*1 P.3d 1220 MANAGE COUNTIES RISK IDAHO UNDERWRIT

MENT PROGRAM Plaintiff-Appellant,

ERS, COMPA INSURANCE

NORTHLAND corporation,

NIES, a Minnesota

Defendant-Respondent.

No. 34375. Idaho,

Supreme Court of

Boise, January 2009 Term. *2 24, 1980,

day, meeting June was held with from Spokane members Sheriffs Office the Kootenai and Sheriffs Of- investigation fice the killings. to discuss of County Deputy Prosecuting Kootenai Attor- ney D. Haws also Marc attended meet- time, supervisor ing; prosecut- at the his attorney, During was Glen Walker. meeting, course of Haws took notes that his understanding reflected of murders. 1980, In late Paradis was arrested and Palmer, charged with murder of Ms. presented theory, the State its based on the opinion Brady conveyed Dr. of Haws, through Palmer Ms. had aspirated water from the creek near Post body Falls in her partially which was found submerged, suggesting that she had been alive she went into the creek and was 10, 1981, Idaho. thus killed On December following a trial conducted Haws and an- deputy prosecutor, other Kootenai guilty Peter found Paradis was of degree first murder and sentenced death. Hull, Anderson, Boise, appel- & for Julian sought Paradis review of his conviction Phillip argued. lant. Collaer relief, appeal, post-conviction and federal ha- Blanton, Boise, Hall, Farley, & Oberrecht corpus. peti- beas While one of his habeas respondent. Farley argued. for Donald J. 1996, pending January tions was copies counsel obtained of the notes Haws HORTON, Justice. 24, meeting, had made the June out of an This case arises insurance dis- significant which revealed inconsistencies pute. Management Idaho Risk Counties opinions Brady’s day autop- Dr. after the (ICRMP) Program appeals Underwriters sy cause Palm- as to the and location Ms. summary judgment grant district court’s opinions Brady and the er’s death Dr. offered insurer, In- favor of ICRMP’s awaiting trial trial. While Paradis (Northland), holding Companies surance 1980-1981, County in Paradis’ at- duty Northland had no to reimburse ICRMP torney made a request had routine for disclo- for costs it incurred on behalf of insureds sure, its prosecutor but the did reveal Haws’ not and settlement a lawsuit defense potentially exculpatory notes or filed Donald M. Paradis. We affirm. in or information related to them. Eventually, Paradis’ case before the went I. AND FACTUAL PROCEDURAL Appeals United Court of for the Ninth States BACKGROUND Circuit, held that the non-disclosure Kimberly exculpatory On June evidence to a bodies of amounted vio- Brady prosecution’s Palmer and Scott Currier were discovered lation of the under Falls, Maryland, Idaho. De- the woods outside of Post 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. (1963), transported Palm- George

tective Elliott Ms. L.Ed.2d and remanded Paradis’ Portland, granted er’s federal Par- and Mr. Currier’s bodies to case. The district court petition Oregon, the Chief Medical Examiner adis’ the State to where habeas ordered Oregon, Brady, against new trial the State of William initiate a release M.D., performed autopsies. following pled guilty charge him. Paradis to a lesser complaint filed a and demand for felony and was released on accessory to a September jury trial Northland on alleged damages complaint 2006. The custody, Following Paradis’ release upon of contract based breach of tort claim with he filed a notice refusal to reimburse ICRMP. *3 9, 9, County 2001. On on October partial summary court for moved the district 2003, complaint a in the U.S. Paradis filed judgment asking that the court hold that Idaho, nam- for the District of District Court duty Kootenai ICRMP had a to defend its Walker, County, Brady, Dr. insureds; County granted the mo- the court defendants, Haws, Erbland, Elliott as 29, 1, 2007, May tion on 2007. On March rights, negli- of his civil alleging violations summary seeking Northland filed a motion arrest, prosecution, malicious gence, false judgment obligation that it had no to reim- imprisonment, negligent and intentional false ICRMP, grant- burse which the district distress, emotional and defama- infliction of 11, ed on June 2007. filed a of mo- tion. The defendants number dismiss, and the federal district tions to II. STANDARD OF REVIEW claims, a number of but court did dismiss summary reviewing an order for When

