Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado

COMPANY, Hyundai HYUNDAI MOTOR America, Inc., City and Port

Hyundai, Inc., Petitioners, ALVARADO, al., Respondents.

Mario et

No. 95-0969.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Sept.

Decided June

Rehearing Sept. Overruled

edly judgment of preempted, and affirm the appeals. the court Background I. Eighteen-year-old Mario his Alvarado and brother, Fidel, passengers in a younger were classmate, Hyundai Excel Mario’s driven Reyes. The front seats were Vince Excel’s equipped two-point passive with a restraint system. automatically A shoulder belt place passenger’s into across the moved closed, chest and when vehicle’s door ramp there was a seat and knee bolster help passengers submarining prevent from under the dash in the event of a collision. lap two-point assembly This did include belt. Malinas, Antonio, Ruth G. David San E. Keltner, Worth, Heibron, M. Fort David Les- seat, passenger in and Mario was the front Landau, Francisco, lie G. San David M. riding his was rear of the car. brother Prichard, Crofts, Antonio, H. Thomas San raining, Reyes attempted It was and Dallas, Walkowiak,

Vincent S. Malcolm E. vehicle, pass off Excel skidded another Wheeler, Denver, CO, for Petitioners. wearing was the road and rolled over. Mario seatbelt, ejected through his but was Brown, Austin, Christa E. Hamil- Rebecca result, he paralyzed sunroof. As a ton, Rockwall, Corpus Hastings, Steve T. Reyes incurred the chest down. Fidel and Christi, Respondents. injuries. lesser SPECTOR, Justice, opinion delivered the Hyundai parents Mo- Mario and his sued Court, GONZALEZ, of the America, Inc., Company, Hyundai tor BAKER, HANKINSON, ABBOTT and (Hyundai).2 City Hyundai, and Port Inc. Justices, join. They defectively alleged that the Excel was designed equipped it with because was not Congress passed the National Traffic and belts, lap Hyundai provide ade- that failed Motor Vehicle Act of 1966 “to reduce quate warnings danger re- of the increased injuries accidents and deaths and traffic belts, sulting lap from the lack of that and persons resulting from traffic accidents.” 15 Hyundai give adequate failed to instructions (recodified § 49 U.S.C. system. for the use the vehicle’s restraint 30101). § The issue us is whether the before They alleged negli- also was implementing Act and its gent grossly negligent upon based and asserting preempt common-law claims that a same acts or omissions. passenger was vehicle’s restraint de- judg- fectively partial summary designed because the manufacturer moved for ment, asserting lap the Alvarados’ claims ap- to install belts. court failed upon belt were peals were not based the lack concluded these claims imple- and its preempted. preempted hold that Act 908 S.W.2d We impli- menting regulations. granted court expressly neither nor trial were unchanged. Although tively appeals initially Because court Act was codified in Code, statutes, chapter pre-1994 United States the federal parties refer to the including regarding transportation, statutes consistency do we will likewise. interest Act, reorganized chap- and moved to No. ter 49 Pub.L. Alvarado, Alvarado, Mario's 2. Fidel Jr. Alicia (1994). The Stat. 745 states capacities parents, sued their individual reorganization was made "without substantive younger next friends. as the Fidel's change,” portions id. at and indeed those Safety Act relevant to this case were substan- 1392(a) (recodi § the motion. The Alvarados then filed a no- cle standards. 30111(a)). tice of nonsuit and later refiled their case in a fied at 49 U.S.C. While the “reasonable, county. response, Hyundai practicable different re- standards must be 1392(f)(3)(recodified quested modify that the first trial court appropriate,” its id. provide 30111(b)(3)),Congress nonsuit order to at 49 U.S.C. intend prejudice adjudicated by to the “safety overriding the ed that be the con shall partial summary judgment, and the trial sideration the issuance of standards.” S.Rep. 89-1301, court did so. reprinted in 1966 No. added); (emphasis U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714 see appealed The Alvarados both the dismissal 1392(a) (recodified § at 49 U.S.C. U.S.C. prejudice with partial and the merits of the 30111(a)) (“The § Secretary shall establish summary judgment. Alvarado v. appropriate order Federal motor vehicle (Tex.App. Motor 885 S.W.2d 167 — San safety practicable, ... [that are] rev’d, (Tex. 1994), Antonio 892 S.W.2d 853 safety, shall meet the need motor vehicle 1995). appeals The court of concluded that terms.”) (em objective and shall be stated the dismissal prej should not have been with added). phasis udice and did not reach the is sought sues. then review here. express preemption The Act sought We held that a nonsuit after a trial provides: clause that grants partial summary court judgment Whenever Federal motor vehicle results in a prejudice dismissal with on the standard established under this title is in disposed issues summary judgment, of effect, political no State or subdivision of a converting partial thus summary judg any authority State shall have either to final, ment into a appealable judgment. establish, effect, or to with continue Alvarado, Hyundai Motor Co. v. 892 S.W.2d respect any motor vehicle or item of at 855. We remanded the case to the court equipment any safety motor vehicle stan- appeals of to allow it to consider the Alvara- applicable aspect per- dard to the same dos’ contention that them “no claim belt” equip- formance of such vehicle or item of preempted. remand, was not Id. On ment which is not identical to the Federal appeals court of held that there was no ex Nothing standard. in this section shall be press implied preemption of claims and preventing any construed as State from reversed the trial judgment. court’s enforcing any safety standard which is granted Hyundai’s S.W.2d at 253. We appli identical to Federal standard. cation for writ of challenging error these 1392(d) (recodified § 15 U.S.C. at 49 holdings. U.S.C. 30103(b)).

§ It also has a clause providing “[cjompliance any Feder- Statutory II. overview al motor vehicle under standard issued Congress enacted the National Traffic and any exempt person this title does not from response Vehicle Act of 1966 in any liability under common law.” 15 U.S.C. accelerating spiral inju of deaths and 1397(k) (recodified § 49 U.S.C. resulting unsafely ries designed vehi 30103(e)). § S.Rep. 89-1301, cles. reprinted No. H.R.Rep. 2709, 2709-10; Secretary U.S.C.C.A.N. adopts standards the are, No. at 10-11 P. fundamentally, perfor John Note, McCauley, Cipollone Myricfc requirements, design require & mance not Def 1392(a) (recodified lating Airbag Preemption Defense, § 30 ments. See id. at 49 30111(a)) explic The Act’s Ind. (requiring U.S.C. that standards L.Rev. purpose terms”); objective Perry is “to reduce traffic accidents and shall “be stated in Am., Inc., injuries persons resulting deaths and from v. N. Mercedes Benz (recodi (5th 1257, 1260 Cir.1992); traffic accidents.” 15 U.S.C. Hernandez-Gomez 30101). Leonardo, accomplish fied at 49 To 185 Ariz. 917 P.2d purpose, Congress empowered legislative history Sec retary Transportation adopt motor vehi- Act makes that fact clear: Preemption III. standards are ex-

