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Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc.
824 P.2d 841
Idaho
1992
Check Treatment

*1 Humphrey Margaret Humphrey, H. and 824 P.2d wife; husband and Samuel V. Jordan BANK, The IDAHO FIRST NATIONAL Jordan, wife; and Barbara husband and and its successor interest West One McFadden, and Donnie B. dba McFad Bank, N.A., Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, Investments, Family den Counterclaim ants-Respondents-Cross Appellants, v. FOODS, INC., BLISS VALLEY an Idaho v. Walker, corporation; Thomas G. Jr. BANK, The IDAHO FIRST NATIONAL Walker, and Donna I. husband and and its successor interest West One wife; Robert A. Erkins and Bernardine Bank, Idaho, N.A., Counterdefendant- Erkins, wife; M. husband and Freder Appellant-Cross Respondent. Surbaugh ick L. and Carole W. Sur wife; baugh, Rodney husband and D. Frederick L. and Carole SURBAUGH W. Swartling Swartling, and Jean K. hus wife, Surbaugh, as husband and and as wife; Leforgee band and Rex S. and Surbaugh trustee for the Frederick L. wife; Cheryl Leforgee, E. and husband #50405; Rodney D. Retirement Trust Ridgeway Nancy A. N. Robert and Swartling Swartling, and Jean K. as wife; Ridgeway, husband and Robert J. wife, husband and and as trustee for Porter, Porter II and Karen L. husband Rodney Swartling D. Retirement wife; and Mark F. Grefenson and Hed #50402; Leforgee Rex Trust S. and Che Grefenson, wife; wig husband and Al wife, ryl Leforgee, E. and as husband Frost, lan R. Frost M. and Frances hus Leforgee, and as trustee for the Rex S. wife; Brumbach, Harry band and F. Jr. Plan; Chartered Pension Robert CPA Brumbach, and Janice L. husband and Ridgeway Nancy Ridgeway, A. and N. wife; Joyce Dale D. Stukenholtz and E. wife, for as husband and and as trustee Stukenholtz, wife; husband and Miles DDS, P.S., Ridgeway, A. the Robert Humphrey Margaret Humphrey, H. and Plan; Porter II and Pension Robert J. wife; and husband Samuel V. Jordan Porter, wife, and Karen L. as husband Jordan, wife; and Barbara husband and and as trustee for the Robert J. Porter McFadden, and Donnie B. dba McFad #50403; II Mark F. Retirement Trust Investments, Family den Defendants- Grefenson, Hedwig as Grefenson and Respondents. wife,

husband and and as the trustee the Mark F. Retirement for Grefenson L. and Frederick SURBAUGH Carole W. #50601; R. Frost and Fran Trust Allan wife; Rodney Surbaugh, and husband wife, Frost, husband and and ces M. as Swartling Swartling, D. and Jean K. the Allan R. Frost Retire as trustee for wife; Leforgee Rex and husband and S. #50701; Harry Brum F. ment Trust wife; Cheryl Leforgee, E. husband and Brumbach, bach, L. as and Janice Jr. Nancy Ridgeway A. and N. Robert wife, and as trustee husband and wife; Ridgeway, husband and Robert J. Brumbach, Harry F. Jr. Retirement Porter, Porter II and Karen L. husband #51101; Dale D. Stukenholtz Trust wife; F. and Hed Mark Grefenson Stukenholtz, Joyce as husband E. Grefenson, wife; wig Al husband and wife, Dale D. trustee for the and as Frost, M. hus lan R. Frost and Frances #52201; Trust Retirement wife; Brumbach, Stukenholtz Harry F. Jr. band Margaret Humphrey and Brumbach, Miles H. L. husband and and Janice wife; Humphrey, Samuel husband wife; Joyce E. Dale D. Stukenholtz Jordan, wife; hus Stukenholtz, and Barbara husband and Miles V. Jordan *2 wife, trustee for the band Retirement Trust

Samuel V. Jordan #51501; McFadden, and Donnie B. dba Counterclaimants-Respondents-Cross Investments, Family McFadden

Appella n ts,

v. BANK, The IDAHO FIRST NATIONAL its successor interest West One Bank, Idaho, N.A., Counterdefendant-

Appellant-Cross Respondent. INC., FOODS, VALLEY an Idaho BLISS corporation; and Robert A. Erkins and Erkins, Bernardine M. husband wife, Counterclaimants-Respondents,

v. BANK, The IDAHO FIRST NATIONAL and its successor in interest One West Bank, Idaho, N.A., Counterdefendant-

Appellant. WALKER, Thomas G. I. Jr. Donna Counter-claimants-Respondents-Cross Walker, wife, husband and Appella nt s,

v. BANK, The IDAHO FIRST NATIONAL and its successor in interest West One Bank, Idaho, N.A., Counterdefendant-

Appellant-Cross Respondent.

No. 18230. Idaho, Supreme Court of Boise. Sept. 1991. Rehearing Denial of On Feb. 1992. *4 Colo., Hart, Denver,

Holland & Boise, C. plaintiff-appellant. William for argued. McClearn Mauk, Boise, Skinner, de- & for Fawcett Valley Foods. fendant-respondent Bliss argued. Mauk William L. Boise,

Chandler, for de- Allyn, Dillion & B. Thomas fendant-respondent Erkins. argued. Chandler Welsh, Cosho, Humphrey, & Greener Boise, Walkers. defendants-respondents argued. H. Richard Greener Elam, Boyd, Boise, Burke & attorney, for defen- tax formed a limited partnership dants-respondents Surbaugh produce through pleurotus and market mush- (limited guarantors). Bliss, McFadden rooms on Erkins’ ranch outside Bobbi K. argued. Ranch, Dominick Idaho. Erkins owned White Arrow large geothermal spring which had a on it Hall, Farley, Blanton, Boise, Oberrecht & and, prior forming for some time for amicus curiae Idaho Bankers Ass’n. partnership Walker, limited with Thomas argued. Richard E. Hall researching had been seeking ways geothermal use spring develop BAKES, Chief Justice. growing operation. mushroom He had also (Idaho First) Idaho First National Bank seeking financing been from several brought this foreclosure action to collect sources, ultimately opted but for a limited approximately owing pursuant million $3.2 partnership in which he and Thomas Walk- to notes personal property and real and general partners er were the and several security instruments on a loan to Bliss private professional people and business Foods, (Bliss Valley Inc. Valley). The bank partners. They developed were limited obligors guarantors also sued as plan, private placement business memoran- general partners and limited of Bliss Val- da, subscription agreement began ley.1 *5 soliciting private funds from investors and Valley, Bliss Erkins Robert and Thomas lending period several institutions over a Walker, general partners primary and twenty-three several months. The Twin loan, guarantors twenty-three of the and invested, Falls area residents as limited partners limited who were also limited obli- partners, approximately million in the $1.1 gors guarantors2 liability and denied and ultimately negotiated business.3 Walker a raised a number of affirmative defenses million loan from Idaho First National $3.2 and counterclaims. At the conclusion of Bank. trial, entered million verdict $5.7 agreement, Under the terms loan against Idaho First on several of the bor- 24, finally August which was executed on rowers’ counterclaims. The trial court en- 1984, Valley up Bliss could borrow to $3.15 verdict, judgment tered on the released the 1, July million from Idaho First before obligations repay

borrowers from their to 1985, investments, partners’ but the own loan, any of the million and $3.2 awarded million, approximately were to be used $1.1 in attorney borrowers million fees $2.7 any made on the Idaho before draws were and costs. The trial court also denied Ida- Valley required First loan. Bliss was judgment ho First’s motion for notwith- begin making quarterly payments April on verdict, standing the remittitur and new 1, 1985, and to maintain a current debt-to- appeals trial. First now trial equity working capital ratio of 1.75:1 and partners court’s decision. The limited and $750,000 beginning October 1984. appeals. Walker have filed cross provided could occur The loan that default nonpayment upon several conditions: I. FACTS installment; warranty; fail- any breach of Erkins, condition, comply an Idaho ure covenant Robert busi- loan, nessman, Walker, agreement and Thomas a Twin Falls or contained in the unless Originally, Valley partner- parties specifi- referred to 1. Bliss was a limited that one or more ship referred to as Geo-Pleurotus Growers Lim- cally. However, partner- Partnership. ited when the changed ship incorporated, later the name was twenty-three partners limited consisted 3.The Foods, Inc., Valley and the loan doc- to Bliss uments were re-executed. We refer to the com- pany throughout people professional and their or business eleven individual, spouses, Donnie McFadden. and an Valley.” opinion this as "Bliss or had been clients of All but McFadden were attorney members of one Walker and were Walkers, parties—Bliss Valley, the 2. These four Walker, as ventures with more other business Erkins, twenty-three part- limited and the IV, particularly Part more described in throughout opin- infra. ners—will be referred to requires ion as “borrowers” unless the context days cured within 60 company. of written notice of tus of the The bank asked all default; Valley’s or if Bliss partners sign financial cir- the limited as- amended security sumption liability agreements, cumstances or the value of the which “substantially they affected in an adverse did. The bank later asked the limited manner.” specifically partners sign The loan document guaranty,” another “form provided Agreement contains which bank stated was needed for its “[t]his agreement Lender, audits, some, all, the entire between Bor- own internal but not rower and respect partners complied request. Guarantors with to the limited with this subject supersedes matter hereof and parties signed agree- Once the the loan any prior cancels understandings and ment, assumption liability agreements, agreements Lender, between Borrower and guaranties, project construction on the respect subject Guarantors with mat- began August part- with the ter hereof.”4 being expended ners’ contributions first. Hyder general Kamal was hired as the Both signed Walker and Erkins the loan manager project, Hyder, for the Rob- agreement general partners as the of the Erkins, son-in-law, Burk, ert and his John partnership, pursuant limited authority charge day-to-day opera- were in of the vested in them partnership the limited Erkins, Randy respon- tions. the son of agreement partnership and other doc- Erkins, employee dent Robert was also an agreement, uments. In addition to the loan in providing grow- involved sales and Walker, Erkins part- on behalf of the ing medium the mushrooms. nership, individually, signed notes and gave security por- the bank a interest prob- business encountered various tion of Erkins’ property real which many lems from the onset. The causes of business was to be located and on the problems disputed by par- were *6 equipment Valley. owned Bliss Addi- ties major part and constituted a of the tionally, Erkins and signed Walker both Negotiations trial of this case. on the general guaranties, part- and each limited agreement terms of the loan had extended signed assumption ner an liability agree- later into the summer of 1984 than had provided (1) ment which that each was lia- borrowers, anticipated by been the re- so ble for three times his or her initial limited existing greenhouses the construction on investment; (2) partnership obligations the improve- and the construction of other the partner of each separate limited were from 1984, began August, ments in late instead (3) partnership; that of the the bank June, 1984, plan as the had business bring separate against could any action proposed. unusually An cold winter partner limited regardless of whether or construction, delayed 1984-85 further brought not it also against an action the completed spring which was not until partnership.5 1985. Valley incorporated 3,1985. July Throughout spring

Bliss on summer of the contemplated original 1985, This was Hyder, the loan Erkins and John Burk Robert and, agreement pursuant agree- struggled complete phase to the loan to the initial ment, I) (Phase Idaho First was entitled to seek new the construction and to make the reflecting changed profitable, they loan documents the sta- ran into sever- business but agree- assumption liability agreement 4. Erkins testified that there were no side 5. The However, Walker, according ments with bank. Walker was proposed prepared by to $750,000 permitted testify, regard to with testimony, his "to ensure that all of the limited working capital requirement, during that savings partners be able to realize the tax would negotiations prior signing agreement the loan advantages previously or the tax which had [he] agree- "he ment that we would agreement and I reached an [Donald Chance] get they told would be able to them that go sign ahead and loan only get "The could out of this transaction." present provi- in its form with that they sign suggesting an as- reason I was application sion in it and that I would make agreement sumption of liabilities was for it, grant a waiver and that the bank would so any purposes.” purposes, tax not for particular that it was means to overcome this hurdle.” problems, including personnel 31, al expired difficulties which on December 1985. In among employees, 1986, themselves and other April, Valley Bliss and the bank en- production problems, growing concern tered into the first of a series of written from partners the limited and from the agreements, credit extension in which the regarding bank viability of the business agreed principal bank to defer payments and, subsequently, a claimed reluctance of repayment and extended the time for of the the bank to advance additional funds under 1, 1986, loan until June consideration for agreement, claiming the loan the borrowers acknowledging validity borrowers produc- were in default of the terms. The re-promising pay of the debt tion and sales of mushrooms were not keep payments debt interest cur- meeting original projections set out in January, rent. January, Between 1986 and plan, compa- business which caused the 1987, Valley sought Bliss and Idaho First ny meeting repayment difficulties in its granted five more similar credit extensions. obligations. Valley complied Bliss the credit exten- problems delays prompted agreements January,