permitted file an amended com- Paradis to judgment, the standard of review for this alleged at plaint held that Paradis had by Court is the same standard used continuing torts that were not least some ruling district court on the motion. Wat by of limitation. Paradis barred statutes Weick, 500, 504, 112 son v. 141 Idaho P.3d complaint, naming filed an amended (2005). 788, Summary judgment prop is adding same defendants and claims for false pleadings, depositions, er when “the and ad light privacy. and invasion of file, affidavits, together missions on with the any, genuine if show that there is no issue as in- ICRMP was formed 1985 and sold any moving that material fact and members, including its surance to party judgment is entitled to a as a matter of County. Beginning continuing in 1986 and 56(c). law.” Idaho R. Civ. P. 2001, through purchased ICRMP insurance Upon receiving copy decide, Northland. A court must first contract, complaint initial from Kootenai construing ambigu whether it is ous, question Lovey copy forwarded a which is a of law. ICRMP Idaho, Regence BlueShield 139 Idaho analyzed initial Northland. ICRMP also (2003). A contractual and, complaint allegations based provision ambiguous reasonably if it is continuing torts, duty decided that it had a subject conflicting interpretations. Id. If defend Kootenai and the individual appear ambigu at does not issue defendants, subject to exclusions and limita- face, party ous on and if its neither asserts policy. tions ICRMP’s ICRMP retained ambiguity, that it contains then this Court Haws, separate County, counsel for Kootenai interpretation. exercises free review over its Elliott, and Northland did not meaning Id. The of the contract and the object. managed litiga- Paradis parties intent of the must be determined years, keeping tion for the next two North- plain meaning from the of the words used. proceedings, land informed of the until a Id. finally settlement was reached.1 On Febru- 13, 2006, ary Northland first informed III. ANALYSIS position coverage ICRMP of its did not A. Northland is not ICRMP’s reinsurer any exist for of the claims only according and is liable to ICRMP complaints. definitively Northland the terms of Northland’s own denied ICRMP’s claim for reimbursement of July defense and settlement costs on urges that its decision to ex coverage in- tend to the Kootenai finding litigation engaged wrongful 1. No was made in the had conduct. Haws, Erbland or of the other defendants faith, Surplus good taken in evidenced it. Int’l Lines Ins. Co. v. as Certain sureds judgment summary court’s district and Underwriting Syndicates Underwriters London, to defend holding that ICRMP had Lloyd’s F.Supp. lawsuit,2 therefore and that (S.D.Ohio 1994). if that even reinsurer, Northland, must ex- as ICRMP’s the defense and settlement costs related corresponding coverage. ar- Northland tend litigation technically the Paradis were not is a gues it sold ICRMP Northland, policy, ICRMP’s covered as not bind which does reimbursement reinsurer, is nonetheless bound to reimburse beyond the coverage to extend ICRMP for those costs. court, of that The district terms problem arguments with these is that recognizing thoroughly parties that the while *4 both the the forms” the versus “follow and “follow this issue of reinsurance discussed insurance, apply to rule on only declined fortunes” rules to reimbursement reinsurers. it, stating request a that Northland did not Northland not ICRMP’s is is reinsurer. It on this issue in its motion sum- decision true, out, points as ICRMP that in in- one mary judgment. parties The have renewed policy stance the Northland refers to ICRMP Court, however, before this the discussion as “Named Northland’s Reinsured.” Howev- question question the of and because is a law er: motion for is before this Court on a construing In an policy, insurance the summary judgment, appropriate it is for the plain meaning Court must look to the of v. to address it Bakker Thunder Court now. to the words determine if there are LLC, 185, 189, 141 Spring-Wareham, Idaho ambiguities. This ques- determination is a (2005). 108 P.3d 336 resolving tion In question of law. of reinsurer, A of the the strict sense law, policy the Court must construe the term, only according the terms is liable to whole, by a not phrase.’’ “as isolated contract, of the and conditions reinsurance Glass, Cascade Auto Inc. v. Idaho Farm only if the 44A Am. reinsured is liable. Co., 660, 663, 115 141 Bureau Idaho Ins. P.3d However, § “[a] Jur.2d Insurance ‘fol (2005) (quoting 754 Selkirk Seed Co. policy form’ in a reinsurance lowing clause Fund, 434, 437, State Ins. Idaho incorporates by all terms and reference the (2000)) added). (emphasis policy, except of the reinsured to Aside conditions by single, appearance the extent that the reinsurance contract from this isolated the “reinsured,” specifically scope terms defines the of word there nothing its own is in the i.e., coverage differently, exclusion.” via an policy Northland to indicate that it is a rein Co., Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Ins. Home surance contract. There is no the “follow (S.D.N.Y.1995). F.Supp. policy. forms” clause Northland argues policy that the Northland is a language incorporating There is no other the policy incorporates reinsurance language into the County, policy with ICRMP’s short, policy. policies In Northland are such, by where as ICRMP is bound discrete, if Northland is at all liable to Northland, policy, of its a terms so too is as ICRMP, only by it can be the terms of reinsurer, bound to reimburse ICRMP. policy. A single Northland’s own instance of the word “reinsurance” will not lead us to Northland, further as import the rules reinsurance contracts reinsurer, ICRMP’s is also bound agreement expense of the doctrine, which requires the fortunes” “follow which Instead, parties bargained. we look to the indemnify pay- to insured for reinsurer express agreement of that reasonably of the terms to deter ments within the terms technically liability. even if original not covered mine Northland’s ICRMP, obligation appeal has been the district to is 2. There no land is not liable and our judg- court's determination that ICRMP had to decide whether affirm or reverse that Rather, authority say its Kootenai not have defend insureds. ment. We do ruling appeal only stems from the court’s whether was correct not this grant district the former as it is summary judgment holding that North- before us for review. II, For “occurrence” means an not liable to reimburse Section B. complaints happening do the Paradis accident or or event or contin- ICRMP because allege under the North- repeated exposure an occurrence to conditions not uous or personal injury damage land insurance or which result during period. All property contract express terms of the personal injuries persons to one or more agreed to reim that Northland make clear property damage arising out of an and/or place if an “occurrence” took burse ICRMP happening accident or a or event or period ICRMP was covered during the repeated exposure continuous or to condi- un policy states The Northland tions shall be deemed to be one occur- II that: der Section rence. only bodily inju- applies This Section injury property damage ry, personal Thus, whether we must decide policy period and occur complaints alleged an defined occurrence as of an occurrence which takes arise out triggers North- place scope territorial within the liability. land’s Policy. arguments ICRMP advances several A—COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL why liability own as under its *5 hereby agree, LIABILITY: Underwriters policy triggered by allegations of tor the limitations, subject terms and condi- conduct contained in the com tious mentioned, indemnify to tions hereunder plaints. first contends that the dis ICRMP sums, including the Assured for all ex- court, determining trict if the Paradis fully penses, by all as more defined the complaints alleged what amounted to an oc loss, term ultimate net which the Assured currence under the Northland erred legally obligated pay shall become to as by reading complaints narrowly. the too by bodily damages imposed law because of broadly, argues, Read ICRMP the com injury, property damage, personal injury, plaints allege potential at least one occur injury, liability advertising products and or rence under And completed operations, host/liquor liability Northland, urges, is liable for the malpractice or incidental result from potentially cost to defend and settle even an occurrence and which occur the covered, covered, actually in addition to policy period. claims because:

Under Idaho law and consistent with states, other an insurer’s duties to defend C—LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILI- indemnify separate are duties. The hereby agree, subject TY: Underwriters duty duty than defend is broader limitations, terms and conditions indemnify. duty trig- The to defend is mentioned, indemnify hereunder the As- gered third-party’s complaint if the reveals sured for all sums which the Assured shall liability potential that would be cov- errors, obligated pay be reason of ered the insured’s negligent arising omissions or acts out of Co., Hoyle v. Mut. Ins. Utica 137 Idaho performance of the Assured’s duties (2002) (citations omit- acting while official as law enforcement ted). that, position It if the is ICRMP’s even regular public or officer course of complaints allege do not at least one actual defined, employment arising as hereinafter occurrence, they allege poten- do at least one any out of occurrence from cause on occurrence, potential tial and such a occur- Injury, Bodily Injury, account of Personal duty triggers rence Northland’s to defend Property Damage, Rights Violation of Civil liability. and thus its Aid, happening during period or First except of this insurance as covered under argument The fault in first is that II A Section and B. duty Northland did not owe a to defend. policy language The the term occur- There is no in the contract defines obligated un- provides rence as follows: that Northland was tinuing inju- settle the cause that in all of dertake to defend and claims resulted damage. ries and Court against ICRMP’s Kootenai insureds. concluded that company’s is liable to reim- the occurrence adoption It is true that Northland was the specified discriminatory employment policies. burse defense costs as net Id. however, provisions policy; emphasized such The court that: loss liability triggered must first be actual multiple inju The fact that there were occurrence, duty is to and then Northland’s they ries and that magni were different costs, pay for not to defend ICRMP’s defense injuries tudes and that extended over a ICRMP’s The fact that Northland insureds. period of alter our time does not conclusion could be liable to for defense costs single there awas occurrence. As resulting from an actual occurrence under long injuries proxi as the stem one does not create Northland a single mate cause there is occurrence. Thus, duty to defend. the district court cor- Champion Corp. Int'l. v. Continental Ca Cir.1976), rectly complaints focused on the Paradis (2d Co., sualty 546 F.2d 505-06 they alleged ascertain an actual whether oc- denied, rt. 434 U.S. 98 S.Ct. ce trigger currence that would under the (1977). Indeed, 54 L.Ed.2d 75 to reimburse. definition of the term “occurrence” in the Appalachian policy contemplates that one next Paradis com- may occurrence multiple dispa have plaints allege do in fact at least one actual impacts rate inju on individuals and that place during occurrence that took may period ries extend over of time. court, however, period. The district relied Appalachian v. Liberty Mut. Id. Ins. Co. Ins. Co., (3rd Cir.1982), 676 F.2d 56 to determine Certain single of its identification of the they Appalachian do not. involved the occurrence, Appalachian court next not- liability question of whether a insurer had to aspect ed that occurrence that *6 provide coverage losses its insured in- place policy must have taken the peri- within curred in the of class action settlement liti- injury. od was the result or Id. at 61-62. gation involving sex in em- discrimination The court difficulty observed the in that the ployment discriminatory where the insured’s “injurious case was that the effects of [the originated conduct before the effective date employment policies ... began insured’s] im- coverage impact but had an class mem- mediately upon adoption their and continued bers both that date. before and after The at period least to some into the extent at policy issue defined an occurrence as: coverage provided by policy.” the [insurer’s] happening [A]n accident or a or event or a Id. at 62. that “in type The court held this repeated exposure continuous or to condi- of a place case the takes occurrence when the

