HYUNDAI MOTOR CO. and Hyundai Motor America, Inc., Petitioners, v. Victor Manuel VASQUEZ and Brenda Suarez Vasquez, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Alyssa Amber Vasquez, Respondents.
No. 03-0914.
Supreme Court of Texas.
March 10, 2006.
Rehearing Denied May 26, 2006.
189 S.W.3d 743
Michael A. Caddell, Cynthia Bodendieck Chapman, James Juranek, Caddell & Chapman, Houston, Ricardo G. Cedillo, L. J. Strieber, Davis Cedillo & Mendoza, Inc., San Antonio, Ezequiel Reyna Jr., Law Offices of Ezequiel Reyna, Jr., Weslaco, for Respondents.
Harvey G. Brown Jr., Wright Brown & Close, LLP, Houston, Vincent S. Walkowiak, O. Rey Rodriguez, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Hugh F. Young Jr., Reston, VA, Brent M. Rosenthal, Baron & Budd, P.C., Dallas, G. Alan Waldrop, Locke, Liddell & Sapp LLP, Austin, for Amicus Curiae.
Justice BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice HECHT, Justice O‘NEILL, Justice BRISTER, Justice WILLETT, and Justice CAYCE
In this case, we decide whether a trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to allow a voir dire question from counsel that previews relevant evidence and inquires of prospective jurors whether such evidence is outcome determinative. We hold that it does not. The court of appeals held that it does. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
I. Background
Four-year-old Amber Vasquez died in a low-speed neighborhood traffic collision, after the passenger-side airbag in her aunt‘s Hyundai Accent deployed with enough force to catch Amber‘s chin and break her neck. The driver of the other car had turned unexpectedly in front of the Hyundai, and the force of the collision threw Amber forward in her seat. It is undisputed that Amber was not buckled into her front-seat seat belt at the time of the accident.
Amber‘s parents, Victor and Brenda Vasquez, sued Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Motor America, Inc. (together “Hyundai“), contending that Hyundai had placed the airbag incorrectly, and that the airbag had deployed with too much force in this low-impact accident. Hyundai responded that the airbag that killed Amber was not defective because a child wearing a seat belt—as state law requires2—or sitting in the back seat—as the car‘s warnings cautioned—would not have been injured by its dеployment.
In placing Amber unbuckled in the front seat, Amber‘s aunt, Valerie Suarez, disregarded airbag warnings on both sunvisors, a hangtag from the rearview mirror, a decal on the dashboard, and a notification in the owner‘s manual. Suarez ignored the warnings because she planned a short neighborhood trip and believed that the airbags would deploy only at higher speeds. Hyundai conceded that it knew some occupants would ignore the airbag warnings about placing children unbuckled in the front seat,3 but maintained the risk was outweighed by the benefits of the airbag to all others.4 Hyundai named Suarez and the driver of the other car as responsible third parties.5
The trial judge dismissed two jury panels before seating the jury in the case from a third. During the first voir dire, Amber‘s counsel asked jurors6 whether the
Before the third voir dire, the trial judge discussed with counsel her concern that the previous jury panels had misunderstood the inquiry about placing a child in the front seat without a buckled seat belt to be one about the weight they could give to particular evidence in the case rather than whether they could fairly consider all of the evidence presented.10 As a result, during the third general voir dire, in response to counsel‘s request to ask general questions “about belting, seat belting, and seat belting habits much akin to what I did the last time I did general voir dire,” the trial court responded, “I am going to let you ask those questions.” Thereafter, the trial court allowed counsel to ask “general questions about belting” and to inquire about jurors’ personal seat belt habits, but she did not allow disclosure that Amber was not wearing one at the time of the accident.11 Counsel asked questions about whеther the jurors buckled their seat belts on short trips, before leaving the garage, before exiting a driveway, and before leaving a parking spot. At the conclusion of the third voir dire, the trial court excused 3 of the first 28 jurors for cause and seated a 12 member jury and one alternate.