[T]he new revised standards, performance speci- pected to be Supremacy Clause Under fying required perfor- minimum safe Constitution, the laws the United States mance of vehicles but not the manner Law of supreme “the the United States are to achieve manufacturer is Land; Thing any in the Constitution specified performance. Contrary not Laws of State VI, cl. A withstanding.” Const. art. would thus concerned preempted and “without effect” state law is performance measurable with the Maryland v. it conflicts with federal law. braking system, design its details. Louisiana, 725, 746, 101 S.Rep. 89-1301, reprinted, in 1966 No. may A federal law 68 L.Ed.2d 576 at 2714. U.S.C.C.A.N. Cipollone expressly preempt state law. See adopted has Stan- Inc., 516, 504, Group, 112 Liggett 505 v. U.S. 208, protection crash dard which establishes 2608, Addi 120 L.Ed.2d 407 S.Ct. performance requirements, expressed in may implied if tionally, anthropomorphic terms of forces exerted on Congress scope of statute indicates that dummies, sys- passenger for restraint test occupy the field ex intended federal law to (1988).3 § For tems. See 49 C.F.R. 571.208 actually clusively when state law conflicts 1, September cars built between 1987 Corp. Myr Freightliner law. with federal 1988,4 1, provides September 208 Standard 287, 1483, ick, 280, 131 115 S.Ct. U.S. options compliance. Three of several (1995) (citing English v. General L.Ed.2d 385 appli- options specifically condition the those Co., 72, 78-79, 2270, 110 S.Ct. Elec. 496 U.S. performance upon partic- cable (1990)); also Moore 110 L.Ed.2d 65 see type restraint is used. ular Corp., 889 Bowling & Billiards Brunswick S4.1.2.2, 571.208, S4.1.2.1, See 49 C.F.R. (Tex.1994). 246, A state law 247-48 S.W.2d S4.1.2.3. presents an actual conflict with federal “ is, comply Hyundai with what elected to impossible private party for a when ‘it effect, option, a fourth S4.5.3. S4.5.3 allows require comply both state and federal with an automatic seatbelt manufacturer use as an where state law ‘stands ments’ or protection requirements crash “to meet the accomplishment and execution obstacle any any option place under and in S4. objectives of Con purposes the full ” assembly required by otherwise seat belt 287, Myrick, 514 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. gress:’ 571.208, option.” S4.5.3. C.F.R. English, 496 U.S. (quoting, respectively, complied with Hyundai 2270, v. Davi 110 S.Ct. and Hines at protection requirements S4.1.2.2. crash 399, dowitz, 67, 52, S.Ct. for frontal option criteria This establishes (1941)). L.Ed. 581 crashes, rollovers, type but not for pri Historically, the states have exercised injured the Alvarados. accident concerning mary authority in matters 571.208, question we must S4.1.2.2. safety of their citizens. public health and Safety Act and the is whether the resolve Lohr, 470, Medtronic, 518 U.S. Inc. v. preempt common-law regulations under it (1996) (cit 135 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. manufacturer chooses damage claims County Hillsborough v. Automated Med. regula- ing by the federal option permitted 707, 719, 105 Labs., Inc., S.Ct. 471 U.S. tions.5 history contend here that complex that the Alvarados 5.We note 3. A of cases describe the number See, summary judg- e.g., rendering Vehicle the trial court erred in of Standard Mfrs. Auto. 463 U.S. Hyundai prove v. State Farm Mut. Ins. it com- Ass'n did ment because 29, 34-38, 103 S.Ct. performance es- plied with Corp., Taylor v. Motors General light of our tablished Standard (11th Cir.1989). however, appeal, we do not disposition of this compliance. proved decide whether were in- the Alvarados which July jured was manufactured (1985), Metropolitan argued: legislature, where it should be Life Massachusetts, competing Ins. Co. v. where the interests be recon- (1985)). vacated, passed”), ciled before the statute is Thus, L.Ed.2d 514 U.S. (1995). Accordingly, we must consider cases, pre-emption all particularly [i]n language, enact- the Act’s the context of its Congress in those in “legislated which ment, understanding of and our “reasoned ... in a field which the have tradi- States way intended the stat- tionally occupied,” [preemption analy- surrounding regulatory ute and its scheme assumption sis] “start[s] that the business, consumers, affect and the law” police powers historic of the States were order to discern whether manifest- superseded not to be by the Federal Act preempt ed a clear intent Act to unless that was the clear and manifest Worthy Collagen common-law claims. purpose Congress.” (Tex.1998) Corp., (quoting S.W.2d Medtronic, 116 (quoting S.Ct. at 2250 Rice v. 2250-51). Medtronic, 116 218, 230, Santa Fe Elevator The United State Court consid- (1947)) (empha 91 L.Ed. 1447 preemptive ered the effect of the added) (citation omitted). sis analytical This Myrick. It concluded in that case that the system, framework is crucial in our federal common-law claims at issue were not if in “[flor close or uncertain cases a court 286, 289-90, preempted. 514 U.S. at 115 proceeds preempt state laws where that Myrick S.Ct. 1483. does not answer the clearly result was not product of Con us, however, question before in that because gress’s judgment, considered the court has case, no standard was in effect. Id. at eroded the government dual of 286, Consequently, 115 S.Ct. 1483. liberties, representation, ensures our diversi argument Court did not reach the that sec- ty, governance.” and effective Kenneth 1392(d) tion preempt does not common law Preemption: al., A Starr et The Law of impact or address of Act’s Report Appellate Judjes Confer 3, savings clause. Id. at 287 n. ence, 40 American Bar Association Leonardo, see also Hemandez-Gomez v. 180 (1994) Ariz. courts, 884 P.2d (noting 190 A number of other both federal and that a requiring explicit state, rule indication of have confronted the issue before us.6 preemptive intent “transfers the decision Some have concluded that preemption about Alvarados’, preempts its reach from the claims similar to the post-hoc speculation lawyers to the forum and some have held that it does not.7 While AG, preemption 6. Claims Volkswagenwerk most often arise in cases v. 189 Wis.2d 525 belt); litigant (App.1994) (lap Boyle Chiys in which a seeks to hold a manufacturer N.W.2d 754 v. upon Corp., (App. or vendor liable based the failure ler 177 Wis.2d 501 to include N.W.2d 865 1993) airbags, although many challenges (airbag). involve al- most identical to the Alvarados’. We see no holding implied preemption, For cases there is important no-airbag distinction between Co., Ltd., Montag see v. Honda Motor no-lap purposes analy- belt claims for of our (10th Cir.1996) (airbag); Pokorny 1414 v. Ford sis. Co., (3rd Cir.1990) (airbag); Motor 1116 (but Taylor, (airbag) Doyle F.2d 816 see holding express preemption 7. Cases that there is Volkswagenwerk Aktiengelellschaft, 114 F.3d 1134 Co., include Harris Ford Motor 110 F.3d 1410 (11th Cir.1997)); Corp., Kitts General Motors (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); Zimmerman v. Volks (10th Cir.1989) (airbag); 875 F.2d 787 Wood v. Am., Inc., wagen 128 Idaho P.2d (1st Corp., General 865 F.2d 395 Cir. Motors (1996) belt); Co., (lap v. Ford Martinez, 1988) Martinez (airbag); Mich.App. (1997) Mich.App. (airbag); 568 N.W.2d (airbag); Cooper 568 N.W.2d 396 v. General Mo Inc., Maplewood Toyota, (Miss. 1997) Wickstrom v. Corp., (airbag); tors 702 So.2d 428 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (airbag); N.W.2d 838 Panar Cellucci v. General Motors A.2d Williams, (Pa. 1998) ites v. 216 A.D.2d (airbag). 629 N.Y.S.2d (1995) (airbag); holding preemption Gardner v. Honda Motor no Cases there is include Ltd., (1988) belt); Doyle, 145 A.D.2d (lap N.Y.S.2d 303 114 F.3d 1134 Munroe v. Gala Fridman, ti, (airbag); N.J.Super. (airbag); Miranda v. 189 Ariz. 938 P.2d 1114 belt); Hernandez-Gomez, (App.Div.1994) (lap Dykema 647 A.2d 167 Ariz. 917 P.2d 238 preempt uniform, in the Act to are in the clear intent results not wake Alvarados’, Cipollone Myrick, we trend note actions such appears finding preemption, to be toward preemption look clause’s lan we first in the Because the statutory at least state courts. context. guage, as well as to its Supreme 517-19, 112 Medtronic, ad- 2608; Court United States id. at us, particular before we dressed the issue 116 S.Ct. at 2250. analyze Hyundai’s independently must con- Supreme application of these Court’s are tention that the Alvarados’ claims is instructive. principles Medtronic preempted upon the lessons we draw based preemption provi involved the Medtronic authority. from relevant Amendments of sion of the Medical Device 360k(a) (“MDA”), which U.S.C. preemption Express A. establishing from “re prohibits states 1392(d) from im Section bars states device that differs quirement” for medical “any posing applicable requirements the MDA.9 imposed aspect performance same of such vehicle Supreme Court looked to plurality A to the Federal not identical Congress’s repeated of the term “re use (recodified 1392(d) standard.” U.S.C. in a throughout the MDA man quirements” 30103(b)). explic at 49 It does not suggesting Congress used the ner itly embrace common-law actions. Neverthe posi specific enactments of to refer to word less, instances, a preemption some judicial legislative or bodies. tive claims, may apply statute to common-law Medtronic, so, doing 2252. In 116 S.Ct. at provision use even if the does not assumed, plurality in accordance See, Cipollone, e.g., specific term. construction, statutory controlling canons 521-22, 112 U.S. at S.Ct. 2608. meaning had that the term a consistent In consid Cipollone, the v. throughout Al the MDA. Gustafson Cf. clauses; express preemption one ered two Co., Inc., 561, 568, 115 S.Ct. loyd mandating any precluded states from “state (1995). 1 labels, cigarette later ment” on while a case, Congress’s use the term In this precluded any statute amendment that Safety Act in the also “standards” elsewhere “requirement Cipollone, 505 prohibition.” Congress preclude to suggests that intended 514-15, 112 majority A U.S. at S.Ct. 2608. legislative or positive ad- imposition of agreed former the Court that did enactments, general rather than ministrative claims, preempt state common-law while tort As one scholar duties. language that latter plurality concluded noted, preemptive intent.8 Congress’s did indicate Act, Safety “mo- Traffic federal 519-21, Under the Cipollone 112 Id. at S.Ct. 2608. safety refers to tor vehicle standards” determining thus that whether teaches us regulations promulgated Congress mani demonstrated “clear and the act Transportation. Nowhere does preempt common-law ac purpose” fest civil claims or other inquiry. mention state tort very statute-specific tions involves actions, except in context of damages determining Congress evinced a whether (5th Cir.1985) Co., (holding belt); that 750 418 (lap Motor 49 v. Cal.Rptr.2d Ketchum (1996) safety compliance did not (lap with Cal.App.4th liability). belt); exempt Phillip, Co. So.2d manufacturer Motor v. Pleasant, v. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994); Wilson Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter Justices (Ind.1995) (airbag); v. Loulos 660 N.E.2d 327 prohi- “requirement or held that the would have Inc., Ford, (Mo.Ct. S.W.2d Dick Smith language preempt common-law did not Co., bition" (airbag); 203, App.1994) Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Cipollone, U.S. at actions. See (1995) (airbag); A.2d N.H. J., (Blackmun, concurring and dis- S.Ct. 2608 Toyota Corp., 231 A.D.2d v. Drattel senting). (1997) (airbag); Minton 662 N.Y.S.2d 535 Inc., Mfg., St.3d Ohio Honda Am. Notably, clause. (airbag); MDA contains Mo- Nelson Ford N.E.2d Nevertheless, claims in held the Court App.3d 670 N.E.2d 307 tor (1995) (airbag). 108 Ohio preempted. were not Shipp General Motors Medtronic See also [1397(k) savings provision § equipment That vehicle obtained for its own use ]. Safety imposes higher performance require- the Traffic use the term that would narrowly required by respect “standard” with ment than that the otherwise feder- broadly respect applicable chapter.” al action to state standard under this (recodified 1392(d) highly unlikely. § action seems at 49 U.S.C. U.S.C. 30103(b)(1)) added). (emphasis This sen- Adler, B. Robert Leñar & Robert S. implies strongly tence that the nonidentical Preemption Preemption Pentad: Federal 1392(d)prohibits “standards” section are the Medtronic, Liability Products Claims After specific, kinds of measurable criteria 64 Tenn. L.Rev. 734 n.215 governmental entities must often adhere language, light Act’s of its goods positive purchasing en- services— context, history and bears out that conclu legislative actments of or administrative bod- First, Congress sion. defined the term “mo duty ies—not the to use reasonable care or tor vehicle standard” selling unreasonably danger- refrain from 1391(2) (recodified Act. 15 U.S.C. at 49 product. ous 30102(a)(9)). A standard is Moreover, regulatory the national context “a minimum standard per for motor vehicle Congress passed in which Act also formance ... which practicable, which suggests did not intend to meets the need for motor vehicle preempt objective common-law claims. At the time provides criteria.” Id. This passed, Act was a number of definition is far removed from a court’s or attempting impose states had jury’s enacted laws determination that a manufacturer safety requirements on vehicles within duty sold breached a of reasonable care or sold a specific posi their enactments of defectively designed product. These deter borders — Ralph Joseph Page, tive law. Nader & A. prac minations involve some element of Automobile-Design Liability Compliance ticability. & See Turner v. General Motors Standards, (Tex.1979); with Federal 64 Geo. Wash. Corp., 584 S.W.2d William Although there had Powers, Liability L.Rev. ., Texas Products Jr (2d ed.1994) activity been little enforcement under these (noting 5.0233 prod Law id., requirements, likely it seems that these liability ucts under both strict are the negligence intended to standards “evaluate the rea 519, 112 preempt. Cipollone, See 505 U.S. at by sonableness of a risk weighing its costs benefits”). (construing preemption provision against S.Ct. 2608 judgment its But a tort “[rjead criteria”; light purpose in of Act’s statement “objective of simply establishes no it against backdrop activity regulatory the of a product establishes that manufacturer or legislatures undertaken state and federal generalized to failed conform to a standard of agencies”). quality specific care or in a Cipol case. Cf. lone, 505 U.S. at 112 S.Ct. 2608 analysis This is consistent with the Su (“Whereas the common law not would nor preme holding Cipollone in that Court’s the

mally require any specific a vendor to use Cigarette Labeling 1965 Federal and Adver packages statement on its or in its advertise Act, barring requiring tisement states from ments, it is the essence of the common to law cigarette advertising, not “statements” did enforce duties that are either affirmative re preclude damage failure-to-warn common-law quirements negative prohibitions.”). Cipollone, actions. at U.S. portions suggest holding, reaching