tions which unexpectedly and unintention- injuries first manifest themselves” and con- ally injury, in personal property results cluded that the the time of occurrence was damage advertising liability during or immediately discriminatory policies after the policy period exposure ... such [a]ll were promulgated, and thus before the insur- substantially general the same conditions policy ance at had taken effect. issue Id. existing emanating premis- at one The district court in the instant case found es location shall be deemed one occur- County alleged insureds’ rence. exculpatory failure to disclose evidence and Id. at 59. properly employees regarding train their Appalachian proximate

The court stated that in or- such disclosure was the sole cause damage der to determine there had been of all the alleged whether an Paradis in his that, policy period, complaints. occurrence within the it had to The district held in 1) 2) identify the decide Appalachian occurrence when accordance with both and Koo- place. Co., it took Id. at 61. The court tenai v. Cas. and then Western Sur. 908, (1988), employed theory proximate 113 87 cause to Idaho the occur- identify occurrence, asking place resulting injury if there rence took when itself, proximate, uninterrupted, one and con- first manifested occurred in but 1980 90 seeking determine began of limitation when Paradis first proceedings purposes. Kootenai, when a tort occurs for insurance county argued

in Idaho. In im- conducted an though a sheriff that even Erie, Co., City Pa. v. Nat. Ins. Guar. the date the prior to proper execution sale (3rd Cir.1997) (citations omit- F.3d liability poli- an occurrence county purchased ted). point relevant of focus for deter- The London, the insurer Lloyd’s of cy from mining an occur- whether county’s damages re- should still cover itself, policy under the is the rence of those that sale because some sulting from the definition of occurrence took effect. after damages accrued continuing torts are consid- makes clear Relying in P.2d at 94. at 113 Idaho single Accord Koo- ered to be occurrence. Appala- court’s decision part tenai, on the lower 750 P.2d at 94. The 113 Idaho that, chian, contrary: Court held that an policy also makes clear occurrence injury, requires a resultant so we consider execution sale is not improper being when the the time of an occurrence as Lloyd’s policy it by the since event covered injurious manifests itself. Accord effect first prior months occurred almost six Appalachian, 676 F.2d at 61-62. An of the insurer is effective date arising out of an “for claims not liable com- the Paradis prior occurred event or accident which plaints allege independent both and continu- the insurance cover- the effective date of during occurrences torts that constitute age, though damages and claims con- even the time ICRMP was covered under the accrue from this cause tinued to began purchasing coverage.” period later insurance from Northland so trigger prior occurrence to that would not Liberty (quoting Appalachian Id. Ins. Co. liability. (W.D.Pa.1981) Corp., F.Supp. Mut. Ins. (3d Cir.1982))). (af d, 676 F.2d 56 f' begin by examining allegations We complaint. claim Paradis’ first Paradis’ first urges that the district court’s alleged that Kootenai and then Koo- light fact illogical conclusion tenai Prosecutor Walker failed to that Paradis the federal district court found regarding Brady train their staff disclosure alleged continuing torts. The federal had when, requirements the time decision, however, was made in re court’s subject of a criminal Paradis became predi sponse to a motion to dismiss that was *7 investigation prosecution and then Koote- for upon cated statutes of limitations those County in nai violation of his constitutional noted, “it is torts. And as district rights. injury alleged from this civil analysis irrelevant to the whether a claim is failure to train manifested itself when Parad- preserved purposes pursuing for 1980-1981, initially prosecuted in is was claim.” This is because: prior to the Northland which occurred Reliance on the commencement of the stat- period. Allegedly, the initial failure led to in dispositive ute of limitation is not deter- withholding exculpatory the continued evi- mining when a tort occurs for insurance however, injury; dence and thus continued trig- and purposes. Statutes of limitation injury ongoing action and such continued gering purposes for insurance serve dates Thus, un- single arose out of a occurrence. poli- distinct functions and reflect different policy, alleged single claim der the this cy of limitation func- concerns. Statutes place prior occurrence that took to the discourage expedite litigation tion to and is not liable for it period, and Northland determining when stale claims. But when purposes, a tort for insurance occurs claim, alleged Paradis In his second generally sought protect courts have to County train and Walker failed to expectations parties of the reasonable regarding require- their staff constitutional the insurance contract. probable cause determinations ments for arrested, charged, was

