211 P.2d 413 | Idaho | 1949
Reduced rate of premium tax is a concession to insurance companies loaning money in Idaho. Idaho Code §
Construction given by insurance commissioner to statute should be disregarded where clearly erroneous. United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Bakes, 1937,
Taxation of income from bonds does not make the bonds "taxable property." Art. VII, Sections 2 and 5, Constitution of Idaho. Diefendorf v. Gallet, 1932,
This action was brought for the purpose of obtaining a declaratory judgment construing section
Section
The decisive question presented for determination is, then: Did respondent have, during the years 1945 and 1946, respectively, "more than fifty per cent of its assets invested in bonds or warrants of this state, or bonds or warrants of any county, city or district within this state authorized by law to be issued, or in taxable property within this state, or in first mortgages upon improved, unencumbered real estate within this state"? If so, it is clear, respondent would be required to pay a tax of only one percent on premiums collected in this state on risks located in this state, in lieu of the tax levied by sec.
Respondent alleged in its complaint that in 1945 its total assets amounted to $1,092,873.23. That these assets were invested (excepting stocks, choses in action and accounts, not material here) as follows: $18,923 in bonds of counties and cities of this state; $33,665.66 in mortgages on improved, unencumbered real estate within this state, and $643,763.03 in United States bonds. Therefore, instead of having more than fifty per cent of its assets invested as required by sec.
Respondent also alleges that in 1946 its total assets amounted to $1,325,963.25; that these assets were invested (excepting stocks, choses in action and accounts, not material here) as follows: $166,899.48 in bonds of counties and cities of this state; $39,101.15 on improved, unencumbered real estate within this state and $530,519.53 in United States bonds. Therefore, instead of having more than fifty per cent of its assets invested as required by sec.
But respondent contends that having paid a tax of only one per cent from 1939 to 1944, and the department of insurance having accepted such payment and construed sec.
Respondent also contends the words "or in taxable property within this state," appearing in sec.
Sec.
[Sec. 70-114] "Statutory terms defined.
* * *
"1. * * *
"2. * * *
"3. The words `personal property' include money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt." * * *
These general definitions of personal property are of little or no value in construing a statute expressly designed for the purpose of levying a tax on premiums collected by insurance companies transacting business in this state. We are here concerned *63
with construing the above mentioned clause, "or in taxable property within this state", as the same appears in sec.
It is at once clear the words "or in taxable property within this state" (sec.
Respondent further contends the failure to include United States bonds in sec.
In Diefendorf v. Gallet,
"The state has the power to classify for the purposes of taxation, only limited by the rule that the classification must be reasonable and founded upon differences between the parties. The equality clause does not forbid reasonable classification. Discrimination through classification is said to violate that clause only where it is such as to preclude the assumption that it `was made in the exercise of legislative judgment and discretion.' Stebbins v. Riley,
"The federal attitude toward the rights and powers of a state to reasonably adjust its system of taxation is best expressed in Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
"`The provision in the fourteenth amendment, that no state shall deny to any person *64 within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, was not intended to prevent a state from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all, such as churches, libraries, and the property of charitable institutions. It may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions, and may vary the rates of excise upon various products; it may tax real estate and personal property in a different manner; it may tax visible property only, and not tax securities for payment of money; it may allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow them. All such regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are within the discretion of the state legislature, or the people of the state in framing their constitution.'"
There is no merit in the contention that the failure to include United States bonds in sec.
It follows the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment in conformity with the views herein expressed, and it is so ordered. Costs awarded to appellant.
GIVENS, PORTER, TAYLOR and KEETON, JJ., concur.