Other S.Ct. 2608. In that express provi that emphasized preemption clause does not Court that the sion, “statement,” using clearly address the Alvarados’ claims. common-law the term Immediately language proscribing warning “required after the referred to the statement imposition of inconsistent state stan- section 4” of the 1965 act. Id. at 1392(d) dards, words, goes provide In section on to S.Ct. 2608. other the Court looked Government, State, type “the United States or a to the of federal action authorized else statute, political may prescribe subdivision a State where in the and reasoned that Con gress only particu- for a to standard motor vehicle motor had intended bar activity by positive Federal minimum type [T]he lar the states — restricting interpreted be as by legislatures need not enactments or administrative care. agencies mandating warning la State common law standards of particular 518-19, 112 Compliance would with such standards bels. Id. at S.Ct. 2608. any necessarily person shield thus not sti’ongest indication that did product liability at law. from common clearly preempt intend not S.Rep. 89-1301, reprinted No. course, is, of claims such as the Alvarados’ at 2720. U.S.C.C.A.N. savings Act’s clause. com- In addition to the House and Senate 1397(k) (recodified 49 U.S.C. in the reports, mittee numerous statements 30103(e)). savings broadly clause is legislative history little leave Act’s “[cjompliance Federal mo worded— preserve all intended doubt tor not ex vehicle does example, For Senator common-law claims. empt any person any liability under congres- Act’s Magnuson, one of the view, savings In common law.” Id. our sponsors, “[cjompliance remarked that sional virtually meaning clause would be rendered necessarily would not with Federal standards preserve if it not such less did as liability at the any person from broad shield If Alvarados’. claims such the Alvarados’ product law on law. The common common expressly preempted are section Cong. remains as was.” still 1392(d) adopted because the 1966) (state- 14,230 (daily ed. June Rec. standard, preserves then the clause House, the Magnuson). In the ment of Sen. preempted not claims that would Michigan, Representa- representative from Pokorny place. Ford Motor the first said, Dingell, tive (3rd Cir.1990); Tay single preserved every lor v. General Motors have common- [W]e Cir.1989). (11th contrary remedy a manufac- against That result is exists law statute, duty, construing give turer of a motor vehicle our benefit every See Ameri that all of the purchaser. effect clause word. This means Inst., Donovan, Inc. v. devices can Textile warranties and all the other Mfrs. 490, 513, 101 are common afforded Menasche, they buyer, purchaser, in the United States remain 528, 538-39, against L.Ed. 615 can be exercised manufactur- (1955).10 er. Cong. 19,663 Aug. (daily ed. Rec. legislative history strongly sup- The Act’s 1966) (statement Dingell) (emphasis Rep. ports express pre- conclusion added). extinguish does the Al- emption clause Safety Act’s light language report varados’ claims. The House clause, savings the express preemption unequivocally, proposed stated clause, history, legislative and statute’s intended, specifi- and this It is subsection perceive a “clear and manifest” do not we establishes, compliance that cally Congress’s part preempt to intent on not to a defense or standards is Transp., Inc. claims. CSX Alvarados’ See parties of rights to affect the otherwise 664, Easterwood, 658, 113 S.Ct. 507 U.S. law those relat- particularly common under Rice, 1732, (quoting 123 L.Ed.2d 387 contract, liability. warranty, and tort ing to 230). Accordingly, we hold that 331 U.S. at Rep. expressly are not 89-1776, Alvarados’ claims Similarly, at 24. H. No. report provides, preempted. Senate Act's savings Cooper, 702 So.2d at But have that the Some courts concluded Con- Congress express preemption shows that clause itself that clause is intended demonstrate field; occupied states gress leaves occupied has not the entire field of motor vehicle has not Ltd., See, no impose when e.g, Montag free to their own standards safety. v. Honda Motor 574, (D.Colo.1994), place. Myrick, at 514 U.S. F.Supp. standard is in 286, 577 856 aff'd Cir.1996); (10th grounds, 115 S.Ct. 1483. other Implied preemption ysis Supreme Court had B. because the Pleasant, issue); Wilson addressed Cipollone, noted Court (Ind.1996) 327, (holding that 660 N.E.2d savings “entirely forecloses Act’s clause [wjhen Congress has the issue considered pre-emption,” pro- possibility implied pre-emption and has included analysis implied preemption ceeding with legislation provision explicitly enacted course). Like the Arizona and the safer issue, addressing pro- and when courts, likely it is Indiana we believe provides vision a “reliable indicium forecloses the that the Act’s clause congressional respect intent with to state preemption in this case. possibility implied authority,” “there is no need to infer con- courts, Nevertheless, we “take the like those gressional pre-empt intent state laws jurisprudentially proceed safer course provisions” from the substantive implied preemption analysis.” Her- with an legislation. reasoning Such is a variant nandez-Gomez, (citing 917 P.2d at 243 Wil- principle expressio of the familiar unius 336-37). son, 660 N.E.2d at Congress’ est exclusio alterius: enactment observed, may As we have provision defining pre-emptive of a preempt scope impliedly state law when implies reach of a statute that matters Congress intended of a statute indicates that beyond pre-empted. that reach are not (field occupy exclusively preemp a field (citations 517, 112 505 U.S. at S.Ct. 2608 tion), actually state law conflicts or when omitted) (quoting, respectively, Malone v. (obstacle preemption), either with federal law “ 497, 505, White Motor U.S. ‘impossible private party because it is (1978), S.Ct. and Cali comply with both state and federal re Guerra, Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. quirements,’” fornia “state law ‘stands because 272, 282, 479 U.S. 107 S.Ct. accomplishment as an obstacle to (1987)). language This led a number of objectives purposes full execution ” that, Cipollone, courts to conclude Congress.’ Myrick, at express preemption implied clause forecloses (quoting English, at 78- 496 U.S. S.Ct. See, preemption. e.g., Myrick v. Hines, Freuhauf at 110 S.Ct. (11th Cir.1994), Corp., 13 F.3d 399). We examine each of these S.Ct. Freightliner Corp. Myrick, sub nom. aff'd potential preemptive avenues in turn. 280, 115 1483, 131 514 U.S. S.Ct. Inc., Ford, Loulos v. Dick Smith preemption 1. Field (Mo.Ct.App.1994); S.W.2d Hernan may Field occur when dez-Gomez, Myrick, 884 P.2d at 190. But regulation of federal so “[t]he [is] scheme explained Cipollone the an pervasive as to make reasonable the infer Myrick, nounced absolute rule. 514 U.S. ence that left no room for the Instead, “[a]t Rice, supplement it.” 331 U.S. at States best, Cipollone supports an inference that an (citing Pennsylvania R.R. express pre-emption clause forecloses im Comm’n, v. Public Co. Serv. plied pre-emption.” Id. at (1919)). 63 L.Ed. 1142 It when “the Act of also occur Myrick, After some courts have concluded a field in which the federal touch[es] clause, express preemption that Act’s the sys is so that the federal interest dominant conjunction savings read in with the Act’s preclude tem to enforcement will be assumed clause, reliably Congress indicates that did subject.” on the Id. of state laws same not intend to foreclose common-law claims 399). Hines, (citing 312 U.S. at 61 S.Ct. lap airbag. upon based the lack of a belt or Hernandez-Gomez, See, at are aware of no court that has e.g., 917 P.2d We occupy Congress that intended to (noting possible that it is the Act’s concluded safety. the field of vehicle Vehicle categorically precludes preemption, entire clause areas preemption safety significantly anal- differs from the proceeding implied with 142-43, peculiarly that have found to involve been interests, impossibility here. It is not

federal such as the of fed- is no such There officials, Maryland, impossible comply for with eral Johnson v. U.S. to both (1920), S.Ct. L.Ed. 126 or law with a state common-law federal and relations, Hines, duty lap international see 312 U.S. include belts. to not scope promulgated 61 S.Ct. 399. And the the the Act did persuades Congress installing has preclude Hyundai lap statute us that not from belts. pervasively By specify regulated limiting the field. standards themselves may to express preemption the Act’s clause in- with belts belts combined shoulder Secretary adopted protection applicable stances in which the has be used to meet crash standard, 571.208, Congress implicitly § left the requirements. S4.1.2.3. 49 C.F.R. states free to enforce their own standards in impossible comply Nor is it for to (re- 1392(d) the interstices. See 15 U.S.C. to and at the same time with federal law 30103(b)). codified at respond damages in of common- breach Moreover, adopted by (“If Perry, F.2d at 1264 law duties. See Hyundai proceeded under which is held in tort for not a manufacturer is liable comprehensive. not not It did mandate a protection designing provide its to particular design perfor provided and no required by greater than that the federal mance standard for rollover accidents. See standard, comply can still manufacturer 571.208, S4.1.2.2, Thus, C.F.R. S4.5.3. and the state with both federal standard preemp Standard defines the extent system to by designing its tort standard Act, reach of the it “is tive latter.”). meet As Arizona occupies comprehensive regulation that Hernandez-Gomez, Court observed Rather, entire field. it covers crash may and weigh the risks “Manufacturers particular applicable worthiness standards to live benefits and choose occasion aspects equipment performance.” vehicle vehicle change rather their'behavior.” al lawsuit than dez-Gomez, Hernan P.2d at 248; Cipollone, at at 505 U.S. 917 P.2d cf. (“[Tjhere general, is S.Ct. 2608 language Myrick reinforces our pre-emp

Certain federal inherent conflict between Safety Act warning conclusion that the does not occu requirements tion of state py safety. vitality the entire field vehicle state common-law dam continued actions.”). distinguished a case that had held that ages damage claims Common-law affirmatively distinguished the failure of federal officials can be from a state statute authority a deter regulation prohibit Hyundai their amounted to exercise that would regulation expressly per that no was warranted. taking mination action that federal law (dis Growers, Myrick, 514 U.S. at S.Ct. Lime & mits. Florida Avocado Cf. 1210; Ray Hernan tinguishing v. Atlantic at S.Ct. Richfield dez-Gomez, at 247. 917 P.2d (1978)). case, however, “Unlike this we law may preempt also state A Ray to cen intended found “ state law ‘stands as obstacle when the authority regulated all over the area tralize full accomplishment and execution (emphasis add one decision-maker.” ” objectives Congress.’ purposes ed). cannot conclude We 287, 115 Myrick, 514 According pervasively regulated area. 399). Hines, 67, 61 U.S. at (quoting ly, hold Act does not we Thus, identify Congress’s purposes must we safety. preempt the entire field of vehicle enacting Act. objectives

2. Obstacle Congress’s over- indisputable It Safety Act was riding passing the purpose in preempted when A state law injuries caused to reduce traffic deaths the fed impossible comply with both is express- by traffic accidents. requirement. Florida Lime & and state eral Paul, purpose: Growers, unequivocally that ly and states Inc. Avocado

H noted, “Congress Fifth purpose As the Circuit Congress hereby declares that the minimizing goal accidents meet its of sought is to reduce traffic [the Act] of injuries by auto injuries and caused persons and result- number of deaths and deaths Therefore, minimum stan- ing by setting forth from traffic accidents. accidents necessary liability in leaving law determines that is common dards and safety (empha- standards Perry, to establish motor vehicle F.2d at 1265-66 place.” added). equipment in inter- for motor vehicles and sis commerce; support state to undertake and Congress’s purposes was Another of necessary safety develop- research and competition vehicle foster innovation and ment; expand and to the national driver report re- safety. The committee Senate register. marked, the faith legislation reflects “[T]his (recodified § at 49 U.S.C. 15 U.S.C. responsible exercise that the restrained 30101). Likewise, § purpose of Standard authority can channel the creative of Federal 208 is “to reduce the number of deaths of technology automo- energies and vast inju- occupants, severity

vehicle of competitive industry vigorous into a bile 571.208, § Allowing the ries.” 49 C.F.R. S2. improve of vehicles.” effort to entirely proceed claims to is con- Alvarados’ S.Rep. 89-1301, reprinted in 1966 No. purpose. sistent with Accordingly, at Con- U.S.C.C.A.N. legislative history abundantly gress Act’s the standards to be characterized purpose. demonstrates the dominance of that adopted “minimum[s].” S.Rep. See, (“ 89-1301, 1391(2) e.g., reprinted § ‘Motor vehicle U.S.C. No. Rep. 2714; 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at H. No. 89- means a minimum standard standards’ 1776, at 10-11. The statement of performance, Senator or motor vehicle motor vehicle (recodified Magnuson, sponsors, typi- one of the Act’s is at 49 equipment performance.”) 30102(a)(9)). expressed by cal of views mem- § various with Con- Consistent innovation, Congress: bers of gress’s manufac- intent to kindle to do more than the stan- turers are free necessary again It should not be to call Perry, at 1265- require. dards grim roll of Americans lost and maimed on liability Allowing imposition tort highways. compelling the Nation’s Yet the Congress’s desire to not inconsistent with strong safety leg- need for the automobile encourage innovation. islation which the Commerce Committee is today reporting lies embodied those sta- allowing courts have concluded Some coming tistics: 1.6 million dead since the congres state tort claims would frustrate automobile; 50,000 over to die this uniformity, deprive a purpose sional And, year. accelerating spiral unless the Congress in manufacturer of a choice that arrested, 100,000 of death is Americans See, e.g., tended it to have. Wood v. General will die as result of their cars (1st 395, 412 Corp., 865 F.2d Cir. Motors Cong. 14,221 (daily 1988); ed. June Fifth Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1123. The Rec. (statement 1966) Magnuson). Circuit, Circuit, Sen. quoting the Third declined to “secondary elevate what it described as savings history The Act’s clause and its goal” uniformity over the Act’s Congress’s purposes another of show that inju reducing “primary goal” of deaths in ac- preserve common-law claims was ries: objective. complishing primary As we its noted, broad, primary pro- LU]niformity Congress’s clause is was have enacting Act. In 15 viding compliance goal 1381, Congress any person from declared exempt “does not U.S.C.A. “to reduce purpose Act’s any liability under common law.” 15 U.S.C. 1397(k> (recodified injuries to accidents and deaths and 49 U.S.C. traffic 30103(e)). 89-1776, resulting quoted persons from traffic accidents.” Report House preserv- above, strong Congress evidently thought in- Congress’s demonstrates ing would further rights parties affect the common tent not “to Rep. safety, motor vehicle since goal H. at 24. common law.” No. 2508(d) 1397(k) legislation pro- part included as of the Act. 2084. Section of that was face of In the of this clear declaration vides: unwilling

congressional purpose, we are to Nothing in this section shall construed accept overly preemp- an broad notion Secretary person, in- by any the or other uniformity tion based on that could have court, altering affecting cluding any as or Congress’s undercutting the effect of con- by any provision other law administered safety. cern pas- applicable to such the trucks, buses, multipur- or [Pokorny,] agree senger F.2d or at 1122. We cars Circuit, establishing reject pose passenger vehicles or as with the Third and refuse to development Savings any precedent regarding in the Congress’ the favor of Clause secondary goal uniformity. promulgation any Federal Motor thus We Safety Nothing in this Perry’s find that state law clam for defec Standard. Vehicle design air or in the bag tive of an does not section amendments made Safety with the this section to Federal Motor Vehicle Safe- create actual conflict by any underlying ty shall regulatory Act and its scheme. Standard 208 be construed person indicating as an intention court omitted). (citations Perry, 957 at 1266 affect, modify Congress change, or to “secondary also decline to elevate a We any way liability, any, of motor the a Congress’s pri- purpose” so to frustrate as applicable law vehicle manufacturer under mary Similarly, not purpose. we do believe to with or without inflata- relative vehicles secondary goal providing the manu- that ble restraints. outweighs pri- facturers with choice a Id., According at to Stat. 2085-86. reducing injuries. mary goal of deaths Hyundai, provision Congress’s reflects observed, imposition As have com- we had that intent to endorse the that held cases liability impose any partic- mon-law does Safety preempts claims. Act common-law manufacturer; upon ular this, asserts, we infer From should comply to manufacturer choose preempts Act Alvar- that the 1966 the minimum tort federal standards bear ados’ claims. liability doing cost business. See (“We reasons, recognize that two cannot make that Perry, 957 F.2d at 1265 For we First, only leap. plain language and the manufacturer who chooses to meet the section’s history Congress’s performance require- legislative suggest that bare minimum its potential for ensure the 1991 amend- ments will be burdened with the intent to any way liability, this is that ments did not in affect automakers’ tort the exact burden Clause.”); spe- preserved Savings liability. Report bill Congress The House Growers, in- cifically section is not “[t]his & states Florida Lime Avocado cf. litiga- (emphasizing to be ‘sword’ a ‘shield’ in 83 S.Ct. 1210 tended Rep. 102-171(1), H. to or otherwise.” No. statute’s reference “minimum standards” tion concluding reprinted statute did not “reveal 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. Nevertheless, rely invites design marketing orders should us 2508(d) it regulations”). upon section to shield from displace all state here. Hyundai argues Finally, that certain ac- 2508(d) Congress Congress If intended section tions indicate preemption, it preempts claims. make statement about common-law doing singularly means of so. passed chose a obscure Congress the Intermodal Surface Act, simply Efficiency have amended Transportation a massive could express Act’s clause highway Pub.L. No. 102- funding bill. See (codified preempted “stan- forthrightly state that the as amended 105 Stat.1914 U.S.C.). liability findings, B of of 49 Part dards” include scattered sections Act; meaning that among but it did not. The clear bill amended 2508(d) is that Secretary to can infer from section things, commanded the we other law, change not to require automakers intended Standard 208 amend Al- might have been. at whatever the airbags. Stat. install 13 no-lap Alvarados’ cordingly, hold that the majority addressing the we though the of cases preempted. impliedly are not belt claims Safety of the Act at that preemptive effect preemption, that view was time had found See, e.g., v. Ford

