*1 Avganic Industries, Inc., Co., Chemical Plaintiffs-Appellants,† Affiliated Casualty Surety Co., & Aetna Co., Co., Insurance n/k/a Affiliated FM Insurance Casualty Reading, PA., American Co. of American Co., Co., Motorist Ins. Canadian Universal Ins. Chi cago Casualty Co., Co., Insurance Continental First Agency Co., State Ins. First State Underwriters of England Corp., England New Reinsurance a/k/a New Corp., Reinsurance Co., Granite State Insurance Surplus Co., Great American Lines Insurance a/k/a Empire Surplus American Co., Lines Ins. The Home Indemnity Company, Company, Home Insurance Integrity Company Liquidation, Insurance Samuel Fortunato, F. Commissioner of Insurance of the State Jersey, capacity of Miron, New and Michael in his as Liquidator Integrity Company, Insurance Interna Surplus Co.,
tional Lines Ins. Interstate Fire & Casualty Surplus Co., Northbrook Excess & Co., Ins. predecessor Company, as to Allstate Insurance Old Republic Co., Ins. Co., Transcontinental Insurance United States Fire Ins. Walbrook Insurance Com pany Lloyd's Limited, Certain Underwriters at companies,
London, and other Defendants- Respondents. Appeals
Court of 94-0032, 95-2840, Nos. 97-0719. Submitted on briefs 11, 1998.
February 7, 1998. May Decided to review denied. †Petition
(Also 423.) reported in 582 N.W.2d *2 plaintiffs-appellants, On behalf of the the cause Raymond Krueger, was submitted on the briefs of F. Meany Douglas Michael, David V. P. Dehler of Best *3 & Friedrich of Milwaukee. defendants-respondents,
On behalf of the cause was Becker, submitted on the briefs of Todd A. Coyne, Niess, Schultz, Richard G. Niess of Bauer, Becker & Madison, S.C. of Horstman, and James K. Anthony Mary P. Katauskas and A. Sliwinski of Wil- Montgomery, Chicago. Ltd., liams & defendants-respondents, On behalf of the Casualty Surety Company, Aetna and n/k/a Travelers Casualty Surety Company, and the cause was submit- Schrimpf ted on the brief of Thomas R. and Susan R. Tyndall ofHinshaw & Culbertson of Milwaukee. Dykman, Roggensack Deininger,
Before P.J., JJ. Hydrite
DYKMAN, P.J. Chemical Co. and (hereinafter Avganic "Hydrite") appeal Industries, Inc. summary judgment dismissing from orders for their against insurance action the defendant insur- Hydrite argues companies. that trial court anee duty concluding in that the insurers do not have a erred indemnify Hydrite investigating for the cost of to remediating groundwater
soil and contamination vicinity Hydrite's facility Cottage chemical agree Grove, City of Edgerton with the trial court that Wisconsin. We Cas. General (1994), precludes coverage. Accord granting affirm the trial court's orders we ingly, summary judgment. motions for insurers' Hydrite compelling appeals from an order it to also certain documents to the insurers. disclose argues protected by are the attor- that the documents ney-client product privilege doctrine. and work We already properly that the trial court have concluded granted summary judgment. insurers' motions they are Because insurers have established judgment a matter of law without the entitled to as question documents, the of whether withheld properly Therefore, the documents is moot. withheld compelling appeal from the order we dismiss the discovery.1
BACKGROUND July 30,1989, the United States Environ- Effective (EPA) Agency the federal mental Protection issued Recovery portion Act of a Resource Conservation and (RCRA License) Hydrite Hazardous Waste License facility. required Cottage The license for its Grove *4 Hydrite develop implement action to and a corrective plan to address environmental granted properly that the trial court Because we conclude case, Hydrite no summary judgment the merits of the on compelling longer required comply with the trial court's order discovery. spent
caused the release of industrial solvents storage facility. an old drum area at the Hydrite requested indemnification from the defen- paid paid dant insurers for the sums and to be for the investigation environmental and remediation at the Cottage facility, including development Grove the implementation plan imposed of the corrective action coverage. the RCRA License. The insurers denied Hydrite April against filed a lawsuit the insur- seeking coverage during ers, for the costs incurred the investigation and remediation of the at contamination Cottage facility. the Grove
