Case Information
*1 TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-17-00559-CV
I. R., Appellant
v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1-FM-16-000877, HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
I.R. appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her minor child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. Following a trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for terminating I.R.’s parental rights existed and that termination was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2).
On appeal, I.R.’s court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. , 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying procedure in appeal from termination of parental rights). The brief meets the requirements of by presenting a professional evaluation of the *2 record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor , 160 S.W.3d at 646–47. I.R.’s counsel has certified to this Court that she provided appellant with a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw as counsel and informed her of her right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. The Department of Family and Protective Services has filed a response to the Anders brief waiving its right to file an appellee’s brief unless it deems a brief necessary after review of any pro se brief filed by I.R. To date, I.R. has not filed a pro se brief.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all of the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record, including the brief submitted on I.R.’s behalf, and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. We agree that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating I.R.’s parental rights. We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. [2]
*3 _____________________________________________ Melissa Goodwin, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Goodwin
Affirmed
Filed: November 1, 2017
[1] We refer to the mother by her initials only. Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
[2] See In re P.M. , 520 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). In In re P.M. , the Texas Supreme Court held that the right to counsel in suits seeking the termination of parental rights extends to “all proceedings in [the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of a petition for review.” Id. at 27. Accordingly, counsel’s obligation to I.R. has not yet been discharged. See id. If I.R., after consulting with counsel, desires to file a petition for review, counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an brief.” See id. at 27–28.