not unanimous. Garrett (D.Md.1987) (no Co., F.Supp. 407 Motor 684 summary, the Alvarados’ In we hold that preemption); Murphy v. Nissan failure upon the manufacturer’s claims based (E.D.N.Y.1987) Corp., F.Supp. 650 922 expressly nor lap belts are neither to install Union, (same); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Auto Accordingly, we af- impliedly preempted. (1989) A.G., 328, Pa.Super. 567 A.2d 312 appeals judgment of the court of and firm the (same). addition, In of other cases number to the trial court for further remand the case to that of the had reached conclusions similar proceedings. premiere Eighth Circuit in the crash worthi case, Corp., ness Larsen v. General Motors Justice, OWEN, dissenting opinion, filed a (8th Cir.1968): 495, ap “It is 391 F.2d PHILLIPS, Justice, in which Chief HECHT Safety parent that the National Traffic Act is Justices, ENOCH, joined. and supplementary intended to be of and addi PHILLIPS, OWEN, Justice, joined by negligence common law tion to the ENOCH, Justice, and HECHT Chief product liability.... ... not an The Act is Justices, dissenting. liability.” exemption from common law See Shipp also v. General 750 F.2d Motors Fundamentally, in this case is the issue (5th Cir.1985); Sours v. General National Congress intended whether (6th Corp., 717 Motors Cir. Safety Act of 1966 Traffic and Motor Vehicle 1983); Inc., Ellis v. K-Lan occupant as to what to leave decision (5th Cir.1983). Clearly, the of the state provided in vehicles to restraints should regarding the effect of the Act on Secretary Transportation to leave was not uniform as of juries Not across America. decision surprisingly, majority of the courts to solid Congress have held that consider this issue in importantly, Congress’s More even if make this deter- intended that 2508(d) clear, tent in cannot section we re- mination. The issue what impute Congress that intent to the of 1966. required demands a bal- straints should be settled that ‘“the views of a “[I]t well ancing many considerations that subsequent Congress form hazardous basis appropriately was more accom- concluded ’” inferring for the intent of an earlier one.” plished the federal level with intense scru- States, 16, 26, Russello United study systems. tiny and of restraint (1983) (quoting S.Ct. that, mandate spite Act’s County Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Jefferson for motor vehi- whenever a Labs., Abbott 165 n. effect, no State shall have cles is (quoting S.Ct. L.Ed.2d that is not authority to establish a standard Price, United States 361 U.S. one, the holds identical to the federal Court (I960))). also 4 L.Ed.2d 334 S.Ct. may impose common-law tort that a state Clark, n. States v. United failing to do liability on a manufacturer require. more than the federal Supreme has mandated that part gen- Court relies in The Court’s decision statute, courts “are not to conclude even savings clause in the eral in the legislated law] the ouster of though [state the United States unambiguous congressional supersede of an similar clauses do absence held that provisions & the one in express preemption to that effect.” Florida Lime like mandate Growers, supports also its 373 U.S. at Act. The Court Avocado added). rejection preemption based on a one-sided (emphasis history purpose of the context, legislative histo- discussion of language, Act’s has failed to consider unequivocal precept. Ac- Act. The Court ry no such reveal contends, and the Excel. proceedings govern- of the federal inside the extensive held, no-lap- led trial that the Alvarados’ ment that court preempted the National regulate occupant systems, restraint belt claims are vehicle Safety ofAct including two-point the re- Traffic and Motor Vehicle authorization 1381-1431, regu- §§ and systems formerly the one at in this 15 U.S.C. straint like issue Finally, promulgated the Court has made no at- thereunder.4 case. lations today tempt distinguish its decision from Act, it enacted the When Worthy unanimous v. our decision Colla- Department empowered the of the Corp.,1 just ago, four months gen decided “appropriate Transportation establish regulat- we held that a federal statute which safety vehicle standards.”5 Federal motor ing preempted the medical devices such Federal directed “[e]ach damage claims when the device practi- shall be motor vehicle by govern- had been scrutinized the federal meet need for motor cable shall [and] specific applied. regulations ment and safety.”6 Congress also included an vehicle express provision. the Sec- Once by reasoning I persuaded Because am standard, the States retary has established of four of five federal circuit courts prohibited imposing a stan- are from and three courts of last decide issue2 to the Federal dard that is “not identical states,3 other resort of which have held standard.”7 no-lap-belt no-airbag preempt- claims are ed, respectfully I dissent. At time manufactured injured, Excel in Mario Alvarado was which

I specific most options, had automakers However, required lap belts.8 The Excel from which Mario Alvarado was performance require- certain ejected equipped over was met when it rolled ments, regulations it permitted A federal two-point system. restraint passive with a system belt automatically fully automatic seat place belt moved into furnish a shoulder lap particu- include The passenger’s chest when the vehi- did not belts.9 across regulations closed, ramp lars are considered door and a seat and knee of these cle’s question presented in this detail The helped keep passenger the seat below. bolster regu- and the The case in the event of a crash. is whether preempt state stat- occupant nothing “passive” because the did lations imposing addi- regulations utes two-point assembly it. did to activate This systems requirements on assert tional restraint lap not include belt. Alvarados damage part claims if the manu- re- also common-law that if a belt had been option permitted system, have remained facturer chose straint Mario would (Pa. (Tex.1998). Corp., 806 Motors 706 A.2d lucci v. General 1. 967 S.W.2d 360 1998) (airbag). Co., Harris v. Motor 110 F.3d 1410 2. See Ford 1997) (9th Montag (airbag); v. Motor Cir. Honda explains, at 2 n. As see 974 S.W.2d the Court denied, Cir.) Co., (10th (airbag), F.3d cert. reorganized moved to Act was U.S. -, 61, 136 117 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d chapter Code in 1994. - 49 of the United States (1996); Pokorny v. Ford Stat. 745 No. Pub.L. denied, (3d Cir.) (airbag), cert. 498 U.S. pre- consistency, refer to the interest of I (1990); Court, Kitts appeals, as the court of 1994 statutes (10th Corp., F.2d 787 Cir. General Motors parties have done. denied, 1989) (airbag), cert. 494 U.S. Wood 1392(a). 5. 15 U.S.C. (1st Corp., Cir. Motors General denied, 1988) (airbag), cert. Id. 1392(d). Id. Am., Inc., Volkswagen 3. See Zimmerman belt), (lap cert. P.2d 67 Idaho 571.208. See 49 C.F.R. - denied, -, (1997); Cooper v. General Motors L.Ed.2d (Miss.1997) (airbag); Cel- 702 So.2d specific mandate via that conclusion regulations. There is a considerable federal producers.13 regarding preemption of manufacturers body of law federal statutes similar state common-law here were regulations at issue Act, that the which indicates care- lawmakers after federal implemented However, question “yes.” answer to that alternatives, regula- and the fully weighed law, of that it is I turn to a discussion before requirements. embody detailed tions history illuminating to consider the extensive Excel’s applicable to the safety standards occupant regulation of federal restraint at 49 C.F.R. system are found restraint systems the detailed (1988), called Federal § 571.208 sometimes Hyundai. apply to (FMVSS) Safety Standard Motor Vehicle is to purpose of FMVSS 208 208. The stated II requirements for the “specifiy] performance regulations in crashes.”14 occupants The concludes that the protection Court of vehicle type design accomplish pur- did not tell what this regulations The federal performance use but instead established crashworthiness pose by “specifying vehicle options.10 requirements under four different forces and accelera- requirements in terms of also observes that there were The Court anthropomorphic dummies measured on tions un- performance requirements for rollovers crashes, by specifying equipment test option by Hyun- particular der the chosen passive active and restraint requirements for misleading, and dai.11 These assertions are systems.”15 they oversimplify complex, a and misconstrue types pas particular what The issue of expressly regulatory scheme that al- detailed required under senger should be restraints lowed to choose not to meet rollover longstanding and has com law is requirements protection if met other crash of the attention Secre requirements. manded the sustained Transportation, tary Department of of the regulations governed restraint Safety Transpor Highway and the National general systems quite specific, not the (NHTSA), and at tation Administration type regulation preemp- found to have no times, Congress. The stan the attention by Supreme tive effect the United States issue, promul first was dard at FMVSS Medtronic, In Med- Court in Inc. v. Lohr.12 required all automobiles gated in 1967 and tronic, distinguished gen- lap have manual belts.16 ones, specific taking eral from the federal into account the extent to which amended in 1972 to regulation was government competing balanced consid- had passive re- gradual phase-in of require a erations: many members of because so straints option An up.”17 “buckle public failed to generality requirements make these before 1975 for cars manufactured available quite unlike a ease in which the Feder- pre- system that ignition interlock was an weighed competing al Government man- starting unless the the car from vented particular require- interests relevant to the outcry Public fastened. ual seatbelts were unambiguous question, reached an ment inAct Congress to amend the led competing those con- conclusion about how ignition inter- the use of the prohibit 1974 to particu- resolved in a siderations should be of a continuous buzz- cases, system or the use implemented lock case or set of lar 571.208, S1. 14. 49 C.F.R. S.W.2d at 9. 10. See 974 11. See id. added). 571.208, (emphasis S2 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 12. 518 Fed.Reg. 2415 16. 32 2240; Harris v. see also Id. at FMVSS, (9th Fed.Reg. Cir. 17. See Ford Motor 1997). [Rjecent In Canadian Gov-