During discovery, Hydrite withheld certain docu- attorney-client privilege ments under the and work product Hydrite produced log privilege doctrine. a iden- tifying the documents it withheld. The insurers moved compel production many of of the documents. produce The trial court ordered a of number granted Hydrite's petition appeal them. We for leave to 94-0032.) discovery (Appeal order. No. briefing interlocutory appeal After on the was com- plete, Supreme City the Wisconsin Court decided of v. General Cas. (1994). N.W.2d 463 Certain insurers moved the court of appeals to remand the case so that the trial court could apply holding Edgerton. staying so, We did appeal directing the trial court to consider the Edgerton issues on remand. remand,
On both and the insurers moved summary judgment. granted The trial court Hydrite's complaint, insurers' motion and dismissed concluding holding Edgerton, that, under the duty indemnify insurers did not have to defend or 95-2840.) Hydrite. Hydrite appealed. (Appeal No. *5 again this court to remand the case moved trial court to the for the resolve issue as join in certain insurers that did not summary judgment. the first motion for granted Hydrite's We motion. On stipulated remand, and the insurers to the policies." again terms of certain "lost The trial court Edgerton precluded coverage concluded that and summary judgment remaining granted the insurers. 97-0719.) Hydrite appealed. (Appeal All No. three appeals have been consolidated before this court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW summary judgments using novo, review de the We methodology Spring the trial See same as court. Green Kersten, 304, 315—16, Farms v. 136 Wis. 2d 401 (1987). Summary judgment appropriate 816, 820 genuine fact when there are no issues of material moving party judgment is entitled to as a matter 802.08(2), § law. See Germanotta National Stats.; 293, 296, 2d 349 N.W.2d Indem. 119 Wis. (Ct. 1984). App. deciding motion, trial first court consid- complaint pleadings to determine whether the
ers the may granted states a claim for which relief be See State Bank v. whether the answer states a defense. (Ct. 508, 511, 916, 917 Elsen, 1986). evidentiary they moving party's App. do, If party are examined to determine whether facts summary judgment. prima If has made a case for facie moving party prima case, has made facie party's proofs opposing affidavits and are considered any genuine exists as to determine whether a issue exists, material fact. Id. If a material factual issue summary judgment inappropriate. *6 Id.
DISCUSSION
Hydrite argues that the trial court misconstrued
City Edgerton
750,
v. General Cas.
of
(1994),
inappropriately granted
517
463
N.W.2d
and
summary judgment. The insurers contend that
the
properly granted
summary judgment
trial court
them
supreme
holding Edgerton.
under the
ingly,
court's
Accord-
analysis
Edgerton.
we will start our
with
Edgerton, Edgerton
In
Gravel,
Sand &
Inc.
(ES&G)
City
owned
(City) leased and used as its landfill from 1968 to 1984.
groundwater
n.5,
Id. at 758 &
The and ES&G forwarded these letters to specifically their requested carriers, insurance and ES&G pay any regard- its insurers to costs incurred ing provide the site and to a defense. Id. at provide at N.W.2d 468-69. The insurers refused to cov- erage or defense. Id. at 517 N.W.2d at 469. Both City declaratory judgment and ES&G filed a action against seeking insurers, a determination that the duty indemnify insurers had a to defend and them for claims, out of DNR or EPA actions any liability arising the contaminated site. Id. or suits involving Edgerton, the relevant insurance read: policies company pay will on behalf of the insured all legally sums the insured shall become obli- which gated pay damages as because of bodily injury or
A. property damage
B. applies, to which this insurance caused an occur- rence, company right and the shall have the duty any against seeking to defend suit the insured bodily injury on account of such or prop- erty damage.... omitted).
