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Hyatt v. Doll
576 F.3d 1246
Fed. Cir.
2009
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 IV. CONCLUSION has failed to establish

Although Gordon injunction we inappropriate,

that the Proudfoot damages

reverse the award. have ob-

did not establish would Logistics project

tained the Bombardier breach;

were it not for Gordon’s accord-

ingly, failed to establish that Proudfoot has any

it suffered financial loss.

REVERSED. HYATT, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Gilbert P. DOLL, Director, Acting

John J. Patent Office,

and Trademark Defendant-

Appellee.

No. 2007-1066. Appeals,

United States Court of

Federal Circuit.

Aug. Lardin, joined Highland, value for it." Banks v. So.2d it is difficult to understand added), (Fla.Dist.Cl.App.2006) (emphasis attempt quantify how could even Proudfoot denied, (Fla.2007). review 959 So.2d 718 We portion of that increase that is attributable compensa fail to see how the amount of total knowledge to Gordon's of Proudfoot’s confi- Highland tion earned Gordon at would be event, any ques- dential information. any indicative of the value of benefits purely tion is academic as Proudfoot has upon Proudfoot have conferred him. Al attempt. made no such though Gordon received a raise when he *2 Bass, III, Sterne, Kessler,

Kenneth C. P.L.L.C., Washington, Goldstein & Fox of DC, argued plaintiff-appellant. On the A. Lewis brief were Wilma and Michael I. Coe, LLP, Moring Washing- & of Crowell ton, Greg- DC. Of counsel on the brief was Roth, ory Gregory L. of Law Offices L. Roth, Palma, La CA. Of counsel was Martinez, Moring L. Crowell & Michael LLP, DC, Washington, and J. Robert Evans, LLP, Chambers, Herron & Wood Cincinnati, OH. Jenks, Solicitor, Associate William G. Solicitor, Office of the United States Pat- Office, Arlington, ent and Trademark VA, argued defendant-appellee. With McManus, him on the brief was Robert J. Ray- Associate Solicitor. Of counsel Solicitor, Chen, Acting mond T. and Thom- Krause, Associate Solicitor. W. MICHEL, DYK Judge, Before Chief MOORE, Judges. Circuit Opinion for the court filed Chief Judge Dissenting opinion filed MICHEl. Judge Circuit MOORE. MICHEL, Judge. Chief Plaintiff-Appellant Hyatt ap- Gilbert P. grant summary judg- peals from Dudas, in ment in favor of Jon his official capacity as the Director United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”),1 sustaining the decision of the 43(c)(2), Doll was substituted for Appellate Rule of Pro- cedure John 1. Pursuant to Federal continuation-in-part a continuation or Appeals of Patent and Interferences Board (“Board”) rejec- the examiner’s uphold applications, several earlier some which Hyatt’s U.S. of the 117 claims of tion of 79 were themselves continuations or continua- 08/471,702 No. Application Patent Serial tions-in-part. first J.A. When *3 (“the supported as not application”) '702 filed, application priority the '702 claimed adequate description. ap- written The by 1984; Hyatt later back to amended the It argued April on 2008. peal was back application priority to claim to 1975. that under our case- clear from the record J.A. 10756-57. specific Hyatt had an affirmative law application originally The '702 as filed duty to the PTO to disclose claims, 238-page specification, had 15 a court, and was so by the district excluded pages drawings. and 40 of J.A. 10000-293. PTO, willfully by but refused notified incorporated by It multiple also reference process. in the examination cooperate (such publications the “Texas as Instru- case, uphold the facts of this we On ments, Book, Logic Circuits Data ALS/AS Hyatt’s court’s exclusion of evi- district 1983”), 10173-74, J.A. and a “disclosure therefore hold that the district dence. We many ha[ving] copies document of of’ a list correctly granted summary judg- documents; of referenced on the list were the Board decision be- sustaining ment manuals and specification prod- sheets Hyаtt no other evidence and cause offered “Viewpoint/3A ucts such as the Plus” and findings the Board’s decision was based Floppy the “Siemens OEM Disk Drive conclusions, all of fact and factual of which FDD 100-8”. J.A. 10239^0. After sever- evidence, supported are substantial specifica- al rounds of amendments to the thus we affirm. claims, Hyatt ultimately tion and the can-

I. original celled all 15 claims and added 117 new claims. 4. claim 107 J.A. New is not A. Proceedings Before the Examiner atypical: Hyatt is the sole listed inventor on the A process operating memory system Hyatt application. regis- '702 has been comprising the acts of: a patent agent tered as since 1975 and information; generating input image prosecuted application wholly on his own.2 storing array a two dimensional pixel image blocks of information '702 application computer relates to two pixel memory, dimensional block technology and software and is entitled array the two dimensional blocks “Improved Memory Having Architecture pixel image arranged information in a Multiple Output Arrangement.” Buffer Hyatt array filed the two dimensional of rows application '702 on June 1995. J.A. 10001. The '702 application pixel image columns of blocks of infor- (Table) (Fed.Cir. 1996); upon resignation Hyatt, Dudas Dudas’s as Director. F.3d 424 In re (Table) (Fed.Cir. 1991); F.2d 925 1478 In re Hyatt is also familiar with this court. See (Table) (Fed.Cir.1988); Hyatt, 852 F.2d 1292 Dudas, (Fed.Cir.2008); Hyatt v. 551 F.3d 1307 (Table) (Fed.Cir. Hyatt, In re 770 F.2d 182 Dudas, (Fed.Cir. Fed.Appx. 1985); (Table) (Fed. Hyatt, In re 770 F.2d 181 Dudas, 2008); (Fed. Hyatt v. 492 F.3d 1365 Cir.1985); (Table) Hyatt, In re 770 F.2d 178 Cir.2007); (Table) Hyatt, In re 243 F.3d 554 (Fed.Cir.1985); Hyatt, In re 714 F.2d 160 (Fed.Cir.2000); Hyatt, In re 211 F.3d 1367 (Table) (Fed.Cir. 1983); Hyatt, In re F.2d (Fed.Cir.2000); Boone, Hyatt v. 146 F.3d (Fed.Cir. 1983); Hyatt, re (Fed.Cir. 1998); Hyatt, In re (Table) (Fed.Cir.1983). (Table) (Fed.Cir. 1997); Hyatt, In re rate than the first information rate in

mation, pixel the blocks wherein response signal. have boundaries to the second clock image information between; there 10472-73. J.A. generat- addresses and write generating action, January In a 1997 office addresses; read ing Hyatt’s final examiner described amend- array of dimensional