er.18 that same amendment research has indicated that the absence of responded public ernment also concerns 2-point lap result in the auto- belt airbags about mandated and other automatic prevent- being matic less effective belt passive systems. Congress prohib- restraint addition, ejection. ing the door adopting ited mounted, 2-pointed may have little belt require standard that would a manufacturer ejection of oc- capability preventing an meet that other than a standard means cupant the event an accidental door system,” in the “belt which was defined However, opening during a collision. integrated sys- belt shoulder 3-point will not even automatic belt seat, passenger tem for front unless the ejection, prevent involving all fatalities regulation was submitted to as a result of since some fatalities occur Congress thereby was not vetoed.19 ensured impacting components interior before system manual seatbelt ejection, as a result of while others occur public then familiar to the would not be occupant objects outside contact with replaced passive abolished and re- Moreover, partial ejection. vehicle after opportunity straint without an 2-point sys- the door belt in the mounted say doing, Congress “no.” In so actually prevent openings may tem door balancing the indicated that was many instances, “loading” in since the of types of might benefits be safer of what (which door) the is attached to the belt systems against public’s the sensibilities and keep during can the closed tend to door concerns. These enactments also indicated crash. Congress’s public that the concern would dis- should Three-point automatic belts be as systems they too intru- able restraint belts, Depart- effective as manual controversial, or leave sive would ment’s for of auto- estimates effectiveness protection. passenger with no matic Automatic belts reflect this. belt adjusted effectiveness estimates have been By the 1988 involved in time by percent downward at the lower end manufactured, litigation this was FMVSS 208 range because there is some evidence again passive phase had been revised to in 2-point belts be less effective systems require passive and to restraint re- 3-point than belts.23 systems in all straint automobiles manufac- in junctures promulgation At other September tured after 1989.20 rule, Secretary final noted again this ultimately in amended the 1991 to lap necessary protection in belts were for require lap airbags combined with and shoul- protection rollovers. “To attain in these non- der belts all new automobiles.21 crashes, lap [rollover rear-end] frontal adopting regulations applied belt, In lap/shoulder be worn.”24 belt must Secretary the Excel in which Mario Alvarado was in- recognized But the also that seat- injuries jured, Secretary Transportation con- belts result more severe could options length.22 types sidered various at some some of crashes: Secretary cognizant two-point The Airbags provide pro- also belts employed by restraint like the one higher speeds tection than belts rollover, prevent ejection do, might provide protection in a they will better extremely use kinds Secretary permitted against nevertheless several debili- tating (e.g., inju- facial two-point system: injuries brain and 30127(b) (1997). 1410b(b)(l)(1982) (repealed 21. See 49 18. 15 U.S.C. 1994). FMVSS, Fed.Reg. 22. See Pokorny 1410b(b)(2), 1410b(f)(2); §§ see also 1116, 1123-24 Ford Motor Id. at 28985. Cir.), denied, (3d cert. L.Ed.2d Id. at 28991. Fed.Reg. 20. See airbags, ries) prohibited the use They nor general- mandated than belts. also they than be ly spread impact recognized of a crash could better but instead seatbelts, likely cause which are more meeting requirements of the used injuries in the internal or broken bones option at the of the manufactur- they body where restrain oc- areas er. cupants in severe crashes.25 history, I mean to reviewing do not Secretary The further considered the rela- alleging defec- imply that common-law merits of and nondetachable tive detachable airbag include design an did not tive because seatbelts but did not mandate ei- automatic or similar claims to detect a child sensor ther, recognizing had that both benefits issues preempted.33 are not Those are or usage for non- drawbacks.26 While the rate point in re- The are not before the Court. might seatbelts detachable automatic illustrate counting these considerations reasoned, higher, Secretary were a there weighed consciously that federal lawmakers myriad countervailing concerns. Some options expressly permitted the various passengers find auto- would nondetachable type one of re- manufacturers choose “uncomfortable, matic seatbelts cumbersome another within certain straint over “[ojthers entrap- and obtrusive” and -willfear two-point system by Hyun- used limits. that this ment.” concluded option expressly contemplated as an dai was that, in “might hamper automobile sales” and restraining passengers. emergency, might some find nondetacha- v. National Solid Court’s decision Gade get belts “harder to out of.”28 The Sec- ble Association, Management teaches us Wastes retary that the “most con- observed serious analysis should turn public’s that “the them that cern” was dislike of “ may system ‘operate (e.g., by lead to defeat of the the federal and state laws whether belt).”29 cutting Secretary object.’”34 the The also was The on the same mandating concerned that by nondetachable alleged “operate Alvarados the force belts would manufacturers to eliminate object” the Act and feder- the same as the middle front because was no seat there regulations al for occu- —the commercially-developed pro- technology to pant systems. restraint The extensive histo- vide an automatic seat belt for the center systems ry regulation of restraint of federal and that it seat nondetachable belts made strongly preemption. indicates prop- difficult to install a child restraint seat hand, erly.30 On the other the of drawback Ill passen- was detachable automatic belts ' gers detach use would and not them.31 its in Preemption genesis of law has state Supremacy Clause of the United the States Similarly, Secretary weighed po- the the Constitution, provides that of which the laws airbags many types in tential effectiveness of supreme the Law States “shall be against potential injury to United of crashes (children) Land; any Thing in position” passengers of the the Constitu- “out of when Contrary airbag deployed.32 any Laws of to an The neither tion or State Transp. Corp., Int’l 25. Id. 33. Bammerlin v. Navistar Cf. (7th Cir.1994) (holding preemp- no 26. Id. at 28992. large of a claim that the belt in a tion defectively designed be- tractor-trailer truck was 27. Id. engine housing); cause it attached Am., Inc., Perry v. Mercedes N. Benz of Id. (5th Cir.1992) airbag (holding claim it did not inflate was not was defective because Id. at 28993. preempted). Id. 34. 505 U.S. (1992) (quoting Napier v. Coast Line Atlantic 605, 612, R.R.. (1926)). L.Ed. 432 32. See id. at “express” or notwithstanding.”35 preempt- preemption A state is denominated law is “implied”: if ed “without effect” it conflicts with federal law.36 Court concluded Frequently, preemptive “label” we scope Medtronic that the of is impli- carry choose with substantive will principles.37 two The first is the informed In scope pre-emption. cations for the Congress presumption that does not cavalier- however, case, not. this it does Our dis- action, ly partic- preempt state-law causes of Kennedy as to agreement with Justice legislated ularly Congress has in a field when preemptive Act’s effect whether the OSH traditionally occupied Such States.38 “implied” “express” is or is less labeled “consistent federal- approach is with both agreement important than our primacy ism concerns and the historic implications of the text of the statute regulation of matters health and state congressional pre-empt intent evince a safety.”39 principle The second that the is fed- nonapproved state when a Congress, which is the “‘ultimate intent eral is in effect.45 case,”40 every preemption is touchstone’ text” of “implications of the purpose from the structure and determined unmistakably reflect that some state a whole not revealed the statute as express preemp- preempted. laws are through reviewing [also] the text “but provides: tion clause understanding way in court’s reasoned of the and its intended statute motor a Federal vehicle Whenever regulatory surrounding scheme to affect subehapter standard established consumers, business, and the law.”41 effect, political inis subdivision State any authority of a have either State shall express,42 Preemption may may be or it be establish, or to continue effect implied scope if indicates statute respect motor vehicle or item of occupy intended federal law any safety equipment motor stan- vehicle exclusively or when field state law aspect per- dard to the same applicable times, it actual conflict with federal law.43 At equip- or item of such vehicle formance preemptive difficult to discern ment not identical the Federal which is express implied. a statute is effect of Nothing in this section shall be standard. Management Gade v. National Solid Wastes any from preventing State construed as Ass’n,44 plurality of the United Su States safety enforcing any standard which is preme implied preemption, found Court safety to a Federal standard.46 identical Kennedy in a concur while Justice concluded However, preemp Act also contains a sav- ring opinion express that there was that, ings explicitly refers to common- plurality observed when the clause that tion. The any with strongly “Compliance Federal a statute evinces an intent claims: text of important motor standard issued under preempt, it is often less whether vehicle VI, Myrick, Corp. Freightliner 43. v. 35. art. cl. 2. U.S. Const. 280 , 1483, L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Louisiana, 725, 746, Maryland 36. v. 451 U.S. (citing English Elec. 496 U.S. v. General (1981). S.Ct. (1990)); L.Ed.2d Bowling see also Brunswick & Billiards Moore v. 37. at 116 S.Ct. 2240. 518 U.S. (Tex.1994). 247-48 889 S.W.2d 38. Id. 44. 505 Id. Id. S.Ct. 2374. at 104 n. S.Ct. 2240. Id. at 1392(d). 46. 15 U.S.C. Inc., Liggett Group, Cipollone regula- Act Nothing or its in the subchapter exempt person this does currently use of ABS regulates the tions any liability under common-law.”47 re- imposes no As Standard devices. Supreme Court had oc- United States prohibiting requiring either or quirements preemptive provisions casion consider the manufactur- systems, tractor-trailer ABS Freightliner Corp. in con- obey state standards are free ers Myrick,48 open that decision left two of cerning stopping distances vehicle 1) key case: whether the issues this stability_ promul- In absence of only Act preempts in the term “standard” standard, simply fails the Act gated statutes and and not com- state devices to address need ABS 2) claims; effect of the mon-law Further, currently has Standard all. liabili- clause state common-law concerning nothing say ABS devices separate ty.49 Myrick, plaintiffs in two other, way has or the and NHTSA one tractor-trailers were suits contended re- track manufacturers to not ordered designed they negligently were not because finding using A frain from ABS devices. braking systems equipped with antilock undermine no feder- would (ABS).50 safety regulations had Federal respect objectives purposes al promulgated imposed stopping dis- been devices, since none exist.53 ABS which, matter, practical tances as a could Myrick, United States When issued use be met of ABS devices. petition it a Supreme also had before Court However, prior to the these collisions seeking review of Hernandez for certiorari eases, that federal standard had been Leonardo,54 held that which had -Gomez suspended by the Court of Ninth Circuit expressly preempt no-lap-belt claims are not “ strong prob- Appeals because ‘there [was] certiorari, granted The Supreme ed. Court ability potentially has created a [ABS] judgment, and remanded vacated highway than more hazardous situation exist- light for further consideration ease opera- ed before the Standard became remand, Myrick.55 the Arizona court On was not tive.’”51 thereafter again express there no concluded that was regulatory reinstated authorities. implied pre preemption, then conducted an The tractor-trailer manufacturers neverthe- analysis by Myrick, emption indicated negligence claims less contended that implied preemption.56 held that there was no preempted. not filed. petition A for certiorari was second Thus, Supreme while the United States Court held that there was no aspects of the opined on some express implied preemption because there Act, dispositive ease issues that ad- federal standard effect by that court. remain unanswered stopping stability for dressed distances or hinted, are, however, There a number federal tracks.52 The howev- er, that have addressed claims under state law had the and state court decisions tort re- preemption of claims that a vehicular potential to conflict with the negligently system or promulgated did was defective thereunder straint have consid- particular designed. Most these cases address device: 286, 1397(k). Id. § Id. at 115 S.Ct. 1483. 47. 52. 280, 1483, S.Ct. 131 L.Ed.2d

48. 514 U.S. 115 Id. at 115 S.Ct. 1483. 53. (1995). 385 297, (1994). 183 54. 180 Ariz. 884 P.2d 3, Id. at n. S.Ct. 49. 287 115 1483. Hernandez-Gomez, Am., Volkswagen v. Inc. 55. at 115 1483. Id. L.Ed.2d 742 131 514 Paccar, (quoting 115 S.Ct. 1483 NHTSA, (9th Cir.), 643 cert. Inc. v. Leonardo, denied, v. 185 Ariz. Hernandez-Gomez (1978)). P.2d ered airbag, dly62 the failure to furnish an al- preempted. These are a few of though a number of decisions have consid- preemption the eases that address of such ered lap claims based on the absence of a listing may claims. A more extensive be agree belt. I with the Court that there is no Corp.,63 found Cellucci v. General Motors distinguishing valid basis no-lap- between Cooper Corp.64 v. Fur General Motors no-airbag belt and claims.57 Both seek to ther, ap at least two federal district courts impose liability though even the manufactur- no-airbag plying Texas law have concluded given option by er regula- was impliedly preempted,65 are and anoth supplying tions of a restraint that did applying er federal district court Texas law lap have belt or one that did not have preempted has held that claims were airbag.58 an The fact that the Alvarados are they alleged inadequate warning extent claiming lap airbag that a belt rather than an belts must be worn.66 Two Texas should have been furnished does not affect appeals courts of have also indicated that analysis of whether their common-law preemption.67 there is equivalent claims are the imposing a “safe- implicit ty recognition of the fact that it standard” that is “not identical” to the meaning today gone against weight federal standard within the of authori- express preemption ty, clause of the the Court asserts that the more recent Court, part company Act.591 with the howev- finding preemption.68 “trend” is toward no er, rejects reasoning many when it of so This is not borne out when the decisions are other courts that have concluded such claims analyzed. More recent cases that have found preempted. are no-lap-belt, no-airbag, analogous claims to preempted are numerous and include de- While there are decisions that have con Seventh, Ninth, cisions of the and Tenth preemption,60 cluded there is no the Court Appeals Circuit Courts of and the courts of juris identifies some of the decisions in other Idaho, no-lap-belt Mississippi, dictions that have last resort of held or no- Penn- airbag expressly61 claims are implie sylvania.69 either 57. See 974 Corp., S.W.2d at 5 n. 6. 65. See Dallas v. General Motors (W.D.Tex.1989); F.Supp. 902 Surles Ford Mo- Co., 571.208, (N.D.Tex.1988). F.Supp. tor See C.F.R. S4.5.3. 1392(d). 59. 15 U.S.C. Co., F.Supp. 66. Martin v. Ford Motor (S.D.Tex.1996). 7; Perry 60. See 974 S.W.2d at 5 n. see also Am., Inc., Mercedes North 957 F.2d 1257 Benz of Co., 67. Marrs v. Ford Motor 852 S.W.2d (5th Cir.1992) (holding that a claim that an air- writ) (Tex.App. (holding no no- — Dallas bag defectively designed because it failed to airbag impliedly preempted); claim was see also open preempted); Shipp was not v. General Mo- Corp., Brewer v. General Motors 926 S.W.2d (5th Cir.1985) (holding tors 750 F.2d 418 1996), modified, (Tex.App. — Texarkana although complied manufacturer (Tex.1998) (indicating design S.W.2d 187 some strength regulations). with roof preempted). defect claims were 7; S.W.2d at 5 n. Schlotz 68. 974 S.W.2d at 6. (hold (Minn.Ct.App.) 557 N.W.2d 613 denied, ing no-lap-belt preempted), claim cert. U.S. -, Truck, N.V., Europa 69. Gracia v. Volvo - (1997); Truck, Europa (7th Cir.1997) ( see also Gracia v. Volvo system), 291 windshield retention N.V., (7th Cir.1997) - (holding denied, U.S. -, 697, 112 F.3d 291 rt. ce Safety preempted Act a claim that a wind (1998); Harris v. Ford Motor defective), Co., shield retention in truck was (9th Cir.1997) (airbag); 110 F.3d 1410 Mon - denied, -, 697, cert. U.S. 139 Co., (10th Cir.) tag v. Motor F.3d 1414 Honda 75 L.Ed.2d 641 denied, - U.S .-, 61, (airbag), 117 cert. S.Ct. (1996); 136 24 L.Ed.2d Zimmerman v. Volks Am., 62. See 974 S.W.2d at 5 n. Inc., 851, 7. wagen 128 Idaho P.2d 920 67 (1996) belt), denied, - U.S. -, (lap cert. 117 806, (1997); 63. 550 Pa. 706 A.2d n. Cooper 812-13 4 S.Ct. 137 327 L.Ed.2d v. (Miss.1997) Corp., General Motors 702 So.2d 428 (airbag); Corp., Cellucci General Motors v. (Miss.1997). (Pa. 1998) (airbag); 64. 702 So.2d 433-34 Pa. 706 A.2d 806 see preemption clause interpre- lations. The I take with this also issue Court’s a any authority of removes Supreme expressly Act tation of United States Court deci- or to continue in effect preemptive considered the to establish sions have State applicable to the same “any safety other than the standard effect statutes case, subject application which not iden- aspect performance them to this ... is and I which now turn. The Court tical to the Federal standard.”72 common-law the Alvarados’ concludes that IV “establish, or continue claims do not standard,”73 determining “safety questions in decisions The threshold effect” a 1) Supreme Act are Court indicate preemptive reach of the the United States im- whether under the common law otherwise.

