Thе IDAHO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Thomas CAMPBELL, Principal, Bonneville High School, et al., Defendants-Respondents.
No. 11090.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Feb. 7, 1973.
506 P.2d 112
In the case at bar, as in Ferguson v. City of Seattle and Hopper v. Reed, supra, the jury was instructed as to a motorist‘s duty to keeр a careful lookout. The instruction (no. 11) given by the district court reads as follows:
“You are instructed that in order to keep a proper lookout, a mоtorist or pedestrian must do more than merely look; it is his duty to see and be cognizant of what is in plain view or obviously apparent, and is chargeable with seeing what he should have seen, but not with what he could not have seen in the exercise of ordinary care.”
Since the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendаnts, it must have found that the defendant driver did fulfill her duty to maintain a reasonably careful lookout. There is substantial competent evidence to support this finding; for example, several eyewitnesses testified that the plaintiff was dressed in dark clothing, which would have made it difficult for a motorist to have seen him at night, and one witnеss testified that the plaintiff angled across the street, thus placing himself in an area of the road where—as compared to the crosswalk—the presence of pedestrians would be less likely to be anticipated by drivers. Under these circumstances, the statutory duty to sound her horn was not applicable, аnd the instruction requested by the plaintiff-appellant was properly omitted by the trial court.
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.
SHEPARD, McQUADE, McFADDEN and BAKES, JJ., concur.
Ferebauer & Whyte, Idaho Falls, for defendants-respondents.
McFADDEN, Justice.
The Idaho Commission on Human Rights (plaintiffs-appellants, hereinafter referred to as the Commission), created by
After attempting to resolve the dispute between the parents and the high school administration, the Commission filed its amended complaint seeking injunctive relief from the enforcement of thе hair length regulations. The amended complaint alleged that the principal of the high school enforced the hair length regulations adopted by the Board of Trustees of the school district which were applicable only to male students. The Commission also filed a motion for an order to show cause аnd a preliminary injunction with supporting affidavits.
The district court refused to issue an order to show cause and set for hearing the motion for a preliminary injunction. In rеsponse to appellants’ amended complaint and motions, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, a motion tо dismiss the amended complaint for its failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and also a motion to strike portions of the apрellants’ amended complaint. In accordance with the trial court‘s request, the parties submitted briefs in support of their respective positions concerning the scope of
The essence of this appeal concerns the scope of
“[i]t shall be a prohibited act to discriminate against a person because of, оr on a basis of, race, color, religion, sex or national origin, in any of the following:
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(6) For an educational institution;
(a) to exclude, expel, limit or otherwise discriminate against an individual seeking admission as a student or an individual enrolled as a student in the terms, conditions, and privileges of the institution * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
Although this statutory provision explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of
By its nature a preamble is prefatory and declarative of public policy. Since the preamble is indicative of the legislative purpose only, it is not conclusive nor does it confer or enlarge powers. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 152, pp. 131-132. The preamble‘s purview does not extend to more explicit statutory provisions. State ex rel. Arn v. Consumers Co-op Ass‘n, 163 Kan. 324, 183 P.2d 423 (1947); In re Bale, 63 Wash.2d 83, 385 P.2d 545 (1963). See, Curly‘s Dairy v. State Dept. of Agriculture, 415 P.2d 740 (Or.1966). When the preamble conflicts with a later more specific unambiguous statutory provision, the latter is considered to be an exception to the preamblе. Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528 (1947); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 349, pp. 730-731. Here the specific provision of
The district court in dismissing the appellants’ amended complaint held that the pleadings must show facts of unlawful discrimination. The appellants’ complaint alleged facts showing that the respondents were discriminating against male students in violation of the provisions of
The judgment of dismissal of the appellants’ amended complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be grantеd is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Costs to appellants.
DONALDSON, C. J., and McQUADE and BAKES, JJ., concur.
SHEPARD, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent from the concluding language of the majority opinion. The majority evidently loses sight of the nature of the action which was one for injunctive relief. The majority opinion further ignores the rationale for the decision of the district court. In his memorandum opinion, the district judge stated:
“The question, basically, is whether the regulation of the defendants is unreasonable and arbitrary. Yet the Attorney General wants me now, merely on the basis of his complaint and without any further proceeding, to determine ex parte, that the regulation is unreasonable and enjoin the enforcement of that regulation. If he wants me to make that determination, I suggest that he must plead
it. I decline to do so without an evidentiary hearing, and would dismiss his complaint based upon the theory that discrimination between the sexes, without further showing, is unreasonable. In short, the complaint shows that there has been a differentiation between the sexes but that is a far cry from unlawful discrimination.” (Emphasis supplied)
I suggest furthеr that the regulation enacted by the school board carries the standard and orthodox presumption of validity since this action was not brought under constitutiоnal theories as was the case of Murphy v. Pocatello School District, 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878 (1971).
Notes
“The general purposes of this act are
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(2) To secure for all individuals within the state freedom from discrimination becаuse of race, color, religion or national origin in connection with employment, public accommodations, education and real proрerty transactions, and discrimination because of sex in connection with employment, and thereby to protect their interest in personal dignity, to make аvailable to the state their full productive capacities, to secure the state against domestic strife and unrest, to preserve the public safety, health, and general welfare, and to promote the interests, rights and privileges of individuals within the state.