Id. at
at 472 (emphasis
*7
The
court held that
as used in
supreme
"damages"
insurance
means
policies
legal damages, generally
nature,
in
designed
past
to
for
pecuniary
compensate
Id. at
783,
[A]s an
form of
rather,
past wrongs;
to
for
designed
compensate
not
any
deter
future contamina-
they were intended to
Response, Compensa
Comprehensive
The
Environmental
1980,
Liability
"Superfund."
as
See
tion and
Act of
also known
n.2,
City Edgerton
Cas.
v. General
(1994).
463, 467
See §
144.442(8)-(9),
STATS.
action,
injunctive
tion
providing
means
while
cleanup
for remediation
of the affected site.
type
This
of relief is distinct
from that which is
substitutionary
monetary compensation provided
—
for a
up
to make
claimed loss.
(citation omitted).
Id. at
A. or Property Damage
B. applies
to which this insurance .... language policy language This is identical to the Edgerton. Edger- construed in And like the insureds Hydrite seeking ton, was not reimbursement its "legal damages." for insurers Under the terms of the required pay License, RCRA was not substitutionary, monetary compensate EPA relief to wrongs. past required Instead, was develop implement plan a corrective action Cottage address environmental contamination at the facility. Hydrite sought Grove indemnification from its investigation insurers for the cost of its environmental *8 Cottage facility, and remediation at the Grove includ- ing development implementation of the plan pursuant corrective action to the RCRA License. "legal damages" Edgerton. These costs are not under Therefore, we conclude that the insurers were not required indemnify Hydrite under the terms of the policies. insurance
Hydrite argues that the facts of this case are dis-
tinguishable
Edgerton,
facts of
and therefore
controlling.
support
it contends that
is not
In
argument, Hydrite
primarily
of its
relies
on General
Hills,
167,
Cas. Co. v.
(1997),
209 Wis. 2d
Refining Company
pick up
waste from his service
Hills,
171,
station.
Hills' insurer filed a
requesting
duty
the court to determine that it had no
indemnify
defend or
Hills. Id. at
561 N.W.2d at
asserting
counterclaimed,
721. Hills
that the insurer
breached its contractual duties and
acted
bad faith.
policy
Id. at
sought recovery response costs, for it did not seek holding Edgerton. "damages" 174, under the Id. at at 721. N.W.2d supreme court first noted that a rem- whether edy sought depend upon does not constitutes upon of the rem- action, the form of the but the nature edy sought. 178, 561 at Hills, 209 Wis. 2d at Damages preventive." nature, in "are remedial not 723. the relief Arrowhead Id. The court concluded substitutionary, monetary sought relief from Hills was past wrongs, designed compensate for not relief prevent at future harm. Id. at 561 N.W.2d 724. Therefore, the court concluded that Arrowhead was "damages" seeking Hills as that term was used policies at Id. the insurance issue. The court further seeking "conclusion that Arrowhead is stated that its legal damages compensate past for Arrowhead wrongs prece- Wisconsin is accord with established repairing restoring dent damaged property . . . that cost of original and water to its condition proper compensatory damages." a measure of Id. omitted). (emphasis Utility WPS, hired Helmreich WPS Construc- gas building
tion to install
service to a
owned
WPS,
Tomahawk School District.