writing two incomplete, stating: ment image information into pixel blocks Applicant point also has failed to out block mem- pixel dimensional the two specification support where image input to the ory response for the amended and added be found response information and “Applicant claims. MPEP 714.02 states *4 addresses; write specifically point out the should also a signal having clock generating a first any amendments made to support rate; clock first the disclosure.” The disclosure includes pixel image informa- accessing blocks of the claims. addresses, response to the read tion response appears to be bona Since accessing pix- of blocks of wherein fide, through apparent oversight but information from the two image el provide or inadvertence failed to a com- memory is at pixel block dimensional plete response, applicant is required in response information rate a first complete response within a TIME signal; the first clock LIMIT of ONE MONTH from the date boundary smoothing block generating of this letter or within the timе remain- pixel image to smooth the information ing response period of the last at boundaries between information action, longer. Office whichever is information; pixel image blocks Hyatt responded J.A. 10493. a month la- by weight a storing weight information speci- ter with further amendments to the memory; drawings fication and J.A. and 10498-503. information weight accessed generating following support indication of where weight information by accessing the for the new claims and amendments memory; weight stored specification could be found: weighted image generating smoothed in- Representative antecedent basis by weighting pixel information page compres- for data cludes 23:2-19 contained in the image information sion; buffer; for the frame page 50:6-9 pixel image infor- accessed blocks the section entitled “LOGIC BOARD” to the accessed response mation at 117-127 pages “Address Generators” in response information and weight generator; the section for the address infor- boundary smoothing the block entitled “MEMORY ARCHITEC- mation; pages at 25-62 and the section TURE” signal having a clock generating second pages entitled “MEMORY BOARDS” at clock rate different second memory having for the block 128-135 the first than the first clock rate of cir- accessing, writing, processing and signal; clock cuits; the section entitled “GRAPHICS weighted smoothed generating output 9-14, pages pro- at PROCESSOR” to the image response information 214-30, gram listing pages pages at weighted image informa- smoothed 29-31, 41, 42, and 50 for the vector tion, generation wherein processor; the section en- generator and in- weighted image output smoothed FILTERING” information titled “SPATIAL formation is at different generate program listing generator weight which will pages 15-24 and the spatial processor; addresses,” pages generator 231-236 for “an address pages for the transform 33:15-24:11 apply weight which will addresses processor. inputs RAMS U5E U6E is further referred to

The Examiner intensity at the same time the bits are (see the Prelimi- the Table of Contents applied being to RAMS U3E and Amendments) nary for additional ante- U4E,” generator and “an address cedent basis. generate weight will addresses which selecting weight 10504-05. J.A. values from weight perform table to the desired the examiner issued October weighting function at spatial filter” rejecting action all 117 of final office limitations”) (collectively, ‘weight’ “the Hyatt’s adequate claims for lack of written enablement, (cid:127) description, lack of double boundary smoothing” “block anticipation, or patenting, obviousness. (cid:127) memory system “that the ais video rejected 10634-64. The examiner J.A. image compression system” data lack of de- groups of claims for written (cid:127) “a quantization weighting processor” *5 and based on the fol- scription enablement (cid:127) “generating compressed data video im- lowing groups thirteen limitations and age information” limitations: (cid:127) making product “the act of in re- (cid:127) decompressed image “a datа video in- sponse image information” put generating circuit data decom- In J.A. 10638-56. some of his written pressed image information” description rejections, the examiner indi- (cid:127) an writing accessing “a circuit and cir- cated the closest match he could find be- writing and reading cuit for a block of claim language tween the and the disclo- pixel image video data into the block specification. example, sure of the For memory” “the process writing and 1-14, 17-20, 22- examiner stated “Claims reading and a block of im- pixel video 25, 34-37, 42-45, 81-85, 49-52, 95-112, 117, age memory” data into the block and claim a writing circuit and an (cid:127) “a processor responsive vector to an accessing writing circuit for and reading a pixel image accessed block of video pixel image block of video data into the information and to vector information” memory. block These claims cover simul- (cid:127) processor “a responsive to accessed writing reading taneous and of block of pixel image block of video information” graphic image specification data.... (cid:127) spatial processor “a responsive to an sequential describes a to and write read pixel image accessed block of video memory.” from the block J.A. 10641. For information and to vector information majority description the written re- generating compressed and data vid- however, jections, merely the examiner eo” a claim (cid:127) “a quan- stated limitation —such as “a frequency processor,” “gen- domain weighting processor,” tization “a video im- erating frequency domain image infor- mation,” age compression system,” “a “frequency spa- data domain infor- mation” processor responsive tial to an accessed (cid:127) pixel image block of video information and “a block processor responsive to an pixel image generating

accessed block of informa- vector information and data tion and to vector information” compressed video”—was “not enabled” or (cid:127) See, “not specification.” described input weight generating circuit “[a]n information,”

input A10645,10652-53. weight e.g., “an address Proceedings bol form and even showing component pin B. Before the Board and wire designations connections,” J.A. September In continuing — 10827, and “With the extensive memory represent appealed the exam- himself — 99-135) (e.g., Spec, disclosure pro- rejection final iner’s the Board. J.A. (e.g., Spec, 87-98, cessor disclosure 214- Hyatt’s presented argu- 10936. brief such 36) in the instant application, it is unbeliev- prima rejections as “The '112-1 ments are object able the Examiner would erroneous because the disclosure is facie memory processor disclosure of fea- correct,” presumptively valid and J.A. tures,” addition, J.A. he ..., includ- significant “The disclosure is ed document entitled (repro- “Table-1” comprising pages description over 200 diagrams below), detailed schematic duced provided which he had not show- examiner, ing commercially actual electrical purporting give examples available components sym- well known schematic of support:

TABLE-1 REPRESENTATIVE REPRESENTATIVE PAGE(S) TERMINOLOGY NOTES1 OCCURRENCES CITES 25-83,128-164 access A >100 25-83,128-164 address A >500 25-83,128-164 A block >80 boundary =3 compress =4 compressed data =1 decompressed =1 *6 (FFT) frequency C =7 33-34 graphic D 9-14, >20 214-230 image >50 50-55 information >100 THROUGHOUT input >200 THROUGHOUT 25-83,128-164 memory >400 pixel >300 THROUGHOUT processor >50 85-98 quantization E >100 231-236 read A 25-83, >50 128-164 36,'45, 46, simultaneous >8 smoothing =1 spatial 15-24, B >20 231-236 9-14, vector D >50 214-230 video 77,166,168-171 =8 weight F >100 162-164 25-83,128-164 write A >100 notes, J.A. 10832-34. In accompanying Memory terminology; including memory Hyatt access, asserted that catego- read, certain broad memory write, memory “terminology” ries of were disclosed in cer- memory and block terminology; is dis- tain specification closed, textual sections of the in two whole sec- example, in tions entitled “MEMORY ARCHITEC- and raw source code in appearing specification. J.A. 10833-34. For exam- TURE” and “MEMORY BOARDS” (associated ple, in note “A” with the (Spec, terms at 25-62 and Figs. 128-35 and “access,” 6E-6N) “address,” “block,” “memory,” two additional whole “read,” “write”), Hyatt sections stated that entitled “BUFFER MEMO- 11594. The Board even considered (Spec, BOARD” J.A.