poses “safety is “not identi- standard” that six of the United Cipollone, members safety applicable cal” to federal agreed that the terms Supreme Court States 2) aspect performance,” “the same “requirement prohibition” in Public or meaning effect of clause. Smoking Act of 196974 in- Cigarette Health cluded claims.75 The Court A “ phrase ‘requirement reasoned that “safety term standard” is defined un- sweeps broadly suggests prohibition’ der the Act: positive enactments and distinction between (2) safety “Motor vehicle standards” common observed that law.”76 The Court means a minimum motor standard for ve- effectively can regulation state be as exerted performance, equip- hicle or motor vehicle through damages through an award of performance, practicable, ment which is “ preventive relief.77 ‘The obli- some form of the need motor vehicle meets be, compensation can is gation pay indeed safety provides objective and which crite- be, designed potent govern- method of ria.70 ”78 ing controlling policy.’ conduct and The Court describes the standards as majority “minimum” standards.71 A States This accurate United respect to A in Cipollone a manufacturer. manufac- Court reasoned that common- may damage premised turer But exis- exceed standards. actions are on the legal duty are not mínimums tence that such actions standards with re- of a gard prohibitions.”79 regulation; they impose “requirements to state are absolute. impose safety explained States “it is the standard that essence any respect are regu- differs the federal the common law enforce duties that Co., (NHTSA). Mich.App. Traffic See 49 also v. Ford Motor Administration Martinez 1.50(a). (airbag); C.F.R. 568 N.W.2d 396 v. Schlotz (Minn.Ct. N.W.2d denied, -, belt), App.) (lap at cert. - U.S. 71. See S.W.2d 7. Miranda v. Fridman, 1392(d). N.J.Super. (App. 647 A.2d 167 72. 15 U.S.C. Div.1994) Williams, belt); (lap Panarites v. Id.; (N.Y.App.Div. A.D.2d 629 N.Y.S.2d 359 see 974 S.W.2d at 1995) seatbelt); (airbag Dykema or automatic AG, Volkswagenwerk, 189 Wis.2d §§ 74. 15 1331-1340. U.S.C. denied, belt), (lap (App.1994) N.W.2d 754 cert. L.Ed.2d 75. 505 S.Ct. 2608. (1995); Boyle Chrysler 177 Wis.2d 1993) (App. (airbag). N.W.2d 865 Id. 1391(2). Id. At the time 70. 15 manufactured, Excel was motor vehicle Diego Bldg. (quoting San Trades Council developed and issued Sec 773, Garmon, Transportation. retary of (1959)). 1392(a). authority L.Ed.2d 775 promulgate stan The delegated by dards has since been Highway of the Id. 112 S.Ct. 2608. to the Administrator National negative in also undercuts this requirements either affirmative or decision CSX safety prohibitions.”80 plurality A of the Court Court’s conclusion that since the stan- continued, inquiry Safety in Act are “minimum” central each case dards under “[t]he standards,86 may impose straightforward: legal we whether the the common law ask duty predicate liability for failure to include belts. The that is the of the common-law that, contended because the damages ‘requirement action constitutes a or claimants CSX smoking regulations maximum allowable prohibition based on and health federal set trains, nev- imposed respect speeds law with to ... the common law could State ”81 advertising promotion.’ impose liability when a train was ertheless if traveling than the maximum rate at less liability negligence products In duty operate common-law the train at a uncrashworthiness, prem- alleging the basic speed and safe rate of was breach- moderate ise of the cause of action is that there has Supreme ed. re- The United States Court duty been a breach of a to meet some mini- jected reg- argument, observing that the Thus, safety. mum standard state law governing speed the maximum ulations impose “safety would standard” that is “not adopted trains “reveal that the limits were safety identical” to a federal standard under posed by after the hazards the track Safety attached as result conditions were taken into account.”87 The equipment that fed- the failure include regulation that state Court admonished permitted eral law the manufacturer to omit. speed through damage suits was of trains by permit- foreclosed federal ease, analogous In an the United States up speeds: to travel to certain ted trains Supreme Transportation, Court held CSX neg- Inc. v. Easterwood82 that a common-law context the overall Understood alleging ligence cause of action excessive lim- regulations, speed structure of the law, speed stringent of a train was a “more only establishing its must be read as rule, order, regulation, or standard” than a precluding ceiling, but also additional state safety regulation “covering” the max- regulation respondent of the sort speed imum of trains under the Federal Rail- impose petitioner.88 seeks Supreme road Act of 1970.83 The by regulatory governing scheme seat legal imposed concluded that duties Court regulation speed scope of the belts is similar to the of the the common law fell within the “law, rule, order, adopting stan- regulation, broad terms of trains CSX. Act, similarly pursuant dards Secre-. standard.”84 tary Transportation al- Paper in International considered various held Co. Ouellette restraining passengers in a nuisance claims ternatives for state CSX, pre- against pollution source of crash. As out-of-state regulation means of preempted discharge water stan- clude additional state common-law claims. dards under the Clean Water Act.85 added). promulgated (emphasis under the preempted windshields com Act that addressed 2608; see 81. Id. at 112 S.Ct. also American denied, - U.S. -, claims), mon-law cert. Grinnell, Tobacco Co. v. (Tex.1997) 951 S.W.2d But cf. holding (following Cipollone and Bowling & Billiards Moore v. Brunswick regarding post-1969 failure common-law claims (Tex.1994) (common-law 889 S.W.2d preempted). to warn were design product was not a claim for defective meaning regulation" "law or within n. 82. 507 U.S. Act). Federal Boat II). (1988 Supp. U.S.C. 434 83. 45 1391(2). 86. 15 U.S.C. 84. 507 U.S. at 113 S.Ct. 1732. 507 U.S. at 113 S.Ct. 1732. 481, 496,

85. 479 U.S. Europa also Gracia v. Volvo see 88. Id. Truck, N.V., (7th Cir.) (holding that 112 F.3d 291 manufactured, provided: Safety Act today is also at odds The Court’s decision decisions, Worthy any v. motor with two of our recent vehicle “Compliance with Federal v. Collagen Corp.89and Continental Airlines subchapter this safety standard issued Only ago, we unani four months any any person from liabili- exempt does Kiefer.90 Worthy a federal mously held in stat (Non-substantive ty law.”93 under common express preemption clause foreclosed ute’s statute was made when the revisions were damage The statute un common-law claims. recodified.94) blush, ap- this would At first scrutiny Worthy provided: der This pear common-law claims. to save all “ political of a State or subdivision [N]o task, however, focus ‘a is not to Court’s or establish continue effect State provi- single [to] ... but look sentence respect hu- to a device intended for ”95 of the whole law.’ sions any requirement (1) which is man use — from, to, any re- different or addition Supreme giv- The Court United States chapter to quirement applicable under this meaning and guidance regarding en us (2) device, relates to the In Morales v. savings clauses. effect to or effectiveness of the device or Airlines, Inc., Trans World any require- matter in a other included general savings clause held that a applicable ment device under supersede specific “cannot be allowed chapter.91 Ac- preemption provision.”96 substantive recognized likewise Air- We Continental that, held notwithstand- cordingly, Morales brought private that a suit lines v. clause, Kiefer ing savings express preemption parties constitutes enforcement of state provision prohibit- from precluded the States makes The Court no effort distin- law.92 deceptive advertising of ing allegedly airline guish these decisions and would be hard- through pro- consumer fares enforcement of cases, pressed to do In both those we so. statute under tection statutes.97 followed decisions of the Su- United States scrutiny expressly preempted the States preme equated “requirement” Court and damage with common-law claims under state law, rule, enact[ing] enforc[ing] any reg- “safety It law. difficult see how ulation, standard, imposed by any having provision standard” common law is or other imposed by “requirement” different from a relating to the force and effect of law common law. rates, routes, any air carri- or services of er.98 Accordingly, express expressly clause of Act would savings provided: clause However,

preempt the Alvarados’ claims. Nothing chapter in this shall in savings clause must also be considered.

way abridge or alter the remedies now B statute, existing at provisions chapter of this are addi- speaks directly clause com- claims. At the time the Excel was tion to such remedies.99 mon-law (1992) (Tex.1998). (quoting Pilot Ins. Co. 89. 967fS.W.2d 360 L.Ed.2d Life Dedeaux, S.Ct. 481 U.S. (Tex.1996). (internal (1987) quotation 90. 920 S.W.2d 274 marks L.Ed.2d omitted)). citations 360k(a) (1997). § 21 U.S.C. 2031, 119 96. 504 (Tex.1996) (citing Ameri- 92. 920 S.W.2d L.Ed.2d Airlines, Wolens, 513 U.S. can Inc. (1995)). Id. at 112 S.Ct. 2031. 1397(k). § 93. 15 U.S.C. 1305(a)(1) (1978) (current § version 98. 49 U.S.C. (1998)). § at 49 U.S.C. 30103(e) (1997). See 49 U.S.C. (current at 49 version Management Solid Wastes 95. Gade National (1998)). Ass’n, Morales,100 That quoted claims such as the Alvarados’.”106 Supreme the Court Ouellette, reflects the shallowness of statement Paper from International Co. v. safety standards reasoning. The Court’s which said: “we do not believe manufacturing defect preempt would not carefully to undermine this drawn intended airbag if seem that an claim. And would through general saving clause.”101 statute safety complied stan- that otherwise with Paper con- and International cast Morales injure it de- an infant when dards were on this Court’s conclusion siderable doubt Safety preempt a ployed, the Act would not savings in Act clause pro- that the manufacturer should have claim preserves a federal common-law claims when infant in the warning place not to an vided safety very aspect of standard addresses the just examples a few front seat. These are allegedly performance the vehicle’s not be savings clause would which deficient. “meaningless” though the manufacturer even However, Cipollone, dicta United applicable safety standard. complied with the Supreme that a States Court did indicate quotes congressional com This Court also savings clause could save common-law claims reports mittee and statements of individual express preemption from the reach of support view its members Compre- pointed clause. Court any preempt Act does not Tobacco Health Edu- hensive Smokeless course, the law claims.107 Of United common 1986,102 prohibited the cation Act of Supreme has admonished that States Court “ relating imposing from a ‘statement States single legislator, even the the “remarks of a products to the use of smokeless tobacco analyzing leg sponsor, controlling not are ”103 Court concluded health.’ history”108 and that “reliance on the islative general, inherent conflict that there was no history support interpreta legislative [an] warning of state between federal just treacherous tion of shows how [a statute] preservation of com- requirements and the at can be.”109 It is “hazardous task savings damage under the mon-law Moreover, by congres statements best.”110 savings Compre- clause in the clause.104 The and individual members sional staffers Health Edu- hensive Smokeless Tobacco savings Congress that were made when Act to the one at issue cation is similar not Safety Act was considered are clause of here.105 Report said Committee clear. The Senate necessarily” Morales, “not that the Act would In- This does not discuss claims: preempt common-law Paper, or tension between ternational time, Cipollone. and the dicta in the committee believes those decisions At the same Instead, adopt should be free “[i]n [its] the Court declares that States view, to the Federal stan- savings be rendered standards identical clause would may play virtually preserve dards so that States meaningless it did provides: savings Act clause 100. 504 U.S. at 112 S.Ct. 2031. liability Continuation of common-law 481, 494, (c) Compliance any Federal motor ve- L.Ed.2d 479 U.S. (1987). sub- hicle standard issued under this any exempt any person chapter from does not (1986). liability under common-law. §§ 102. 15 U.S.C. 4401-4408 1397(k). 15 U.S.C. (quoting 112 S.Ct. 2608 103. 505 U.S. S.W.2d at 8. 106. 974 4406). id. at 8. 104. Id. 281, 311, Brown, Chrysler Corp. clause in the Smokeless Tobacco

