Appellants, Charles Igwilo and Uchechukwu Angela Igwilo, are the parents of an infant daughter, appellant Ozioma A. Igwilo. Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo were the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case (“Igwilo I”) against Dr. Maria Y. Que in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Dr. Que was insured by the P*I*E Mutual Insurance Company (“P*I*E”), which was adjudged insolvent after Igwilo I was filed. Subsequent to P*I*E’s insolvency, the Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation (“PCIGC”), appellee, provided a defense to Dr. Que in Igwilo I. Igwilo II was filed, also in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, to obtain a judicial declaration as to how many “covered claims” the Igwilos had asserted in Igwilo I.
In Igwilo II, the Igwilos filed a motion for summary judgment in which they sought a declaration that they had three “covered claims.” PCIGC sought a declaration that the Igwi-los had only one “covered claim.” The court granted the Igwilos’ motion for summary judgment, but found that they had two “covered claims.” Appellants appeal from that
1. Did the court err in determining that the Igwilos had two “covered claims”?
2. May Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo recover damages for loss of services and pre-majority medical expenses for their infant daughter?
We answer “no” to the first question and “yes” to the second question, and affirm.
Facts
In their complaint, the Igwilos asserted that Dr. Que committed medical malpractice by not properly treating Mrs. Igwilo while she was pregnant. The complaint alleged that after a prenatal examination on August 10, 1996, Dr. Que failed to diagnose Mrs. Igwilo with preeclampsia. As a result of Dr. Que’s malpractice, on August 25, 1996, Ozioma A. Igwilo, the Igwilos’ child, was born with severe and irreversible brain damage.
The Igwilos further asserted that Mrs. Igwilo suffered various physical symptoms and problems that would not have occurred but for Dr. Que’s negligence.
As parents and next friends of Ozioma Igwilo, Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo sought damages as a result of the child’s bodily injuries. In addition, the parents in their individual capacities sought recovery of damages that they suffered because of Ozioma’s injuries. The parties dispute whether the complaint also sought compensation for damages arising out of the bodily injuries to Mrs. Igwilo.
Dr. Que was insured by P*I*E under a policy that provided liability coverage of $1,000,000.00 for “each claim” and $3,000,-000.00 as an “annual aggregate.” P*I*E was adjudged insolvent, and PCIGC stepped in to defend and indemnify Dr. Que. Thereafter, a dispute arose between the Igwilos and PCIGC concerning the number of “covered claims” presented by the Igwilos in their complaint against Dr. Que. Specifically, the Igwilos contended that they had asserted three “covered claims,” one for Mr. Igwilо, one for Mrs. Igwilo, and one for Ozioma Igwilo. PCIGC denied separate coverage for each of these claims and, instead, asserted that the claims aggregated to form one “covered claim.” The Igwilos brought the declaratory judgment action (Igwilo II) to have the court determine the number of “covered claims” implicated by their complaint in the underlying tort action (Igwilo I).
The court ruled that the Igwilos had asserted “two separate, distinct ‘covered claims’ ” in the underlying medical malpracticе action. In its memorandum opinion, the court stated:
The court finds that the language of Md.Code Ann., Ins. Art., § 9-302 and § 9-306 applies to any “covered claim” that may result from the negligence of the insured and existing on or before insolvency of insurer. In the case sub judice, Plaintiffs assert two separate distinct “covered claims” that arose as a result of the alleged negligence of Dr. Que, both of which existed before insolvency of P*I*E.
The parents’ claim for injuries sustained by the mother, with resultant damage to marital relаtionship, and loss of child’s services comprise one “covered claim,” and the child’s claim, for injuries sustained as a result of the claimed negligence constitute the second “covered claim.” Therefore, these two claims are each considered a “covered claim” within the meaning of Md.Code Ann., Ins. § 9-306.
In its order, the court held:
The PCIGC’s obligation, therefore, is to provide liability coverage up to $299,900 for each of the two “covered claims,” asserted in the underlying litigation, i.e.: a) the injury to the child and all claims that are caused by, derive from or arise out of that bodily injury; and b) the injury to the mother and all claims that are caused by, derive from or arise out of that bodily injury.
The Igwilos appeal from the court’s order, contending that the court erred in failing to find that they set forth three “covered claims” in their complaint. PCIGC has cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to find that the Igwilos’ complaint set forth a single “covered claim.”