RY” and “BUFFER 6W-6AF). “misleading” Table-1 in that it indicated Figs. and 136-58 and 63-83 “quantization” appeared that the word Although Hyatt presented 10833. J.A. specification, while the ac- specification argument thirty-six pages general tually symbol contained the and the and enablement re- description the written “FlX(exp)” arithmetic functions 10823-58, reversed, J.A. jections should be “INT(exp).” J.A. 11617. address —and did Hyatt separately did not Board nevertheless reversed the specification sup- not indicate where rejections thirty-eight of the examiner’s any of the claim could be found port for— claims. J.A. 11638. The Board reviewed determined limitations examiner specification, looking sup- the entire for the limitation support, except lacked claim port for each of the limitations at 10836^40, J.A. and the “making product,” support issue and found for three of the limitations. J.A. 10835. group “weight” (such as one for “a decom- limitations data that Ta- Hyatt general made statements input generat- pressed image video circuit speci- of contents of his ble-1 and the table ing decompressed image data video infor- support for the rele- fication indicated mation”). See, e.g., J.A. 11599-601. The specification. vant limitations existed rejection Board also reversed one because argued that J.A. also language appearing was based on not twenty-nine publications lists of had been (the limitations). “weight” the claims J.A. incorporated by specifi- reference into the eight groups 11602-03. For the other provided enabling cation and disclosure. however, issue, claim limitations at “making 10848-51. Aside from the J.A. agreed Board with the examiner limitations, (such product” “weight” and the “generating these limitations two Table-1, processed image dimensional information Hyatt did not correlate his table in response pixel to the accessed blocks of contents, any incorporated-by- image response information and publications particular reference limi- information”) two dimensional vector were tations. supported by adequate written de- Although reversing some of the examin- scription, explained reasoning its *7 description er’s written and enablement See, e.g., detail. J.A. 11604-06. The rejections, the Board sustained the written rejections also on the Board reversed rejections description and enablement for obviousness, grounds anticipation, seventy-nine July in a claims 2002 decision. in patenting, double which are not at issue J.A. 11638. The Board addressed each of appeal. this J.A. 11638. claim limitations relied on ex- Hyatt request rehearing filed a for rejected aminer. The Board Table-1 as September the Board on 2002. J.A. unhelpful identifying description written supporting In the brief his re- support: quest, provided argu- he extensive new agree merely with the examiner that We specification ments and citations pointing to isolated words scattered purportedly detailing disputed where limi- throughout specification not de- does still-rejected tations of each claim derive scribe the invention claimed as a combi- description support written and are en- elements, functions, nation of and inter- abled. J.A. 11642-792. The Board denied connections, anymore dictionary than a that request rehearing, holding his for provides description support written arguments these new and citations could are book where words used combi- presented during and should have been provide meaning. original appeal briefing. nation to a certain J.A. 11805-07. Hyatt timely appealed then the district § 145 Action The C. judgment stayed to this court. court’s We Hyatt, acting now April On in a appeal pending the decision relat- counsel, court ac- filed a district through Dudas, appeal, Hyatt v. 492 F.3d 1365 ed against tion under 35 U.S.C. I”). (Fed.Cir.2007) (“Hyatt ju- We have a motion for Director filed The Director. 1295(a)(4)(C). risdiction under 28 U.S.C. arguing principally summary judgment, reject all of Board’s decision that the II. application claims of the '702 the relevant appeal The central issue in this is wheth- description and enable- for lack of written properly er the district court excluded the by substantial evi- supported ment was parties argue Hyatt declaration. motion, proffer- Hyatt opposed the dence. whether, light century of prec- over his declaration as well as ing his own practice involving trial court edent rehearing request his briefing from decisions, actions to overturn Patent Office “Hyatt (collectively, Board dec- before the court properly district excluded laration”) purported support- evidence Hyatt’s parties declaration. The are cor- summary precluding ing opposition squarely rect that this court has never of the Director. The judgment favor exactly addressed issue what stan- objected Hyatt declaration Director governs ruling district courts in dard Hyatt timely failed to ground on the admissibility of evidence dur- withheld Hyatt v. Du- submit it before the Board. ing Hyatt argues examination the PTO. das, **4, 6 n. 11 2005 WL “ plaintiff that a in a 145 action ‘enti- II”). 2005) (D.D.C. (“Hyatt Sept. subject tled’ to submit additional evidence” no other evidence. Hyatt submitted no other than imposed limitations those by the Federal Rules of Evidence. [Blue Hyatt The district court excluded br. at The Director counters that 11-12]. it found had declaration because Congress could not have intended district it to “negligent” failing to submit been disregard courts in 145 actions to timely in a during examination or the PTO proceedings altogether. before the PTO *4- appeal. to the Board on Id. at manner urges are The Director actions proceeded 7. The district court then partly at least a form of of PTO Board and analyze the record before the decisions, submitted to up concluded that the Board’s decision or at through negligence, to the PTO rejections was description hold the written gross negligence, least evidence. Id. at supported by substantial in a properly excluded 145 action. genuine found that no *7-10. As the court *8 raised, fact had been issues of material regarding 145 is silent what evi- Section summary judgment to the Di granted any whether new evidence—can dence—or Hyatt’s rector that claims were invalid an action. Nor does be admitted such description what, re failure to meet the written if expressly any, the statute indicate (and the enablement quirement give considered court must deference the district moot). Board, Id. at *10. The district court of the or our court to findings issue the Hyatt’s subsequent rulings motion for re of the district court. As back- denied Dudas, origins of 1453 ground, we will trace the consideration. WL 2006). (D.D.C. of practice and summarize the historical Sept.30, 955, Court, 79, 84, Which, 65 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed. 1488 according Supreme 325 U.S. 3. Coe, 4915). (1945) (discussing origins of R.S. briefly.” Co. v. “cannot be stated Hoover whereby appli- a an process did also created excluding applicant certain challenge cant could the decision We will present to the Patent Office. court, not, although this board of examiners did parties one issue the also discuss involving overlap to situations was limited Act Procedure the Administrative patent a and a patents between or between (“APA”). patent application: A. there shall be two [WJhenever interfer- patent on ing patents, or whenever a 1. have application shall been refused Shortly founding of the United after an adverse decision a board exam- of of States, its constitu- Congress, pursuant to iners, ground patent on the Progress of power “promote tional with an applied would interfere Const, Arts,” art. and useful U.S. Science unexpired patent previously granted, I, 8, 8, patent first act. passed cl. its any pat- such any person interested 10, 1790, Apr. Act of ch. Stat. 109-12. otherwise, ent, by assignment either or statute, majority of “the Under case, any applicant the one such State, Secretary Secretary of for the case, may remedy by in the other have war, Attorney department of and the Gen- equity; having bill in power patent ap- eral” had the to allow a thereof, on notice to cognizance adverse plication. Congress pro- Id. did not had, parties proceedings and other due judicial vide for review of the decision to may adjudge pat- and declare either the years reject patent application. Three part, ents void in the whole or in or later, Congress the examination abolished any inoperative particular and invalid patents, of and for the next three dec- States, part portion of the United ades, operated under a United States according par- to the interest which the regime patent registration. See Act of may possess ties to such suit 21, 1793, 318; ch. Feb. Stat. P.J. patent patented, or the inventions Federico, Ap- Patent Evolution of Office adjudge also such 2), Soc’y peals (pts. & J. Pat. Off. entitled, according principles (1940), Soc’y Pat. J. Off. act, provisions of this to have and re- (1940), at 838. invention, speci- ceive a for his claim, thereof, any part fied in his or for Congress created the Patent priority right as the fact of or inven- post Office and the Commissioner any tion shall such case be made to 4, 1836, 1,§ July Patents. Act of ch. adjudication, if appear. And such it be 5 Stat. 117. The Commissioner and his right applicant, in favor of the of such responsible staff of seven for deter- were shall authorize Commissioner to is- mining patent applications if disclosed suf- patent, filing copy sue such on his useful, ficiently important, and novel al- adjudication, comply- and otherwise leged patent. inventions to warrant a See ing requisitions with the of this act. §§ 7. An applicant id. dissatisfied with Provided, however, That judg- no such decision could Commissioner’s adjudication shall ment or affect appointed by to a “board examiners” rights any person except parties State; Secretary of least one board *9 deriving action title to the and those selected, practicable member “to if was be subsequent from or under them convenient, knowledge for his and skill judgment. rendition of such art, manufacture, in or particular the removed). alleged branch of which the 17 (emphasis science to Id. added and additionally provided for appertains.” Congress Congress invention Id. 7. federal sibility examining application no re- over such actions with jurisdiction examiner;” actions, suits, in a “primary Congress vested venue: “[A]ll strictions on single also a “examiner in controversies, authorized arising any and cases 4, §§ charge of interferences.” Id. 46. States, or con- granting the United law of appealed The decision of either could be right the firming to inventors exclusive examiners-in-chief,” “to the board discoveries, or shall be their inventions from there to the Commissioner.5 Id. equity as cognizable, as well originally appeal §§ Further 46-47. could be taken law, circuit courts of the United by supreme “to the court of the District of States, any having district court Columbia, banc;” sitting in thе appeal was court.” jurisdiction of a circuit powers produced to be decided “on the evidence §Id. 18. §§ before the commissioner.” Id. 48-50. decades, the next several minor Over The decision of the District of Columbia of con- process were made to the changes supreme challenged court could be via a testing an adverse decision of the Commis- equity: bill 1839, Congress specified that sioner. patent a on application is [WJhenever examiners, appeals instead of to board whatever, refused, any reason either from a decision of the Commissioner would by the commissioner or the supreme justice the district taken “to the chief be the District upon Columbia District court of the United States for the commissioner, ap- from 3, 1839, Act of ch. of Columbia.” Mar. may plicant remedy ‍​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍by have bill in later, years 355. Several Con- Stat equity; having cognizance and the court any appeals instead directed one gress thereof, parties on notice to adverse of the judges of the of “the Circuit Court had, proceedings may other due adjudge Aug. Act of District of Columbia.”4 entitled, according that such 107, 1, During 75. ch. Stat. law, a patent to receive for his inven- War, Congress abolished the District Civil tion, claim, specified any or for district and circuit courts and of Columbia thereof, part as the facts the case newly- assigned all their functions to appear. adjudication, And such if it be “supreme created court for the District of right applicant, favor of the of the 3, 1863, Act of Mar. ch. Columbia.” shall authorize the commissioner issue 1, 3, §§ 12 Stat 762-63. None of these patent, applicant filing such on the changes procedure affected the of the 1836 adjudication, copy office in equity, act for a bill which remained complying requi- and otherwise after some court of the District of available sitions of law. And in all cases where had reviewed the Commission- Columbia opposing party copy there is no Dixon, er’s decision. See Potter v. 19 F. commissioner, shall be served on the bill (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1863) (No. Cas. expenses proceeding and all the 11,325). paid by applicant, shall be whether decision is in his or not. substantially pat- Congress revised final favor 8, 1870, (later 4915) July ent laws 1870. See Act of Id. codified as R.S. added).6 230,16 Primary respon- (emphasis procedure ch. Stat. 198-217. Unlike statutory changes merely 4. The District of Columbia district and circuit 5. These formalized practice developed that had over time courts were both the same three staffed within the Patent Office. Federico 853-56. judges. Federico at 850-52. Although provided equi- the statute a bill in ty could be filed after an adverse decision *10 1256 Cir.); D.C.Cir., Wis., to E.D. to 7th Cour- act, act allowed a 1836 the 1870

