HYER v. SALT STEAKHOUSE LLCHYER v. SALT STEAKHOUSE LLC
CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendants Salt Steakhouse LLC and David Mizrahi‘s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Ashley Hyer‘s putative class action Complaint pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant David Mizrahi owns Salt Steakhouse, a restaurant in Long Branch, New Jersey.2 (ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 2-3; ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 2-3.) He states that he manages the day-to-day operations, including hiring and firing employees, determining employee work schedules, and otherwise controlling the restaurant‘s finances and operations. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 14.) Plaintiff Ashley Hyer worked for Salt Steakhouse as an hourly and tipped server from May 8, 2023 through April 6, 2024. (ECF No. 19 ¶ 1; ECF No. 22 ¶ 1.) Defendants state Plaintiff‘s responsibilities included, among other duties, serving food and drinks to customers. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 28.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants improperly paid her and other employees over the course of Plaintiff‘s employment. Plaintiff first pursued her concerns through an action before the New Jersey Department of Labor (NJDOL) (the NJDOL Action). (ECF No. 15-2 ¶ 2.) See also Hyer v. David Mizrahi and Salt Steakhouse, WC-1973-0824-HUM (N.J. Super. Ct.). In a complaint filed on August 4, 2024 (the NJDOL Complaint), Plaintiff sought $494.64 in unpaid sick time. (ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 4-5; ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 4-5; ECF No. 9-5 at 5.)3 On October 30, 2024, Plaintiff
A wage claim hearing was held in the NJDOL Action on March 27, 2025. (ECF No. 19 ¶ 11; ECF No. 22 ¶ 11; see also ECF No. 9-7 at 2.) Plaintiff appeared pro se; Defendants were represented by counsel. (ECF No. 19 ¶ 12; ECF No. 22 ¶ 12; ECF No. 15-3 at 5:17-6:7.) During the hearing, Plaintiff told the wage referee that she “was advised to only pursue overtime and sick pay at this time,” which totaled $1,105.70. (ECF No. 15-3 at 6:8-7:10.) While Defendants expressed willingness to settle at the hearing, (id. at 9:5-18, 12:5-7), Plaintiff declined, in part because an attorney had advised her to “not sign any confidentiality agreement or to . . . accept a settlement,” (id. at 15:11-16:7). The wage referee heard testimony from Plaintiff and Mizrahi and evidence was presented by both parties. (See generally id. at 15-27, 47-57.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the wage referee determined that Plaintiff‘s overtime pay was subject to tip credits, thereby awarding Plaintiff $118.65 in unpaid overtime and that Plaintiff‘s unpaid sick time was actually time paid while Plaintiff was suspended, which totaled $120.00. (Id. at 62:23-65:20.) In total, Plaintiff was awarded $238.65 plus $25 in liquidated damages (the Award). (Id. at 64:3-12; see also ECF No. 9-7.) Defendants paid the Award to Plaintiff, and no appeal was filed. (ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 28-29; ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 28-29, 38; ECF No. 24 ¶ 38.)
On April 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action. (ECF No. 1.) Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and other similarly situated servers, Plaintiff‘s Complaint alleges that Defendants unlawfully withheld tips thereby failing to pay minimum wage and overtime pay. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 42-43, 50-54.) Plaintiff asserts five causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the New Jersey
On August 22, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 9.) Upon review of that Motion, the Court determined that the Motion and its exhibits raised matters outside of the pleadings, and the Court converted the Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment as permitted under
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
III. DISCUSSION
A. Counts III and IV
At the outset, Plaintiff concedes that her claim for overtime pay pursuant to the NJWHL is moot, because she litigated and won that claim in the NJDOL Action. (ECF No. 15 at 1 n.1.) As such, Count IV is dismissed with prejudice. And because a plaintiff “cannot recover under both the FLSA and [the] NJWHL, since recovery under the NJWHL would duplicate recovery under the FLSA,” the Court also dismisses Count III with prejudice. Nieves v. Top Notch Granite & Marble LLC, Civ. No. 10-1589, 2011 WL 2937352, at *3 (D.N.J. July 19, 2011); see also Lurty v. 2001 Towing & Recovery, Inc., Civ. No. 18-6302, 2019 WL 3297473, at *5 n.6 (D.N.J. July 23, 2019) (collecting cases concluding that a plaintiff may not recover damages under both the FLSA and the NJWHL).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata—specifically, claim preclusion—because they were already adjudicated in the NJDOL Action. (ECF No. 9-2 at 8-12.) Plaintiffs respond that their federal claims could not have been litigated before the NJDOL and thus could not have been precluded by the NJDOL Action; the NJDOL Action was an informal process that, according to Plaintiffs, is not due deference for claim preclusion purposes; and, in any case, the elements of res judicata are not met. (ECF No. 15 at 6-13.)