209 Wis. 2d at
installing
line,
Hydrite argues seeking first that it is to recover restoring damaged property the cost of and water to its original recognized condition, which Hills as a measure compensatory damages. But of relevance in Hills sought was not whether the sums the insured the from damages; insurer would rather, be considered the focus remedy sought was on whether the the insured damages. would be considered In Hills, substitution- ary, monetary compensate past wrongs relief to for was sought insured, from the therefore, the sums sought damages from the insured were considered be by policy. Here, covered the however, the EPA did not substitutionary, monetary Hydrite. seek relief from through required Instead, EPA, License, the the RCRA Hydrite implement necessary corrective measures to Cottage address environmental to the Grove facility. remedy sought by the EPA is more akin to remedy equitable sought by Edgerton the DNR substitutionary remedy sought than the in Hills. Accordingly, Hills does not affect our conclusion that "damages" does not seek indemnification for from its insurers. argues seeking recovery also that it is for
"damages" damage because its claim involves to third- party property. Hydrite reasonably contends that it expected coverage damage third-party caused to property. complaint, Hydrite In its notes that soil and beyond groundwater has extended contamination boundary beyond storage of the area and drum facility. supporting Cottage in its affidavits Grove And summary judgment, Hydrite asserts that its motion for addressing neighboring contamination it was properties investigation design
through and the site systems. remedial distinguishable
Hydrite argues Edgerton damage it owned because involved WPS, hand, the other In Hills and on insured. property. The insured did not own the contaminated part distinguished its case from Hills court property in was not the contaminated Hills because insured, it not fall and therefore would owned *11 owned-property exclusion of Hills' insur- within the policies. Hills, 209 2d at 561 N.W.2d ance See Wis. at 724. Hydrite's argument reject because we believe
We
Edgerton and Hills is of
that this distinction between
marginal
significance
Edgerton
here. The
court did not
owned-property
of
even reach
issue whether
applied.
Hills,
n.14,
See
2d at 180
exclusion
Wis.
at 724. After the
court decided
issue that
the DNR's letters to the
the threshold
seeking damages"
a
insureds did not constitute
"suit
triggering
duty
defend,
the insurers'
it was unneces-
sary
application
for the court to consider the
of the
Edgerton,
owned-property
184 Wis. 2d at
exclusion. See
Hydrite's
Likewise, if
[Ulnlike neither the EPA nor DNR have requested or directed Hills develop a remediation plan or incur remediation response costs under CERCLA or an equivalent state statute....
... [A] position reasonable insured in the Hills would interpret the phrase "as damages" to claim, include for a brought by parties DNR, other than the EPA or which obligates him or pay her to monetary sums because of the negligent contamination of property that does not fit within the owned-property exclusion, since this very is the reason that an purchases individual liability coverage.
Hills, Wis. 2d at 185, 561 at 724-25 added).5 (emphasis Regent Manitowoc, See also City Ins. Co. v. (Ct. 1996).
450,
347, 369-70,
82,
90
"damages"
given
if
court believed that
were
a broad
interpretation,
damages"
phrase
"as
would become
surplusage
any expenses prior
because
or incidental to
litigation
by
policies. Edgerton,
would
covered
be
Similarly, interpret "expenses" if were we as equivalent "costs," we would the term render "dam- ages" policies surplusage in the all because expenses policies. would also be covered We policy must avoid a construction of the that would portions meaningless surplusage. render of it mere or Physicians Rockline, Ins., See Inc. Wisconsin Serv. (Ct. App. 583, 593, Wis. 2d 1993). Hydrite's proposed Therefore, we must avoid construction. "expenses"
Instead, we believe that the covered policy legal expenses defending are incurred in "damages, damages. phrase for claim consequential direct or expenses" policy, it and contained appears consequential expenses" that "direct or types "damages" what defines damages, are covered: direct consequential damages, expenses defending damages. using By a claim incurred give con- interpretation, all words effect to we this *14 provision.7 policy in the tained pro- policies argues that that several also coverage net loss" are "ultimate for vide Edgerton. policy distinguishable construed coverage policy provides example, "for dam- one For expenses, consequential ages, all as more and or direct pol- by fully The net loss.'" term 'ultimate defined icy which "the total sum net loss" as defines "ultimate company any both, insurer, or as its insured, or property pay by obligated dam- reason of... become through adjudication or age ., either claims . . agreed policy, compromise." insurer Under another pay loss... the ultimate net of the insured "to on behalf liability by may reason of the sustain the insured which imposed upon by by law, or assumed the insured liability damage contract," for insured under policy arising "ulti- This defined an occurrence. out of as: net loss" mate
(A)
legally obligated to
the insured is
all sums which
by
adjudication
reason of
damages whether
pay as
injury, personal
settlement,
bodily
because
or
liability to
advertising
damage or
injury, property
and
policy applies
this
which
Fiberglas Corp. v. American
Owens-Corning
The court in
(Ohio
1995),
C.P.