105. The provides: (c) liability Effect on laws 109. Id. any Nothing chapter shall relieve person at common-law or under 226, 242, Mergens, 496 U.S. statutory person. Ed. v. 110. Board law to other State 4406(c). 15 U.S.C. airbag case claims in an worthinesss significant role in vehicle impliedly preempted.117 federal minimum [T]he field.... interpreted as re- need not be cog- Congress Irrespective of was whether stricting standards of State common-law crashworthi- potential nizant of Compliance care. with such standards originally enacted ness claims when any per- necessarily thus not shield

would than Act, been more Safety there has now product at common- son litigation. decades of crashworthiness two law.111 claims certainly aware of such Congress was Report from the House more direct: was when, Safety Act in it amended lap and airbags with intended, mandated combined specifi- It is and this subsection in all two front seats establishes, compliance shoulder belts cally with in- amendments new automobiles.118 Those to standards is not be a defense or Congress preempt no- intended parties dicate that rights to affect the otherwise airbag claims. particularly those under common-law relat- contract,

ing warranty, and tort liabili- “Nothing in said: The 1991 amendments ty.112 made un- or in the amendments this section Motor Vehicle congressional reports der section Federal these were this When by Safety 208 be construed country recog no in the had shall prepared, court Standard indicating any person court an intention Because of as nized crashworthiness claims. affect, fact, modify in by change, in Wood this First Circuit concluded any, of a motor Corp. any way liability, v. Motors did General applicable law intend for the in the Safe vehicle manufacturer clause inflatable ty with or without Act to save crashworthiness claims.113 relative to vehicles leave opinion Congress intended to pointed to Evans v. restraints.”119 Wood Gen unaffected, year “applicable law” and in Corp.,114 eral Motors decided the same by passed, had been the over- that the Act was which held construed preempting weight authority plaintiff whelming that a failed to state a cause of Virtually fed- by no-airbag car all state and alleging action that a uncrashwor- claims. majority of thy. disagreed appellate courts the vast At least one other court has eral Wood, analysis in had held that no-air- concluding Tay in federal district courts Corp.,115 preempted.120 Only three bag lor that the semi claims were v. General Motors prior had nal v. decisions to 1991 concluded decision Larsen General Motors issued no-airbag preempted. were not Corp.,116 recognized which in 1968 a crash- claim, by an intermediate state worthiness was foreshadowed One was a decision of court, “scholarly commentary.” Eighth Circuit and the two others appellate By federal courts.121 Taylor decisions of district nevertheless held uncrash- (8th Cir.1968). 89-1301, (1966), reprinted S.Rep. at 116. No. 391 F.2d 111. 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2720. at 875 F.2d 89-1776, (1966). H.R.Rep. at No. 30127(f)(2). 118. See 49 U.S.C. Corp., 865 See Wood v. General Motors 2508(d), Stat. 119. Pub.L. No. denied, Cir.1988), (1st 403-406 cert. (codified differ- with some 110 S.Ct. U.S. 30127(f)(2)). language ences at 49 U.S.C. (1990). 7; cited S.W.2d 5 n. see also cases 120. See 914 denied, Cir.), (7th F.2d 822 cert. 114. 359 Cellucci, Cooper, n.4 706 A.2d at 812-13 (Eleven at 433. So.2d later, years the Seventh Circuit overruled Corp., Union, F.2d 104 White Motor case. Gingold v. 121. See Audi-NSU-Auto Huff 1977).) (7th Cir. Pa.Super. 567 A.2d 312 Garrett Co., (D.Md.1987), F.Supp. 407 Ford Motor (11th Cir.1989), Corp., 875 Kitts General Motors cert. de rev'd sub nom. Cir.1989); (10th nied, Murphy Mo v. Nissan F.2d 787 (E.D.N.Y.1987). F.Supp. tor courts, incorporate the contrast, of action did not circuit numer- law causes four federal courts, Act as the many state standards under the ous federal district care, none of these applicable standard of courts had ruled otherwise.122 It was preemption. A Cipol- Supreme decision decisions addressed after the Court’s v. K- Court, Ellis cited lone that a few appellate began courts fourth case to do with Lan nothing had whatsoever preemption.123 conclude that there was below, not consider Act and did But as will be discussed preemption.128 Ci- recently explained question of federal has more pollone mis-read some courts. has been history Safety Act light of the of the In provision, agree I preemption, express preemption and its rejecting this Court dis addressed the with most courts that have cusses the 1991 amendments no-lap-belt claims Congress expressed and would hold that Act and the intent of issue Safety Act expressly preempted.129 The change that the amendments did not are therein refers to Larsen not save common-law clause does applicable law. The Court directly options Corp.,124Shipp v. Motors v. General conflict with General A v. General Motors granted by federal standards.130 Motors Sours Corp.,125 and Corp .,126 general savings clause should not be read prior all to the 1991 decided in a stat- amendments, policy embodied authority proposition for the undermine federal regulations give Although utory scheme.131 Federal preempted.127 were not that claims several, limited, op- although common- manufacturers those decisions indicate that state 418, Cir.1985). Co., (5th Pokorny F.2d 421 v. Motor 902 F.2d 125. 750 122. See Ford (3d Cir.1990) (airbag); Kitts v. General Mo 1116 Cir.1989) (10th Corp., (airbag); F.2d tors 875 787 1511, (6th Cir.1983). 126. 717 F.2d 1517 Corp., Taylor 875 F.2d 816 v. General Motors denied, (11th Cir.1989) (airbag), 494 U.S. cert. 127. See 974 S.W.2d 13. 1065, 1781, (1990); 110 S.Ct. 108 (1st Corp., v. Motors 865 F.2d 395 Wood General 157, (5th Cir.1983) (discussing 161 695 denied, 1065, Cir.1988) (airbag), cert. 494 U.S. Special Packaging of Household Substances see, 1781, (1990); e.g., 782 110 S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d Act). for Protection of Children Inc., Toyota, Maplewood 416 Wickstrom v. (airbag); (Minn.Ct.App.1987) Gard N.W.2d 838 Am., Co., Ltd., 41, See, Volkswagen e.g., 145 A.D.2d 536 Zimmerman v. ner v. Honda Motor 851, (1996) (1988) Inc., (lap (airbag); cases cited 128 920 P.2d 67 N.Y.S.2d 303 see also Idaho Co., Cellucci, belt); Cooper, Hyundai Motor 557 N.W.2d 706 A.2d at 812-13 n.4 v. Schlotz belt); (lap (Minn.Ct.App.1997) Miranda v. 613 702 So.2d at 433. Fridman, 20, N.J.Super. (App. 647 A.2d 167 276 Div.1994) belt); Dykema Volkswagenwerk (lap v. See, Doyle Volkswagenwerk Aktienge e.g., v. AG, 206, (App.1994) 754 189 Wis.2d 525 N.W.2d (11th Cir.1997) lellschaft, (lap 114 F.3d 1134 Co., belt); (lap v. Ford Motor 110 see also Harris 1300, denied, - U.S. -, belt), 118 S.Ct. cert. Cir.1997) (9th (airbag); v. F.3d 1410 Martinez Galati, (1998); 466 Munroe v. 189 140 L.Ed.2d 247, Co., Mich.App. 224 568 N.W.2d Ford Motor 113, (1997) (airbag); Her Ariz. 938 P.2d 1114 (1997) Maplewood (airbag); v. Wickstrom 396 Leonardo, 509, 185 Ariz. 917 nandez-Gomez Inc., (Minn.Ct.App.1987) Toyota, N.W.2d 838 416 belt); (1996) (lap Ketchum v. P.2d 238 874, Williams, (airbag); 216 A.D.2d Panarites v. Co., 1672, Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.App.4th 49 57 Motor (1995) (airbag); Gardner v. N.Y.S.2d 359 (1996) belt); (lap v. Phil Motor Co. 41, Co., Ltd., A.D.2d Motor Honda (FIa.Dist.Ct.App.1994); lip, Wil 639 So.2d 1064 Boyle (1988) Chrysler (airbag); N.Y.S.2d (Ind.1995) (air Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327 son v. 207, (App. Corp., N.W.2d 865 177 Wis.2d Inc., Ford, bag); Dick Smith Loulos v. 1993) (airbag). (airbag); (Mo.Ct.App.1994) Tebbetts S.W.2d 149 Co., N.H. 665 A.2d 345 v. Ford Motor Co., See, Pokorny (1995) Corp., e.g., Motor 902 F.2d (airbag); Toyota v. Ford Motor Drattel denied, (3d Cir.), (1997) (air cert. 662 N.Y.S.2d 535 231 A.D.2d (1990); Inc., Wood v. Mfg., 112 L.Ed.2d bag); Am. 80 Ohio Minton v. Honda of (1st (1997) Corp., 413-14 (airbag); Motors Nelson General 684 N.E.2d 648 St.3d denied, Cir.1988), App.3d cert. 108 Ohio v. Ford Gener Cooper, Cellucci v. (airbag); see also N.E.2d 307 550 Pa. 706 A.2d (discussing after Ci al Motors cases decided So.2d at 436 . decided) incorrectly why they pollone and were Zimmerman, See, Cir.1968). (8th e.g., P.2d at 72. 124. 391 F.2d know, after implied preemption.135 We now Lap option re- tions. belts are but one for Myrick and ex Supreme issued straining passengers, regulations au- Court and the Cipol Cipollone, plained its not to decision thorize manufacturer include supports an inference options “[a]t lone best specified of the belts one other im express pre-emption clause forecloses an Preemption chosen. arises because common- plied pre-emption; it does establish failing law to choose one restraint Thus, if a court to con even rale.”136 higher over establishes a another express preemption, clude that is no there regulations, standard than con- scope express preemp resolution of the express purposes trary to the intent and the inquiry. clause not end Con tion does regulatory the federal scheme. it is flict still exist when express preemp A decision that there is “ comply private party to ‘impossible for a ordinarily tion obviate the would need require with both state and federal question implied preemption. consider “ ”137 ments,’ as an when state ‘stands However, the United States accomplishment obstacle to and execution among has not resolved the conflict the deci objectives full of Con purposes Therefore, area. like sions this the Arizona ”138 gress.’ preme su court in Hernandez-Gomez v. not agree I this Court that is with Leonardo, “jurisprudentially I take the safer impossible Hyundai comply to both with for proceeding implied pre course” of with an law a state common-law federal and with analysis.132 emption duty regulations lap to belts. The include Safety promulgated under the Act did V installing lap belts. prohibit Hyundai from Cipollone 1992, Prior to the decision safety specify that themselves standards overwhelming number of courts confronted lap belts with shoulder belts combined no-lap-belt no-airbag with claims had held requirements.139 certain be used to meet impliedly that such claims preempte Hyundai comply Nor is it for to “impossible” Cipollone d.133 It was after the deci to and at the time with federal law same sion that some and one state courts federal respond damages for breach of common- contrary.134 held circuit court Those law duties. express concluded preemp courts that provision tion and I clause in the take Court’s conclusion issue precluded any damages on imposition consideration of based 509, 238, (1996) belt); (1996); (lap 132. 185 Ariz. v. Phil- 917 P.2d 243 see 595 Motor Co. 327, Pleasant, lip, (FIa.Dist.Ct.App.1994); also v. Wil- Wilson 660 N.E.2d 336-37 639 So.2d 1064 (air- Pleasant, (Ind.1995). (Ind.1995) v. N.E.2d 327 son 660 Ford, Inc., bag); v. Dick Smith 882 Loulos See, Co., (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (airbag); e.g., Pokorny S.W.2d Tebbetts 133. v. Ford Motor 149 (3d Cir.) denied, 853, Co., 203, (airbag), N.H. A.2d 345 1116 cert. 498 v. Ford Motor 140 665 U.S. 147, (1990); (1995) Toyota Corp., (airbag); 112 v. Motor 111 S.Ct. Kitts v. Drattel (10th 326, (N.Y.App.Div. Corp., 662 N.Y.S.2d 535 General Motors 875 F.2d 787 Cir. A.D.2d 1997) 1989) Taylor Mfg., (airbag); Corp., (airbag); v. Am. General Motors Minton Honda v. Inc., 62, (1997) (11th Cir.1989) (airbag), 684 N.E.2d 648 875 F.2d 816 de Ohio St.3d cert. 1065, Co., nied, 1781, (airbag); Motor Ohio U.S. Nelson v. Ford 110 S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d (1995) (1990); (airbag). App.3d 670 N.E.2d 307 Wood v. General Motors (1st 1988) denied, (airbag), Cir. F.2d 395 cert. 110 S.Ct. See, Loulos, e.g., 882 S.W.2d at 152. Cellucci, (1990); also see cases cited in 706 A.2d n.4, Cooper, at 812-13 and 702 So.2d at 433. Myrick, S.Ct. 1483. See, e.g., Doyle Volkswagenwerk Aktienge English, (quoting Id. at S.Ct. 1483 (11th Cir.1997) lellschaft, (lap 114 F.3d 1134 2270). 496 U.S. at denied, - U.S. -, belt), cert. Galati, Munroe Davidowitz, (quoting Hines v. (1997) (airbag); Ariz. 938 P.2d 1114 Hern (1941)). 85 L.Ed. 581 Leonardo, 185 Ariz. andez-Gomez belt); (lap Ketchum v. P.2d 571.208, Cal.App.4th Cal.Rptr.2d 139. 49 C.F.R. S4.1.2.3. liability failing proper analyz- common-law laws is framework for tort for do not the say enough than ing preemption. more the federal standards re- It is not “ quire purposes goals and ] would not as an obstacle to and of federal state ‘standf Indeed, accomplishment “focus and of the full law are the same.144 execution ” objectives’ laws purposes purposes of the “whether the of the two are parallel divergent’ Act.140There a tends to ‘obscure more is difference between state systems determining state is requires statute that all than aid’ in whether law restraint lap by Preemption preempted have belt and state federal law.”145 analysis turn not conduct that exacts for should on whether federal failing impose state “‘are at distinct and include belt. Both law aimed “ ” they higher safety ‘oper- standards but on whether than different evils’ object.’”146 analysis upon scheme. I turn to a When the now closer ate the same particulars pro- that are of that federal scheme. Act and the studied, mulgated it are conclusion upon “operate A no-lap-belt claims object” same as the federal standards arguments One advanced govern occupant systems is restraint accepted Alvarados the Court su- 1) apparent compelling. It is perficially compelling. It is that common- carefully Transportation damage are consistent with one promulgating weighed competing interests Act, purposes of the which is occupant sys- restraint “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and 2) tems, as the two-point such one injuries persons traffic resulting from ac- and at issue in this case was studied autho- cidents.” The establishment or continua- safety promulgating rized the rule liability design tion of for de- 3) standards, specific options, limited and but and negligence fects would advance that belt, including lap system a without a goal. liability may spur Common-law systems given for restraint and States are industry develop automotive to safer de- op- those permitted not to further restrict signs. tions. response argument, some courts safety purpose noted is have not the sole B