under the (7th O’Connor, 890, 890, 227 F. 892 any refusal to allow son v. equity for bill Cir.1915) of inter- just (appeal a refusal based from examiner application, not examiners-in-chief, ferences, of to interfering patent.7 an to board on 111., Commissioner, D.C.Cir., to N.D. to to 1893, creаted “the court of Congress In Cir.). many 7th It also seemed unusual Columbia,” which of appeals of District time; hearings and Congressional at the of the appellate supervision general had to the 1927 amend- reports leading up of Columbia. supreme court of the District Act, the fact that in no ments to the Patent 1, 7, 9, 1893, 74, §§ 27 ch. Stat. Act of Feb. pos- appeals” other area of law were “five court were also as 434-35. To this new See, e.g., often mentioned. Pro- sible was signed appeals from decisions of Com Hearing cedure in the Patent appeals from missioner. Id. 9. While Office: H. H.R. 7563 and H.R. appeals the court of of 13487 judgments” “final of before Comm, (“H.R. Hearing”), on Pats. taken to of Columbia could be the District (Dec. 1926) (statement 10, of Cong. 69th Court, 8,§ Supreme Supreme id. Paul, Legislation of A.C. Chairman jurisdiction to held that it lacked Court Comm., Section, Am. Bar Pat. Appeals of review decision of Court Ass’n); the Patent Procedure in affirming the District of Columbia of Office: Comm, Hearing on S. the S. rejection application of an Commissioner’s 4812 before (“S. ”), Hearing Cong. 69th on Pats. may because “the decision of be (Dec. 1926) (statement 20, of Thomas E. pat of challenged generally and refusal Robertson, Pats.); H.R.Rep. Comm’r by bill may ent be reviewed and contested (Jan. 1927).8 2, 28, 69-1889, No. Revised Statutes provided” as Moore, 1, 9, § 4915. Frasch v. 211 U.S. 1927, Congress significantly altered (1908). S.Ct. 53 L.Ed. 65 reviewing rejections. A process doing substantial motivation for so was the appellate path Although this created lengthy process involving unusual and from the Patent Office seem appeals” patent applicants. “five See id. today, highly path unusual to us such a Co., appeal process, To streamline the various v. Elec. was used. See Uihlein Gen. (7th Cir.1931) groups suggested eliminating the bill (appeal interferences, or the direct from the Patent equity from examiner of board Commissioner, Office; examiners-in-chief, Congress retaining settled on both equity, prac- by the the su- could file a bill in "either commissioner upon preme court of the District Columbia tice did. See Commissioner sometimes commissioner,” appeal from the the statute (Robertson) ("If Hearing it is an S. 4812 at 8 interpreted allowing was nonetheless a bill case, parte requires ex the statute that service only equity to be filed after an adverse must be made on the Commissioner of Pat- supreme decision of the court of the District ents, and the Commissioner of Patents will Pats., of Columbia. See Kirk v. Comm’r accept service in these suits all over the not Mackey (D.C.Sup. WL *2 Department States. The of Justice has Untied 1886). that, thought proper do the com- it so accept only missioner will service Dis- equity practice applied 7. The rules of to suits Columbia, Baltimore, nearby.... trict of or in Appleton Revised Statutes 4915. See years five When I came in as commissioner Ecaubert, (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 45 F. Texas, and, course, ago we had one in 1891). very department makes it difficult for the 8. While Revised Statutes 4915 did not on its handle.”). faсe limit the venues in which a dissatisfied *11 action, of Patent to elect other review Office but forcing applicants but procedures Coe, changes procedure Hoover Co. v. made a few in the the other. has one or 955, 79, 83, L.Ed. 1488 65 S.Ct. in various instances to correct some of U.S. (Paul). (1945); at 10 De- Hearing arisen, S. particularly which have problems ar- equity primarily bill in fenders of the mainly pro- section 146. These details are out that it was the by pointing for it gued cedural.”). § Subsequent changes to patent appli- supporting only method cosmetic; mainly § have been 145 current- See, H.R. testimony. e.g., live cation with (much 1952): ly reads as it did in 11, (Robertson); S. Hearing at applicant An dissatisfied with the deci- (statement Hearing at 15 of Edward Appeals sion of the Board of Patent additionally simpli- Rogers). Congress S. appeal in an [35 Interferences by combining the appeal process fied 134(a)] may, unless U.S.C. has (to within the Patent Office appeals two been taken to the United States Court and then to the board of examiners-in-chief Appeals for the Federal [un- Circuit Commissioner) (to into one a three- 141], remedy by der 35 U.S.C. have constituted appeals” member “board of against civil action Director Patents, from “the Commissioner United States District Court for the Dis- commissioner, the assistant first assistant trict of Columbia if commenced within commissioner, examiners decision, such time after such not less chief’). 2, 273, 1927, §§ Act of Mar. ch. 3- sixty days, than ap- as the Director 9, 44 Stat. 1335-36. points. may The court adjudge that backlog of a in the Court of Because such is entitled to receive a Columbia, in of the District of Appeals invention, patent specified for his as 1929, renamed the “Court of Congress any of his claims in the involved decision Appeals” the “Court of Customs Customs of the Board of Patent In- Appeals and ap- redirected Appeals,” and Patent terferences, as the facts case the Patent Office to the re- peals from adjudication appear and such shall au- Act ch. named court. of Mar. thorize the Director to issue such 1475-76; Hearing at 25- 23 Stat. S. 4812 requirements with the compliance (statement Chairman, Fenning, of Karl expenses proceed- law. All the Comm, on Laws & Rules of the Am. Pat. ings paid by applicant. be shall Ass’n).9 Law Congress significantly reworked the 2. Patent Act in 1952. Revised Statutes Under Revised Statutes 4915 as ex- provi- separate 4915 was bifurcated into isted from 1927 to differences existed parte pro- 145 for ex sions: 35 U.S.C. procedure in equity between bills ceedings, and 35 U.S.C. 146 for interfer- parte proceedings based on ex and those clear proceedings. Congress ence made interferences; based on as enacted change meant this was not the last three sentences read: application of Revised Statutes substantive opposing In all where there is no eases (1952), S.Rep. § 4915. See No. 82-1979 be party copy bill shall served reprinted in 1952U.S.C.C.A.N. commissioner; (“This on the and all the ex- group of sections makes no funda- change appeals penses proceedings paid mental in the various shall be Appeals change, the Court of of the District of Colum- 9. Prior to this Chief Justice William conges- regularly reassigning help court’s Taft had been bia to relieve the latter Howard Appeals Hearing at judges the Court of Customs tion. S. 4812 25-27. from *12 according dence had to be determined whether the deci- applicant, the final equity jurisprudence. or not. In all suits of principles sion is in his the favor words, there are ad- brought hereunder where In other the witnesses who had the record in the Patent parties verse proceedings in the interference testified admitted in whole or Office shall be testify had to anew in the suit in the subject party, on motion of either part, they testify If district court. did not so costs, as to and conditions to such terms had to be accounted for in their absence penses tences is form the current version of Revised Statutes (emphasis parties testimony and exhibits the Patent and Trademark terms and conditions as to admitted shall have the same tion penses, and the es, Patent originally taken and testimony. The impose, on motion of and Trademark Office shall be admitted In such suits the record tion of expenses, applicant.” in the current version of 146: without parts same right the basis for the last the witnesses as the court Office to take the witnesses added). The first of these sen- without force thereof, of produced and taken and proceedings prejudice when admitted shall The last two sentences § further further either further testimony and parties prejudice, 4915 of effect in the suit. § the record in the as the court appear 145: produced party upon testimony. shall be cross-examina- to take cross-examina- as the record in § if Office “All the right however, sentence effect originally costs, in revised exhibits, paid further impos- Patent when have as ex- ex- of of if to be used rejected this approach. Patent Ergon Corp., 96 F.2d ty, cept by generally, based on the example, cited novo review Gen. Statutes F.Cas. ences cases could be read to 1938). To the extent in the suit. evidence of the interference and ment was the the interference was to secondary evidence. The proof and is ex commissioner is Talking explained usual expensive Hoe, Office record little consent of § in Ex taken without much 1016-17. here, way passed prior practice 112 parte, Pictures standard, parte Squire means of U.S. at if the not entitled to the credit and, the usual to avoid this arduous “[t]he parties. amending In testimony Corp. pre-1927 regard even if these cases are Congress clearly reproducing evidence before be received 5 S.Ct. [1927] weight. 812 affording support v. It is proceedings (which way.” to formali- Am. Tri- permitted here, taken in interfer- (3d Revised amend- 25) taken, a de Cir. For ex- as suit. § § Because both 145 and 146 are de § from Revised added). rived Statutes (emphasis Congress added these previously we have described them as last two sentences to Revised Statutes “parallel provisions,” Royalty Winner Int’l § 4915 in 1927 to eliminate an inefficient (Fed. Corp. Wang, that had practice previously required been Cir.2000), from precedent in interferences. As the ex- our 146 cases Third Circuit plained, prior guidance interpreting under Revised States can be used for amendment, to the 1927 145. We have noted that while introducing prescribes method given the evidence in the interference action, record in a “section 145 PTO proceedings only could be introduced as evidence, secondary completely silent about evidence.” Win proper after founda- ner, competency tion laid. The such evi-