The Vasquezes appealed, contending the trial court erred in disallowing voir dire inquiry into whether the jurors would be “predisposed, regardless of the evidence,” against the Vasquezes because “there is no seat belt in use,” to a point that “[the jurors] could not be fair and impartial.” Hyundai responded that the proposed voir dire inquiry is improper in that it asks jurors about the weight they would place on a particular рiece of relevant evidence, and thus the trial court properly refused to allow it. A panel of the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s judgment. Upon rehearing en banc, however, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in disallowing the inquiry because the proposed question focuses “on the ability of the jurors to be fair.”12 This Court granted Hyundai‘s petition for review.13
II. The Purpose of Voir Dire
The Bill of Rights in the Texas Constitution guarantees litigants a right to trial by a fair and impartial jury14 and authorizes the Legislature to pass laws “to maintain its purity and efficiency.”15 The Legislature thus has authority to pass laws establishing those qualified to serve, consistent with the right to a jury trial.16 To that end, the Legislature has established general juror qualifications relating to age, citizenship, literacy, sanity, and moral character.17 The Legislature also has established bases for juror disqualification, including those relating to witnesses, relatives, and interested parties.18 Among these bases, the Legislature has disqualified from jury service anyone who “has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against a party in the case.”19
Voir dire examination protects the right to an impartial jury by exposing possible improper juror biases that form the basis for statutory disqualification.20 Thus, the primary purpose of voir dire is to inquire about specific views that would prevent or substantially impair jurors from performing their duty in accordance with their instructions and oath.21
In addition, this Court recognizes that trial courts should allow “broad latitude” to counsel “to discover any bias or prejudice by the potential jurors so that peremptory challenges may be intelligently exercised.”22 “A peremptory challenge,
[T]he scope of the voir dire examination quite obviously can not be bounded by inflexible rules of thumb, for of all the delicate psychological factors inherent in a jury trial perhaps none is more essentially subjective and hence less submissive to dogmatic limitations.25
Peremptory strikes are not intended, however, to permit a party to “select” a favorable jury.26 Counsel‘s latitude in voir dire, while broad, is constrained by reasonable trial court control.27 Such control is necessary because, “[t]hough the motive of a peremptory challenge may be to protect a private interest, the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine representation on a governmental body.”28 Thus, the exercise of jury strikes is not solely a private endeavor: “[W]hen private litigants participate in the selection of jurors, they serve an important function within the government and act with its substantial assistance.”29
III. Voir Dire Inquiry Regarding Facts in a Case
Voir dire inquiry into potential juror bias and prejudice thus is proper to determine whether jurors are disqualified by statute30 and to seek information that allows counsel to intelligently exercise their peremptory strikes. Because the statute does not define “bias” or “prejudice,” we defined them in Compton v. Henrie, using their ordinary meanings:31
Bias, in its usual meaning, is an inclination toward one side of an issue rather than to the other, but to disqualify, it must appear that the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act with impartiality. Prejudice is more easily defined, for it means prejudgment, and consequently embraces bias; the converse is not true.32
Other sources confirm that “bias” generally relates to inclinations, while “prejudice” is associated with prejudgment.33 Although it expressly prohibits only bias or prejudice concerning parties, we rеcognized in Compton that the statute extends to bias or prejudice concerning types of cases.34 A juror who is prejudiced against all medical malpractice claims, for example, is necessarily prejudiced “against a party in the case,” even if they have never met.35
Although a juror may be statutorily disqualified because of a bias or prejudice against a type of claim or a general inability to follow the court‘s instructions regarding the law, this Court has refused to hold that statements that reflect a juror‘s judgment about the facts of a case as presented, rather than an external unfair bias or prejudice, amount to a disqualifying bias. In Cortez v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., an attorney summarized the evidence during voir dire, and then inquired of the jurors whether either party was “starting out ahead.”36 The Court held that such inquiries are improper, and that a trial court should not disqualify a juror based on an answer to an inquiry that seeks “an opinion about the evidence.”37
Cortez thus adopted the general rule that it is improper to ask prospective jurors what their verdict would be if certain facts were proved.38 Fair and impartial jurors reach a verdict based on the
First, an inquiry about the weight jurors will give relevant evidence should not become a proxy for inquiries into jurors’ attitudes, because the former is a determination that falls within their province as jurors.41 Just as excluding jurors who weigh summarized facts in a particular way infringes upon the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, so too does excluding jurors who reveal whether they would give specific evidence great or little weight.42 In both cases, questions that attempt to elicit such information can represent an effort to skew the jury by pre-tеsting their opinions about relevant evidence. And, when all of the parties to the case engage in such questioning, the effort is aimed at guessing the verdict, not at seating a fair jury.