Discussion
Standard of Review
The Court of Appeals has stated that “the proper standard for reviewing the
The summary judgment motiоn before the trial court involved the interpretation of a statute. This Court has held that the “interpretation of a statute presents a question of law.” Papillo v. Pockets, Inc.,
Relationship Between P*I*E and PCIGC
PCIGC was created by the Maryland Legislature as a “remedy for the particular societal malаdy caused by defunct insurance carriers.” Joe Shifflet, Inc. v. PCIGC,
The Insurance Article of the Maryland Code sets forth the obligations of PCIGC. Section 9-302 provides that the purposes of the subtitle are:
(1) to provide a mechanism for the prompt payment of covered claims under certain policies and to avoid financial loss to residents of the State who are claimants or policyholders of an insolvent insurer; and (2) to provide for the assessment of the cost of payments of covered claims and protection among insurers.
The powers and duties of PCIGC are provided in § 9-306. Section 9~306(a)(l) provides that, subject to a statutory cap, PCIGC is “obligated to the extent of the covered claims existing оn or before the determination of the insolvency” or to certain covered claims that arise after the insolvency. Section 9-306(a)(2) provides that PCIGC’s obligation “shall include only that amount of each covered claim that is in excess of $100 and less than $300,000.” The statute further provides that PCIGC “is not obligated to a policy holder or claimant in an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy out of which the claim arises.” § 9-306(a)(4). The trial court and all parties agreed that PCIGC’s maximum liability per “covered claim” is $299,-900.00.
Clearly, the concept of a “covered claim” is central to this statutory scheme. Section 9-301(d) defines a “covered claim” as “an insolvent insurer’s unpaid obligation ... that ... arises out of a policy of the insolvent insurer.” Therefore, to determine
P*I*E Insurance Policy
Under the policy issued to Dr. Que, P*I*E’s obligation is limited by the Limits of Liability provision applicable to “each claim.”
The Limit of Liability stated in the General Deсlarations, as applicable to “each claim,” is the limit of [P*I*E’s] liability for all damages because of any one claim or suit or all claims or suits first made during the Policy period because of injury to or death of any one person....
Thus, as it applies to this case, P*I*E’s liability is limited to $1,000,000.00 “for all damages because of ... all claims or suits ... because of injury to ... any one person.” (Emphasis added.)
On appeal, PCIGC argues that, “[rjegardless of the number of claims or tort claimants, if there is one bodily injury, only one ‘each claim’ limit applies to all claims related to that bodily injury. Regardless of the number of claims or tort claimants, if there is one bodily injury, the most P*I*E Mutual was obligated to pay for all those claims was $1,000,000.” (Emphasis in original.) On the contrary, the Igwilos contend that the word “each” in the liability limitation means that every claim is individually subject to the liability cap, regardless of whether the claims all relate to or arise from bodily injury to one person. The Igwilos further contend that, under the Section II, Paragraph 2 of the policy, any additional claims for damages resulting from the same injury are considered separate claims. Upon reviewing the statute, the underlying insurance policy, and applicable case law, we reject the Igwi-los’ contention and agree with PCIGC.
As the Court of Appeals recognized in Daley v. United Services,
In Daley, the insurance policy at issue contained limitations quite similar to the оne in this case:
Limits of Liability: The limit of bodily injury liability stated in the Declarations as applicable to “each person” is the limit of the company’s liability for all damages, including damages for care and loss of service, arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one occurrence.
Coverage — Limits of Liability
A. Bodily Injury Liability each person — $100,000.00— Each Occurrence — $200,000.00.
Daley,
After reviewing the language of the policy in Daley, the Court summarized the insurer’s obligation:
[The obligation] was subject to two limits: (1) a $100,000 “each person” limit for all damages, including damages for care and loss of services arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one occurrence; and (2) a $200,000 “each occurrence” limit for all such damages arising out of bodily injuries sustained by two or more persons as a result of any one occurrence.
Daley,
The provision in the underlying insurance policy in this case is strikingly similar to that in Daley. The Limits of Liability provisions divide P*I*E’s liability into two categories: (1) “each claim” liability, which applies when one person has died or been injured, and (2) “annual aggregate” liability, which “is the total limit of [P*I*E’s] liability for all damages and for all claims first made during the effective Policy period, subject to the above provisions respecting ‘each claim’ ” liability. Thus, the $1,000,000.00 cap in the insurance policy represents the maximum liability for all claims arising from the death of or injury to one person, regardless of the number of claims that arise out of that injury.