However, open have left the extent to which in General Talk we we explained Pictures, §in Congress provided ing adopt precedents should from admitting the Patent Office this method other circuits. Id. thus We undertake that it “shall have the required record past review of decisions of other courts. pro originally if taken effect as same *13 pre-1927 Under version of the stat- specific to overcome a in the suit” duced ute, Supreme made clear that a Court equity in in only bills problem that existed equity bill in under Revised Statutes interferences, not those based based on § independent proceedings 4915 was not of The absence of sim parte prosecution. ex Instead, in the Patent Office. the Court suggest § language in 145 does not ilar given less this bill in equity that the PTO record should be described as Fregeau § in a 145 action. But see weight something appeal. more than a mere It 1034, 776 F.2d 1041-42 Mossinghojf, v. application is an to the court to set aside (Fed.Cir.1985) (Newman, J., concurring in depart- the action of one of the executive (asserting 145’s silence about evi part) government. ments of the The one 145 proceedings dence means charged with the administration regard conducted without should be system patent investiga- had finished its record). Indeed, be PTO as we discuss tions made its determination with low, by the it was well established Su respect question of priority of agency that review of deci preme Court That gave invention. determination agency on the record. generally sions was rights the defendant the exclusive aof that there kept It should also be mind A patentee. proceedings is institut- parte prosecu between ex are differences courts, proceeding ed to set practice tion and interference before —a PTO, testimony may as that live aside the conclusions reached the ad- such be taken in interfer certain circumstances department, give ministrative and to parte prosecution, ences but not ex see plaintiff rights there awarded to Ap Trial of the Board of Patent Division something the defendant. It is Standing peals and Interferences Order judgment, nature a suit to set aside 1, http://www.usрto.gov/go/dcom/bpai/ and, such, is not to be sustained Benson, v. Standing-Order.pdf; Ginter mere preponderance evidence. (B.P.A.I.2005). 1342, 1349 U.S.P.Q.2d Daniels, 120, Morgan 124, 153 U.S. (1894) (emphasis S.Ct. 38 L.Ed. 657 added). Although dealing with the burden the Federal Circuit has not While evidence, proof admissibility and not delineated a standard under which evi Morgan makes clear that proceedings actions,10 §in dence be excluded the Patent before Office could not be dis- specific various other courts have. Issues regarded proceedings. The Su- §to 145 actions are a matter of Federal preme Court had also that under Circuit, circuit, explained regional rather than law. Banner, an applicant Revised Statutes Corp. Titanium Metals Am. v. (Fed.Cir.1985). far, could file a So presents any party object 10. The dissent several of cases in did to the evidence. This engage sponte which this court has considered new evidence court does not in sua review of analyzing evidentiary rulings; objections 145 and 146 cases without not raised be- pre- ordinarily whether that evidence should have been fore the district court are consid- Caterpillar the PTO. Dissent at 1284-85. ered waived. Inc. v. Sturman In- sented to dus., cites, however, (Fed.Cir.2004). none of the cases the dissent actions, and there Revised Statutes equity. proceed- This mean[t] bill hav- in a court of the United States ing guidance gleaned no clear to be from jurisdiction under the original equity ing jurisprudence. The dis- Supreme Court laws, ordinary according to the recognize that Hoe involved sent fails to equity practice procedure. course equity not a bill in under Revised Statutes appeal from the It not a technical [wa]s mandamus; § 4915 but rather a writ of in sec- like that authorized patent-office, secretary of the issue was “whether the as made confined to the case tion power by interior law to revise and had office, but [wa]s in the record of reverse the action commissioner of upon competent heard all prepared and patents” in an interference. 112 U.S. at adduced, upon the whole above, quoted 25. As the Court 5 S.Ct. merits. *14 noted that a suit under Revised Hoe Hoe, v. United States ex rel Butterworth § “prepared 4915 was and heard Statutes 50, 61, 25, 112 5 28 L.Ed. 656 U.S. S.Ct. adduced,” all evidence but upon competent (1884);11 Coe, see also Hoover Co. v. 325 “competent remained silent as to what was 79, 83, 955, 65 89 L.Ed. 1488 U.S. S.Ct. evidence” under Revised Statutes 4915.12 (1945) (Under 4915, “a trial R.S. formal erroneously presents The dissent these proof afforded on which include is phrases holding. from Hoe as a Dissent at presented in the Patent Of- evidence Hoe, however, reading 9. The dissent’s of fice.”); Hien, 432, 439, In re 166 17 U.S. contrary Supreme is to the Court’s: (1897) (“The 624, S.Ct. 41 L.Ed. 1066 bill equity provided Although, by 4915 is as was said this court in section wholly proceeding different from the ], proceeding by equity, bill in [Hoe from decision the commis- appeal 4915, under section on the refusal sioner .... The one is in the exercise of an for a grant application patent, intends jurisdic- original, appellate, the other of according ordinary a suit to the course tion.”). also, recently, More the Court has equity practice procedure, and passing, “in noted the settled law that in a appeal patent- not a technical from the a disappointed applicant section 145 action office, nor confined to the case as made may present pres- evidence that it did not office, pre- in the record of that but is Board, ‘presence ent pared upon competent and heard all evi- such new or evidence makes a different adduced, upon dence the whole mer- ” Winner, judge.’ factfinder district its, is, yet proceeding fact 202 (quoting F.3d at 1345-46 Dickinson v. necessarily, apart application Zurko, 150, 164, 1816, 527 U.S. 119 S.Ct. patent. (1999)) (emphasis 144 L.Ed.2d 143 added Marble, 432, 439, Gandy v. U.S. Winner). (1887) (emphasis S.Ct. 30 L.Ed. 1223 holding The dissent that our is “in states added; Hien, omitted); citations see also Supreme jurisprudence conflict with Court (in at at explain- 166 U.S. S.Ct. fact, point.” on this In Dissent 1282. ing Gandy, noting equity that “the bill in Supreme Court has never decided the application was sub modo a branch of the issue of what kind of evidence or when patent”). evidence could be introduced in 145 or for the (1995 misrepresents import tionary Legal Usage 11. The 2d dissent of an Modem phrase quotation. isolated See ed.). from this Dis- sent 1283. Competent synonym evidence is a for ad 12. Garner, Bryan missible evidence. A. A Dic- right, stated “that Supreme weight of the other Court cases its evidential