These sion until when Valley request post- Bliss any payment bank to it failed to make on the loan. pone requirements or waive various Idaho brought First then this action agreement. Valley loan In late Bliss 11, 1987, against all borrowers on March requested working capital a waiver of the securing foreclose on the collateral principal payment covenants and the first agreement, debt and to enforce the loan 1,1985. April agreed due on Idaho First note, promissory assumption liability covenant, working capital waive but did guaranties, agreements, and credit exten- April not extend the 1 due date for the first agreements. sion principal payment, Valley which Bliss liability The borrowers denied on 20, 1985, May Hyder made. On wrote to documents, raising the loan several affirm- requesting principal Idaho First They defenses. filed counter- ative also payments begin April be rescheduled to against claims and amended counterclaims 1, 1986, 1, 1985, April instead of and that First, including a claim of RICO vio- the final draw date on the loan be extended lations, duty good faith breach of the 1, 1985, July from to December 1985. dealing, fiduciary duty, and fair breach of agreed Idaho First to extend the draw date faith, fraud, negli- breach of the tort of bad requested, only postponed but it *7 gent misrepresentation, tortious interfer- quarterly principal payment July due on rela- ence with Robert Erkins’ contractual 1985, requiring remaining principal pay- all tions, and a claim of defamation Robert Babcock, ments to be made. Bill the Idaho Erkins, the first time which was raised for charge overseeing First official in the in the amended counterclaim. Valley, suggested supe- loan to Bliss to his working capital requirement riors that the trial, objec- Before and over the bank’s through be extended November 1985. tions, realigned parties, the trial court However, response, superior, Babcock’s plaintiffs and designating the borrowers Chance, him ’til Donald instructed to “wait As a result the Idaho First as defendant. waiver, request customer default and essentially tort case proceeded case as a analyze then situation.” bank, fore- against the rather than as a proceeding against the borrowers. closure Finally, pro- because of dismal financial trial, jury re- a thirteen week After jections Valley and the fact that Bliss had 16, 1989. The turned its on June verdict up working capital kept with its First had not com- jury found that Idaho requirements, current ratio Idaho First violation, on fraud or a but mitted RICO gave Valley Bliss written notice of default counterclaims, remaining it returned 15, 1985, which, under the October First. against Idaho million verdict agreement, Valley $5.7 terms of the loan Bliss First jury found that Idaho Specifically, the sixty days Valley cure. Bliss re- had re- faith with the tort of bad committed plied, requesting Idaho First to forbear borrowers, fiduciary commitment, terminating spect to all breached from the loan duty Valley, owed to Bliss the Erkins and voluminous and much of in the it was partners, expert opinion. expert opin- the limited and breached the cov- form of The good hotly enant of ions dealing disputed, faith and fair owed were as was much of decision, Erkins, Walkers, Valley, to Bliss the other evidence. The wheth- partners. jury finding the limited er verdict of the jury The also found Court, dependent upon fact was the bank defamed Erkins Robert expert tortiously whose and whose evidence was interfered with his contractual Finally, believed. Reasonable men or women jury puni- relations. awarded could differ as to which side entitled damages tive guaran- to each of the limited to the verdict or to the Court’s decision. tors. The million $5.7 award included $3.1 yield I to the combined wisdom of the Valley million to Bliss for the bad faith jurors Judgment twelve and hold that the tort, approximately million to the Er- $2 jury’s based verdict should kins, $137,000 Walkers, to the approxi- stand. $360,000 mately guarantors. to the limited appeals judgment The bank from the equitable case, As to the issues in the motions, rulings post-trial raising on the

involving the bank’s foreclosure claim and issues, including following: numerous borrowers, the defenses filed (1) Did the in submitting court trial court err jury’s finding concluded that the jury to the the issue of bad faith tort? binding the verdict were on the court in its issues, equitable (a) determination of the in- admitting Did the trial court err in cluding the bank’s claim on the foreclosure highly prejudicial irrelevant and evi- making action. Without any findings of dence based on the bad faith tort law, fact or conclusions of claim? court denied

the bank’s foreclosure claim and released (2) Did the in submitting trial court err obligations borrowers from all repay jury to the the borrowers’ claim that principal and interest on the mil- $3.2 the bank owed borrowers a fiduci- lion loan obtained from the bank. The ary duty? judgment court entered jury’s on the ver- (3) Did Erkins have a viable claim for dict in favor of the borrowers for the total defamation, and was that claim barred $5,598,000.00. sum of The court then by the statute of limitations?

awarded all attorney borrowers’ fees and (4) submitting Did the trial court err in totalling $2,683,547.33. costs jury Erkins’ claim that the bank tortiously interfered with his contrac- post-trial First filed several mo- prospective tual relations and economic tions, including trial, motions for new re- advantage, and did the trial court im- mittitur, and JNOV. In its memorandum properly instruct on this motions, denying decision the trial claim? court held: (5) Did submitting the trial court err in conflicting evidence was throughout *8 jury to the the borrowers’ claim of position the trial and party of each punitive damages? placed was jury. my before the From (6) improperly Did the trial in- court

point jury of observation the could as jury regarding struct the the borrow- easily have come back with a verdict for ers’ claim that the bank breached its “the Bank”. If this had been a court duty good dealing? faith and fair trial, I would have found for Bank” “the (7) upon entering Did the trial err in my findings based own court fact from my judgment partners for the observation of the limited who my evidence and testify did not at trial? credibility determination of of witnesses. (8) by realigning

However, Did the trial court err say I jury’s cannot parties before trial? supported by verdict was not substantial evidence, (9) awarding nor the verdict was Did the trial court err in against weight attorney of the evidence. The fees and borrowers’ case, sides, evidence on both costs?

274 case____” appeal, partners

On cross the limited in the Carpenter v. Double R raise the following Co., issues: 602, 606, Cattle 108 Idaho 701 P.2d 222, (1985). 52(a)

(1) 226 Did I.R.C.P. reads in failing the trial court err in part: “In all actions tried jury submit to the facts partners’ the limited jury claim of without a negligent misrep- advisory jury, the Bank’s with an resentation? the court shall find specially the facts separately state its conclusions of (2) law Did allowing the trial court err thereon entry appropri- and direct the of an partners present the limited a de- judgment____” added.) ate (Emphasis good duty part fense of a faith on the Thus, regard of the to the provide Bank to bank’s foreclosure information? of its notes security, regard and with (3) Did the trial court err in not submit- to the borrowers’ defenses to that fore- ting jury to the fiduciary a breach of closure, obligated the trial court was duty claim on behalf of Walkers? fact, findings make its own conclusions BOYLE, JJ., JOHNSON and 52(a); of law and decision. I.R.C.P. Car- McKEE, Tern., SCHROEDER and JJ. Pro penter Co., supra. v. Double R Cattle concur. However, the trial court did not make any findings of fact. decision on the his II post-trial motions the trial court stated FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE that, trial, “If I this had been a court would We analysis by commence our con upon my have found for ‘the Bank’ based sidering the relating bank’s claims findings my own of fact from own observa- proceeding. foreclosure The foreclosure of my tion the evidence and determination mortgage equitable pro a note and is an credibility The trial court witnesses.” 247, ceeding. Young, Steed v. 115 Idaho judgment nevertheless entered a based (1988); 766 P.2d 717 Federal Land Bank solely jury, on the verdict of the without Parsons, Spokane v. 116 Idaho 777 making findings of P.2d 1218 its own of fact and conclu- Gorham, (Ct.App.1989); Rees v. sions of law based on its own evaluation of 207, 212, (1917) 30 Idaho 164 P. failing the evidence. In to make its own (“[T]he require rule is too well settled to findings, the trial court erred. I.R.C.P. authorities, mortgage the citation of that a 52(a) requires the trial court in a fore- equitable proceeding, foreclosure is an proceeding, advisory closure even with an party which neither is entitled to a findings jury, to make its own of fact and trial.”). Thus the bank’s claim of fore conclusions of law in accordance with his security, closure of its loan documents and own “observation of the evidence and ... borrowers, and the defenses raised credibility determination of of witnesses.” part equitable pro were foreclosure Co., supra. Carpenter v. Double R Cattle ceedings. alone, judgment For that reason trial court would have to be vacated complaint Because the “in bank’s remanded to the trial court to the case equitable jurisdiction of the dis voked the findings of fact re- court, necessary make the jury’s findings trict verdict and 52(a). quired by Carpenter Rule v. Double advisory only, would be and under I.R.C.P. Co., 52(a) supra; Boydstun, v. judge responsibility has the of R Owen Cattle (1981).6 findings P.2d 413 making the ultimate and decision 102 Idaho *9 findings issues in favor the counterclaim 6. In addition to the absence of on the the awards on case, relieving the borrow- portion borrowers and also verdict of the foreclosure obligation repay appears $3.2 million cre- ers of their on the counterclaim issues to have Having trial is recovery that a new Not loan. necessary, concluded ated a double only for borrowers. damages the extent to given need not resolve $5.7 borrowers we were the million, existing judgment of the court result- judgment court’s relieved the which the trial merely recovery, note that on obligation but admitted to the ed in a double borrowers of their cognizant of the repay trial court should be million loan. There retrial the $3.2 bank to be, extent, recovery the coun- duplication potential where appears a in for double to some

275 However, creating duty by an insurer to an in- disposition in view of our sured, in remaining through in III the breach of which can result issues Parts X, faith breach of an insur- in that a new trial is the tort of “bad which we conclude contract,” apply not in a debtor- case, ance do necessary in this the trial court’s find- opinion relationship. Unigard The credit ings fact and conclusions of law should contracts are invari- noted that insurance upon proceed- be based the evidence and fixed, whose ably standardized contracts ings at the new trial. negotiated and are exe- terms are not setting. The cuted in a non-commercial BOYLE, J., and SCHROEDER and contract, prepares insurer the insurance McKEE, Tern., JJ. Pro concur. ever, seldom, if reads— while the insured terms of the much less understands—the Ill agreement. contrast, in- alleged loan In bank BAD FAITH TORT in this case was a commercial volved and a busi- transaction between a bank Regarding the claim borrowers’ tort ne- The bank loan under ness borrower. faith, trial, of bad when this case went to fixed, “invariably gotiation was not an the trial court did not have the benefit of in contract ... a non-com- standardized recent decision in Canyon our Black Rac for setting,” which was the basis mercial Club, quetball Inc. v. Idaho First Nation Rather, ruling Unigard. in the Court’s Bank, 119 Idaho 804 P.2d 900 al the transaction here was a commercial (1991), rejected in which we the tort of bad one, have a debtor- which would created lending faith in the commercial context. In relationship, for both the creditor which brought Canyon, Black bank customer security and the for the loan were terms against alleging, among an action the bank Accordingly, poli- negotiation. under things, bank had committed cy of the tort reasons for establishment by breaching the tort of bad faith an al faith breach of an insurance con- of “bad leged oral contract to make a commercial applicable in not here. Unigard tract” Canyon, loan. Black this Court distin guished relationship the borrower-lender Idaho at 804 P.2d at 905. relationship insured-insurer in from the arguments make several The borrowers Unigard, 112 730 P.2d White v. support in of their claim that Black Can- (1986), adopted in which Court ought applied to this case yon faith in the insurance context. tort of bad correctly and that the trial court submitted Canyon The in stated: Court Black jury. The faith tort issue to the bad Unigard in did hold While this Court arguments crux of each of the borrowers’ in duty that a exists an insurer-insured surrounding circumstances com- is that the can re- relationship, the breach of which mercial loan transactions are similar faith, in action for bad the ratio- sult an relationship. those in an insurer-insured adoption Unigard borrowers, nale behind that According types both relationship “special performance usually was based involve transactions service, contract, and in- which exists between insurer public of a an adhesion 1014], bargaining P.2d disparity power sured.” 112 Idaho at 99 between [730 borrower, point on to of which cre- Unigard went the lender and all The Court (non- unique ‘personal’ “special relationship” such as the “that it is the ate a out fur- commercial) Unigard. insurance con- Court found Walkers nature of argue Canyon Black does not imposition of ther justifies the tracts which because, ultimately since this Court dealing.” apply fair duty good faith and no valid in that case that there was held Unigard The reasons stated Id. *10 operative affirmative defenses. facts as upon same are based terclaims BOYLE, JJ„ parties, “attempt contract between the JOHNSON and White constitutes McKEE, Tem., distinguish SCHROEDER and JJ. Pro dictum concur. binding which is not in this case” where par-

