation in a case like this. Mrs. Fleming was traveling in the nighttime. She was awakened in the late hours of the night and told that if she did not pay her fare she would be ejected from the train. This must have humiliated her greatly. She had to have the porter seek to borrow money for her, and to offer to pledge her personal effects to get the money to save being ejected
Complaint is likewise made of the $250.00 award of punitive damages. Mrs. Fleming testified in substance that the conductor unbuttoned the curtain of her berth, put his lantern in her face and in a rough, ungentlemanly and coarse voice told her that the ticket was no good and that she would have to pay her fare; that again, when she had just had time to take off her night dress, the conductor rudely pulled the curtain aside and exhibited her only partly dressed. If these facts are true, if the conductor jerked aside the curtain and exhibited the appellee in a half-dressed condition to the other passengers in the car, or even to the eyes of the conductor himself, he was guilty of conduct such as to justify the instruction upon, and this small award of, punitive damages.
For the reasons given the judgment of the .trial court is affirmed.