Because of this fundamental difference 1981 when Paradis in his con- consistently reject- prosecuted, again in and violation of purpose, courts have rights. alleged This failure and they are the statutes stitutional ed the idea bound injury prior any resulting also occurred 1986 would have been a continuation policy period. begun in Haws’ conduct 1980: but for Haws’ alleged subsequent non-disclosure and fabri- third, fourth, claims al- Paradis’ and fifth cation in there would have been noth- County, that Kootenai leged subpoena. Similarly, for Paradis to later Haws, Prosecutor, Walker, complaint specifically Paradis’ alleged that Elliott, Brady negligence, and were liable for Haws’ false statements occurred “throughout arrest, and prosecution, false malicious false (Em- involvement” in [Haw’s] Paradis’ case. imprisonment they “instigated, pursued added). Thus, phasis even those statements prosecuted degree charges first murder and alleged have been made after commence- Paradis,” negli- against and that Walker period ment of the would have been regarding gent in his failure to train his staff prior continuation of those made to it. More Brady requirements disclosure and constitu- importantly, if alleged even these claims an requirements probable cause. Par- tional policy period, occurrence North- Haws, Elliott, alleged claim adis’ sixth land not would still be liable. Haws left Brady, perhaps and and Erbland Walker employ of Kootenai two conspired against to concoct evidence Paradis years prior the start of policy period, it present and as fact in violation Paradis’ and Northland is not liable for actions he rights. alleged civil Paradis in count seven departure. took after that Brady’s conduct that contributed against negli- conviction Paradis amounted The first and second claims of Paradis’ gent intentional infliction dis- of emotional complaint were the amended same as those Again, both the initial and the tress. event original complaint. The third claim of resulting injury alleged in claims oc- these complaint alleged the amended that Walker curred, purposes prior and Kootenai failed to train then- prior years Paradis’ conviction 1981—five present staff not to and fabricate fabricated beginning of policy period. defendant, evidence which their did, resulting staff with immediate injury, eighth alleged Brady claim 1980-1981. The fourth al- amended claim “repeatedly” by “perpetu- Paradis defamed leged Brady maliciously prosecut- and Elliott at[ing] unsupportable the contrived and theo- ed in violation rights. of his civil convicted, upon ries” which Paradis was alleged The fifth amended claim all defen- thereby “providing] [Brady’s] cover for own engaged pre-arrest dants conspiracy to transgressions expense at the continued jurisdiction probable fabricate cause. punishment of Again, Paradis.” albeit con- complaint alleged Count six of the amended tinuous, alleged conduct with its result- rights Elliott violated Paradis’ constitutional ing injury prior occurred to Paradis convic- by falsely procuring an arrest warrant. if tion. Even this claim read as could be Count seven that Walker occurrence, however, and Koote- alleging because negligent nai County training were Brady, ICRMP did not defend *8 thereby supervising permitting their staff alleged would not be liable for con- still his seizure, arrest, wrongful and conviction of duct. eighth alleged Paradis. The amended claim ninth, tenth, Paradis’ claims eleventh intentionally Brady that inflicted emotional alleged conduct amounted to Haws “during investigatory distress on Paradis or negligent intentional infliction of emotional phase and after his conviction.” While Specifically, distress and defamation. these resulting injury alleged conduct and in these alleged sup- claims that Haws in assisted may many years, claims have continued for it pressing subpoena Paradis’ of Haws’ 1980- occurred, purposes all for of policy, prior notes, prosecution which Paradis was began insuring to the time Northland attempting to obtain for his 1986 habeas ICRMP. corpus petition, and that Haws made false throughout in guilt complaint statements about Paradis’ The ninth claim the amended Brady alleged portrayed involvement in The al- his Paradis’ case. Haws Par- leged suppression subpoena light of in privacy Paradis’ adis a false and invaded his IV. CONCLUSION after Paradis’ con- they made