there is a valid contract between the IV ties.7 arguments We have reviewed the FIDUCIARY DUTY of the support borrowers of their faith tort bad We next consider whether the trial claim, them, and the cases cited and are submitting court erred in nevertheless convinced that our decision in borrowers’ claim that Idaho First owed and Canyon Black correct. The was bad faith fiduciary duty breached a to them. The tort, genesis peculiar which had its in the trial court submitted the breach of fiduci first-party nature of the insurance con- ary duty claim on behalf all of the Unigard, White v. tract, explained as Walker, except borrowers who was one of application first-party has no outside the general partners experi and an two context, clearly spelled insurance as we out attorney negotiated enced and who the loan Canyon Black in the partnership. case. We adhere to with the Bank on behalf of the our decision in Black Canyon.8 dismissing In claim of Walker’s breach partners attempt negotia- 7. The limited further to distin- nished in the course of the settlement tions, guish Canyon by claiming Black any that it dealt "shall not be admissible for reason or relationship, 22, with a while in February any .lender-borrower manner.” The court on bank, against relationship their case 1988, approved stipulation and stated that However, guarantor. that of lender and their stipulation "constitutes an order of this attempt distinguish Canyon per- Black is not Nevertheless, permitted court.” the court twenty-three people suasive. These were not borrowers to introduce evidence of these settle- only guarantors, partners but also were limited negotiations theory that the settle- ment on partnership. in the Geo-Pleurotus The Idaho negotiations supporting the ment were evidence partnership, First loan was made to the so the spite borrowers’ bad faith claims. In of the borrowers, partners limited are also and their prior stipulation and the court’s orders when guarantors as does not distin- additional status offered, that, evidence was the court ruled guish them from the borrowers in Black Can- normally though compromises "Even admissible, are not event, any disposition yon. our of the bad that, respect to the issues of upon faith tort issue is based much broader faith, of bad I feel that it does remain this case policy considerations. change position an issue.” The trial court's law, and one- 8. Much of the evidence in this three view of the incor- resulted from court’s 53, support half month trial was admitted in porated No. into the bad faith Instruction bad faith tort claim. Evidence which the trial any part conduct on the bank's which was ruled be inadmissible court had earlier would "intentionally the tort unreasonable" constituted was nevertheless admitted based the trial of bad faith. The trial court concluded that ruling the bad court’s that it was relevant to negotiations were “intentional- bank’s work-out example, claim. For the trial court faith tort ly unreasonable.” negotiations be- admitted evidence settlement specifically precludes admission I.R.E. 408 parties, that the tween the based on the claim negotiations work-out settlement such as the negotiated bank the settlement in bad faith Furthermore, proposals which were discussed. bad that evidence was relevant to the therefore rejection faith of the bad our reversal and negotiations faith tort claim. The settlement tort, rejected rationale have the trial court’s we negotiations, which were related to work-out evidence, which, under for the admission of this Valley principals of Bliss conducted between 408, clearly inadmissible Rule Evidence bank, related to the infusion and officers of Coleman, anyway. 114 Idaho In Ross v. equity capital and additional loan of additional capital, (1988), there this Court held that 761 P.2d 1169 management well as matters. duty party reasonable to conduct was no ruled, originally of a had as a result trial court authority negotiations im- and “no settlement limine, "Negotiations, discus- motion in bar- pose for “bad faith’ [settlement] sanctions sions, agreements stipulations, they if relate gaining.” 761 P.2d at 1188. 114 Idaho at they’re compromise, for sure to settlement Willis, v. 119 Idaho See also Turner Furthermore, going to be admissible.” (1991). of evidence The admission P.2d 737 stipulation parties a written had entered into negotiations, and the admission 25, 1988, the settlement February the court on filed with trial court ruled which the of other evidence they the bank and Bliss Val- which recited that solely upon faith the bad based negotia- was admissible ley tions, settlement intended to enter into retrial in theory, be admissible on will not expressly agreed tort parties that their and the statements, rejection faith tort. of the bad of our evidence fur- view conduct or

277 relationship will Bank, edging fiduciary that a fiduciary duty against the the trial stated, solely attorney through” court “Mr. Walker was an “arise a borrower-lender who, showed, conclusively juris- had relationship, the evidence cases from other cite to knowledge superior plaintiffs’ to that of there are some dictions which hold that representative as to all matters fiduciary relationship with which in a instances which representatives he of Idaho dealt with may arise a lender and borrower. between Woell, First.” See, v. 434 e.g., Union State Bank (N.D.1989); Wachholz, N.W.2d 712 Deist v. asserts that our recent decision bank (1984); 207, 208 Mont. 678 P.2d 188 Deni- Racquetball Canyon v. Black Club 684, Madeira, 230 Kan. son State Bank v. Bank, 171, First 119 Idaho 804 National (1982); Capitol 640 P.2d Dolton v. 1235 (1991), P.2d the 900 resolves issue and re- Ass’n., P.2d 642 21 Federal Sav. & Loan quires trial reversal on the court’s submis- Robertson, (Colo.App.1981); Pigg v. 549 fiduciary duty sion of the claim breach v. (Mo.App.1977); S.W.2d 597 Klein First Alternatively, in this case. the 418, Bank, Minn. Edina Nat’l. 293 196 argues bank that the same rationale which (1972). Canyon 619 In the Black N.W.2d caused the trial court to refuse submit cases, or similar case we reviewed those fiduciary Walker’s claim of breach of rela- reject chose to the claim but nevertheless Valley tionship applies to Bliss and the fiduciary relationship. of a partnership, members of the since general partner Walker the was was who case, In the recent Kansas Denison negotiate on the authorized behalf of 684, Madeira, Kan. Bank 230 640 State v. partnership actually and who drafted (1982), 1235 the defendants invested in P.2d loan agreement, assumption liability dealership retail a automobile had agreement, and all the other documents bank, sought financing through a which partnership. behalf of the provided financing to the had also dealer- that, In Canyon, supra, Black we held ship owner the seller. When the who was . relationship generally, loan, a between bank defendants defaulted on the bank lender and borrower was a debtor-creditor promissory sued to recover on the notes. relationship, fiduciary relationship, not a counterclaimed, alleging The defendants stating: fiduciary duty that the bank breached failing fully

“We it owed to them disclose have been unable locate case problems dealership financial fiduciary relationship which a held owner’s financial solely through a involvement with bank. longstanding arise holding no relationship fiduciary owed prior creditor-debtor deal- bank defendants, Supreme ings duty to the Court the customer between explained the characteristics of a expressed bank.” The rule of Kansas ... fiduciary duty relationship as follows: above cases holds that a is lender-borrower situation a debtor- imparts posi- a fiduciary relationship A relationship, fiduciary and not creditor peculiar placed by tion of confidence relationship. fiduciary A one individual in another. 'primarily person duty to is a with a act 176, (citing P.2d at 119 Idaho at 804 905 A fiduciary another. Wichita, Dugan v. First National Bank benefit of exercise, position is in a to have and 1009, 201, (1980). 227 P.2d Kan. 606 1015 does have and exercise over also, See v. Idaho First National Peterson influence relationship im- fiduciary another. A 578, Bank, 367 P.2d 83 Idaho plies superiority one a condition of (1961)(“It generally stated that the rela- Generally, in parties the other. over general a bank and its tionship between relationship, property, fiduciary in- creditor”); depositor is that of debtor placed authority of the other is terest or Bank, Meyer First National v. Idaho charge fiduciary____ in the (1974). 525 P.2d 990 omitted, (citations holding at ital- Notwithstanding our 640 P.2d 1241-42 Black added). borrowers, original, emphasis ics in Canyon, while acknowl- *12 278 Supreme placing re-

The South Carolina Court the customer is his trust and cently fiduciary duty defined a in relying as follows: confidence the bank and is so to counsel inform bank him. fiduciary implies party

The term that one superior position inis a to the other and 196 N.W.2d at 623. position that such a him exer- enables foregoing authorities are consistent reposes spe- cise influence over one who Canyon our decision in that a with Black him____ cial trust and confidence in As not create a borrower-lender situation does rule, general respect a mere for anoth- fiduciary relationship. From a review of judgment er’s or trust in this character is evidentiary the entire record we conclude usually such a not sufficient to establish is our that this case controlled Black relationship. The facts and circum- case that the trial court erred Canyon repos- stances must indicate that the one submitting fiduciary duty in the breach of ing for his trust has foundation belief jury. claim to the giving presenting that the one advice or Robert Erkins and his wife were arguments acting not his own be- Ranch, of the White Arrow north owners half, in the interests of the other but Bliss, Idaho, geo a which contained party. had, spring. thermal Erkins for several Bank, Burwell v. South Carolina Nat. individuals years, discussed with various (1986) 790 288 S.C. 340 S.E.2d energy capitalize geothermal on the how to (citations omitted, added). emphasis Ap- potential of Arrow Ranch. White standard, plying court Burwell Among the uses he considered was a mush arrangement held that a borrower-lender growing operation. Erkins had dis room relationship, fiduciary not a conclud- was growing of mushrooms with cussed ing: knowledgeable in the individuals several special reposed If a trust [the customer] field, progressed the discussions had officer], bank there is no evidence [the contacting potential point he was where that was aware of it. bank officer] [the capital to finance the mushroom sources party cognizant Each was of the tenuous Mr. Mil growing operation. He contacted position company financial ... ler, vice-president the Idaho First Na signed. The when the documents were Bank, Erkins had discus with whom tional bargained fact that [the customer] potential joint ven regard to a sions with signed the before he bank officer] [the Bank Idaho First National ture between indicates that documents customer] [the growing project. in a mushroom and Erkins dealing parties aware that the were was discussions, Mil During the course of those length. reasonably not at arms He could that, because of suggested ler to Erkins have that bank believed officer] [the project, a large capital demands of such instead on behalf of acting on his behalf age, might Erkins not of his and because bank]. [the capital resources all of his want to commit 340 S.E.2d at 790. basket”) in your eggs one (“put all of Bank, 293 v. First Edina Natl. ought Klein to consid project, and that he such a 418, 196 (1972), the court bring Minn. N.W.2d partnership to forming a limited er spread stated: equity capital so as to other un inherent in such an were risks which the correct rule We believe sugges upon Miller’s Based tried venture. transacts business with a bank when and his wife tion, that he customer, Erkins testified it has no depositor or other accept that “we would the customer and concluded duty to counsel special very proposal” nice First National Bank’s every fact relat- him of material inform that he decided transaction—including joint for a venture ing to the through use of capital material, try to raise motive, participat- for would if bank’s In December partnership. special cir- limited ing in the transaction—unless Walker, Falls a Twin Thomas exist, he contacted such as where cumstances together putting attorney experienced has reason to know knows or bank Bank, repre- Walker was arrangements tax and First National capital venture Erkins, limit- responded senting Valley, and the profit Bliss reasons. Walker proposal, stating, ac- positively partners. to Erkins’ ed Erkins, that, cording really “We would partnership, In the limited Walker *13 you like look the idea that have and to at partners, and the general Erkins were something group see if our can do under a agreement specifically autho- partnership (Em- partnership arrangement.” limited business of the rized them to conduct the added.) phasis Erkins testified that when things necessary partnership to do all a limit- Miller recommended that he look at partner- purposes of the carry to out the partnership, and Tom ed “when Walker express- partnership agreement ship. The along says comes he would like to look Er- general partners, ly provided that going partnership, a limited I had at into Walker, duty fiduciary to kins and owed a already. my bridge crossed the And mind the loan partners. limited None of me, a and see says to let’s take look at this owed a documentation states that bank partnership would do.” what a limited fiduciary obligation toward the borrowers. Walker, negotiated which re- Erkins with part- purposes of the limited One of the forming partner- sulted in their a limited shelter, i.e., provide a nership was to a tax ship, general part- of them as with two during the tax loss write-off substantial ners, capital necessary to raise the venture part- years operation of the for the initial required lending a insti- order to induce this, accomplish accord- ners. In order to provide to mushroom tution to loans ing testimony, the Internal to Walker’s growing operation. plan called for the required regulations Revenue Code million, partnership to contribute with $1.1 partners guarantee and be that the limited approximately another million to be $3 risk for at least three times the amount at raised bank loans. partner- in the limited of their investment attorney specializing Walker was an in ship. compliance ensure with I.R.S. To capital raising tax and other venture com- loan regulations, prepared Walker all the panies and was involved in numerous limit- documents, including assumption of lia- partnerships By ed and other ventures. obligated limit- bility agreement which each December, referring group” to “our in the for three times his partner ed to the bank Erkins, conversation with Walker partner- or her in the limited investment apparently referring company to a was ship. by him owned called Professional/Execu- plan prepared also the business Walker Leasing, “personnel leasing compa- tive it partnership and submitted for the limited ny” part- employed which all of the limited possible lending institutions for to several ultimately ners who invested in the Bliss loans, First ultimately settling on Idaho

Valley operation, except Donnie mushroom previously its Bank because of National Leas- McFadden. Professional/Executive project. The expressed support for the entity ing an formed for tax reduction was partnership interests which limited purposes participants each of the which reg- selling not to be partnership was were (the twenty-two partners limited in the Depart- security the Idaho istered as a with venture) Valley employed were Bliss Finance, private to but were ment of in turn leased their services back which prepared Consequently, Walker offering. practices maximize professional their Placement entitled “Private a document way re- tax benefits of individual their provi- Memorandum,” set out the which plans, etc. A substantial number tirement plan, part- limited sions of the business partners Valley Bliss limited were financial contained nership, and which in other ventures be- involved with Walker relevant to all other facts statements and Leasing sides the Professional/Executive mem- private placement project. These many them in as as five Company, some of separately for each prepared oranda were Walker and Erkins testi- ventures. Both sought whom Walker particular individual preparation of the documen- fied that in the part solicit, for the most included regard loan from Idaho to which with tation Memorandum, ultimately part- nership Agreement those who became limited and the making ners.9 and has relied in this investment therein, only on the information contained approximately Walker sent letters provided information him in otherwise individuals, inviting twelve them to a meet- writing by the General Partners or infor- 12, 1984, ing May Holiday at the Inn in mation from books and records of the Gen- Falls, plan Twin where the business By placing warranty eral Partners.” discussed them both Erkins and language subscription agreement, in the Walker, was, been, given and each or had he to make Walker testified that wanted private placement memorandum con- people going sure that who were cerning partnership offering.10 the limited make an investment had all of the informa- May meeting, many As a result of the 12th *14 partnership tion about the available signed partnership of the attendees limited them, provid- in the written documentation subscription agreements agreeing to enter it, ed, they provided had all been partnership capital. the and contribute their they and he assumed that had read it Later, not, including Three did Babcock. subscription signing their view partners the remainder of the limited who agreement dialogue to that effect. with ultimately joined Valley the Bliss limited trial, during the court Walker’s counsel partnership private place- received their stated, except dispute “There’s no at all for ment memorandum from Walker Mr. Donnie McFadden the other [that] [a]ll signed subscription agreements, according brought into the invest- individuals were subscription testimony. to Walker’s In the Walker, them by approached ment Mr. who agreement, copy a of which is attached to dispute There’s no about the investment. A, opinion Appendix this each subscriber about that.” that, undersigned re- warranted “The has [private upon this evidence the trial court placement] Memoran- Based ceived Walker, dum, general part- carefully concluded that and has reviewed the Part- experienced been en- Walker sent businessman who had 9. One of the individuals to whom "private placement variety the cock, memorandum” was Bab- gaged ventures in Cali- in a of business manager of the Idaho First National was in the horse fornia and Idaho and who Falls, expressed had an inter- Bank in Twin who Idaho, Hagerman, breeding at the business near investing partnership. est in the limited partner. He had been time he became a limited However, ultimately he Babcock concluded that the late 1970’s and a friend of Babcock’s since position invest because of his at the could not at Babcock's branch of the had banked glowingly project spoke bank. Babcock early Bank since the 1980’s. First National friend, and delivered his documents to his customer, bank Babcock had themselves been McFadden and partner, and sometime investment ventures, business involved in two or three McFadden, ultimately Donnie who became the mush- advised McFadden of Babcock first venture, partner twenty-third in the limited profit potential. Babcock venture and its room along the other eleven clients of Walker with McFadden, according to McFadden’s advised wives. Much of McFadden’s contact and their avail- testimony, another "slot” that if there was project initially came and information about the ought partnership to con- he able in the limited However, did, prior from Babcock. McFadden Later, split- investing. the two considered sider subscription agreement signing for one of ting opportunity When to invest. interests, Babcock’s partnership travel to the the limited not be able to he would they Babcock concluded that with Walker where White Arrow Ranch personally position with the physical participate bank, of his site and dis- because viewed the develop- project potential gave data and and its for of the financial cussed the he some private his ment. McFadden also submitted McFadden for he had to documents which that, placement for memorandum to his accountant while testified consideration. McFadden prior making in- the decision to (the his review pri- three-ring binder he had received the vest. memorandum), did not read placement he vate accountant personally it to his it but delivered testimony busi- his described the 10. Walker in family mem- and his McFadden for his review. being optimistic concerning plan as more ness accompanied mush- personally bers were project, private potential and the all room-growing who answered site Walker conserva- placement memorandum as a more regard questions to the investment. their project. tive evaluation of pur- Thereafter, August McFadden by Walk- was not solicited 11. Donnie McFadden partnership. in the limited his interest chased partnership. McFadden was an to enter the er ner, superior had the knowledge regarding that these during statements were made the loan transaction and the April, May mushroom months of and June of venture, representatives, agreement bank’s nine months after the loan and denied Walker’s claim that the bank consummated. Erkins first asserted the owed Walker a fiduciary duty. agree. claim of defamation in his We amended coun- 24, 1988, terclaim filed March beyond well Both the bank and the hoped borrowers two-year pro- statute of limitations monetarily benefit the loan transac- 5-219(5).13 However, scribed I.C. Er- § They tion. bargaining were at arm’s 15(c) kins asserts that under I.R.C.P. his length, according Walker, and each was defamation claim relates back to the initial looking out after its own interest. Each 12, 1987, May counterclaim filed which was was competently represented by qualified years less than two after at least some of representative fully capable who was the statements were made. In the alterna- protecting parties.12 interests of their tive, Erkins claims that Idaho First waived To hold the bank to the standard of a its statute of limitations defense. fiduciary transaction, financing thus Regarding requiring Erkins’ primarily it to act contention that for the benefit defamation claim itself, raised the amended borrower rather than “would *15 counterclaim put an relates back to obligation intolerable the initial upon banking counterclaim, 15(c) provides I.R.C.P. institutions and ordinary day-to-day convert “[wjhenever business the claim or defense transactions asserted fiduciary into rela- in tionships pleading the amended where none arose out of the were intended or an- conduct, transaction, ticipated.” or occurrence Denison set State Bank v. Ma- deira, attempted forth or 640 P.2d to be set forth in at 1243. Accordingly, we original pleading, reaffirm our recent in amendment relates decision Black Can- yon Club, original back to the date of the Racquetball Inc., pleading.” and conclude If, however, pleading that on this the amended record the sets trial court erred in submitting forth a cause new of action unrelated to borrowers’ claim of breach original fiduciary pled, transaction or duty to occurrence jury.

the amendment does not relate back to the original date of pleading. Black Can BOYLE, JJ., JOHNSON and Martin, yon, supra; Wing v. 107 Idaho McKEE, SCHROEDER Tern., JJ. Pro (1984). 1172 P.2d concur. The Erkins’ initial counterclaim did V allege any action, defamation cause of allege any nor did it part conduct on the DEFAMATION give the bank which would to a def rise counterclaim, In his amended Er- Robert amation action In Robert Erkins. kins raised a claim for defamation. The good claim of duty breach of the faith jury found in favor of him on his def- dealing original fair contained in the amation claim. Idaho challenges First counterclaim, alleged Erkins that “Mr. claiming, award among things, provided Babcock inaccurate and mislead the claim was barred the statute of ing information to investors ... the effect limitations. impact of which was to have adverse on the upon The defamation claim Facility’s operations. particular, was based Mr. by Babcock, several provided statements made the Babcock inaccurate and mislead loan, Idaho First officer in charge ing of this concerning information the activities of ...,” about Robert Erkins. The Randy record indicates Erkins son counter- 12. Walker testified that he was these partnership. was diligent types financing negotiations representing the interests of the experienced and that he Within two in 13. tery, 5. An action for 5-219. false [******] Actions (2) years: imprisonment ... libel, slander, assault, personal or seduction. injuries.— bat- However, 218, 5-219, claimant Robert Erkins. these 5-224 and 12 1977.” U.S.C. § allegations added.) only 9(h) concern Erkins’ (Emphasis Robert I.R.C.P. states: son, Randy, only then relation to a pleading “In the statute of limitations it is implied claim of breach of the covenant of generally sufficient to state that the action good dealing. faith fair There was no barred, allege particularity against any- notice of a defamation claim Session Law or the section of the Idaho Therefore, one. we conclude that the def- pleader Code which the relies.” alleged amation claim in the amended coun- Thus, the bank’s assertion the statute of “conduct, terclaim did not arise out of limitations in I.C. 5-219 its answer § transaction or occurrence set forth” the was sufficient to raise the statute limita- 15(c). original counterclaim. I.R.C.P. Ac- tions as a defense to the Erkins defamation cordingly, the defamation claim does not action. Engineering, Resource Inc. v. Sil- filing relate back to the of the initial coun- er, (1972); 94 Idaho 500 P.2d 836 Jo- terclaim, 12, 1987, May filed and the def- Darrar, seph v. 93 Idaho 472 P.2d 328 applicable amation claim is barred (1970). two-year statutes limitations. I.C. 5-§ denying In memorandum decision its 219(5). As this Court stated in Black Can- motions, post-trial bank’s the trial court yon, supra: requested had not an held that the bank Given the fact that ... these new tort on the statute of limitations de- instruction entirely causes of action were different being prior fense to the case submitted to origi- from the claim ... contained in the and, therefore, the defense complaint, nal and because the new 49(a).14 pursuant waived to I.R.C.P. part upon claims relied new facts not determination that the statute trial court’s alleged original complaint, in the trial pursuant of limitations defense was waived court concluded that the tort claims in *16 49(a) to I.R.C.P. because the bank failed complaint the amended did not relate request jury assumes that a instruction filing original to the time of of the back presented question this defense a of fact. 15(c), complaint under I.R.C.P. were However, noted in Reis v. as this Court limitations____ by barred the statute of 434, (1982): Cox, 104 Idaho 660 P.2d that the trial court did not We conclude The time when a cause of action accrues holding. err or its discretion in so abuse question of may question a of law or a be 178, 119 Idaho at 804 P.2d at 907. fact, any depending upon dis- whether nevertheless, contends, that Erkins material fact exist. puted issues of First its statute of limitations Idaho waived dispute any no over issue Where there is failing request it by defense that regarding the of material fact when jury. The included as an instruction to the accrues, question cause of action neglected argue Erkins that since the bank by the for determination one of law jury, it cannot to raise the issue before court. appeal. now raise it on (citations at 50 104 Idaho at 660 P.2d of limita- Idaho First raised the statute omitted). to Erkins’ tions defense in its answer undisputed testimony at trial was counterclaim, which first raised amended defamatory allegedly statements defamation claim. Idaho First’s an- ’ during April, occurred by made Babcock “[cjounterclaimants swer stated no 1985. There was May and June of part by in whole or claims are barred concerning the limitations, question of fact to resolve including, applicable statute of 5-217, or the date when to, those statements 5- date of not limited Idaho Code but §§ de- 49(a) jury. omitted without such provides part As to an issue 14. I.R.C.P. that if "the or, finding; special may if it verdict issue make a form] court omits the court [in mand by by pleadings so, the evi- raised have made a shall be deemed to fails to do it of fact dence, by right party to a trial each waives his judgment finding on the with the in accord jury before the issue so omitted unless added.) (Emphasis special verdict.” jury its submission to the retires he demands filed, relations; (2) the defamation claim was which was with contractual the bank’s years more than two after the statements privileged actions were because of its fi- Thus, were made. the statute of limita- nancial interest and investment in the en- question tions defense awas of law. Not (3) terprise; sup- there was no evidence to only did the bank raise the statute of limi- port damages amount of awarded answer, tations its but bank moved (4) jury; jury improperly was in- judgment notwithstanding for a the verdict relating structed on the law tortious based the statute of limitations de- contracts, (5) interference with fense as set out in its answer to the amend- adopted has the tort of interference 50(b) provides ed counterclaim. I.R.C.P. prospective advantage economic which that, “Any party aggrieved verdict, by a was included in Instruction No. previously whether or not he has moved for instruction on “tortious interference with verdict, directed four- move within relationships.” contractual For several days entry teen after the judgment to reasons, we conclude that the instructions any judgment have the verdict and entered judgment were erroneous and that the aside____” thereon set Since the statute of award for tortious inference with contrac- limitations defense was raised in the an- tual relations must be reversed for a new swer to the pro- amended counterclaim as trial. 9(h), vided I.R.C.P. the motion for j.n.o.v., and since there was no factual is- A. sue over whether or not more than two years elapsed had making between the First, jury in improperly filing statements and the of the amend- structed relating on the law to tortious counterclaim, ed the issue of the statute of interference with contractual relations. law, limitations was one of and the trial Instruction No. was instructed court erred in failing grant the bank’s that the prove elements which Erkins must judgment motion for notwithstanding the are: verdict on the basis that the defamation 1. The existence of pro- a contract or claim asserted Erkins was barred spective advantage; economic two-year statute proscribed of limitations Knowledge by interfering 2. party; 5-219(5). in I.C. § 3. Intentional interference with the con- *17 prospective tract or economic advan- BOYLE, JJ„ JOHNSON and and tage justification; without and McKEE, Tern., SCHROEDER and JJ. Pro concur. Damage proximately by 4. caused the interference.

VI prima This instruction misstates the facie elements of the tort of interference with TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE party by contract a third as set forth WITH CONTRACT this Court in Barlow v. International Har- Erkins’ amended counterclaim included a Co., 881, vester 95 Idaho 522 P.2d 1102 claim for tortious interference with con- (1974). Furthermore, merges it the claims relationships. alleged tractual Erkins that of tortious interference with contract and (1) the bank interfered arrange- with his prospective the tortious interference awith Valley ment provide with Bliss to consult- advantage, economic which has different ing (2) services and also interfered with the elements, B, as set out Part infra. receipt payments of lease from the real Barlow, prima the Court held a that property which he had leased to Bliss Val- facie case of the tort of interference with $250,250 ley. jury The awarded to Erkins requires plaintiff prove: contract the to on this claim. (a) contract; the existence of a appeals, claiming, among The bank things, (1) (b) knowledge that there no part was evidence to of the contract on the support defendant; claim of tortious interference of the

