At issue in this.appeal is whether a jury verdict against the Double R Specialty Molding Co., Inc. (“Double R”) for violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), is covered under a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. (“Nationwide”). Both parties moved for summary judgment and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. It found that the verdict was not covered under the terms of the liability insurance policy because the Lanham Act violation could not result in an “advertising injury,” as that term is defined in the policy, and that, even if it could, the jury’s conclusion that Double R had acted “willfully” invoked a policy exclusion precluding coverage for advertising injuries caused “by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity.”
Upon careful review, we conclude that the Lanham Act violation gave rise to a covered “advertising injury” under the policy, that there was a causal connection between the injury suffered and Double R’s advertising activities, and therefore that the jury award is covered under the insurance policy. Moreover, we find that because the “knowledge of falsity” exclusion in the insurance policy is ambiguous and, under Florida law, must be construed narrowly, it does not bar coverage in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide and remand the case with instructions to grant Hyman’s motion for summary judgment.
I.
The relevant facts and procedural history are straightforward. On March 1,1988, a patent was issued to Dale Klaus, vice-president of Inter-Global, Inc. (“Inter-Global”), for the design of a mounting for a particular type of outdoor plastic light. 1 Klaus assigned his rights to that patent to DAL Limited Liability Company (“DAL”), which then granted Inter-Global the right to manufacture and sell the mounting. Inter-Global, in turn, sold the mounting in two pieces designated as the B-l and B-1S bases. In April 1989, Double R began manufacturing a similar mounting with pieces designated as DRB-1, DRB-1S, DRB-3, and DRB-3S bases. Both Inter-Global and Double R marketed their products to equipment ‘ manufacturers, which then sold completed lighting fixtures to retail stores.
In November 1994, Inter-Global and DAL filed suit against Double R in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri alleging - patent infringement and unfair competition. The suit subsequently was transferred to the Middle District of Florida. The complaint alleged three causes of action: direct patent infringement; indirect or contributory *1184 infringement; and unfair competition in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The Lanham Act claim alleged that Double R had used artwork from Inter-Global’s brochures in its advertisements and designated its products using model numbers similar to those used by Inter-Global. 2
The case proceeded to trial in November 1998. The jury found in favor of Double R on the direct and indirect patent infringement counts, but found for Inter-Global and DAL on the Lanham Act claim. 3 The jury also found that Double R had acted willfully. Accordingly, it awarded DAL and Inter-Global $400,000 in damages. That award was modified by the district court in February 1999 to include $206,892 in prejudgment interest, for a total judgment of $606,892.
Subsequently, Double R sought indemnity for the judgment from Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the insurance company from which it had purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy in December 1992. The policy provides coverage for “ ‘[advertising injury’ caused by an offense committed in the course of advertising [Double R’s] goods, products or services.” It defines “advertising injury” to include:
injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses:
a. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or organizations’ goods, products or services;
b. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy;
c. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business; or
d. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.
The “advertising injury” coverage is subject to the following exclusions:
This insurance does not apply to:
a. “Personal injury” or “advertising injury:”
(1) Arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity;
(2) Arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first-publication took place before the beginning of the policy period;
*1185 (3) Arising out of the willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the consent of the insured....
In response to Double R’s claim under the “advertising injury” provision of the policy, Nationwide sent Double R a letter dated November 16, 1994, in which it denied coverage. Specifically, the letter stated that the Lanham Act claim did not constitute an “advertising injury” as that term is defined by the policy and that the claim was subject to one or more of the exclusions described above. It also said that the policy did not cover “willful” patent infringement or unfair competition. 4
In December 1999, Double R effected an “Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors,” in which it assigned all assets, including “proceeds from insurance policies” to Larry Hyman. In his capacity as Double R’s assignee, Hyman filed suit in state court in Hillsborough County, Florida on July 20, 2000 against Nationwide. He sought a declaratory judgment establishing that the judgment against Double R was covered by the insurance policy. Nationwide removed the case to the Middle District of Florida. At the close of discovery, both Hyman and Nationwide moved for summary judgment.
On August 23, 2001, the district court granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment and denied Hyman’s motion. The district court concluded that the “advertising injury” provision of the insurance policy did not cover Double R’s Lanham Act violation. Specifically, it found that the violation did mot fall under the coverage for “misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business.” In addition, the district court found that, even if the violation gave rise to a covered “advertising injury,” summary judgment in favor of Nationwide still would be proper because the “knowledge of falsity” exclusion barred coverage. Specifically, the district court concluded that the jury’s finding that Double R had acted “willfully” invoked the policy exclusion precluding coverage for injuries “[ajrising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity.”- On appeal, Hyman argues that the district court erred in reaching those conclusions.
II.
We review a “district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo,
applying the same legal standards used by the district court.”
Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Gallagher,
Further, we are required to apply Florida law to determine the meaning of the insurance policy. Thus, we look at the policy as a whole and give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.
See Dahl-Eimers v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,
The jury in the underlying infringement suit found that Double R had engaged in unfair competition in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),
5
which creates a federal cause of action for false designation of origin or trade dress infringement,
see Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere,
A.
As we have noted already, the insurance policy lists four categories of covered harms that may constitute “advertising injuries.” The parties agree, and we concur, however, that only the provision encompassing “misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business” is relevant in this ease. Thus, the precise question presented is whether the trade dress infringement in the underlying suit eonsti-tutes a “misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business.”
In answering that question, first we must decide more generally whether trade dress infringement can ever be a “misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business.” Because the language used in Nationwide’s policy is standard for commercial general liability insurance policies, that question has arisen on several occasions in other jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
The district court in this case followed the Sixth Circuit’s approach and determined that “no trade dress claims ... are covered under the ‘advertising injury’ provisions.” We disagree and conclude that trade dress infringement may constitute a “misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business.”
As we must under Florida law, we begin with the language of the coverage section.
See Auto-Owners,
Second, “style of doing business” is routinely defined, without explanation, as “unambiguously refer[ring] to ‘a company’s comprehensive manner of operating its business.’ ”
Novell,
We have no trouble finding that a product’s trade dress may fall within the definitions of “advertising idea” or “style of doing business.” Trade dress is defined as “the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, textures, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”
John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,
It is only a short step, then, to conclude that the “misappropriation” of an advertising idea or style of doing business may include trade dress infringement. To prove a claim for trade dress infringement, the plaintiff must establish that “the trade dress of the two products -is confusingly similar.” Thus, the plaintiff must show that the infringing company’s packaging, labeling, or marketing resembles closely those features of the original product. As it is commonly understood, the term “misappropriation” encompasses such an action. See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1442 (1986) (defining misappropriate to mean “to apply to illegal purposes” or “to appropriate dishonestly”).
We are unconvinced by Nationwide’s argument that “misappropriation” covers only injuries actionable under the common law tort of “misappropriation.” There is no indication in the policy that the phrase was intended to be so limited, and the ordinary meaning of the term misappropriation encompasses a wider spectrum of harms.
See Adolfo House,
We believe, therefore, that the district court erred in relying on
Advance Watch.
The majority of courts outside the Sixth and Eighth Circuits to confront this question, including one applying Florida law, have rejected the reasoning of that case.
*1190
See, e.g., Frog, Switch,
Indeed, we agree that
[t]o adopt [the Sixth Circuit’s] reasoning here would do violence to principles of liability insurance policy construction well established under Florida law, which start with the basic premise that terms of an insurance contract must be given their plain, ordinary and generally accepted meanings viewed from the perspective of the average person, with insuring language given its broadest possible sweep and exclusionary language the narrowest possible reach.
Adolfo House,
Thus, trade dress infringement may, under certain circumstance, constitute a “misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business.” We note, however, that it will not always do so.
See, e.g., Ekco Group,
We turn, then, to the trade dress infringement at issue in this case. The bases for Inter-Global’s trade dress infringement claim were the model numbers used by Double R that were confusingly similar to Inter-Global’s numbers and the artwork from Inter-Global’s advertisements used by Double R in advertising its products. Together, those aspects of the trade dress for the light mounting manufactured by Inter-Global clearly constitute an “advertising idea” or “style of doing business” as those terms are defined above. Indeed, the artwork and model numbers plainly were designed to promote Inter-Global’s products by garnering attention to them in the catalogue. Further, the jury verdict finding that Double R had infringed that trade dress by using it in its own advertisements demonstrates that Double R had “misappropriated” the ideas.
Thus, in addition to finding that trade dress infringement generally may constitute a “misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business,” we are satisfied that the trade dress infringement committed by Double R gave rise to an “advertising injury” under the commercial general liability insurance policy. The district court erred in reaching a contrary result.
B.
Having'determined that'the trade dress infringement in this case constitutes a “misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business,” we are also required to determine whether there was a causal connection between the advertising injury and Double R’s advertising activity. That requirement also originates from the policy’s coverage for “[advertising injury’ caused by an offense committed in the course of advertising.” Thus, “the injury for which coverage is sought must be caused by the advertising itself.”
Microtec Research, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
Simply selling an infringing product is not sufficient to satisfy the causal connection requirement.
See Poof Toy,
In this case, the district court, relying again on Advance Watch, found that there was no causal connection between Double R’s advertising activity and the injury suffered by Inter-Global because “[t]he mere publication of an advertisement showing an infringing product is insufficient to establish the requisite advertising activity.” That conclusion, however, ignores the scope of the conduct upon which the trade dress infringement claim was based, and we find that, when taken in its entirety, the claim establishes the requisite causal connection.
The trade dress infringement claim was based on Inter-Global’s allegations that Double R used model numbers that were substantially similar to Inter-Global’s model numbers to identify the parts of the light mounting. Specifically, Inter-Global alleged that “Double R has used and continues to use in commerce model numbers, which are similar to those used by Inter-Global, to identify products made by Double R that are identical in structure and appearance to products made by Inter-Global.” (Comply 22.) Those model numbers were used in Double R’s catalogs, which were sent to manufacturers of light fixtures. In addition, Inter-Global argued at trial that “Double ‘R’ has used and continues to use in commerce artwork from Inter-Global’s advertising brochures in advertising its own products, including ... advertisements in magazines with nationwide distribution....” {Id. ¶ 21.) Thus, Inter-Global argued that Double R did more than simply publish an advertisement containing a picture of the infringing product — it claimed that Double R identified the product by the model numbers similar to Inter-Global’s in an advertisement designed to look like Inter-Global’s.
Moreover, Inter-Global claimed specifically that it had suffered an injury as result of the promotion and advertising of Double R’s products as identified by the similar model numbers. It argued that “[b]y using Inter-Global’s artwork and model numbers in advertising, promoting, or marketing Double ‘R’s products, Double ‘R’ ... likely confused or deceived the general public and purchasers,” {Id. ¶ 25), and that “[t]he effect of Double ‘R’s advertising alleged hereinabove is to enable Double ‘R’ to pass off its products as those of Inter-Global or as having some association or affiliation with Inter-Global,” {id. ¶ 26).
Argument and evidence presented at trial supported these allegations. Indeed, as the district court noted, “Inter-
*1193
Global attached a copy of an advertisement published by Double R ... con-tainting] depictions of the infringing products sold by Double R ... as well as the confusingly similar model numbers.... The advertisement was a central part of the underlying litigation.” .- These allegations and evidence are sufficient to establish the requisite causal connection between Double R’s advertising activity and the injury suffered by Inter-Global.
10
See, e.g., Bigelow,
In concluding on this record that there was a causal connection between the trade dress infringement and Double R’s advertising activity, we need not address whether trade dress infringement by itself necessarily satisfies the causal connection requirement. 11 Rather, we find *1194 simply that Double R’s publication of advertisements featuring artwork similar to the artwork in Inter-Global’s ads and promoting products substantially similar to Inter-Global’s products designated by similar model numbers to Inter-Global’s model numbers is sufficient to create a nexus between trade dress infringement and advertising. Therefore, the district court erred in finding that the jury verdict for trade dress infringement was not an “advertising injury” covered under the insurance policy.
III.
Having determined that the Lanham Act violation in this case falls within the policy’s “advertising injury” coverage, we examine appellee’s final argument that coverage nonetheless is barred by the policy’s “knowledge of falsity” exclusion. That exclusion bars coverage for advertising injuries “[a]rising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity.” The district court found that, even if there was an advertising injury in this case, the jury’s determination that Double R acted “willfully” invoked that exclusion and thereby barred Hyman’s claim. Because, however, the term “falsity” as used in the exclusion is ambiguous and therefore must be construed narrowly under Florida law, the exclusion does not bar coverage in this case. 12
*1195 The term “falsity” is not defined in the policy and, in this context, has not been the subject of any relevant case law. It is not, however, an uncommon or arcane term and, in common parlance, “false” means “untrue” or failing to correspond to a set of known facts. See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 819 (1986) (defining false to mean “not corresponding to truth or reality: not true”); 5 Oxford English Dictionary 572-73 (2d ed.1989) (defining false to mean “[ejrroneous, wrong[; mjendacious, deceitful, treacherously sjpurious, not genuine”); Black’s Law Dictionary 618 (7th ed. 1999) (“Untrue ... Deceitful; lying”).
Those definitions, however, do not help us determine what sort of actions or statements may be said to be false in this context. This case would be easily resolved if any of the information or assertions in Double R’s advertisements were “untrue” in the sense that they did not correspond to a set of known facts. If for example, Double R had asserted that its bases were manufactured by Inter-Global, that statement clearly would be false and any advertising injury resulting therefrom would be excluded.
See, e.g., Wackenhut Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.,
In this case, however, there are no such assertions. Rather, Double R was found to have created the likelihood of consumer confusion — the likelihood that consumers would think that its products either were made by Inter-Global, were identical to Inter-Global’s, or were in some way endorsed by, or affiliated with, Inter-Global.
See Univ. of Fla.,
Indeed, the jury found specifically that Double R did not engage in false advertising under the Lanham Act, which would have required a showing that Double had made a false or misleading statement of fact about its products. 13 Moré *1196 over, we are not persuaded that the “knowledge of falsity” exclusion necessarily was invoked by the jury’s finding that Double R acted willfully. With respect to willfulness on the Lanham Act claims, the jury was instructed that “[a]n act is done willfully if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to commit such an act.” That definition does not in any way determine whether Double R’s statements or advertisements were'“false.”
Under these circumstances, we think it is unclear whether the “written material” giving rise to the “advertising injury” should be described as “false.”
See, e.g., Interface, Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.,
No. 99-CV-1485,
As we’ve discussed, the most common use of the term “false” is to mean “untrue” or failing to correspond to a set of known facts — not creating a false impression or, maybe, only customer confusion. According the term the broadest definition would undermine the clear directive from Florida law that ambiguous insurance policy exclusions are construed against the drafter and in favor of the insured.
See Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
Because we must construe the exclusion narrowly and in favor of coverage, we find that Double R’s actions were not “false” inasmuch as they did not amount to direct assertions of untrue facts. 14 Therefore, *1197 the exclusion does not preclude coverage for the jury verdict at issue in this case.
IV.
In sum, the district court erred in determining that the trade dress infringement that occurred in this case was not an “advertising injury” covered under the insurance policy issued by Nationwide. Similarly, it erred in concluding that the “knowledge of falsity” exclusion precluded coverage. We are satisfied that coverage under the policy does exist for the jury award, and, accordingly, we reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide and’ remand this case to the district court with instructions to grant Hyman’s motion for summary judgment. 15
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Notes
. The patent at issue is United States Letters Patent No. 4,729,073, entitled "Lamp Mounting.”
. Apparently, Inter-Global’s sale of the mounting pieces as B-l and B-1S bases was consistent with its numbering scheme whereby products were designated by a model number beginning with the first letter of the name of the part. Thus, "accessories” were designated by model numbers beginning with "A,” "bases” by model numbers beginning with "B,” "cages” by model numbers beginning with "C,” "panels.” by model numbers beginning with "P," and "roofs” by model numbers beginning with "R.” Double R apparently marketed several other products, in addition to the bases at issue in this patent infringement suit, using the same numbering scheme, but with "DR” in front of the first letter.
. With respect to the Lanham Act claim, the jury was instructed:
On Inter-Global's claim of unfair competition based on false designation of defendants’ products, it has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) The defendants sold products and falsely designated that their products were the same as Inter-Global's products;
(2) The defendants' conduct was likely to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the defendants with Inter-Global, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the defendants’ products by Inter-Global; and
(3) Inter-Global was thereby damaged.
In order to find for Inter-Global on the issue of false designation, it is not required to prove actual confusion.