None upon addressed -this that, dissent relies impaired much from the though fact either, un- or even involved suits question accessible, it was not introduced during § 145 or Revised Statutes der proceedings.” the interference Standard (which an issue in Zurko involved Co., Cartridge Cartridge Co. v. Peters § 141 rather than an action appeal under (6th Cir.1896). F. 145) under was whether standard Fowler, In Western Electric Co. v. APA “applies forth in the when review set interference, Fowler, to an party argued findings fact the Federal Circuit reviews for and submitted evidence supporting a by the Patent and Trademark Of- made June 1901 date of practice, reduction to fice.” 527 U.S. at 119 S.Ct. 1816. and, after the examiner of interferences Hien, an which involved priority awarded opponent § 4911 than a bill Revised Statutes rather interference, attempted Fowler to submit equity under Revised Statutes supporting a March 1901 two-year decided whether the the Court (7th practice. reduction to 177 F. an applicant respond time limit for Cir.1910). This new evidence was admit- required actions of the Patent Office ted, but the examiner of interferences held years be allowed two to file *15 original argument. Fowler to his Id. appeals notice of with the court of appealed successively Fowler exam- for the District of Columbia. 166 U.S. at chief, 436,17 Commissioner, iner in 624. and the S.Ct. n of Appeals Court for the District of Colum- sure, Supreme To Court cases be bia, but the decision of the examiner of that in circumstanсes new establish some interferences was. affirmed each time. Id. may merely be submitted. But evidence equity Fowler filed a bill in to obtain a may be because new evidence submitted patent, and the Circuit Court for the necessarily right mean this is does not unfettered;14 Northern District of Illinois found for may there still be situations may Fowler. Id. at 224. appeal, in which new evidence be excluded. On the Sev- century, the last lower federal courts Over enth Circuit discounted the evidence Fowl- have found circumstances which the ac- Office, produced tardily er in the Patent party tions of a before the Patent Office basis, and on that reversed the district justify by evidence offered excluding 228-29; court. Id. at see also Courson v. party patent. from a suit to obtain a O’Connor, (7th 227 F. 892-93 Cir. 1915) (allowing testimony new in the cir-