284

(c) Also, management. regard- causing intentional interference a removed from contract; breach ing payments, agreement the lease the loan (d) bank, signed by Erkins, provided with the injury plaintiff to resulting from if payments breach. that the loan was no default any partners. would made to of the (emphasis Id. at 522 P.2d at 1114 add- ed). provides The Barlow case then case, Under the Barlow Erkins had plaintiff prima after the has established a it proving burden of that was the intention- case, “the burden is on the defendant al interference caused facie bank which prove justification.”15 to of the Bliss breach contract between Erkins, Valley not dissatisfaction given by No. 48 Instruction partners Bliss limited which caused court was The erroneous. Barlow case Valley it had to terminate contract clearly requires prove, the claimant find, with Erkins. Instruction 48 did not jury an “intentional interfer No. contract____” requirement in- causing ence of the follow the Barlow a breach given require The instruction did not Er- interfer- jury struct the intentional prove kins to intentional that the interfer of the ence must have caused the breach ence caused breach the contract. It any liability accrue. contract before would only required that the intentional interfer a party A entitled to have damage proximately ence resulted in properly instructed on the issue of causa by the caused interference. give proper tion. a instruction Failure asserting essentially Erkins was two is reversible error. Robert causation First, claims of he claim- interference. Richards, v. 115 769 P.2d son ing that bank interfered with his ar- (1989); Wilson, Corey v. 93 Idaho rangement Valley provide con- with Bliss (1969). given instruction P.2d 951 second, services, and, sulting that the bank erroneously forth the of causation set law receipt pay- interfered with the lease contract, as for tortious interference with had property ments from the real which he case, requires set out in the Barlow Valley. leased Bliss granting of a new Robertson v. trial. Whether not the bank’s conduct was Wilson, Richards, supra. supra; Corey v. causing an interference “intentional disputed was a breach the contract” B. There issue of fact in the case. was sub- appeal The bank also claims on stantial, though conflicting, evidence intro- adopted never the cause of that Idaho has part- to the effect that limited duced “pro action of tortious interference with with Erkins’ ners were dissatisfied spective there advantage,” economic management general partner as a activities including that fore trial court erred in Valley operation, Bliss and that dis- we being of Erkins claim Instruction No. 48. While satisfaction was the cause within 15. With ence, " the law crystallized to the existence or volved, actor’s Restatement of (1962). Settlemeyer, depends on * * * cumstances; whether, upon a consideration of the relative spite its (1939). ‘Unlike the law of The issue in regard conduct Barlow his See expected What is [interference a conduct also 150 complete significance of the facts Torts case noted: justification for Colo. Freed effect "unwarranted” interference defamation, this branch of non-existence of justifiable under the cir- each case whether the should of each case.' Watson v. § 326, set of definite rules v. Manchester 767, of harm another.” 372 P.2d contract] comment is permitted an interfer- factors privilege. 453, has not Service, a at 63 456 de- in- 95 Idaho at justified W.L. interference supra amation, er fied. Mitchell (1957). "Otherwise is § [148] v. 691-692 [1958]. O'Neill, 163 Knudtzon, ordinarily 129, the interference A.2d Prosser, at 151 [165 pp. where 181 are 936-37 893, [833] justifiable Cal.App.2d with contract is tried supra for [1964].’’ Kan. Handbook of the Law v. employed by improper 522 Aldrich, at 837 (4th When an action [65 of the defendant 930, P.2d conduct is rendered ed. Wash.2d *18 186], at 317 P.2d means, [1960]; Jackson v. supra, 1971). determine wheth 1114. 331 157], P.2d [689] [122 such See Calbom to a defendant. was involving 440, 396 of Torts Vt. jury, as def- justi P.2d 19], 443 un- at it

285 plaintiff prove that the question, we statement that directly ruled on the have not cases, prior “improper” under the alluded to the tort two have interference Harvester, 767, court, 95 v. International in an Barlow listed in that factors § 881, (1974), P.2d 1102 and Twin Linde, 522 redefined the opinion by Justice D City Distributing, Inc. v. Falls Farm & “wrongful interference with tort as Inc., 351, Co., 528 Supply B 96 Idaho & relationships”. Top Serv. economic (1974). In Falls Farm & P.2d 1286 Twin Co., 283 Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Body Distributing, noted that City Court 1365, (1978). 201, P.2d 1368 Or. 582 adjoining tearing sign down of a in an Thus, inter- a cause of action for tortious building competitor a tres- by a “was both from either the defen- ference arises possesso- pass appellant’s ownership improper objective an pursuit dant’s sign space, ry rights window or the use of harming plaintiff tort of ‘interfer- as well as a common law injury in fact cause wrongful means that ” prospective advantage.’ 96 ence with business rela- plaintiff’s contractual or 359, 1294, citing Idaho at 528 P.2d at both Serv., P.2d at 1368. tionships. Top Barlow, Draft supra, and the Tentative interference is estab- A claim for tortious of Torts No. Restatement of the Law lished (2d), (1969), pp. seq. 766A at 50 et § resulting injury interference when Prosser, Torts, pp. Law of 130 at 949 et § wrongful by some mea- to another is 1971). (4th seq. ed. beyond the fact the interfer- sure case, City Since the Twin Falls Farm & liability may ence itself. Defendant’s has not had occasion to address this Court improper motives or from arise from However, again. several of our issue means____ improper No the use of neighboring years. states have recent privilege unless the question of arises Seattle, City 112 Wash.2d See Pleas v. wrongful interference would be but (1989); Top 774 P.2d 1158 Service recognized privilege Even a ... Co., 283 Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. privilege be overcome [however] (1978); 582 P.2d 1365 Dolton v. Or. means used defendant are when the ’n, Capital Savings Federal Loan Ass & recog- justified by the reason for cases, (Colo.App.1981). 642 P.2d 21 These nizing privilege____ cases, as well as numerous other recent Serv., Interfer- Top 582 P.2d at 1371. claim approved have some variation of the “wrongful” by reason of a ence can be prospective of tortious interference with a regulation, recog- or other or statute relationship, prospective eco- business law, common or an estab- nized rule of However, advantage. all of the nomic profession. lished standard of trade or proof require cases as an element of Therefore, only plaintiff must show not plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s inten- intentionally inter- the defendant only tional conduct not caused the interfer- relationship, but fered with his business prospective economic advan- ence with “duty of had a also that defendant tage, also that the defendant’s conduct but non-interference; i.e., he interfered wrongful the tort must have been before used improper purpose ... or ... for an arises. v. Lar- improper means ...” Straube Court, Washington Supreme When 357, 361, son, P.2d 371 287 Or. Seattle, adopted City the tort of Pleas v. (1979). the economic “wrongful interference with of this adopt Oregon formulation We *19 Oregon relationship,” by established doing other courts in so. tort and follow Court, Supreme it stated: at 1163. 774 P.2d right balance has We believe in Washington court agree with the We by colleagues our on the been struck Seattle, Oregon and the City Pleas v. Rejecting the Oregon Supreme Court. Shop, Inc. v. Top Body in court Service first approach facie tort prima Co., adopt the tort supra, and adopt in Allstate Ins. declining to Restatement and re- wrongful interference with economic Re- of implication of the second toto 286

lationships in regard as outlined those cases. A to Erkins’ claim that With plaintiff, prima in order to establish a intentionally the bank interfered with the fa- case, any claimed inten- cie must show receipt payments of lease from the real prospective a tional interference with eco- property which he had leased to Bliss Val advantage resulting injury in nomic to the ley, facially that claim asserts a true Bar plaintiff wrongful by “is some measure low-type tortious interference with a con beyond the fact of the interference itself.” tract, i.e., property Erkins’ lease real Pleas, plaintiff 774 P.2d at 1163. The must which, Valley, Bliss unless there was a establish that the intentional interference permitting party clause either to terminate resulting wrongful, in injury was which will, appear at would to be a contract (1) by proof be shown that either: the which, by Valley, if Bliss breached would improper objective defendant had an or subject damage it a claim Erkins. (2) purpose plaintiff; to harm the or the However, paragraph agree 3.12 of the loan wrongful defendant used a means to cause that, specifically provided ment in the event injury prospective business relation- Valley in that Bliss was default of ship.16 agreement, payments terms of the no were general to be made to or on behalf of the plaintiff After the has established partners partners or the limited claim, prima the burden then shifts facie the contracts which the Bliss Val borrower privilege. to the defendant to establish ley general part had with the or limited question privilege “No arises unless the acknowledged ners. Erkins in his testimo wrongful interference but for the would be that, ny that he was aware under that if privilege; only it becomes an issue provision agreement of the loan he was charged part facts would be tortious on the any payments from Bliss entitled receive unprivileged Top of an defendant.” Ser Valley Valley if Bliss was default of Co., Shop, Body vice Inc. v. Allstate Ins. agreement. loan Because the trial court (1978). 582 P.2d 1371 Or. findings made no of fact or conclusions Valley regarding law whether Bliss arrange regard With to Erkins’ agreement, an essential default of the loan Valley provide consult ment with Bliss determining element for whether there was services, arrangement ing if that was mere any damages suf breach of the lease or ly employment-at-will, terminable ei an alleged fered Erkins as a result of having a party ther without the other claim the lease con tortious interference with contract, Er- against it for then breach missing. tract was kins’ claim based on the loss of those con merged improperly Instruction No. 48 sulting services would not be the tort separate claims of tortious interference interference with contract as set out wrongful interference contract and with Barlow, constituted a claim but would have relationships. It omitted with economic prospective for tortious interference with Barlow, in the tortious requirement from Erkins advantage economic which would claims, that contract interference with the interfer prove have to that the intentional in- an “intentional conduct was bank’s “wrongful” ence was as defined above. the con- causing terference a breach a contract with Bliss Only if Erkins had Furthermore, properly it did not tract." Valley to Valley subject Bliss which would of tortious interference define the claim of contract if it termi damages for breach par- advantage, prospective economic consulting Erkins contract with nated requirement that the interfer- ticularly the Erkins have a claim for tortious would it is ac- Barlow, “wrongful” before ence must be under with a contract interference No. 48 Accordingly, Instruction tionable. A as outlined Part above. intimidation, indicated, misrepresentation, wrongful 16. As the deceit or Top Court Service Top disparaging "a bribery, include conduct in violation of falsehood." means would ... or regulation, recognized rule Service, or other statute P.2d at 1371. *20 "violence, law," of such as threats of common

287 erroneous, and that claim must be VIII reversed for a new trial. COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH

AND FAIR DEALING BOYLE, J., and SCHROEDER and jury The trial in court instructed the

McKEE, Tern., JJ. Pro concur. Instruction No. 39 that: Every imposes parties contract on all JOHNSON, J., VI(A). concurs Part obligation good the contract an of faith dealing performance

and fair its VII enforcement. “Good faith” means hon-

esty in fact in the conduct or transac- PUNITIVE DAMAGES tion concerned. good party duty Each owes a to exercise trial court submitted the issue dealings faith its and transactions with punitive damages jury, of which party. party If a fails to deal punitive damages found no in favor of Bliss honestly party, with the other it is liable Walkers, Erkins, Valley, the and the but duty good for a breach of the of faith. punitive damages assessed in various Additionally, Instruction No. 40 read: amounts, $4,000 $34,000, ranging from guaranty relationships, In all Idaho First partners-guarantors, favor of the limited guarantor duty owes to a of continuous $288,- punitive damage for a total of award good dealing. faith and fair 000. Because we have reversed the award instructions, Based those re- ccompensatory damages for the bad faith against turned a verdict Idaho First and in tort fiduciary duty and breach of causes $250,250, favor of Erkins for in favor of action, punitive damages award of $46,000, Walkers the amount of must likewise be reversed. Yacht Club partners in favor of the limited in the sum Service, Sales & Inc. v. First National $2,000 each. Idaho, 852, 864, Bank North 101 Idaho appeals, raising Idaho First several 464, (1980)(“The 623 P.2d 476 judgment in regarding errors is submission of this awarding compensatory this action dam jury. Initially, sue to the for the same reversed, ages must judg and thus the reason which we reversed the award of awarding punitive damages ment must like i.e., punitive damages, ad erroneous proceed wise be reversed for further support mission of evidence in of the bad ings.”). As have we noted in Parts III and fiduciary duty faith and breach of claims above, major portion IV of the evidence which should not have been issues in this at this trial related to the bad faith tort and case, judgment the verdict and on the cove claims, fiduciary obligation breach both good dealing nant of faith and fair must be erroneously of which were submitted to the set aside. v. Yacht Club Sales & Service retrial,

jury. On the evidence well be Idaho, First National Bank North su different, and the trial court will need to pra. Additionally, that In we conclude independently evaluate the evidence sub contrary struction No. 39 law mitted at retrial to determine whether or prior our established cases. not the evidence is sufficient to meet the Surety, In Luzar v. 107 Western required standard in Cheney v. Palos 693, (1984), Court, 692 P.2d 337 Verdes, 897, (1983). 104 Idaho 665 P.2d 661 defining without nature covenant See also Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. that, involved, stated faith and fair “Good Services, 118 Idaho 800 P.2d 656 every dealing implied obligations are (1990). Idaho at 692 P.2d at contract.” 107 340. v. Intermountain Gas Metcalf BOYLE, JJ., Co., (1989), JOHNSON P.2d we 116 Idaho McKEE, Tem., SCHROEDER and JJ. Pro first defined what constitutes a breach dealing good concur. faith and fair covenant *21 288 party change