“Res judicata includes the legal concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion prevents the relitigation of identical cases, whereas issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of discrete issues.” Sec‘y of U.S. Dep‘t of Labor v. Kwasny, 853 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Claim preclusion, which is at issue in this case,4 “bars a party from asserting claims that were brought, or could have been brought, in a previous action.” Vaccaro v. Unique Scaffolding Sys., Civ. No. 21-16657, 2022 WL 1284721, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2022) (citation omitted). This “insulat[es] courts from the relitigation of claims.” Watkins v. Resorts Int‘l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 597 (N.J. 1991). The doctrine “serves the purposes of finality and repose, the prevention of needless litigation, the reduction of unnecessary burdens of
“Claim preclusion applies not only to matters actually determined in an earlier action, but to all relevant matters that could have been so determined.” McNeil v. Legis. Apportionment Comm‘n of State, 828 A.2d 840, 859 (N.J. 2003) (quoting Watkins, 591 A.2d at 599). Under New Jersey law,5 claim preclusion requires a showing of three elements: “(1) the judgment in the prior action must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action must grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one.” Id. (quoting Watkins, 591 A.2d at 599). This test should not be applied “mechanically,” but rather courts should “focus on the central purpose of the doctrine, to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out [of] the same occurrence in a single suit.” Copeland v. U.S. Bank Cust PC5 Sterling Nat‘l, Civ. No. 20-7016,
Regarding the first element, Defendants contend that the wage referee‘s decision was “valid, final, and on the merits.” (ECF No. 9-2 at 8 (citing Vaccaro, 2022 WL 1284721, at *2).) They argue that the wage referee acted in a judicial capacity and resolved factual issues litigated by the parties. (Id. at 8-9.) A hearing was held where Plaintiff appeared, presented evidence and made argument, resulting in an award in Plaintiff‘s favor that neither party appealed. (Id. at 9.) In response, Plaintiffs argue that the NJDOL is an “unequal jurisdiction” and thus no final hearing or decision on the merits occurred. (ECF No. 15 at 11-12.) Plaintiffs further argue that “because Defendants voluntarily agreed to pay [Plaintiff] for her unpaid sick time and overtime,” claims which are not asserted here, and because Defendants “lost” at the hearing when the wage referee granted an award in Plaintiff‘s favor, there was no final adjudication of the merits or final judgment. (ECF No. 15 at 12-13.)
“[A]s a general rule, an adjudicative decision of an administrative agency should be accorded the same finality that is accorded the judgment of a court.” Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Springfield, 744 A.2d 1169, 1179 (N.J. 2000) (quoting Bressman v. Gash, 621 A.2d 476, 481 (N.J. 1993)) (citation modified). And “[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.” Sheeran v. Progressive Life Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 469, 476 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-422 (1966)). Indeed, in Vaccaro v. Unique Scaffolding Systems, the district court found that a similar NJDOL hearing fully satisfied this first element because the wage referee “issued a valid and on-
The parties agree that the second element is satisfied as the parties are the same, (ECF No. 15 at 11 n.9), so the Court next considers the third element: whether Plaintiff‘s claims in this case grow out of the “same transaction or occurrence as” the claims in the NJDOL proceeding. McNeil, 828 A.2d at 859 (quoting Watkins, 591 A.2d at 599). Defendants argue that the claims Plaintiff brings in the Current Action “grow out of” Plaintiff‘s “wages and employment” at Salt Steakhouse, which were previously adjudicated in the NJDOL Action. (ECF No. 9-2 at 10-11.) Plaintiff contends that the NJDOL Action pertained solely to sick and overtime pay, which are “entirely separate from whether Defendants failed to pay her adequate minimum wages and/or tips.” (ECF No. 15 at 12-13.) Plaintiff also argues that Plaintiff‘s FLSA claims arise from federal law and thus could not have been litigated as part of the NJDOL Action. (Id. at 6-7.)
