GREGORIO IGARTÚA-DE LA ROSA, ET AL., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant, Appellee.
No. 04-2186
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
October 14, 2004
Torruella, Circuit Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Howard, Circuit Judge.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. Senior District Judge]
Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, with whom Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, H.S. García, United States Attorney, Michael Jay Singer and Matthew M. Collette, Attorneys, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, were on brief, for appellee.
Per Curiam.1
Gregorio Igartúa de la Rosa (“Igartúa“) brings his fеderal constitutional appeal to us a third time, contending that his inability to vote for the President and Vice-President of the United States of America on account of his residency in Puerto Rico is a redressable violation of his right to equal protection as a United States citizen. We affirm the district court‘s dismissal of his claim, relying on our prior dispositions in Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1049 (1995) (“Igartúa I“) and Igartúa de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Igartúa II“). In Igartúa II, referring to Igartúa I, we noted that “this court held with undeniable clarity that the
Our prior opinions canvass the relevant constitutional landscape. Igartúa II, 229 F.3d at 83-84; Igartúa I, 32 F.3d at 9-11. We need only observe that Igartúa has raised no argument that would bring the matter outside the usual “rule that earlier decisions are binding.” Igartúa II, 229 F.3d at 84 (discussing the two exceptions to the rule). Under First Circuit precedent, a panel such as ourselves is bound in the present circumstances by a
Affirmed.
(Dissenting Opinion follows.)
GREGORIO IGARTÚA-DE LA ROSA, ET AL., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant, Appellee.
No. 04-2186
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Dissenting).
If on the one hand it can be argued that Puerto Rico and its “citizens” are better off materially than they were when the island was invaded 106 years ago,3 the undeniable fact is that it
The conundrum created by the Insular Cases13 and People v. Balzac, 182 U.S. 298 (1922), not only gives underlying support to this subservient condition, but more importantly, it relegates the U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico to perpetual inequality by insulating the political branches of government from any effective pressure from these citizens, who have neither voting representation in Congress nor the right to vote for the offices of
The dead end with which these citizens are today faced was forecast by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Downes when he said: “The idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere upon the earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them as mere colonies or provinces -- the people inhabiting them to enjoy only those rights as Congress chooses to accord to them -- is wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius, as well as with the words, of the Constitution.” Downes, 182 U.S. at 380 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
The doctrine of inequality created by the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases stands on the same discredited theoretical footing as that espoused by the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),14 and which was put to rest by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Had the
Although the political rights of the United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico are at stake, the issue presented is not a “political question” any more than were the rights claimed in Brown. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803) (“The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals . . . .“).
Those born in Puerto Rico have since 1917 been born citizens of the United States. See
The indefinite disenfranchisement of the United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico constitutes a gross violation of their civil rights as guaranteed by the
It is also a violation of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doс. A/810 at 71 (1948) (“UDHR“), proclaimed by the member nations of the U.N. General Assembly shortly after World War II. The UDHR provides that:
(1)Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
. . .
(3) The will of the people shall be . . . expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage . . . .
Although the UDHR does “not of its own force impose obligations of internаtional law,” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 125 S. Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004), it has been recognized for its “moral authority” by the Supreme Court. Id.16
The United States has committed itself to specific binding international obligations regarding the right to vote of all of its citizens. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1967), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (ratified by the Senate April 12, 1992, 138 Cong. Rec. S-4781, S-4783) (“ICCPR“), to which the United States has been a party for the past twelve years, states in clear and unambiguous terms in Article 25 that “[e]very citizen shall have the right and opportunity . . . to vote . . . at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage . . . .” Furthermore, Article 2, Para. 1 states that each signatory “undertakes . . . to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . without distinction . . . .” Most
[w]here not already provided for by existing legislati[on], . . . each State Party . . . undertakes to take necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
Additionally, in Paragraphs 3 (a) and (b), each State Party undertakes “[t]o ensure that any person whose [ICCPR] rights or freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy,” to ensure that such rights are “determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.” Paragraph 3(c) makes clear that these rеmedies shall be enforced by the “competent authorities.”
Those portions of the UDHR that rise to the level of customary international law, see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Pt. VII, introductory note (1987) (“[A]lmost all States would agree that some infringements of the human rights enumerated in the Declaration are violations of the [U.N.] Charter of customary international law.“), in addition to the ICCPR and the оbligations established thereunder, are the law of the land.
The ICCPR was signed by the United States in 1976 and ratified thereafter by the Senate in 1992. See 138 Cong. Rec. S-4781, S-4783. Although the Senate added an Understanding that the ICCPR would not be self-executing, id., I cannot сountenance that this Nation would have committed to the ICCPR by signature and ratification if compliance with the obligations enumerated therein was not contemplated. The duplicity and cynicism that would be implicit if such were the case would be a stain on our national honor and integrity of monstrous proportions. Because I refuse to believe that the United States would so act, I cannot but conclude thаt there is no legal excuse for continued non-compliance with these agreements.
Although there exists no individual cause of action to enforce the ICCPR in the instant case,17 I am nonetheless compelled
The United States has taken some actions to meet some of its obligations both under domestic and international law to validate the right of all citizens to vote in national elections. The Constitution was thus amended in 1961 to allow citizens resident of the District of Columbia, (an unincorporated territory of the United States, as is Puerto Rico), to vote for the offices of Prеsident and Vice-President.
Furthermore, in 1986, Congress passed the
Since we decided Igartúa II in 2000, the United States has taken no action towards the national enfranchisement of its citizens in Puerto Rico or towards ending the present colonial relationship. This total inaction is particularly poignant at this moment in our history, when we seek to convince the inhabitants of far-flung places of the world of the democratic process and the validity of its expression through the ballot box.18 It is nothing short of ironic that close to 3,500 U.S. citizens from Puerto Rico support these goals by their presence in Iraq and Afghanistan as members of our Armed Forces, while they are themselves denied these rights particularly with regards to the election of their Commander in Chief. Their presence in thеse distant lands has not been without some cost.19
Given the failure by the United States to take steps to rectify this clear violation of a fundamental right, I believe that the courts of the United States are required to take such extraordinary measures as are necessary to protect the discrete groups that аre “completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States.” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (Marshall, C.J.); see Carolene Prods. Co, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico are such a group.
Because the normal avenues of government are not open to the United States citizens who reside in Puerto Rico to end the limitless and unconstitutional (see Downes, 182 U.S. at 380 (Harlan, J. dissenting)) colonial condition that deprives these citizens of the equality that should be inherent in United States citizenship, it becomes incumbent upon the judicial branch to take
For the above reasons I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my brethren in the majority.