by comments alleged claim Specifically, viction. grant of sum- affirm the district court’s We that corroborated Brady statements made the Paradis com- mary judgment because that Haws testimony at trial and his false allege an occurrence under plaints did not that Par- and 1987 in 1986 made statements policy. Costs to Northland. though Even this guilty of murder. adis was con- place after Paradis’ alleged took conduct Pro Tem Justice BURDICK and Justices policy peri- the start of and after viction TROUT and KIDWELL Concur. a malicious fiction” od, “product of it was the re- initially created with immediate JONES, Justice, concurring. that was specially J. Thus, the conduct injury in 1980. sultant fully opinion, I but concur the Court’s that took of an occurrence a continuation opinion only relates wish to observe that the im- policy period. More place prior to the entity question to the of which bears above, ICRMP did discussed portantly, as responsibility payment of costs and ex- employ Brady, and Haws left the not defend litigation penses incurred in the Paradis period. County prior of any way honesty on the does not reflect alleged for acts is thus not liable Northland defendants, integrity of the Kootenai claim. Marc and Peter Erbland. particularly Haws otherwise, I would not Were situation complaint al- ten of the amended Count because, having participated have the case negli- leged conduct amounted to that Haws’ with both Marc Haws and Peter worked infliction of emotional gent and intentional I have full confidence their hon- during beginning with his conduct distress — esty, integrity. ethics and al- “investigatory phase.” Count eleven Brady conspired to leged that Elliott and to, during, prior and after

withhold evidence rights. civil trial in violation his again, claims conduct that

Once these policy period. prior

occurred short, origi- points

In to both complaints support nal and amended 205 P.3d 1228 complaints, its claim Northland. INVESTING, LABRADOR BLACK however, allege action failed to LLC, Petitioner-Respondent, resulting in- insureds with jury period of cov- that occurred erage policy.3 There- under the City and the KUNA CITY COUNCIL fore, grant we affirm the district court’s Kuna, Idaho, political subdivision of summary judgment. Idaho, Respondents-Appel the State of lants. C. Northland is entitled to an award No. 34513. costs. Idaho, Supreme Court of requested an of costs Northland has award Boise, June 2008 Term. appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40. That rule “[cjosts

provides, part, in relevant shall *9 be allowed as a matter of course to the provided

prevailing party unless otherwise pre-

by law or order of the Court.” As the

vailing party appeal, in this costs are award-

ed to Northland. policy does in several of Paradis’ claims. 3. We further note that Northland’s those not cover intentional acts such as