construed
8Hydrite argues also that in the trial decision and court's summary judgment underlying Appeal order for No. granting summary trial in judg the court erred the insurers grounds place ment on the that no "occurrence" had taken to trigger duty indemnify. Hydrite argues the insurers' that the in considering trial court erred the "occurrence" issue because it beyond scope appeals' was of the court of remand order. summary judgments Spring
We de Green review novo. See Kersten, 304, 315, Farms Wis. 2d (1987). already We have that were enti concluded the insurers summary judgment sought by Hydrite tled because sums Therefore, holding Edgerton. "damages" are not under the we not need to whether the trial court erred consider do consider ing Berge, issue. Sweet v. "occurrence" See 1983). (Ct. 67, 334 559, App. summary, poli- conclude that the insurance we require question insurers do not
cies in expenditures indemnify Hydrite for which for the Hydrite complaint. in its Accord- seeks reimbursement granting ingly, affirm the trial court's orders we summary judgment to the insurers. Appeal
By Appeal No. 94-0032: dis- the Court.— Appeal 95-2840 and 97-0719: Orders missed; Nos. affirmed. (dissenting).
ROGGENSACK, J. Because sufficient stated a sufficient claim and averred has contending damage property it caused to the facts has damage Hydrite third-parties, not which would have reasonably expected to from the insurers' be excluded general indemnify comprehensive under the duties (CGL) liability policies purchased, it and because the policies defined was not issue of an occurrence as summáry judgment fairly court at the before circuit motion, I the circuit court on these would reverse two respectfully Therefore, I issues. dissent. for to Others. Injury
Indemnification
summary
judgment, asserting
moved for
policies
there was
under the CGL
injury
injury
and for
it had
to its own
caused
*16
Relying heavily
City
property
to
of
on
others.
of
Wisconsin,
v. General Cas. Co.
184 Wis. 2d
of
(1994),
majority
750,
ment, that the circuit court determine scope indemnify insurers' duties to under appeal contracts; therefore, written this is not an which must examine whether a lawsuit been filed has Hydrite. against filing The actual of a lawsuit a party precondition declaratory third is not a relief. Loy 806.04, STATS., Bunderson, Section (1982). 400, 407, And, 320 N.W.2d whether a precondition has filed not a lawsuit mining been is deter- injuries whether to the of others by pollutants caused is excluded from indemnification question solely under the contracts at issue. That is interpretation, appropri- an matter contract which is declaratory judgment Hills, ate task for a action. at Wis. 2d at 722. step review, I
As the first in this examined the sought complaint. initial It broad investigation payment and remediation on included Hydrite's property, agree pre- which relief I own Hydrite's complaint by Edgerton. However, cluded also sought indemnification for losses sustained third Additionally, Hydrite's summary parties.1 motion for 1Paragraph complaint part: 34 of the states in relevant *17 judgment clearly focused one part of its claim for indemnification on injuries third parties. support motion, of its Thomas J. Miazga averred: money has spent past injury to address the to the by past environment caused this release. . . . investigations have documented that extensive beyond contamination the boundaries of the Cot- tage facility Grove past was caused release of spent organic chemicals. . Dwight . . Dale and Hus- ton approximately own mostly acres of undeveloped property approxi- which is located mately 750 feet Cottage south of the Facility. Grove property This has been contaminated. ... Property owned the State of damaged by Wisconsin was the past spent organic release of chemicals. . . . legal obligation has a under state and fed- eral law to restore the properties by investigating cleaning and up the environmental injury which groundwater consists of contaminated and soil. also stated Miazga that although Hydrite has spent money harm, future prevent it is not seeking indem- nification for those expenses, but rather it is seeking indemnification only for past injuries. Therefore, its claims in regard to to the injury property of others are nature, remedial as were the claims described in Hills. The allegations in Hydrite's complaint [Approximately 66-gallon 600 to 800 drums at the old NCC drum
storage area released their contents to the environment sometime
storage
after their arrival at the old NCC drum
area and before the
beginning
Hydrite's
operation.
