61 W. Va. 9 | W. Va. | 1906
This is an action of assxmipsit, brought in the circuit court-of Randolph county by E. Clark Ice against W. B. Maxwell, E. P. Loudin, -William Flint and Arnold Cunningham. To a judgment dismissing the action, the plaintiff applied for and obtained a writ of error.
The plaintiff assigns as error the giving of three certain instructions for the defendants, and that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.
By instruction number .one, the jury were, in effect, told if they believed from the evidence that a contract was entered into between the plaintiff and defendants, in December, 1902, by which the latter agreed to pay to the plaintiff five hundred dollars provided he would furnish a purchaser for the Achelles and Stockbridge lands at thirty dollars per acre, and provided further that he would furnish such purchaser-prior to the 28th day of February, 1903, or before the defendants should themselves sell the land to a purchaser-other than the one furnishsd by the plaintiff, and that the-plaintiff failed to furnish the purchaser within said time,, or to notify the defendants that he had made sale of the property, that they should find for the defendants.
Instruction number two in effect presents the same question as is presented by instruction number one. Therefore, they may be disposed of together.
The objection insisted upon is that these instructions are binding, and by them it is made imperative that, the plaintiff furnish a. purchaser at thirty dollars per acre before the 28th day of February, 1903, and that unless the-jury believe from the evidence that such purchaser was furnished within that time, or the; defendants notified of such purchaser, then they should find for the defendants.
Maxwell and Cunningham _ had the agency to sell about, sixteen hundred acres of land in Randolph county-from the owners, Stockbridge and Achelles. . This agency was to expire on the 28th day ' of February, 1903. After-having procured the agency, Maxwell solicited the plaintiff
It is undisputed that the purchasers for the property were not furnished prior to the 28th day of February, 1903. On the 27th day of February, before the agency expired, the defendants purchased the property. After this time, and about the 11th of March, the plaintiff introduced to the defendants, Maxwell and Cunningham, parties who, a few days afterwards, entered into a contract for the purchase of the land in question, at the price of twenty-seven dollars per acre. !
In view of these facts, should the jury have been told that unless the plaintiff found a purchaser at the price of thirty dollars per acre, before the 28th day of February, 1903, they should find for the defendant? While it is true there is a conflict in the evidence upon these points, and the jury may have found that the plaintiff contracted to furnish a purchaser at thirty dollars per acre before the 28th day of February, yet in the light of all the evidence and circumstances in the case, it is contended that these instructions misconceive the case and fall short of presenting it to the jury in its entirety, and that inasmuch as they are binding, and direct a verdict for the defendants, that this should not have
The jury should not have been told that the plaintiff, to entitle him to recover, should have produced a purchaser who was willing to pay thirty dollars an acre for the land. But this would probably be harmless error if that part of the instruction is correct which says that the purchaser must be furnished before the 28th day of February, because in that event, if the purchaser were not furnished within that time, the plaintiff’s right to maintain an action would be barred, and in no event could he recover. A party undoubtedly has the right, in creating an agency for the sale of lands, to fix the life of the agency, and when this' is done, or where the agent is given a certain time within which to make a sale, his right to make such sale does not extend beyond that period, unless the time within which it is to be done is waived, or the contract is continued, expressly or impliedly. It is a condition precedent to the recovery of compensation for the plaintiff’s services that he make the sale within the time stipulated, and unless he perform this condition, he cannot recover. “If the contract of employment between the broker and the principal provides that the undertaking shall be performed within a limited time, the broker is not entitled to nor can he demand commission for his services not accomplished by him within that time.” Clark & Skyles on Agency, section 778, p. 1679. Innumerable cases could be cited to this effect, as this is the universal doctrine.
But while this is the rule, it does not apply in this case, because there is evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was permitted to continue in the employment of the defendants after the 28th day of February, and that he was after that time recognized as their agent. He states that he talked
Consequently, under these authorities, and under the facts and circumstances of this case, the court should not have limited by its instructions the time within which the plaintiff was to furnish such purchaser to the 28th of February, but the question should-have been left to the jury to determine whether or not it was continued beyond that time, or-
Instruction number three, in effect, tells the jury that if they should believe from the evidence that the defendants Maxwell and Cunningham made sale of an undivided interest' in the land to Flint and Loudin, and that they purchased the remaining interest therein, on February 27, 1903, and that thereafter the defendants made no new or additional contract with the plaintiff in reference to the sale, and that the plaintiff did nothing further thereabout after February 27 except to introduce to Maxwell and Cunningham, E. E. and F. C. Wheeler, who later purchased the land, that then the plaintiff under the evidence would not be entitled to any compensation in the shape of commissions, and could only recover such sum as the work actually done in making the said introduction was worth, provided a definite amount as to the value of the time and labor in introducing the purchasers should be shown. ‘ This instruction undertakes to measure the amount which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover on the quantum meruit, and the question is, does it apply the proper rule ? The plaintiff was a real estate agent; was so treated by Maxwell and Cunningham when they first approached him in reference to a sale of the land. He is supposed to be familiar with the market, and to be better able to handle matters of this kind than one who had not given his time and attention to it, and in this case he had written letters to various parties, offering this land for sale; ihe had received several communications in regard to it, and referred them to Mr. Maxwell, and consulted him in reference .to it; and on the 11th of March, acting as such agent, he produced these purchasers to Maxwell and Cunningham. Now is it to b.esaid that the compensation to which he.is en
It is claimed that the defendants admitted liability in the sum of one hundred dollars. This we will not pass upon, as the case must go back for a new trial, and it would not be proper to intimate any opinion upon the weight of the testimony.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, the verdict of the jury set aside, and a new trial awarded.
Reversed a/nd New Trial Granted.