by stating, “Any by action either a material in the terms its of violates, significantly im- “inject which nullifies or Nor does it contract. ... sub- employment con- pairs benefit of the parties’ terms into the stantive contract.” implied-in-law tract is a violation of Rather, requires only parties that the it 627, 116 Idaho at 778 P.2d at covenant.” perform good obligations in faith the im- Further, in 749. we stated agreement. Thus, posed by their ... Metcalf contracts,” implied in “the covenant only in duty arises connection with dam- that the breach “results contract by parties____ agreed terms 626, ages, damages.” 116 Idaho at not tort (emphasis supplied). 807 P.2d at 360 P.2d at 748. We reaffirmed that defi- 778 demonstrate, foregoing As the cases v. nition of the covenant Sorensen good implied faith and fair Tek, Inc., 664, covenant 799 P.2d 118 Idaho Comm (1990). dealing implied by law in the recently, in Burton v. is a covenant 70 Most Union, covenant will be im- parties’ Atomic Workers’ Federal Credit contract. No (1990), 17, 803 P.2d 518 this contrary 119 Idaho to the terms of the plied which is “as a implied described the covenant Court negotiated executed contract contract, tort, covenant in breach parties. Security First Bank Idaho v. employment of which is a ‘breach of the 172, (1988); Gaige, 115 Idaho 765 P.2d 683 ” contract, Idaho at and is not a tort.’ 119 Exchange, 115 Clement v. Farmers Ins. 23, Security In 803 P.2d at 524. First 298, (1988) (an implied Idaho 766 P.2d 768 172,765 Gaige, Idaho v. 115 Idaho Bank good dealing and fair covenant of faith (1988), pointed we out that the P.2d 683 express in a provision cannot override an good faith and fair implied covenant of contract). requires “that the covenant with the dealing cannot be inconsistent parties perform good faith the obli- agreement parties: executed imposed by agreement,” their Bad- gations Security Gaige claims First breached Bank, 116 Wash.2d gett Security v. State dealing im- duty good and fair faith 356, (1991), 563, and a P.2d 356 viola- 807 However, guaranties. we plied in the only “ei- occurs when tion of the covenant ruling agree trial court’s with the violates, signifi- nullifies or party ther ... any duty breach Security First did not impairs any of the ... con- cantly benefit exercising its ex- Gaige by merely tract____” Tek, Inc., Sorensen v. Comm agree- press rights guaranty under the 70, (1990); 664, 669, 799 P.2d 75 118 Idaho claiming There is no basis ment. Co., 116 v. Intermountain Gas Metcalf contrary express implied terms (1989). 744 778 P.2d parties’ agree- rights contained in ment. court, which In case the trial this (emphasis Metcalf, P.2d at 687 115 Idaho at of our did not have the benefit supplied). time at the and Burton decisions Sorensen jury, for the the instructions prepared it implied of the analysis and definition Our No. 39 jury in Instruction instructed the dealing is good faith and fair covenant of and fair good faith that the covenant of In surrounding states. consistent in the con honesty in fact dealing “means Bank, 116 Security State Badgett v. If a ... concerned. (1991), duct or the transaction 807 P.2d Wash.2d the other honestly with year fails to deal just party Washington Supreme Court duty of good party, it is for breach implied covenant liable described the does not No. 39 dealing good faith.” Instruction and fair as follows: faith “dealing honestly with the explain what implied every contract an There is means, instruc nor does the party” dealing. This and fair duty good faith that, merely stand tion advise cooperate obligates parties duty contract, party of a ing upon the terms so that each obtain with each other honestly with another fail to deal does not performance. the full benefit the terms onerous regardless of how party However, does duty good faith addition to may be. of that contract party accept obligate a not extend to

289 being the inadequate an statement of re- for of the same contract. As in breach cases, quirements good implied may of the faith cove- other contract a claimant nant, may jury consequential damages the well the entitled to for have confused “dealing honestly” requirement implied good in the of Instruc- breach of covenant something tion the that “intentionally No. 39 with unrea- faith if “there is in contract requirement suggests they sonable” of the bad tort within the faith were in jury contemplation parties proved Instruction No. 53. The well of the are and certainty.” have concluded that under No. Tie Instruction with reasonable Brown’s & 53, Co., if party intentionally Chicago acted v. 115 Ida- unreason- Lumber Co. Title 56, 61, (1988). ably, 423, 764 might he also have “failed to deal ho P.2d 428 honestly In- party” with the other under Instruction did not suffi- Because No. 39 39, though struction No. even in both cases implied good the of ciently define covenant enforcing he merely rights his under dealing fair the circum- faith and the contract. appli- in which the is not stances covenant cable, judgment 39 adequately damages

Instruction No. did not of award implied inform the to the of relating of law for are re- breach covenant implied good of covenant faith as outlined versed.

in The of Sorensen. covenant Metcalf good dealing faith and only J., fair is violated BOYLE, and SCHROEDER and violates, by party when either “action ... McKEE, Tern., Pro JJ. concur. significantly nullifies or impairs any bene- JOHNSON, J., concurs in result. fit supra. of the contract.” Metcalf, ... requires The parties covenant “that IX perform good obligations in faith the im- posed by agreement.” their v. Badgett REALIGNMENT OF THE PARTIES Bank, 563, Security State 116 Wash.2d the trial court reevaluate On retrial must (1991). 807 P.2d 356 “There is for no basis light realignment of fact that claiming implied contrary terms ex- to the claims, three borrowers’ bad of the tort press rights parties’ agree- contained tort, fiduciary duty, faith breach of Security ment.” First Bank v. Idaho of defamation, which in the resulted bulk 172, 176, Gaige, 683, 115 Idaho 765 P.2d trial, being at evidence admitted have (1988); 687 v. Clement Farmers Ins. Ex- only tort now been eliminated. The claims 298, (1988). change, 115 Idaho 766 P.2d 768 (1) remaining are Robert Erkins’ claim of good Since the covenant of faith is interference or tor- tortious with contract implied a “covenant ... the contract” prospective tious econom- interference under Metcalf, our Sorensen and Burton (2) advantage, possibly the limited ic requires only parties per cases and negligent misrepresenta- partners’ claim of good obligations form in con faith X, infra.) tion. Part {See agreement, tained their covenant began mortgage as a fore- This action only party violated when “action either Regardless closure action. of whether a violates, significantly ... im nullifies jury, case to the is tried court or to pairs any benefit the ... contract.” interpretation a contract or other writ- Co., supra; v. Intermountain Gas Metcalf question ten is a law for the document Tek, supra. Sorensen v. Comm A viola court, fact, the finder there is unless tion implied covenant is a breach ambiguous ambiguity, only an then the contract. It does not result in cause portion DeLancey is a factual issue. v. separate from con action the breach of 110 714 P.2d 32 DeLancey, claims, separate tract nor does it result in Carrico, (1986); Bergkamp 101 Idaho v. damages damages contract unless such (1980). 613 P.2d specifically good relate breach of the rights, responsibili faith covenant. To hold otherwise would The duties and parties fore- duplication damages equitable result in a ties of the awarded proceeding closure are to be determined X comprehensive the court based CROSS APPEAL group negotiated of documents and exe appeal Walkers have filed a cross parties.17 Carpenter cuted v. Dou failure of the trial court to submit their Co., ble R Cattle 108 Idaho 701 P.2d *23 claim of fiduciary duty by breach of (1985). 222 The borrowers’ counterclaims However, bank. we have concluded that depend, greater degree, upon to a or lesser the trial court in submitting any erred rights determination of the and duties the borrowers’ claims of breach of fiduci- created by original loan transaction and ary (See duty jury. IV.) to the Part Ac- findings the trial court’s of fact and conclu cordingly, the Walkers’ claim on their cross sions of equitable law on the issues. appeal has no merit. making fact, findings these judge partners The limited raise issues on two to, may by, defer findings but is not bound appeal.18 First, they cross claim that the made on similar jury factual issues by refusing trial court erred to submit their any legal on counterclaim. State ex rel. negligent misrepresen- claim of the bank’s Court, 95, McAdams v. District 105 N.M. jury. recognized tation to the We a cause 1364, (1986) (“[W]hen 728 P.2d legal 1366 negligent misrepresentation of action for equitable joined issues are in a lawsuit Bancorp, Idaho Bank & Trust v. First 115 the trial eq court should first decide the 1082, (1989). Idaho 772 P.2d 720 Idaho issues, if independent uitable and then 26, April Bank & Trust was decided on remain, may issues those issues be tried to 1989, April, and this case went to trial in jury upon appropriate request.”); Pen legal 1989. The issues this case had Enterprises, mont Dysart, Inc. v. 340 been solidified discovery completed and the (Fla.App.1977); So.2d 1285 v. Albert Jaffe time, long prior to that and thus the deci- Co., Cal.App.2d 592, son 243 Cal.Rptr. 53 sion in the Idaho Bank & Trust case was 25, (1966)(“[Wjhen 36 a case involves both essentially parties not available legal equitable issues the court in the district court for this trial. Since the equitable its discretion decide the issues quantity type of evidence which will be If equitable first. the decision as to the different, given allowed at retrial will be issues is such as is determinative of the today our decision which limits substantial- legal jury issues a trial as to the latter is remand, ly upon the issues to be tried we not, If obviated. trial as to the need not resolve whether the trial court follow.”). However, remaining issues will failing part- erred in the limited submit entry judg “the trial court defer should misrepresentation negligent ners’ claim of proceedings ment in the foreclosure until jury. to the On retrial the trial court after determination counter partners’ negli- should evaluate the limited David and Associates v. Steed claim[s].” gent misrepresentation claims under our 247, 252, 717, Young, 115 Idaho 766 P.2d decisions Idaho Bank & Trust v. First (1988) (Johnson, concurring special Cobbs, 722 J. Bancorp, supra, and Hudson v. 118 Collins, (1990), ly); upon Folkner v. 249 Iowa 91 Idaho 797 P.2d 1322 based (1958). retrial. evidence at N.W.2d 545 partners also raise on

The limited BOYLE, J., and SCHROEDER and court’s denial of their cross-appeal the trial Tern., McKEE, good duty part Pro concur. defense of a faith JJ. argue equitable against part- partners that the claim the limited 18. The limited do not 17. The ners, cross-appeal alleged they capacity partners, raise in their in their as limited errors They simply require a new trial. limited to their investment interest in the limit- reversal and that, argue partnership’s case is reversed and ed assets. The bank’s additional in the event this against partners the limited on their as- remanded for a new trial based on the claims bank, liability agreements guaranties issues sumption these two issues raised claims, jury. legal equitable are not claims. should be submitted to

291 provide agree the bank to upon information. We to the appeal effect that such an with the trial deny parts court’s decision to appealed where the not from are defense. As extensively we discussed intimately not so part connected with the in Part III regarding above faith appealed bad from that a reversal tort, in setting, a contractual the duties and part require would a reconsideration of obligations partners are created below, the whole case in the court the terms of the contract. “Courts court partial appeal [can such can in- interpret agreement an to mean some not] quire only respect portion thing say, interpolate that it does not nor appealed from.” ... [Citation omitted.] something into a contract the contract does general is “the principal ap- that an [I]t Bauscher, Nuquist itself contain.” v. peal from a distinct independent part 89, 95, (1951). 227 P.2d See judgment of a bring up does not *24 also, Nazarene, Ohms v. Church 64 parts appellate review the 262, (1942); Idaho 130 P.2d 679 J.R. Sim court, part and that a reversal of the Chambers, plot Company 104, v. 82 Idaho appealed from does por- not affect the (1960). 350 211 impose duty P.2d To on dependent thereon, tions not but that provide regarding bank information they adjudications[.]” will stand as final changes “material in the nature of the 412, 1194, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 575 P.2d at impose risk” would floating be to a “free quoting Smith, 360, Whalen v. 163 Cal. duty” express not found in the implied or (1912). P. 125 904 agreement. terms of the loan Badgett v. Tolman, 374, In Tolman v. 93 Idaho 461 Bank, Security 563, State 116 Wash.2d (1969), P.2d 433 this Court stated: (1991). 807 P.2d Accordingly, 356 we af It is practice, a sound rule of and one to firm the trial court’s reject decision to this long subscribed, which we have that a defense. trial court restrict will its consideration None of the borrowers have raised in a questions remanded action to those on appeal any cross issue of or law fact specified in the mandate and will not re- regarding jury’s finding verdict already examine issues laid to rest there was no fraud and no violation of appellate preced- court affirmance on the they RICO. Because have any not raised ing appeal. purpose The precept claiming issue error either in the admission litigation is to cause to come to an end evidence, the instructions jury, or period____ within some finite In our jury’s against verdict was opinion appeal on the first we affirmed great weight of evidence on their claims of questions all raised the first trial ex- fraud violation, jury’s RICO verdict cepting the three issues which we re- judgment and the court’s denying any re manded to the district court. That court lief on those judicata, issues is res was, therefore, refusing go correct in those issues subject will not be to retrial on beyond questions. those three remand. Walker v. Shoshone 112 County, 375, 93 Idaho at 461 P.2d at 434. 991, 993, (1987)(“A 739 P.2d 292 appeal cross required only is respondents when the re The one have had trial and spondent change seeks to or add to the verdict on their fraud and RICO below____”); claims, relief afforded Gonzales v. and have not raised issue con- Co., Inc., Novick R.J. Constr. 20 cerning any relating Cal.3d error to the trial of Cal.Rptr. claims, 575 P.2d 1190 any legal those error in the in- (1978): Therefore, jury. structions to the those issues are “Ordinarily appeal laid to rest. Those issues are specific from a [an intertwined, portion judgment] interdependent of a not so or so would leave parts appealed unaffected, respondents’ not with the from other claims which retried, logically it would respon- follow that such must be that the trial of unaf- parts final, fected being must be deemed dents’ other issues on remand would be judgment a final rights prejudiced by being of the facts and allowed to have a they which determine. The decisions are retrial on what was an otherwise error-free is court of the district judgment and RICO issues far as the fraud trial as Accordingly, respon- for a reversed, concerned. the cause remanded are claims will not be fraud and RICO dents’ opinion. with this new trial consistent issues retrial. of attor- appellant. An award Costs to pending any party deferred ney fees BOYLE, JJ., and JOHNSON Tern., court. McKEE, outcome the trial the final JJ. Pro SCHROEDER concur.