The Igwilos’ reliance on Section II, Paragraph 2, of the P*I*E insurance policy is unpersuasive. That provision states: “If any claim is first made during the Policy period alleging injury to an individual that would be covered by this Policy, any additional claim made for damages resulting from the same injury shall be considered a claim hereunder.” As the Court of Appeals has recognized, “[ujnder Maryland law, when deciding the issue of covеrage under an insurance policy, the primary principle of construction is to apply the terms of the insurance contract itself.” Bausch & Lomb v. Utica Mutual,
The fundamental flaw in the Igwilos’ reliance on Section II, Paragraph two, of the P*I*E policy is that the provision does not stand in isolation; rather, it must be read in conjunction with the Limits of Liability provision in the policy. Although each of the claims arising from an injury to one person constitute a separate claim under the policy, liability for each of these claims is limited to all damages because of all claims arising out of injury to any one person. Therefore, even though the claims are “separate,” liability is capped for all claims resulting from the same injury. That cap constitutes the insurer’s obligation under the policy, which then becomes a “covered claim” under Md.Code § 9-301(d). We simply note that determining what constitutes a “claim” under the policy does not resolve the issue of what constitutes a “covered claim” under the statute.
I. Injury to the Child, Ozioma Igwilo
All parties agree that the claimed physical injury to Ozioma Igwilo constitutes a “covered claim.” Thus, the $1,000,000.00 limitation on liability in the P*I*E insurance policy would have applied to Ozioma’s claims for damages, as well as all claims that arose because of Ozioma’s bodily injury.
II. Injury to the Parents,
Ueheehukwu Angela Igwilo and Charles Igwilo
Although the parties agree that the claim for injury to Ozioma Igwilo constitutes a “covered claim,” the Igwilos and PCIGC sharply dispute whether the Igwilos’ claims for injuries to Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo constitute separately “covered claims.” Specifically, the parties disagree as to the following issues: (1) whether Mrs. Igwilo set forth a claim for her оwn physical injuries independent of Ozioma’s physical injury; (2) whether Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo can recover economic and non-economic damages resulting from injury to Ozioma; and (3) whether the parents’ claims for economic and non-economic damages constitute a “covered claim” separate from the bodily injury claim(s).
A. Bodily Injury to Mrs. Igwilo
PCIGC argues that “the complaint in the underlying tort action sought damages for one bodily injury (the child’s).” If this is the case, then PCIGC’s potential liability would be limited to a total of $299,900.00 for the child’s injury and all tort claims arising from that injury, as we have previously discussed, and PCIGC would not be liable at all for any physical injury to Mrs. Igwilo. PCIGC concedes, however, that, “if the complaint in the underlying tort action sought damages because of two independent bodily injuries (one to the mother and one to the child), then the trial [court] was correct in its ruling that there were two ‘covered claims.’ ” The Igwilos maintain on appeal that their complaint in Igwilo I did assert
In count one of the complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo, “on behalf of their infant child,” sought damages for Ozioma’s physical, emotional, and economic injuries. Prior to detailing Ozioma’s injuries, count one chronicled Mrs. Igwilo’s pregnancy with Ozioma, including a description of the physical pain and other symptoms she experienced during her pregnancy. The Igwilos stated in count one that Mrs. Igwilo suffered pain, severe swelling of the facе and extremities, headache, epigas-tric pain, severe preeclampsia, severe toxemia, and an emergency cesarean section. The Igwilos did not seek damages for Mrs. Igwilo’s physical pain and suffering in count one; rather, the relief sought was limited to damages for Ozioma Igwilo’s injuries.
In count two, however, the Igwilos made a “claim for their individual damages, expenses and losses against” Dr. Que. In detailing their damages in count two, the Igwilos explicitly asserted that “[t]he plaintiffs [Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo] ... have in the past, are presently, and will in the future suffer physical pain.... ” The Igwilos also incorporated “by reference each and every allegation set forth [in count one] above, as though fully restated” in count two. We hold that the complaint sufficiently set forth a claim for Mrs. Igwilo’s physical injury.