solvent
reclamation
These
releases into the environment contaminated . . . the soil and
groundwater.
groundwater
Environmental
to soil and
beyond
storage
have extended
the old NCC drum
area at the Cot-
tage
facility
beyond
occupied by
Grove
owned or
NCC, Hydrite
Avganic during
respective policy
each of the
and/or
added.)
periods. (Emphasis
*18
Miazga's
Hydrite polluted
in
affidavit that
averments
property
parties
the
of third
are uncontroverted.
coverage
to determine
is
order
whether
interpret
contend,
excluded as the insurers
one must
the insurance
to ascertain the reasonable
contracts
Hydrite.
coverage expectations of
Insurance contracts
by
ordinary
interpreted
the
maxims of contract con
are
50, 60,
2d
struction. Kuhn v. Allstate Ins.
193 Wis.
(1995).
coverage
124, 128
issue,
532
When
is at
N.W.2d
language
interpret
the insurance
courts must
the
of
policy, as a reasonable insured would have understood
coverage
Hills,
175,
afforded.
The court Hills also property pollu- third-party's caused environmental required by remediation is CERCLA tants for which differently damages caused are to be treated no other means. tank, underground storage negli-
[T]he owner of an
thereby
gently caused a leak in the tank
could recover
polluted
property,
Nischke's
Nischke
remediate her land in
expended
the costs she
received from the DNR.
response to letters she
(citing
approval
at
Additionally, already we have concluded in Robert & Assocs.,Inc., Lee 509, 522, E. (Ct. 1996), App.
457, 462
that contamination to the
groundwater supply and to the
of
land
others is not the
type
damage
by
precluded
Edgerton.
of
Therefore, the
required Hydrite
RCRA license which
to take certain
2
9652(d)
"See
U.S.C.
('Nothing in this Act shall
§
affect
modify
any way
obligations
or
in
any
or liabilities of
person
law, including
law,
under other
State
Federal or
common
with
respect
to releases of hazardous
or
pollutants
substances
other
('No
144.442(11)
contaminants.');
or
Wis. Stat. §
common law
liability
resulting
...
facility
site or
is
any
affected in
authority,
manner
this
power
section.
in
provided
any
and remedies
this
in
section are
addition to
law.')."
authority,
power
remedy provided
or
...
at common
Hills,
n.15,
marily declaring spills the toxic were not policies party no had occurrences under the because that issue and dis moved the court to decide because covery precluded had on the occurrence issue been discovery court, itself, had estab the narrow limits disagree companies lished. The insurance do not with Therefore, I take them those assertions their brief. *20 Schlieper 318, 322, DNA, v. 188 Wis. 2d as admitted. (Ct. 1994). App. 99, 101 Generally, legal circuit courts do not raise issues they requires sponte. However, do, fairness sua when develop parties opportunity have the that legal arguments present on the relevant facts and to 31, 41, Holmes, issue. See State (1982). did not Here, the circuit court parties Its decision on the allow the to brief the issue. appears surprise occurrence issue to have been a to all parties. agree Hydrite's position Therefore, I required important well taken. Fairness that this issue allowing parties present be decided after all their positions on it.
Conclusion. any injury Hydrite
Because I conclude that caused property damage to the of others is which it reasonably expected would not have to be excluded policies purchased under the GCL it parties opportunity because the did not have a fair develop the facts and the law relevant to the occurrence respectfully determination, I dissent.