. The letter also stated that Nationwide "believe[d] the judgment represents an award of restitution regarding funds unlawfully obtained by Double 'R' " and that the policy did not provide coverage for such “ill-gotten gains’’ obtained as the result of willful conduct. No argument is presented on appeal regarding this statement.
. In relevant part, that section states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1998).
. The district court in this case and the parties on appeal use the terms “false designation of origin” and "trade dress infringement” interchangeably to describe Inter-Global's Lanham Act claim. The trial court in the underlying suit used neither designation, instead referring to the claim as one for "false designation.” We note that, because it is based on Double R's use of model numbers confusingly similar to Inter-Global’s distinctive model numbers to designate its products, the Lanham Act claim fairly could be described as either “trade dress infringement” or "false designation of origin.” Without deciding whether it might be relevant in other circumstances, however, we find that distinction to be of no moment in this case. Indeed, it appears that "trade dress infringement” is a subset of the "false designation of origin” or "false or misleading description of fact” claims originally recognized under § 43(a).
See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
Thus, although there may be "false designation of origin” claims to which the analysis in this case would not apply, the Lanham Act violation in this case properly could be referred to either as "trade dress infringement” or "false designation of origin.” Because the case law relevant to our analysis in this case deals with claims designated as "trade dress infringement,” we refer to Inter-Global's Lanham Act claim as one for "trade dress infringement.”
. The district court stated that there were three steps to this analysis. Specifically, in addition to the two requirements listed above, it required Hyman to show that Double R was "engaged in ‘advertising activity' during the policy period when the alleged 'advertising injury’ occurred.”
Sentex Sys., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have mentioned this issue but have not resolved it.
See Novell,
. Even state courts in Michigan, the state whose law the Sixth Circuit applied in
Advance Watch,
have criticized the holding in that case.
See Home-Owners Ins. Co. v. Thomas Lowe Ventures, Inc.,
No. 97-158,
. We note that the majority of the cases cited by the parties and discussed above were resolved in the context of an insurance company's
failure to defend.
In this case, however, Hyman asserts that Nationwide has a
duty to indemnify.
"[T]he duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, in the sense that the insurer must defend even if the facts alleged are actually untrue, or the legal theories unsound.”
Adolfo House,
. Several courts have found that "trademark and trade dress infringement inherently involve advertising activity.”
Poof Toy,
We do note, however, that this case is distinguishable from those cases which have found that claims based solely on patent infringement are not covered under the policy.
See Novell,
. Appellee also argues that two other exclusions bar coverage in this case. The district court did not reach these issues, and they do not warrant much discussion on appeal. First, Nationwide argues that the claim is precluded by the exclusion barring claims for "advertising injury ... [ajrising out of oral or written publication of material whose first-publication took place before the beginning of the policy period.” While Double R acknowledged producing the infringing product beginning in 1989, Nationwide has not submitted to the court an advertisement or catalog published prior to the policy's effective date of December 10, 1992. Instead, it relies on testimony by one of Double R’s customers that it was "more than likely” that the advertisements ran in 1989 or 1990, a statement by Double R’s principal, Warren Levenson, that the first advertisement "probably” was published in 1989 or 1990, and testimony by one of the owners of Inter-Global that he knew about the advertisement "at some point before the end of 1990.” These assertions are insufficient to to foreclose any question of material fact on the issue and, therefore, do not warrant the entry of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide. See, e.g., Dogloo, 907 *1195 F.Supp. at 1391 (“[B]ased on the record before it, the Court cannot say that any advertising published prior to the policy period caused the type of injury alleged....").
Second, Nationwide says that the claim is barred by the exclusion precluding coverage for "advertising injury ... [ajrising out of the willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the consent of the insured.” The Lanham Act, however, is not a penal statute. Even a willful violation, as occurred in this case, would not give rise to a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, coverage for the trade dress infringement claim is not precluded by this exclusion.
Cf. Poof Toy,
. To succeed on a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant made false or misleading statements about its product in an advertisement; (2) the advertisement actually deceived, or had the tendency to deceive, the targeted audience; (3) the deception is material; (4) the defendant's advertised product traveled in interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a
*1196
result of the false or misleading advertisements.
See Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Morgan Tire & Auto, Inc.,
. Finally, we note that this case is plainly different from
Florida v. Russ,
. As a result of this disposition of the appeal, we also deny Nationwide’s motion for appellate attorneys' fees.