In an from opinion Sixth Cir- case). cuit, although excluding evidence out- cumstance of that believes, downplays 13. It ironic that the dissent as absolute as the dissent is it would (and holding seemingly importance trump of the of Zurko criti- the Federal Rules of Evi- APA), cizes the fact that we even discuss the dence. at 12 on see Dissent n. instead fixates “permits disap- the statement that 14. The dissent this See overlooks distinction. pointed applicant present to the court evi- parte Squire, Dissent at 1281-85. Neither Ex present (No. (C.C.E.D.Mo.1877) dence that the did not to the 22 F. Cas. (which Shaw, part rejection 13,269), PTO” of a nor Butler v. 21 F. (C.C.D.Mass.1884), holding that the support Federal Circuit’s rationale for the dissent’s ar 141). apply appeals gument right APA did not that the to admit new evidence Zurko, unconstrained; wholly merely See 527 U.S. at 119 S.Ct. each is recites “permit[ted]”, proposition but the unremarkable that new evi Of course evidence a this does not mandate the admission of all dence have been submitted in suit . evidence whatsoever. If this statement were under Revised Statutes 4915 gave plaintiffs day law a Co. v. in General Electric The court That was priority. view of what coui’t on the issue of took a limited Steinberger day the interference was heard and disregarded: could be new evidence they if chose not to avail themselves of testimony the new In some instances rights gamble their full but to were not as to matters which is offered by giving only part, a and the decision necessary pres- relevant or thought they had in part, weaker of the evidence pre- to the Patent Office entation hand, Af- they did it at their'own risk. hearing. vious in what oth- losing ter on such evidence held that all general it must be train appeals erwise would be a of futile and must testimony competent such tribunals and Court in the action the court be considered they Appeals of the District’ of Columbia 4915, but in so far as the under section into a District cannot come Court Office, of the Patent as sus- conclusions say, for the first time we tell now shall appeal, are treated as a fair tained on story practice the true of reduction to determination, upon testimony, similar patent. and demand being plainly and hence as valid unless erroneous, parties When, case, as the in so far party .... as in this proceeding may interference have produce evidence con- has refused in- estopped asserting things from been Appeals sideration the Court with their claims before the consistent produces very District Office, Patent this court will not use the to overcome the that court’s effect of proofs reaching additional conclu- decision, very trifling he comes close to until it right patent, sion on the processes. If in with the courts’ has determined whether defeated Appeals case the Court of of the District *16 further, in a party position to contest wrong of Columbia was it was because about, give testimony or to additional plaintiffs purposely kept it in the previously the matters thus determined. dark. If now this court were in effect to the decision of that (E.D.N.Y.1913). reverse 699, 701 208 F. brought light evidence for the first After the 1927 to the Pat amendments time, assisting plain- we should be Act, ent no circuit court allowed a de novo profit by tiffs to their own technical trial an action under Revised Statutes wrong doing. § 4915. One of the more influential cases Particularly .... are anxious that we admissibility on the of evidence is Barrett no one should think that we hold that (3d Co., 22 Koppers Co. v. F.2d 395 Cir. any not evidence before the Court of 1927). There, during pro interference Appeals of the District of Columbia is Office, ceedings in the Patent the Barrett inadmissible an action under section Company employees instructed its not to destroy R.S. Such a notion would questions answer about certain of its “com given by the action section R.S. Bar practices.” mercial Id. at 396. The overboard the whole doctrine throw interference, Company rett lost the Morgan Specifically v. Daniels. our equity then filed a bill in under Revised plaintiffs decision is that the in this ac- sought Statutes 4915 and to introduce 4915, R.S., tion under section are es- before the district court the exact testimo topped to evidence which was whol- ny employees it had instructed its not to offer ly possession within their and control at provide during the interference. Id. The proceeding and which Third Circuit found that the district court interference evidence, and, properly saying: they proceeding excluded this withheld from testimony All the additional therefore, pat- from the other was avail- withheld question when the Appeals priority able was and the Court ent tribunals Columbia, thereby before the Patent Office.... of the District for those tribunals impossible made it prac- I am not inclined to sanction the they, render what that court to submitting tice of issues of fact to an right maintain is the deci- plaintiffs, now department, competent administrative issue, sion. upon partial presen- decide evidence, tation of the available reserv- altered; (formatting emphasis Id. at 397 ing presentation the full for a trial in the added); Oil Co. v. see also Standard to set аside the courts order of the (3d Montedison, S.p.A., 540 authority. practice administrative This Cir.1976) (“An brought under action justly condemned Barrett Co. v. is “limited to the review of deci- 146” Koppers Co. ... the Board of Patent Interfer- sion of ences.”). Id. gave Barrett a the Third Circuit