Second, inquiring whether jurors can be fair after isolating a relevant fact confuses jurors as much as an inquiry that previews all the facts. Lawyers properly instruct jurors that voir dire is not evidence, yet jurors must answer whether they can fairly listen to all of the evidence based only upon the facts that counsel have revealed. In responding, jurors are unable to consider other relevant facts that might alter their responses, rendering their responses unreliable. This confusion may explain in part why jurors’ voir dire reactions to the evidence have not been proven to be predictors of jury verdicts: experience tells that, whatever jurors’ stated opinions about particular evidence may be at the outset, they can shift upon hearing other evidence.43
Third, previewing jurors’ votes piecemeal is not consistent with the jurisprudence of our sister court.44 In Standefer v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held it improper to ask jurors whether they would presume guilt if one fact was
[Q]uestions that are not intended to discover bias against the law or prejudice for or against the defendant, but rather seek only to determine how jurors would respond to the anticipated evidence and commit them to a specific verdict based on that evidence are not proper.46
As the statutory standards for bias or prejudice in civil and criminal cases are the same,47 voir dire standards should remain consistent.
Finally, the Court‘s decision in Babcock v. Northwest Memorial Hospital does not dictate that a trial judge must accept questions that seek to assess jurors’ opinions about the weight they will place on particular evidence. In that case, we held that counsel could question jurors about bias or prejudice resulting from a societal influence outside the case—namely, tort reform.48 In contrast, a question that asks jurors to judge the weight to be given an operative fact will not reveal whether jurors have potential external biases or prejudices that improperly skew their view of case facts.
Statements during voir dire are not evidence, but given its broad scope in Texas civil cases, it is not unusual for jurors to hear the salient facts of the case during the voir dire. If the voir dire includes a preview of the evidence, we hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow questions that seek to determine the weight to be given (or not to be given) a particular fact or set of relevant facts.49 If the trial judge permits questions about the weight jurors would give relevant case facts, then the jurors’ responses to such questions are not disqualifying, because while such responses reveal a fact-specific opinion, one cannot conclude they reveal an improper subject-matter bias.
IV. Trial Court Discretion
One of the primary rules of voir dire in Texas civil cases has long been that trial courts have broad discretion in conducting it.50 Until the court of appeals’ decision in this case, neither this Court, nor any intermediate appellate court, had held that a trial court abuses its discretion in excluding a voir dire question that incorporates isolated facts in a case.51 In two
PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 7: I don‘t understand that question. Does that mean like that by what we have heard so far we haven‘t made a judgment?
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: Yeah. I don‘t want—Is there anyone here who has already made up their mind? Let me ask that question real, real loud again. Is there anybody here that thinks that they have already made up their mind on this case right now before you have heard any evidence whatsoever?
Without being present in the courtroom, one cannot tell whether jurors might have understood this response to be “Yes” or “No.”
It can be a close question whether a juror‘s response indicates a prejudice due to personal animus or bias, rather than a fair judgment of the previewed evidence.53
We observed in Cortez that trial judges have discretion to clarify whether a juror‘s response is the result of confusion, misunderstanding, or mistake.54 Similarly, the trial judge must have discretion to exclude questions that seek to gauge the weight a juror will place on specific evidence. In Cortez, we held improper both (1) a juror‘s disqualification based on answers that previewed the juror‘s vote, and (2) the actual questions that sought the same.55 Depending on the circumstances, a trial judge may choose to hear jurors’ responses before deciding whether an inquiry pries into potential prejudices or potential verdicts, but if the question reaches for the latter, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow it. If the trial court allows a question that seeks a juror‘s view about the weight to give relevant evidence, then the juror‘s response, without more, is not disqualifying.
Permitting disclosures about the evidence the jury will hear during the case increases the potential for discovering external biases, but inquiries to jurors after doing so should not spill over into attempts to preview the verdict based on the facts as represented to the jurors. Balancing these competing concerns depends on the facts in a case and on the inquiries posited to the jury. The trial judge is in a better position to achieve the proper balance.
V. The Question
The Vasquezes contend the trial court erred in refusing to allow the following inquiry to the jurors:
THE COURT: What is the type of question you need to ask other than what has already been asked about their own individual use of seat belts or not seat belts?
