48 Ind. App. 300 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1910
The complaint is in one paragraph. It is averred therein that appellee was in appellant’s service as
The complaint then alleges that on August 1, 1905, defendant employed plaintiff; that on January 10, 1906, defendant wrongfully discharged plaintiff, and has ever since refused, and still refuses, to reemploy him, and that plaintiff was able, ready and willing to continue in the service of defendant.
The issue was made by a denial. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for $1,800, which was reduced by a remittitur to $1,200.
“You know it is not everything I can do, the shape I am in. I am ready to work at any time. Please have them place me as soon as possible, as I need the work, Mr. Losey. I received voucher February 6. Still holding it, waiting for information in regard to job. Hope you will attend to this at once, and oblige,
Chester Fairfield.”
In answer to this, the claim agent wrote that he had nothing to do with furnishing positions to employes; that he had not promised appellee a position, further stating: “I had no authority to make any such promise, and never do. * * * However, you could not expect to be placed at work until you had executed a release. This release is embraced in the voucher, and I do not see any purpose in holding it. After you have advised me that you have executed the release and cashed the voucher, I will take the matter up with Mr. Sheuing, and see whether it is consistent for him to do anything for you.”
Appellee went to the superintendent who dipped a pen in
These facts are not only shown by the evidence of appellee, but are largely in the record though the testimony of the other persons concerned, and the finding is not only in accord with the evidence, giving it the view that is most favorable to appellee, as we are required to do, but it is in accord with the overwhelming weight of evidence.
Appellant’s principal contention is that the contract was made with the claim agent, and that his letter, denying his authority to make such a contract, conclusively shows that the essential meeting of minds never took place and, therefore, no contract was ever made. This is too narrow a view. The claim was that the contract was made by appellant corporation, and the evidence clearly shows that through the representations and promises of employment by appellant’s agents, acting within the scope of their respective duties, appellee was induced to execute the release in question. Indeed, the letter of the claim agent does not bear the con
The implication that the execution of the release would procure the employment is irresistible, and when taken with the subsequent statements and actions of those who did have authority “to furnish positions to employes,” the letter comes very far from sustaining the contention. It is suggested that what was said and done with regard to employment was said and done as a matter of humanity to a faithful and unfortunate employe. The suggestion does not accord with what was' done in that regard after the release had been procured.
Various minor matters are mooted, but none of them is of controlling importance.
The judgment is affirmed.