24 Tex. 137 | Tex. | 1859
We are of opinion, that the court did not err in giving judgment for the defendant below. The constitution provides, that “ every bill presented to the governor, one day previous to the adjournment of the legislature, and not returned to the house in which it originated before its adjournment, shall become a law, and have the same force and effect as if signed by the governor.” The bill was passed, and presented to the governor on the 15th day of February, 1858; and the legislature adjourned on the next day, the 16th, in less than twenty-four hours from the time of the presentation. There is no evidence that the governor, or any of the executive officers, have recognised this bill as a law. The object of this suit is to try the question, as to whether it is a law or not. The controversy is made by the parties to turn upon the proper construction of the above recited clause of the constitution.
No authorities have been cited, having reference to the validity of legislative acts. The rule of construction, in the computation of time, was elaborately discussed in the case of O’Connor v.
The phraseology to be construed in this case, is similar to that in the case of O’Connor v. Towns. In this case, it is, that the bill must be presented to the governor “ one dajprevious to the adjournmentin that case it was that the service of process must be executed “five days before the return day.” The object of the provision in this case, is similar to the object in that; to give a certain period of time for something to be done. And if the shortness of the time, in preparing for trial, was an important consideration in that case, the shortness of the time allowed the governor to examine and pass upon the merits of this bill, and perhaps numerous others, is certainly no less so in this case.
The case of O’Connor v. Towns, therefore, furnishes a precedent, fully sustaining the decision of the court below. Under the rule of construction, adopted in that case, the bill should have been presented on the 14th day of February, leaving one entire day, to wit, the 15th, between the day of presentation and the day of the adjournment. It is not necessary, however, that we should decide in this case, that the rule should be extended, so far as to allow one entire intervening day. A full
Whether it be held, that the word day is twenty-four hours from the moment of adjournment, and used as a measure of time, allowed the governor to consider of, and act on the bill, or is an entire day, regarded as an intervening point of time, between the day of presentation and the day of the adjournment, this case does not require us to decide. One or the other construction must be adopted, and under either, it must be determined that a sufficient time was not allowed the governor, in the presentation of this bill; and that it did not become a law by force of its not having been returned by him to the house in which it originated, before the adjournment of the legislature. Judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.