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I need to know whether or not they would be predisposed regardless of the evidence to—Their preconceived notion is that if there is no seat belt in use, no matter what else the evidence is, that they could not be fair and impartial.
THE COURT: And that‘s the type of question you are asking to ask?
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: That‘s the kind of question I need to ask . . . .
After Hyundai‘s objection that the question would “pretest these jurors about the facts of this case,” the trial judge stated:
THE COURT: All right. I‘m going to sustain the objection. We are not going to go any further into seat belts. . . .
The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the
First, the question isolates a single fact material to the case: that Amber did not wear a seat belt. Hyundai‘s defense at trial rested in part on a theory that its airbаgs would not have harmed a child wearing a seat belt, as required by law, or sitting in the back seat. Assuming that placing an unbelted child in the front seat is relevant, admissible evidence, reasonable jurors could base their verdict on that fact alone.57 By isolating this fact, the question seeks to identify those jurors who agree that the one fact overcomes all others. As reasonable jurors, however, it is within their province to so conclude.58 The question thus asks the jurors’ opinion about the strength of this evidence, and does not cull out any external bias or prejudice.
Jurors should not base their verdicts on matters that are irrelevant, inadmissible, or unfairly prejudicial, and counsel is entitled to frame voir dire inquiries that ensure that the seated jury will not do so. In those cases in which prejudicial evidence cannot be excluded,59 a party is entitled to a limiting instruction,60 and to inquire whether jurors can follow it. Here, however, both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that evidence of thе lack of a buckled seat belt was relevant and admissible; thus, the trial court could have determined that the inquiry focused upon the weight jurors would give specific evidence.
Second, incorporating phrases associated with an inquiry into whether the jurors hold a preconceived bias does not alter the basic substance of this question. Although the proposed question refers to predispositions and preconceived notions, both concepts properly relate to opinions jurors hold before entering the courtroom and hearing the relevant facts. Here, the question includes a relevant fact; thus, responses to it encompass more than predispositions or preconceived notions. In this case, the jurors’ judgments about the fact that Amber did not wear a seat belt at the time of this accident are not separable from their potential verdict. The proposed inquiry asks about these judgments, not about any separate unfair prejudice against a party or a claim jurors may have held before hearing the facts of the case.
The emphasis of the question is not ameliorated by asking in it whether jurors could be fair and impartial. “Called as they are from all walks of life, many [jurors] may be uncertain as to the meaning of terms which are relatively easily understood by lawyers and judges.”62 In Cortez, we held that fair jurors do not leave their knowledge and experience behind, but nonetheless must approach the evidence with an open mind.63 However, if an inquiry suggests that, to be “fair,” jurors must not decide the case based on a relevant fact, then a trial court reasonably could conclude that the question seeks a response that reveals nothing about a juror‘s potential fairness, but instead attempts to guess about his potential verdict.
The Vasquezes rely upon several intermediate appellate court decisions to contend that the proposed question is in the form of a permissible commitment question. In those cases, however, the сourts of appeals deferred to the trial courts’ discretion in allowing the questions; none of them reversed a trial court for excluding a question.64 We disagree that trial courts must allow such questions. They do not present a basis for juror disqualification, as the appellate courts that have upheld trial courts’ rejection of them have observed.65
The substance of a question, not its form, determines whether it probes for
VI. Further Questions
At the conclusion of the general questioning of the panel, the trial judge asked counsel to state the additional questions he sought to ask the jurors about seat belts. The Vasquezes profferеd the above question. In sustaining Hyundai‘s objection, however, the trial judge also ruled: “We are not going to go any further into seat belts.”67 In so ruling, the trial judge reversed an earlier decision to allow further follow up about seat belt usage during the time allotted to counsel to question jurors individually at the bench. In sustaining an objection to an improper voir dire question, a trial court should not foreclose all inquiry about a relevant topic.68 The Vasquezes’ complaint as to this part of the trial court‘s ruling, however, is not preserved.