First, Plaintiff seeks to remedy the single wrong of her unpaid wages through monetary damages. While Plaintiff contends that the NJDOL Action was limited to overtime and suspension pay, the complained of acts are the same in both actions in that they involve Defendants’ alleged failure to properly apply tip credits to Plaintiff‘s wages. Indeed, Plaintiff‘s unpaid tip claim was, at one point, part of the NJDOL Action, and Plaintiff concedes that she was able to and nearly did adjudicate her minimum wage claim at the NJDOL proceeding but then “withdrew any claim for minimum wage and tips.” (ECF No. 15 at 1, 3; ECF No. 15-2 ¶ 8.) Res judicata applies not only to matters that were litigated, but to all claims that could have been brought. Watkins, 591 A.2d at 599; cf. Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep‘t of Emp. Div. of Lab. Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[A]ll claims arising from the same employment relationship constitute the same transaction or series of transactions for claim preclusion purposes.“); Wang v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
Second, Plaintiff‘s theory of recovery is the same in both actions—namely the New Jersey Wage Laws. The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff‘s argument that her FLSA claims should not be precluded because the NJDOL lacks jurisdiction to hear such claims. Like the FLSA, the New Jersey Wage Laws “address the most fundamental terms of the employment relationship.” Hargrove v. Sleepy‘s LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 463 (N.J. 2015). The NJWPL is “designed to protect an employee‘s wages and to assure timely and predictable payment,” and the NJWHL is “designed to protect employees from unfair wages and excessive hours.” Id. (citations omitted). Together, the New Jersey Wage Laws would provide an adequate remedy for Plaintiff‘s claims in the NJDOL Action, similar to the FLSA. Id. (recognizing that between the FLSA, NJWPL and NJWHL, “[s]tatutes addressing similar concerns should resolve similar issues“). Also, this is not a scenario where Plaintiff is seeking to bring a discrimination or wrongful termination claim following a wage hearing before the NJDOL. See Bondi, 32 A.3d at 1188 (finding res judicata did not apply where the defendant failed to show that the tribunal would have had the authority to hear the plaintiff‘s tort claims as part of the insolvency proceedings); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 24 & 26(c) (stating that claim preclusion does not apply where a plaintiff is unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts). Plaintiff could have brought her remaining wage claims in the NJDOL Action, and she had a “fair and reasonable opportunity” to
Last, the underlying fact inquiries in both proceedings would be virtually the same. Indeed, both actions involve the calculation of Plaintiff‘s wages while employed at Salt Steakhouse. Plaintiff, Mizrahi, as well as the store manager were all present at the NJDOL hearing to provide testimony, and Plaintiff brought pay stubs, emails, and work schedules to present as evidence at the hearing. (ECF No. 15-3 at 7:12-8:21, 15:16-12, 29:21-32:16, 42:9-16, 48:5-20.) There is no indication that the evidence needed to maintain this action would not have been sufficient to support Plaintiff‘s action before the NJDOL, and the material facts—the dates of her employment and hours worked—are the same in both actions. Thus, the Court finds that all factors weigh in favor of a finding that Plaintiff‘s claims here arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that was before the NJDOL.
Having satisfied all of the elements of claim preclusion, Plaintiff‘s claims in this action are barred by res judicata.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and other good cause shown, Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: August 31, 2026
GEORGETTE CASTNER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE