50 So. 721 | Miss. | 1909
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of tbe court.
In July, 1908, Mrs. Julia H. Daniels brought suit against tbe Illinois Central Railroad Company for tbe negligent killing of her husband on tbe 4th day of tbe same month. Her bus-band was killed in Boguecbitto> an incorporated town, while going to tbe depot of tbe railroad company, intending to take passage on a passenger train which passed through tbe town
The case made by the record is substantially as follows, viz.: On the 4th day of July, 1908, the deceased purchased a round-trip ticket over the Illinois Central Railroad from Brookhaven to Bogueehitto, and about 2 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day boarded a south-bound passenger -train on appellant’s line of railway, and proceeded to Bogueehitto. The above town is a regular passenger station on the line of appellant’s railway where all local passenger trains stop. Being a town within the meaning of Code 1906, § 4043, it is unlawful under the statute for any train to run through the same at a greater rate of speed than six miles an hour, the penalty for a violation of this section being that any railroad company which violates same shall be liable for any damage, or injury, which may be sustained by any one', whilst the train is running through the town at a greater rate than the statute allows. It is thus seen that, if this statute has any bearing on the question of tbe negligent act of the railroad in this case, the facts so circumstanced it as to make it available to the party bringing this suit. After reaching Bogueehitto^, the deceased remained in the town until about 8:30 p. m., at which time he expected to take a local passenger train over the appellant’s line back to his home. A local pas
The particular case presented by this record is not one which this court has been heretofore called on to decide. It is but fair to state that it can hardly be doubted, under the facts of this case, that deceased failed to stop, look, or listen before going upon the track when he met his death, and it may also be stated that the facts show that, if he had stopped or looked, it would have averted the accident, as in either ease he would have discovered the approaching freight train. It is manifest,, however, that deceased did not know of the danger that threatened from the approaching freight train and was not therefore taking his chances of successful escape from known risk. It is-with these facts conceded that we shall discuss this case. While it is unquestionably true that even a passenger is not absolved from all care, it is equally true that it is the duty of the railroad company to exercise the highest degree of care in providing for the safety of a passenger going to the depot for the purpose of boarding its trains. Therefore, as to what constitutes negligence on the part of a passenger must depend upon the facts and circumstances at the time of the injury. This duty of the railroad company is so imperative at the very time
In the case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa, Fe R. R. Co. v. Shean, 18 Colo. 368, 33 Pac. 108, 20 L. R. A. 729, the facts showed that Thomas Shean, deceased, was a passenger on appellant’s cars. While on the train as a passenger, the train arrived at a little station where it was customary for the railroad company to allow its passengers to get their meals. The train on which Shean was a passenger was running in two sections, and Shean was on the first. The eating house was on the opposite side of the track from that on which the train bearing Shean stopped, and, in order to reach the eating house, •it was necessary for Shean to cross over the track. While passing diagonally over the track, the second section came in on .another track, running at a rate of from six to ten miles per hour, and Shean was killed. It was shown that deceased did not stop, look, or listen before crossing the track when he was killed, but, if he had looked, he could have seen the train that
In the case of Warner v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 346, 18 Sup. Ct. 70, 42 L. Ed. 491, it is said: “The duty owing by a railroad company to a passenger, actually or constructively in its care, is of such a character that the rules of law regulating the conduct of a traveler upon the highway when about to cross and the trespasser who ventures upon the tracks of a railroad company are not a proper criterion by which to determine whether or not a passenger who sustains injury in going upon the track of the railroad was guilty of contributory negligence. A railroad company owes to one standing towards it in the relation of a passenger, a different and higher degree of care from that which is due to mere trespassers or strangers, and it is conversely equally true that the passenger under given conditions has a right to rely upon the exercise by the road of care, and the question of whether or not he is negligent under all circumstances must be determined on due consideration of the obligations of both the company and the passenger. * * * Whilst it is true, as was said, in Terry v. Jewett, supra (78 N. Y. 338), that such implied invitation would not absolve a passenger from the duty to exercise care and caution in avoiding danger, nevertheless it certainly would justify him in assuming that in holding out the invitation to board the train the corporation had not so arranged its business as to expose him to the hazard of danger to life and limb unless he exercised the very highest degree of care and caution. The railroad under such circumstances, in giving the invitation,, must necessarily be presumed to have taken into view the state
In tbe case of Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stepp, 164 Fed. 792, 90 C. C. A. 438, tbe court said: “It is now tbe settled rule of tbe federal courts that passengers using station premises for tbe purpose of taking or leaving trains have a right to assume that tbe place is one of safety, and to act upon that assumption. While they are not absolved from all care, they are not required to exercise that high degree of care which tbe law imposes upon travelers when approaching tbe intersection of a highway and a railroad. Tbe traveler upon the highway has no right to assume that tbe railroad is a place of safety, or that trains will not be run over it while be is attempting to pass. On tbe contrary, tbe rule has been repeatedly declared that such a crossing is a place of danger, and that tbe traveler must approach .it with tbe knowledge that tbe company may at any time be moving trains over its road. This is tbe ground of tbe difference between tbe rule as to a pas^ senger while upon station grounds and a traveler upon tbe highway. Tbe one has tbe right to believe that tbe place which be is using is one of safety, while tbe other is bound to know that tbe place which be is approaching is on of imminent danger. Upon tbe basis of this difference tbe rule is now firmly