of the Act.142 Act does not man- The cost, higher safety any date all standards at operate only no-lap-belt on Not do claims only safety determined but those object the same as the federal stan- Secretary Transportation be dards, they those stan- also conflict with “reasonable, appropriate.”143 practicable and with dards. The clash arises balancing. must There be a failing lap for to furnish a because Nevertheless, penalizes choosing a manufacturer for the United States belt under the focusing option expressly granted explained regulation.147 Allowing no- and federal scheme of respective purposes federal state Ouellette, 481, 494, 805, Myrick, 479 U.S. 107 S.Ct. 140. U.S. at 115 S.Ct. 1483 Davidowitz, (quoting Hines v. (1941)). 85 L.Ed. Gade, (quot- 112 S.Ct. 505 U.S. Growers, ing U.S.C. & Avocado Inc. Florida Lime Paul, (1963)). See, Co., L.Ed.2d e.g., v. Ford Harris Motor Cir.1997). (9th 1412 n. 3 Napier Coast (quoting Atlantic Line 605, 612, Harris, 1392(f)(3); R.R. 272 U.S. (1926)). 143. 15 see also L.Ed. 432 at 1412 n. 3. F.3d Brunswick Manage- 147. See Lewis v. 144. See v. National Solid Wastes Gade Cir.1997) Ass’n, (11th (holding that common- 1501-02 ment damage with decision of Paper Co. law claim conflicted L.Ed.2d International are 2” These terms “Type assemblies. lap-belt proceed undercut the called would S3.) 571.209, defined in 49 C.F.R. statutory grant authority to the safety of one Secretary, who is to balance the complied one of have could system against the of another while S4.1.2.1, fairly options: three detailed factors, taking into account other includ- also S4.5.3, S4.1.2.2, Or, under or S4.1.2.3.151 acceptance Ninth ing public and cost.148 The an automatic seatbelt Hyundai could furnish correctly v. Ford Co. Circuit Harris protection re- the crash assembly that met Secretary considered in- observed that opt any of the three quirements . one airbags as their creased as well (S4.1.2.1),lap option the first ions.152 Under declining airbags.149 cost to mandate mandatory. option The first belts were (1) to install required a manufacturer either prohibit particu- than mandate or Rather system that completely passive restraint assembly airbags, Secretary lar belt performance crash re specified meet would gave options, pre- within manufacturers lateral, frontal, rollover quirements for limits, configure their re- scribed how to a combi lap to install belts or collisions or systems long perfor- straint as certain pelvic upper torso restraints nation of requirements mance were met. Federal that would passive addition to the restraint expressly allowed the choice to be made protection requirements crash meet frontal among imperfect systems, recognizing that requirements but not performance and other injuries. prevent one cannot all protection requirements.153 the rollover crash could have mandated belts (S4.1.2.2)required passive option The second struck but did not. balance was protection plus lap belts and a seatbelt warn Secretary, through not the courts States performance requirements ing system. The juries. airbag In the context of the for frontal option for this included those litigation, “judgment [the claimant] for performance re not include crashes but did would have an effect ... identical to a state option quirements rollovers.154 The third regulation requiring airbags statute or in all protection through ei required frontal crash vehicles.”150 pelvic upper torso ther a combination shoulder belt restraint with nondetachable regulations permitted Hyundai belt, system. plus warning a lap or a seatbelt system choose a seatbelt that did not include regard performance requirements It had no lap Hyundai a manufactured the belt. When S4.5.3, Finally, Hyun under ing rollovers.155 case, July Excel at issue in this which was system automatic belt dai could choose an 1988, Hyundai specific options had warning system that met the specified with a restraining passengers 208 for in the FMVSS performance requirements of one of the seat, passenger front called the “front out- specific options. three more position, board” where Mario Alvarado was sitting specific options at the time of the accident. Some of referred Each of the three S5.1, belts; options lap requirements the called for some did not. crash to the frontal (Throughout lap specified are called not detailed test- FMVSS belts which turn assemblies, injury incorporated the “Type ing 1” and the combi- criteria but also seatbelt Hyundai criteria in certain sections of S6.156 pelvic upper torso restraints are nation Act, § Federal Boat 151. 49 C.F.R. 571.208. Coast Guard under the propeller require §§ 46 U.S.C. not to - motors), granted, guards on boat cert. 152. Id. -, (1997), 15, 1998). (May per dismissed rule 46 cert. 571.208, § 153. Id. S4.1.2.1. 1392(f); FMVSS, generally § 15 U.S.C. 148. See Fed.Reg. 571.208, Id. S4.1.2.2. Cir.1997); (9th see

149. 110 F.3d n. 571.208, Id. S4.1.2.3. Coip., Pa. Cellucci v. General Motors also 407, (1998) (quoting and fol- 706 A.2d Harris). 571.208, S5.1. lowing 150. Harris, F.3d at n. Supreme preempted,162 while the passive to claim

asserts that it chose furnish system to of Arizona held Hernandez-Gomez restraint under S.4.5.3 and meet Court implied pre performance requirements option there no the two. v. Leonardo that was rollover/lap because emption in belt case The contend because there Alvarados by the manufacturer did option chosen performance applicable was no rollovers, only to frontal relate not two, option rollovers under their common-law de light express of the crashes.163 In aspect “applicable same claims are not that di provisions regulations of the tailed performance” as FVMSS 208 within the protection, Zimmerman rectly crash address meaning This Act.157 Court is the better-reasoned decision. That agree.158 seems to conclusion is unten options able. Each of the that was available put to rest is One final issue that should be Hyundai protection addressed “crash re two-point regulations authorized whether the Freightlin quirements.” the claim in Unlike systems. While it is true restraint Corp. Myrick,159in there were er “two-point regulations not use words do regulations in effect under the restraint,” Secretary Transportation regarding stopping or vehicle sta distances system, even of such a approved the use trailers, bility for trucks or recognized Secretary expressly though the issue here address crashworthiness of two-point less effec- might restraints detail, systems in passenger restraint includ ejec- systems in preventing than other tive per expressly ing rollovers. was system restraint tion rollovers.164 regulations under FMVSS 208 mitted by Hyundai as the one used was same option choose an not include did by Volkswagen, system and that was used compliance require belts and that did Secretary in years over the evaluated requirements, performance rollover process promulgating stan- protection meet “crash had to other pas- noted that “two dards.165 The requirements.”160 regulations provided systems” appeared restraint workable166 sive addressing the extent to detailed standards knee bol- and later that VW’s shoulder and systems must restrain. The which restraint meeting proven “a means of ster “applicable claims are requirement.”167 passive restraint aspect performance.”161 same specific sought approval Volkswagen and, two-point system, the Alvarados its that have addressed this Other courts concede, Highway Traffic National question differing reached conclusions. have authoriza- specific Administration ruled in Zim- of Idaho held unnecessary America, because FMVSS 208 tion was Volkswagen Inc. that merman v. sys- “already passive belt permits use of directly perfor- regulation addressed passive restraint used protect tem.” vehicle occu- requirements mance option un- no-lap-belt by Hyundai permitted as an pants during crashes and that a 1392(d). advantage opportunity design One takes 157. 15 U.S.C. include, strictly on a for the manufacturer basis, ignition The belt voluntary an interlock. at 6. 158. See 974 S.W.2d door, design detaches from before the car can start- must be reattached 285-86, 115 S.Ct. 1483. 159. 514 U.S. type belt ed the This of automatic next time. bolster) in- (2-point knee has been belt with See 49 C.F.R. 571.208. 160. 390,000 (VW) Volkswagen than stalled in more eightyear beginning period Rabbits over 1392(d). 161. installed on a small number 1975. It was also (GM) Chevettes. It Motors of 1978-79 General 70-71 162. 128 Idaho 920 P.2d option Rabbits. still as an is available n.2, FMVSS, Fed.Reg. P.2d 163. 185 Ariz. 166. 24072. FMVSS, See, Fed.Reg. e.g., 28985. 164. FMVSS, Fed.Reg. FMVSS, See, Fed.Reg. e.g., at 28965. The Fed.Reg. 3834. 168. 39 Secretary observed: long der as it met the federal performance requirements specified options

one of the three FMVSS under

208.169 duty

A belts provide theory or strict negligence that is “not identical”

FMVSS 208. Alvarados’ common-law directly regu- conflict with the federal

latory preempted and thus scheme are requirements satisfied the of S4.5.3. preempts no-

Federal the Alvarados’

lap-belt Accordingly, claims. I dissent.

Jerry P. CHILDS & and Childs

Bishop, Inc., Petitioners,

Joseph HAUSSECKER and Gail

Haussecker, Respondents. GRAVEL,

HUMBLE SAND &

INC., al., Petitioners, et MARTINEZ, ux., Respondents.

Jose L. et

Nos. 97-0324.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Jan. July

Decided

Rehearing Sept. Overruled 571.208,

169. See 49 C.F.R S4.5.3.

Case Details

Case Name: Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado

Court Name: Texas Supreme Court

Date Published: Sep 24, 1998

Citation: 974 S.W.2d 1

Docket Number: 95-0969

Court Abbreviation: Tex.