A trial court may not foreclose a proper line of questioning, presuming that the actual questions posed are proper.69 In some instances, an area of inquiry may be proper, but not the particular question asked. In such circumstances, a trial court may exercise its discretion to reject the form of the question.70 If it is necessary to discuss the facts in the case to probe for potential biases, counsel must frаme corresponding inquiries to avoid jury confusion and ensure that the question does not seek to preview the verdict. When the trial court determines that a proffered question‘s substance is confusing or seeks to elicit a pre-commitment from the jury, counsel should propose a different question or specific area of inquiry to preserve error on the desired line of inquiry; absent such an effort, the trial court is not required to formulate the question.
Thus, to preserve a complaint that a trial court improperly restricted voir dire, a party must timely alert the trial court as to the specific manner in which it intends to pursue the inquiry.71 Such a requirement provides the trial court with an opportunity to cure any error, obviating the need for later appellate review, and further allows an appellate court to examine the trial court‘s decision in context to determine whether error exists, and if so, whether harm resulted.72 In Babcock, we held that litigants need nоt present a list of each intended voir dire question, but parties must nonetheless “adequately apprise[] the trial court of the nature of their inquiry.”73 A timely, specific presentation
Here, in response to the trial judge‘s request that counsel specify the type of additional inquiry he would ask, counsel framed one inquiry. The proposed question is virtually the same inquiry that the trial court perceived had caused confusion during the second voir dire. That the trial court did not allow a similarly confusing question does not mean, though, that the trial court would have rejeсted a different approach had counsel proposed it. For example, the trial court could not have denied a question that asked if any juror had a bias against product liability lawsuits that would prevent them from considering the Vasquezes’ specific claims. Such a bias, if firmly held, would disqualify any prospective juror who confessed such a belief. Not all questions or areas of inquiry involving the facts of a case will impermissibly attempt to pre-test the weight jurors will give those facts. But absent counsel proposing a different method of inquiry that would avoid continued confusion or pre-commitment, the breadth of the trial court‘s ruling is untested. Counsel does not have to present a list of questions to preserve error, but after the trial court‘s ruling sustaining Hyundai‘s objection to the one presented, it was incumbent on the Vasquezes to request alternative approaches to avoid the problems the trial court was addressing by its ruling. Moreover, the fact that counsel asked other general seat belt questions during the first voir dire does not shed light on the extent of the trial court‘s ruling in the third, when counsel already had asked some general seat belt questions and did not refer to the first two voir dires, or any question in them, in response to the trial judge‘s request for the type of additional questions counsel sought to ask—much less seek a ruling on other types of questions counsel previously had asked without objection.76 In determining whether error
The Vasquezes carried their objection to the trial court‘s ruling throughout the remainder of individual voir dire, but they did not frame additional inquiries or convey to the trial court that the thrust of any remaining questions would be different from the single one presented for a ruling.77 We do not know whether the trial court would have allowed other sorts of inquiries had counsel presented their substance. We therefore hold that the record does not present a sufficient basis for review of the trial court‘s ruling foreclosing further inquiry into seat belts.
* * * * * *
The Texas Constitution guarantees a trial by a fair and impartial jury, and our courts use voir dire to achieve that goal. Voir dire inquiries that explore external biases and unfair prejudices further the effort, but those that test jurors’ possible verdicts based on case-specific relevant evidence detract from it. The distinction between the two in some cases is a fine one. Thus, we vest trial judges with the discretion to decide whether an inquiry constitutes the former or the latter; as appellate courts, we should defer to their judgment. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court to consider the Vasquezes’ remaining issues on appeal.
Justice MEDINA filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice WAINWRIGHT and Justice JOHNSON joined.
Justice WAINWRIGHT filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice JOHNSON joined.
Justice WAINWRIGHT, joined by Justice JOHNSON, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE MEDINA‘s dissent1
Notes
Now, what I specifically am looking for are those among you right now that will say, if [Amber] wasn‘t wearing a seat belt, then I don‘t care what the scientific evidence is. I don‘t care about the characteristics of this particular airbag and how it operated in this particular accident at this particular speed. As long as I know that she wasn‘t wearing an airbag—I mean a seat belt, that means that, you know, there‘s no way Hyundai can be responsible. If that is an attitude that you have about seat belts and about airbags, if that is an attitude that you have about accidents of this kind and the tragic results that flow from them, that‘s what I‘m asking you about. Is there anyone here that regardless of what the evidence is, once you hear [Amber] wasn‘t wearing a seat belt your mind is made up?