293 A APPENDIX GROWERSLIMITED PARTNERSHIP

GEO/PLEUROTUS AGREEMENT SUBSCRIPTION Partnership Growers Limited Geo/Pleurotus Box 0. P. West Street Second Falls, ID 83303-1892 Twin Subscription. applies undersigned hereby 1. Partner Part- Limited Growers Limited

become Geo/Pleurotus (the "Partnership"), limited nership partnership be formed the State with laws Robert under Erkins and A. (the the General Walker Thomas G. Partners"), Jr. Partners "General purchase number units limited (the "Units") partnership interest indicated below in accor- agreement terms dance Certificate (the Partnership Limited Agreement "Partnership Agreement") Memorandum, Confidential Private attached Placement (such May relating dated Units Confidential including Placement Memorandum all Private financial state- ments, exhibits schedules contained therein attached thereto, supplements thereto, amendments is herein "Memorandum"). subspription This rejected called Partners sole General in their discretion. *26 Representations 2. undersigned Warranties. The .And acknowledges, represents, warran'ts agrees and as follows: (a) The undersigned Memorandum, has received the carefully and has reviewed Partnership Agreement the Memorandum, and the and has relied making in only therein, investment the information contained provided information otherwise to writing him in the General or Partners information from books and of records the General undersigned Partners. The documents, understands all that records books and pertaining to this investment have been made available inspection attorney for his his accountant and/or Representative(s), his Purchaser as such term and/or Regulation is defined in D promulgated the under (the Securities Act of as "Act"), amended and him, and that books and records Partnership will available notice, reasonable inspec- for during tion investors reasonable at business hours principal place its undersigned business. The (s), his advisor any, if have had a reasonable and/or of, questions ask opportunity to and receive answers

ADMITTED [* EXHIBIT Date Partners, from, person or persons General or behalf, concerning acting offering on their

Units, questions have all such been answered and undersigned. No oral full satisfaction been made or have oral information representations undersigned advisor(s) or his furnished offering Units which were connection in the Memorandum. contained not (i) (b) undersigned has adequate, The means possible current needs and personal for his providing (ii) has no need contingencies, liquidity for in this (iii) investment, is able bear substantial an investment risks the Units an economic (iv) time, present and at period, could indefinite such complete loss investment. afford (c) undersigned's The commitment investments readily not marketable are not "dispropor- which worth his his net tionate investment his cause overall Units will commitment to become excessive. (d) undersigned recognizes The the Partner- peen only recently organized ship has has no operating history financial Units significant risks, investment an including involve captions under set forth those "Risk Factors" Income Tax "Certain Federal Considerations" Memorandum. (e) undersigned advisor(s) his and/or and/or (if Representative(s) applicable) Purchaser his have financial, knowledge experience such tax *27 matters to enable him business them to utilize and/or made available the information to him them in and/or Units, offering with the of the connection to evaluate and the prospective merits risks of the investment and investment make an informed respect to decision with Representative, Purchaser Each thereto. any, if has writing specific in the confirmed any details of and past, or present future all relationships, actual or comtemplated, between himself or his affiliates and any General Partners or the of their affiliates compensation any received or to be as received any relationships. result of such (f) undersigned The understands that Memo- the not has been filed randum with or any reviewed state securities or Federal administrators of because

-2- made the General Partners as to representation the offering. nature the or limited private the the undersigned understands that sale (g) The registered the been under Act has not Units the non-public exemption therefrom an for reliance undersigned the The understands that Units offerings. indefinitely or to be held unless sale may have registered is subsequently thereof transfer other amended, Act, or an exemption as from such under undersigned The is available. further registration Partnership obliga- is no that under understands on register the Units his or to assist to behalf tion exemption any registration. complying with from him (h) undersigned represents The that the Units soley purchased for his being own account are for only for purposes not account investment distribution,** person not for assignment any other that no person to others has resale or beneficial or indirect interest direct in such Units. (i) undersigned The understands that he not dispose sell able to his Units will

be there addition, public market be no under- th^m. that his signed right understands transfer subject be will Units conditions set forth Agreement, Partnership including consent Partners and' against restrictions General transfer transfer not unless violation Act applicable state securities laws (including investor standards). suitability The undersigned understands will the General Partners that consent to a trans- a Unit unless represents transferee fer he that suitability financial required meets standards unless initial subscriber an such are conditions Partners, by the General waived the General right, discretion, have Partners absolute consent transfer of a refuse Unit. (j) undersigned understands legends placed will certificates or other documents evidencing Units respect above *28 assignment, on restrictions resale or disposi- other tion of the Units. (k) undersigned; The if a corporation, partner- entity, ship, or other trust is authorized and other- qualified purchase to duly Units, wise" and hold the (i) entity has not been such formed specific the

-3- (ii) Partnership or Units in the acquiring of purpose under investor Rule accredited as an qualifies equity each under the Act and 501(a)(8) promulgated simulta- and delivered has executed thereof owner Subscription Agreement substan- neously herewith Agreement and a Purchase to tially identical Questionnaire. (l) represents undersigned and warrants that The the in to General Partners provided information all Questionnaire concerning or otherwise Purchaser the status, himself, position and financial his investor matters, or, partner- corporation, case of the in experi- entity, knowledge the and or trust ship, person business the and matters of financial in ence such decision behalf the investment making complete as the set and date entity, is correct any if there should be end hereof at the forth prior to“acceptance information such change in adverse immediately provide will the he subscription, his such information. Partners General individual, (m) if he undersigned, is an is The age. years least at (n) undersigned understands that if he shall The Partnership due any payment to the default in be Partnership Agreement, in his interest the to pursuant pursuant be sold terms Partnership may that Agreement he not be Partnership sale, any amount such as receive entitled Further, Agreement. Partnership provided Partnership that shall understands undersigned privileges against him rights, remedies have all equity, or and in at law addi- available are that tion, Partnership right have shall recover legal fees in connec- costs court reasonable therewith. tion (o) undersigned understands that The discus- consequences arising investment tax from sion Partnership as set forth in the memorandum consequences that actual tax in nature general Partnership investment undersigned depend on his individual circumstances. undersigned (p) understands can there thé Internal or assurance Revenue Code be no will thereunder applied amended regulations deprive its Partnership a manner such

-4- the all of tax they of some or benefits partners might receive, some of expect to and deductions by Partnership or allocation claimed of items income, loss, or gain, among deduction credit of challenged by the partners may not be Internal Revenue Service. THAT (q) UNDERSTANDS THE UNDERSIGNED THE UNITS TO AN EXEMPTION PURSUANT BEEN ISSUED FROM THE HAVE FEDERAL PROVISIONS OF THE REGISTRATION SECURITIES ACT EXEMPTION IS AS THE AVAILABLE OF AMENDED. UNDER §4(2) 505 OF REGULATION D THEREOF AND RULE PROMULGATED ACCORDINGLY, THE UNITS MAY NOT BE THEREUNDER. SOLD OR OR ABSENT REGISTRATION AN TRANSFERRED APPLICABLE EXEMPTION. Adoption Partnership Agreement. of The under- 3. agrees hereby adopts, accepts and to be bound all signed Partnership provisions Agreement of and per- and to terms imposed obligations upon therein all Limited form Partner purchased. Upon respect acceptance the Units to with of this by the General and subscription Partners formation Partnership, undersigned shall become a Limited Partner for purposes. all Special Attorney. Power 4. (a) undersigned, The executing Agree- ment, makes, irrevocably constitutes appoints each and the General his true and Partners attorney, lawful name, him and place for in his and stead his use benefit, and, acknowledge and execute necessary, extent file record: (i) Partnership Agreement all thereto;

amendments (ii) Any instrument may which required to be filed the Partnership, or which file; General Partners deem is advisable (iii)Any documents which be required effect continuation Partnership, admission or Partner, substitution a Limited or dissolution termination Part- provided nership, continuation, admission, such substitution dissolution termination are in accordance terms the Agreement Partnership. Limited

-5- *30 (b) grant authority: Such of (i) coupled Special Attorney of Power Is a interest, shall sur- irrevocable and an is with undersigned. incapacity of the the death or vive (ii) by either of the May be exercised by signing separately as Partners either General or, Limited attorney-in-fact each Partner for Partners, by the Limited listing of all after single signa- the executing any with instrument acting attorney-in- as a of General Partner ture them; all and fact for of (iii) assignment by the a survive Shall portion or a of his the whole Limited Partner of interest. Attorney supersede any does Special Power of This used to Partnership Agreement nor is it to the of part undersigned any rights. of of his Limited Partner the deprive simplified system provide execu- only to a intended is It required, undersigned shall If the execute documents. of tion days five after the the Partners within to General deliver and therefor, designations, request additional sych receipt of as the General attorney or instruments Partners of powers necessary. deem reasonably shall undersigned agrees to The Indemnification. 5. Partnership and the General hold harmless the indemnify employees respective affiliates agents, Partners losses, expenses costs damages, all against from fees) they by which incur attorneys' reasonable (including any fulfill undersigned of failure of reason by or reason Agreement, conditions or terms made under- representations and warranties breach Partnership Agreement, or in connection herein signed undersigned Partner- provided any document or Partners. General ship Miscellaneous. 6. (a) hereby grants undersigned Part- purchased Units security

nership interest payment undersigned secure Investor's Note, of which as Promissory form attached Memorandum, performance "C" Exhibit Agreement form Assumption Liabilities “K", being the Memorandum Exhibit attached (the "Assumption herewith Liabilities delivered Agreement").

6- *31 (b) defaults undersigned In the event the under Assump- or the Promissory Note the Investor's either Partnership and Agreement, the Liabilities the of tion and remedies set rights shall have all the lenders Note, herein, Promissory the and Investor's forth the Agreement, Partner- Assumption of Liabilities and law. ship Agreement provided as otherwise (c) proceeds any of such or From the foreclosure sale, Partnership may the amóHht of all the retain expenses connection incurred it with and costs sale, including sale and foreclosure or costs such any surplus the event attorneys' fees. reasonable sale, proceeds from foreclosure or such remains payments and deductions to all authorized after Partnership, surplus any remaining paid shall be such may undersigned. Partnership The become to any undersigned-recognizes at sale. The purchaser such may public Partnership be unable to effect a purchased part all a the Units so or be- sale prohibitions certain contained in the Act and cause and, therefore, applicable laws state securities compelled private may be resort to one or more to group purchasers to and restricted of offerees sales suitability agree, fulfill certain standards who acquire among things, other to such Units for their account, purposes only and not own investment to view distribution or The résale. undersigned private to though sales so made even consents such may prices upon be at sales terms less than such Units were public favorable if sold at The undersigned agrees private sales. sales made foregoing circumstances will under deemed been made in a commercially have reasonable manner. (d) Partnership shall right have hereunder, one successively enforce or more remedies concurrently, any

or such action shall stop or prevent Partnership pursuing from any further hereunder, remedy which it have under the Partner- ship Agreement tion, including, law without limita- right part on Partnership rights waive its hereunder an commence action Promissory Investor's Note Assumption Agreement of Liabilities though Assumption Agreement Liabilities was unsecured. .(e) any time, At time from time request Partnership, undersigned give, will execute, notice, file record financing and/or

-7- *32 statement, instrument, statement, continuation docu- Partnership may agreement or that the consider ment create, continue, perserve, necessary or to desirable granted security or interest validate the perfect may Partnership or consider which the neces- hereunder rights enforce its or desirable or- sary to exercise security respect with to such interest. hereunder (f) and represents agrees undersigned The that purchased own all be free will of the Units and he (other than the of all and encumbrances liens clear agrees security hereby) and that granted interest he security any interest in grant encumber or not or will Units, respect financing with to such statement file prior foregoing, without the permit any of the or Partnership hereby repre- and consent of the written aforesaid) has he not (except that heretofore sents so. done not undersigned The (g) agrees transfer or the Agreement, any undersigned's of assign this or herein, that agrees the and transfer further interest pursuant assignment acquired hereto Units or with only Partnership made be accordance shall applicable and all laws. Agreement (h) undersigned undersigned agrees cancel, Agreement this revoke may or or not terminate made agreement undersigned hereunder and any Agreement death or survive dis- this shall be binding shall ability undersigned executors, heirs, administrators, undersigned'8 assigns. successors (i) representations, Notwithstanding any warranties, agreements made acknowledgements or herein undersigned hereby does undersigned, or by the granted rights any any other manner waive undersigned state securities laws. under federal or agree- Agreement entire (j) constitutes This respect parties with among hereto ment only be amended subject matter hereof parties. writing by all executed (k) enforced, Agreement be governed This shall all respects construed accordance Any proceeding action the State Idaho. or laws party enforce remedy either or commenced Agreement implied granted right shall -8- in the Fifth District Court commenced State County of,,Twin Falls both *33 hereby jurisdic- personam

parties consent such and venue. tion (1) receipt days Within five of after written undersigned request from Partnership, agrees provide such information and to execute and deliver as reasonably necessary such documents to com- any and ply with all laws and ordinaces ta.-whi.ch Partnership subject. is Subscription Payment. of Method 7. under- acknowledging subscription the minimum thirty is signed, Units, (30,000) hereby subscribes for Units thousand payment as follows: down encloses $1.00 per I Units at Unit for aggregate r>- an^ n $_Zj payable investment folloi/s: (tól{ Twenty percent upon delivery execution this Subscription Agreement, per- eighty (80%) cent delivery execution Partners, them, General either an ,Note Investor's Promissory form attached to the Memorandum as Exhibit "C." Contingency. ThT-s Agreement 8. contingent upon purchase commitment of ^the minimum number of Units receipt Partnership loan commitments $3,150,000. amount less aggregate than page balance [The intentionally left blank.]