B. Parents’ Claims for Economic and Non-economic Damages
Both Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo asserted claims for economic and non-economic damages resulting from Ozioma’s injury. Specifically, they asserted damages for pre-majority medical expenses and the loss of their infant daughter’s services. As the Igwilos state in their brief to this Court, “Mr. Igwilo [and] Mrs. Igwilo ... had ‘separate and distinct’ claims against an alleged tortfeasor, Dr. Que, resulting, inter alia, from physical injuries to a minor child.... ”
On appeal, the Igwilos аrgue that “[pjarents of a minor child injured by someone’s negligence have ‘separate and distinct’ claims for ‘legally cognizable damages’ ... that may either be joined in a single action with the minor child’s claim or filed as separate actions.” See Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper,
Whether the parents’ claims for economic and non-еconomic damages constitute claims “separate” from Ozioma’s is immaterial in this case; as our previous discussion demonstrates, they do not constitute separate “covered claims” under the insurance policy and the statute. The Igwilos’ argument fails, therefore, because it does not take into account the terms of the policy. Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo’s claims are derived from Ozioma’s bodily injury; this is precisely the type of claim that, while legally distinct, is essentially combined with the claim for “injury to or death of any one person” to constitute one “unpaid obligation” under the policy and, therefore, one “covered claim” under the statute.
We find that Mr. and Mrs. Igwilo may be able to recover economic and non-economic
Conclusion
We hold that the Igwilos asserted two “covered claims” in their complaint in the underlying tort action. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.
Notes
. PCIGC filed a cross-appeal in this case which raises two issues. First, PCIGC contends that the Igwilos' claims should have been aggregated into one “covered claim” rather than two “covered claims.” This issue is essentially PCIGC's position regarding the first question presented in the Igwilos’ appeal. Therefore, we address the general issue of how many “covеred claims” are before the trial court without regard to whether the discussion is in the context of the Igwilos' appeal or PCIGC’s cross-appeal.
Second, PCIGC "noted the cross-appeal out of an abundance of caution to protect its rights because the Igwilos have contended ... that the trial court’s memorandum supports their position and is controlling. The PCIGC perfected the appeal to preserve the issue of whether a trial memorandum supersedes or explains the trial court’s order.” As our discussion in this opinion will reveal, it is not necessary to address this issue. Although the court’s order and memorandum opinion slightly differ in their respective analyses, both reach the ultimate conclusion that the Igwilos have two "covered claims.”
. PCIGC concedes, however, that, if the Igwilos set forth a separate cause of action for Mrs. Igwilo’s personal injuries, the Igwilos actually have two “covered claims.” If that is the case, then PCIGC argues that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.
. The trial court in Igwilo II specifically stated that "[t]his declaratory judgment is confined solely to the issue of the number of 'covered claims’ that are asserted by the Igwilos in [Igwilo /]• This declaratory judgment does not attempt to adjudicate or address the merits of the [Igwilos’] claims in the underlying litigation [Igwilo /].” Likewise, this Court will not address the merits of the Igwilos' claims. As PCIGC points out in its brief to this Court, "[t]he proper forum for the issue of whether the Igwilos have a cause of action for [non-economic] damages arising out of the non-fatal bodily injury of their child is the medical mаlpractice action brought by them against Dr. Que.”
. Because P*I*E has become insolvent, PCIGC will now assume that obligation, subject to the statutory cap provided in the Maryland Code, § 9-306(a)(2).
. Accordingly, the Igwilos need not "amend the complaint,” as PCIGC suggests, to "assert a claim by Mrs. Igwilo to recover damages for any independent bodily injury she may have suffered....”
. We reiterate that we will not address the merits of the Igwilos' claims in this opinion. We simply hold that recovery on their two "covered claims” is permissible, subject tо the statutory cap.
. The trial court’s order properly stated that the two "covered claims” were: "a) the injury to the child and all claims that are caused by, derive from or arise out of that bodily injury; and b) the injury to the mother and all claims that are caused by, derive from or arise out of that bodily injury.” In its memorandum opinion, however, the court stated that "[t]he parents’ claim for injuries sustained by the mother, with resultant damage to marital relationship, and loss of child's services comprise one ‘covered claim,’ and the child’s clаim for injuries sustained as a result of the claimed negligence constitute the second ‘covered claim.’ ” (emphasis added). Based on our discussion, the court’s division of the claims in the order, not the memorandum opinion, was correct; the loss of services is derived from the child’s injury and therefore is part of the “covered claim” resulting from Ozioma's bodily injury and not the bodily injury to Mrs. Igwilo. The court's erroneous statement in its memorandum opinion is immaterial, however, as we affirm the court’s final conclusion, consistent in the order and the opinion, that the Igwilos have two "covered claims” under the insurance policy and the statute.