In view of the law as stated above, let us see if the jury were properly instructed with reference to it. By the fourth instruction given for plaintiff, the jury are told that deceased had a right to assume that the train on the parallel track would not be running over six miles per hour past the depot at Bogue-chitto, and, further, that deceased had a right to presume that the railroad company would not run its trains over its parallel track in such a way as to subject him to unusual hazard or ■danger at the station - that deceased was not required to stop, look, and listen before crossing the west trade; that, if the .jury believed from the evidence that deceased did not stop, look, and listen, this fact alone did not make him guilty of contributory negligence if the jury believed that under the circumstances deceased did act as an ordinarily prudent man would act in guarding himself against injury. The practical effect of the fifth instruction given for plaintiff is to tell the jury that they must determine whether deceased was guilty of contributory negligence or not from the standpoint of whether, nr not he was in the exercise of ordinary precaution at the
In view of what we have said above, we do not deem it necessary to pursue the refused instruction of defendant at any great length. It was not error on the part of the court, under the facts of the case, to refuse instruction No. 6 asked for by defendant. It embodied the stop-, look, and listen doctrine,, which had been pressed to its fullest limit in instruction No.. 14, given for defendant. If instruction No. 6 had simply told the jury that if they believed from the evidence that deceased was warned not to. go upon the parallel track when he-
If it be conceded that minor error was committed in the giving of the first instruction for .plaintiff, the error is not sufficiently grave to warrant a reversal. The amount of the judgment is amply supported by the evidence, and, indeed, had the jury returned a larger verdict, it would not have been disturbed on the fact of this case. Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
delivered tbe following dissenting opinion:
Tbe fourth instruction, given for tbe plaintiff is in tbe following words:
“Tbe court instructs tbe jury for tbe plaintiff that tbe plaintiff’s husband bad a right to presume-that tbe freight train, if be bad known it was coming, would not be running over six miles per hour, and that it would not run past tbe depot at Boguechitto on this occasion at a greater rate of speed than six miles per hour; and, further, that be bad a right to presume-that tbe defendant company would not by tbe running of its-trains upon its- parallel track subject him to unusual hazard or danger at said station, and tbe law did not require him to stop, look, and listen before crossing said west track, and, if be did not stop, look, and listen, be would not have been guilty of contributory negligence because of such failure alone. Tbe question of fact to be determined by tbe jury, on tbe subject of contributory negligence, is: Did tbe deceased, under tbe circumstances, in view of tbe presumptions above enumerated, act as an ordinarily prudent man would act’ in guarding himself against injury ?” ¡
Tbe plain effect of this instruction was to charge tbe jury that, although the plaintiff might have known tbe train was coming, yet, because be was entitled under tbe law to assume that tbe train would not run in tbe town and past tbe depot at a speed more than six miles an hour, therefore be could neglect to stop, or look, or listen, and yet this failure to do one or all of these things would not alone constitute contributory negligence. There is no possible escape from tbe conclusion that this is tbe plain meaning of tbe plain language of this instruction. This is not tbe law. Bunning more than six miles an hour through an incorporated town does not of itself alone entitle tbe plaintiff to recover in a case where only actual damages are sought, as here, but it must appear that such excessive speed was tbe proximate cause of tbe injury. ' This charge posi-.
The sixth charge, refused to the defendant, is in the following words:
“The court instructs the jury for the defendant that although they may believe the defendant was negligent in running two trains through the municipality of Boguechitto so that they passed each other at the same time at the crossing at which deceased met his death, and although they may believe that the freight train was running at an unlawful rate of speed, •and that its bell arid whistle were not giving.the proper signals, •still it was incumbent upon the deceased to stop1, look, or listen before going upon the tracks of the defendant, and, if he failed to do this and went upon the tracks after being told not to do so, defendant’s negligence will not entitle the plaintiffs to remover, but they will find a verdict for the defendant.”
The witness Sauls had testified that he had accosted deceased, seized him by the* arm, told him to look out, and warned him of the approaching train. The deceased tore away from him, saying “Oh,” and rushed on. It is true that.the plaintiff introduced a witness to show that Sauls was not present at the scene of the accident at all, but it is also true that another witness for the defendant supported Sauls’ statement that he was there, and the defendant was manifestly entitled to have its theory of the case, as bottomed on this testimony of Sauls, put to the jury on this instruction, and it was error, and fatal error, to refuse this instruction.
In the case of A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Shean, 18 Colo. 368, 33 Pac. 108, 20 L. R. A. 729, the court expressly says: “Under all the facts shown in evidence and the circumstances-surrounding the accident, whether the person injured was guilty of contributory negligence at the time is a question within the province of the jury to decide, and one that the court cannot rightfully take from them.” In the ease of Terry v. Jew
In this case, as I have already pointed out, the sixth charge, which was refused to defendant, was drawn with special reference to the testimony of the witness Sauls, and most indubitably the defendant company was entitled to have its theory of the ease, as bottomed on this testimony, given in charge to the Ñ^y.