-9- TYPE OF OWNERSHIP

(Check One) (One signature required) Individual (Both survivorship parties right Tenants Joint sign) must *34 (Both parties sign) Common must Tenants (Both sign) Property parties Community must (Please copy instrument creating include Trust Trust) (Please Corporation include evidence authorization or purchase form of Articles resolutions By-Laws) Incorporation (Please Partnership Partnership Agree- copy of include ment) (registration) print here exact name Please Unit(s) investor desires -10-

SIGNATURE PAGE FOR INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS Husband/Investor Wife/lnvestor Signature Signature Security Number Security

Social Social Number Name Type or Type Print Print Name Address: Residence Residence Address: *35 at: Executed Executed at:

City City State State this_day this_day , 19 .

Mailing Address:

-11- ) OF STATE _ ) ss. ) County _ day me, this On before _ _1984, notary public undersigned, in and state, for county said appeared personally known to me __, name whose subscribed to" person within instrument acknowledged me that he executed same. WHEREOF, I IN WITNESS have my hereunto set hand seal, my official same affixed day year in this cer- above first written. tificate

Notary Public Residing at expires: Commission ) OF STATE _ ) ss. ) County of _ day me, On *36 _ before _, public notary undersigned, state, county said appeared

personally known to me to _¡__, whose name subscribed person the within instrument acknowledged to me that she executed same. WHEREOF, IN WITNESS I have my hereunto set hand seal, my official affixed same day year in this cer- first above written. tificate

Notary Public for_ Residing at_ expires: Commission -12-

SIGNATURE PAGE FOR CORPORATE INVESTORS (please print corporation type) Name

By: ___ agent) authorized (Signature

Title: _____________ No.:

Taxpayer Identification _________ Principal Address Corporate Offices ___________

Attention: at Executed _this_day City Stat<* ) OF STATE _ ) ss. ) County _ *37 day this me, On _ before _, undersigned, notary public county said state, personally appeared , known _ me President corporation _, whose _^ subscribed name within person instrument or who instrument behalf executed corporation said acknowledged corporation me such executed same. WHEREOF, IN WITNESS I have hereunto my set hand seal, my affixed official same day year first above certificate written.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR Residing at_ Commission expires: -13- PAGE

SIGNATURE PARTNERSHIP INVESTORS FOR type) Partnership (please print Name By: _ _ partner general Signature

By: _ _;_ _i_ (if generalpartner required additional Signature Partnership Agreement) No.: Identification Taxpayer _ Business

Principal _ Address: Address, Mailing different: if

Attention: _this_day Executed at___ State City *38 -14- ) OF STATE _ ) ss. ) County of _ day , 1984, On this me, _ _ before undersigned, notary public state, in and county said , appeared personally known _ me to be one of partnership partners ____, partner one partners who subscribed partnership said instrument, foregoing name ts> acknowledged me that same said he executed partnership name. WHEREOF, WITNESS IN I have hereunto my set hand seal, my official affixed same day year cer- first above tificate written. NOTARY PUBLIC FOR Residing at_ expires:

Commission *39 -15- PAGE

SIGNATURE INVESTORS TRUST FOR type) (please print or Trust Name (please print type) Trustee

Name By: _r——i_ signature Trustee's _ __ Address: Trustee's

Attention: (cid:127) Executed at_ _this_day City State ) OF STATE _ } ss. )

County of _ day year On this _ _, me, notary public undersigned, said before state, appeared personally county known __, name person whose me to be subscribed the within acknowledged to me trustee instrument she executed trustee. same as such WHEREOF, I have hereunto my IN WITNESS set hand seal, day same year my affixed official cer- written. above tificate first

Notary Public for_ Residing at_ expires: Commission -16-

309 JOHNSON, Justice, concurring, Court listed the elements of the tort of concurring specially, concurring in unjustified intentional and third-party inter- result, dissenting. ference with valid contractual relations or expectancies: business I following parts concur in the of the (1) the existence of a valid contractual opinion: (Facts), (Bad Court’s I III Faith (2) relationship expectancy; or business Tort), (Fiduciary Duty), (Defamation), IV V knowledge of the relationship expect- or VI(A) (Tortious Interference with Con- ancy part interferor; (3) on the of the tract), (Punitive Damages), VII and X inducing intentional interference or caus- (Cross Appeal). ing a breach or termination of the rela- I specially part (Foreclosure concur II tionship expectancy; (4) or resultant Procedure). view, my In footnote 6 should damage party relationship whose point out the effect of affirmative defenses expectancy or disrupted. has been Ill raised borrowers and found will, defamation, spite, fraud, force, or jury established, to have been but which coercion, part interferor, on the of the counterclaims, subject were not the i.e.: ingredients, are not although essential (excuse), Valley (excuse), Bliss the Erkins such bearing be shown for such as (equitable Walkers estoppel quasi- they may privi- have the defense of estoppel), (waiv- guarantors the limited lege. er, estoppel, duress). If Valley, Bliss 396 P.2d at 151. Erkins, and the Walkers establish the By (1) requiring proof same of either an im- trial, affirmative defenses a new proper objective purpose or these to harm the defenses would defeat Idaho First’s plaintiff, (2) wrongful use of a means to recovery. injury prospective cause to a business rela- The claim of against Idaho First the lim- tionship, the today decision of the Court guarantors ited legal was a claim for collec- implicitly portion overrules of Twin guaranties. tion on the guar- The limited delineating Falls Farm the tort of interfer- antors demanded and were entitled to a prospective ence with advantage in Idaho. jury trial on this claim and on their affirm- I would follow the formulation in Twin ative defenses. Because the found the Farm, Falls which coordinates with the guarantors limited had established three elements of interference with contract stat- affirmative defenses that were not the sub- VI(A). part ed in ject guaran- counterclaims the limited tors, (Cove- I concur in the part we should affirm result of VIII judgment nant guarantors Dealing). favor of the of Good Faith and Fair In against limited Ida- view, however, legal my ho First on its correctly claim the trial court to enforce the guaranties. good defined faith in Instruction No. 39 to “honesty mean in fact in the conduct or the I part VI(B) (Interference dissent from transaction concerned.” defini- This is the Prospective Advantage). Economic In 28-1-201(19), tion portion used I.C. § view, my proving the elements for interfer (UCC) of the Uniform Commercial as Code prospective ence with advantage economic enacted in Idaho. The loan transaction in should be coordinated with the elements security agreement this case included a proving intentional interference with (Secured subject chapter Transactions) 9 part VI(A). contract formulated in In of the UCC. The of Idaho first count Distrib., City Twin Falls Farm & Inc. v. complaint First’s was entitled “Foreclosure Co., 351, Supply D & B 96 Idaho 528 Property” sought on Personal fore- (1974), P.2d 1294 the Court ruled that 28-9-504, “pursuant closure to Section Ida- respondents one of the had committed the security agreement ho Code.” The was an pro common law tort of interference with integral part of the loan transaction. spective advantage. The Court cited Cal Knudtzon, bom v. parties agree Wash.2d All the in this case that one (1964) authority P.2d 148 ruling. good for this definitions of faith the UCC Calbom, Washington Supreme Id. argues should be used. Idaho First *41 310 equitable

the it of if the good deprive definition of faith contained in would relief 28-1-201(19) legal applies. jury. I.C. The borrowers were tried to a can issues We § deny faith good contend the definition of thus find no to Petitioner reason 28-2-103(l)(b) applies. in precious contained I.C. Steed his most constitutional § (“ faith’ in the case of a merchant right by jury. ‘Good to trial honesty in fact and observance means the right is by jury ... the to a trial Since of commercial of fair reasonable standards under of the “inviolate” the Constitution trade.”) This dealing in the definition does Idaho, party equity a to an ac- State of agree- apply security not here the because right jury tion a a trial on the has to 9, 2, chapter chapter by ment is covered legal pursuant raised to causes of action By of terms of 28-1- the UCC. the I.C. § counterclaim, compulsory his unless 201, apply un- the definitions stated there showing “imperative there is a clear less there is an additional definition con- circumstances” which would cause applicable chapter in the tained the UCC. equity “irreparable harm while claimant in good chap- faith There is no definition jury legal in cause.” affording a trial ter 9. Theatres, Beacon Inc. view, my application In in this case of 250-51, P.2d 115 Idaho at 766 at 720-21 concerning good and fair principles faith omitted). original, (emphasis in footnote dealing developed employment we in have rel. v. District State ex McAdams subjective appropriate. cases is not The Court, 95, (1986), 105 N.M. 728 P.2d 1364 “good 28-1- required faith” I.C. § contrary in is to opinion, cited the Court’s 201(19) requirement is from the different em- I the New Mexico court Steed because required employ- in good faith we have in I that ployed principal rejected Steed ment cases. right jury is to “there no trial incidental (Realignment I IX part from dissent in a suit.” 728 legal foreclosure issues Parties). holding I disagree with the original). (emphasis in P.2d at 1365 legal equitable issues are that when Enter., Dysart, v. 340 Inc. Penmont lawsuit, joined trial court should in a (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977), in cited So.2d 1285 then, equitable issues and if first decide to opinion, contrary the Court’s is also remain, any independent legal issues those I the Florida District Court Steed because if one jury, should be tried to a has issues party Appeals put the on the burden timely my In requested been in a fashion. seeking jury trial to show “that view, impliedly overrules David Steed in the non-jury equitable issues trial 247, Young, 115 Idaho and Associates v. legal prior jury trial of the cause to (1988) I). 766 P.2d 717 {Steed de- presented the counterclaim issues Theatres, I relied on Beacon Inc. Steed any legal right.” prived the defendants of Westover, S.Ct. 3 v. 359 U.S. 79 I, Court 1286. In 340 So.2d at Steed (1959) in holding a L.Ed.2d 988 presenting the party on the put the burden is entitled to action a defendant foreclosure clearly that to show equitable claim compulsory legal on counter- jury trial irreparable would suffer equity claimant I, In the Court said: claims. Steed legal jury if were a trial harm there legal Thus, is whether the it irrelevant claim. equitable “incidental” issues are Co., Cal.App.2d 243 v. Albertson Jaffe claims, trial right jury is since the (1966), in the cited Cal.Rptr. guaranteed under both Idaho specifically contrary the ra also opinion, Court’s 38(a). art. 1 7 I.R.C.P. Constitution § allow the trial I. It would tionale of Steed case, Further, the Bank in the instant try its discretion exercise of court beginning only that the case has claimed abrogate the equitable claim first since the equity, lie equity must I. by jury guaranteed Steed right to trial eq- issues are “incidental” legal view, the trial court my remand uitable, equitable is- legal and and both of the counter- the character assess should “inextricably intertwined.” sues are legal in nature that are Those “impera- claims. showing of no Bank has made trial in which to a should be entitled case which its circumstances” tive *42 jury is free to Valley consider the factual Foods and the Erkins. I also concur any preemptive issues free from of decision portion opinion with the of the on of denial equitable portion the trial court of rehearing concerning part (Defamation) V the case. original opinion of the Court’s in this case. would, however, grant guar- I the limited ON DENIAL OF REHEARING petition rehearing antors’ for for the rea- BAKES, Chief Justice. sons my concurring stated in and dissent- petitions rehearing Two for filed in were ing opinion original opinion issued with the matter, one by guarantors, the limited in this case. joint petition by the other a filed Bliss I also dissent from the decision of the Valley Foods and Mr. and Erkins. Mrs. Court withdraw footnote 17. This foot- petitions Both rehearing for are denied. note reads: However, original footnote 17 to equitable against claim the limited opinion is withdrawn. do not We decide partners, in their capacity part- as limited “Assumption whether Liability ners, is limited to their investment inter- Agreements” Assumption or “Amended partnership’s est the limited assets. Liability Agreements” signed by the limit- against The bank’s additional claims partners guaranties, ed were or constituted partners limited assumption their agreements making parties principal these liability agreements guaranties are borrowers under the promissory notes. legal claims, equitable not claims. The trial court should make this determina- view, my against Idaho First’s claims tion on retrial in determining whether the guarantors the limited on the amended as- affirmative defenses by raised the limited sumption liability agreements guar- partners by are to be resolved the court as part foreclosure, equitable clearly legal of the action of anties are claims and cannot or separate legal as a claim equitable be construed to be in nature. against guarantors, giving due considera- assumption liability agree- The amended analysis tion to this Court’s in David Steed guar- ments state that each of the limited Young, & Associates v. 115 Idaho “unconditionally primary antors assumes (1988). P.2d 717 personal liability, right without of contribu- Corporation any tion from not, or Additionally, we do our action in thereof, opinion pay pursuant Part V of the Shareholder which we set aside the defamation award in agreements favor of Robert Notes.” These describe Erkins because it was barred the stat- guarantors’ nature of the limited obli- limitations, ute way intimate one or the gations “independent any other obli- may other whether or not on retrial Erkins gations Corporation, separate and a assert the defamation claim as an offset to brought pros- action or actions the claims of the Idaho First National against ecuted the Shareholder whether ac- Bank. The offset issue was never raised brought against Corporation tion is below because the district court concluded Corporation joined whether the that the statute of limitations had not run such action or actions.” on the defamation claim in Er- contained guar- Idaho First did not sue the limited opinion kins’ amended counterclaim. Our foreclose, antors to to collect the but rather preclude seeking does not Erkins from guarantors agreed amounts the limited amend his answer to assert such a setoff pay pursuant assumption to the amended claim. agreements guaranties. liability legal, equitable, These are claims. J.,

BOYLE, and SCHROEDER and McKEE, Tern., JJ. Pro concur.

JOHNSON, Justice, concurring and dissenting.

I concur with the decision of the Court petition rehearing deny the of Bliss

Case Details

Case Name: Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc.
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Feb 3, 1992
Citation: 824 P.2d 841
Docket Number: 18230
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
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