While pro- The Eastern District of New York subsequent in a fairly reading limited mulgated a novel formulation of the rule of case,15 interpreted courts have Bar other Barrett, namely that evidence available broadly. Eighth Circuit rett more presented by party but not who lost affirming when a district cited Barrett given before the Patent Office would be that could court’s exclusion “no weight” losing party gave because presented to the Patent Office why have been “no sufficient reason” the evidence Lamar, but was not. Kirschke presented was not to the Patent Office. (8th Cir.1970). Co., The District of Sperry 872-75 Perkins v. Lawrence Aircraft (E.D.N.Y.1932). Massachusetts followed Barrett O’Don 57 F.2d 720-21 Con- Machinery Corp., 2 versely, party nell v. Shoe the court also ruled that the United (1933). There, plain F.Supp. successful before office was by” However, rule. tiff witnesses to the Patent Of “not bound Id. presented Hand, fice, Judge writing Learned they testify about an the Sec- but did Circuit, disapproval ond hinted his allegedly per such experiment plaintiff had interference, stringent exclusion standard the follow- losing formed. Id. After *17 ing year: instituted a suit under Revised plaintiff sought to have the Statutes Koppers, In Barrett Co. v. the Third testify alleged about the same witnesses refused to consider Circuit evidence objected experiment. deliberately Id. The defendant the inventor had sup- which interference, evidence, pressed to this new and the court disal in the and used it, language than saying: lowed broader the exact situa- Mining Mfg. Minn. & Co. v. Carborun time before the district court. Standard Oil See Cir.1946) dum, (3d (di stingu (Ind.) Montedison, S.P.A., 155 F.2d Co. v. 664 F.2d affirming ishing Barrett and district (3d 1981) (“[N]ew court's expert testimony Cir. expert testimony denial of motion to exclude clearly in a admissible section 146 action plain allegedly “available to the which was justification without such to the extent that it proceedings tiffs at the time of the understanding already aids the court issues Patent Office'' because the evidence was not Board.”). presented It is not clear intentionally suppressed). subsequent, In a however, opinion, objecting from the that the Oil, appeal of Standard the Third Cir related party anything attempt place did other than to rejected argument cuit the district justifying the burden of the evidence on the required party explain court should have party offering it. why only offering it was evidence for first quoted ap- before the Patent Office is to sanction required, tion which we Beidler, justice. v. 58 F.2d the destruction of administrative proval Greene Cir.1932). (2d However, it does 209-10 estoppel But we are satisfied that the that it have extended not follow would principle has its limitations. It should suppressed, not the doctrine evidence penalize par- not be used to an innocent merely through plain- neglected but ty. presenta- Nor should it exclude the Perkins preparation. tiffs slackness evidence, previously tion which had Sperry Co. did so Lawrence procurable not been or which had be- Aircraft it, approve. extend but we need pro- come known after interference question prefer is doubtful and we Coming ceedings. now to the instant open, necessary leave it for it is not case, we find that Stoekle did not inten- it here. answer tionally which withhold he produced later in court.... It seems (2d Jones, Dowling v. 67 F.2d undisputable that evidence avail- be (citations Cir.1933) omitted; altered and time, a given able and existent at added).16 altered; emphasis formatting yet knowledge “pos- not be within the accepted The Seventh Circuit likewise person and control” of session desir- that evidence could be excluded from a ing to make use of it. are not We brought case under Revised Statutes prepared say did not Stoekle 4915 because of the actions of a diligence procuring exercise due applicant: evidence sooner than he did. case, In the Bamtt the additional Co., Chicago Supply Globe-Union v. Tel. “wholly evidence was at all times within (7th (format- Cir.1939) (the) possession plain- and control” of added). altered; ting emphasis tiff, he had but “withheld” the evidence By the Corp. time of Velsicol Chemical the Patent cir- Under such from Office. Co., v. Monsanto at least in the Seventh cumstances, it is reasonable that Circuit, the rule based on Barrett had withholding person estopped pres- be developed following: into the principle ent that evidence later. Such [Ajbsent circumstances,17 estoppel properly many special works in- stances, e.g., question when evidence has proper been for the district court secreted, deliberately withheld or was whether the failure of propo- story when a completely changed nent of the additional evidence to uncov- coming dispute to court. do not er procure We its existence earlier or to proposition soundness that all for the interference proceeding occurred evidence, available, pertinent actually in spite proponent’s diligence *18 should be in the in- preparing submitted his case the Board. first before permit partial presentation agree stance. To with the court in We Kirschke approved Examples might The Second had special Circuit earlier of circumstances 16. 17. Beidler, 207, law, of Barrett. See Greenev. 58 F.2d intervening change include an (2d Cir.1932) (quoting 209-10 issue, Banett for presence of a new or the admission of proposition parties that a "cannot come into deserving response other new evidence of a say, Court District and now for the first time e.g., Douglas further elaboration. See Aircraft story we shall tell the true of reduction to Mueller, 321, U.S.App. v. D.C. Co. praсtice patent” stating a demand (1960). F.2d 351 substantially position "This is which the appellees pre- here have taken. It cannot vail.”). The D.C. Circuit has stated that “the it makes no difference whether that plaintiff may not submit for the first time was “at- produce the evidence failure negligent failing evidence which he motives or not by reprehensible tended to submit to the Patent Office.” Cal. Re- (or) other it be for tactical or whether Ladd, 813, v. F.2d Corp. search 820 n. Moreover, 426 F.2d at 874. reasons.” (D.C.Cir.1966). The D.C. Circuit has policy of the of en- find that terms we from prohibited raising also not neces- couraging full disclosure action, justified new issues a sary that there have been an affirmative necessary that rule as a extension of the suppress the evi- action or decision requirement that one exhaust administra- dence; enough reasonably that a it is court, resorting tive remedies before proponent’s diligent preparation of Brenner, DeSeversky v. 424 F.2d 859- Board would have led to case before (D.C.Cir.1970) curiam), or, (per as the the evi- discovery the existence it, explained D.C. Circuit has also a Nor ‍​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍is it production. and its dence “may disregard action not be conducted have been necessary that the evidence general policy encouraging full possession in the exclusive control and tribunals,” disclosure to administrative long pro- it was proponent, as Research, 18; Cal. 356 F.2d 820 n. see Conversely, litigant by him. curable Gallsworthy, also Knutson v. F.2d reasonably diligent been who has (D.C.Cir.1947). 508-09 The D.C. Circuit procuring evidence for identifying “surprise has noted that should not materi- proceeding will not be the interference in” ally affect the result 145 cases. Cal. strengthening pres- from precluded Research, 356 F.2d at 821.18 if new evi- in the district court entation the District of Under Columbia him in become available to dence should forum district court is the exclusive the interim. actions under statute. Since (7th Velsicol, 1046 & n. 10 approximately to have been appear there Cir.1978) (footnote renumbered; emphasis in the District thirty 145 actions filed added). Many district court.19 are ter- Columbia Doll, 07-cv-01695-PLF; expressly v. Although did not Dome Patent L.P. the D.C. Circuit Doll, Barrett, v. 07-cv-01504- support a Hitachi Koki Co. adopt it cited the case to ESH; that evidence which was statement dicta Dudas, Novo Nordisk v. 06-cv-01896- “readily yet pre- important and available" A/S CKK; to the PTO should not be admitted in sented Dudas, Takeda v. 06-cv-01640- Pharm. Co. R.S. 4915. Boucher Inventions suit under TFH; Co., Elec. 227 & n. 5 v. Sola Dudas, Corp. Fullerene Int'l v. 06-cv- (D.C.Cir.1942). Stringham, See also Emerson 01451-RMU; (1930) Equity Suits 83-84 Patent Interference Pats., Sys. Comm’r Innovatit v. ("Barrett Koppers takes the rather extreme Seafood 06-cv-00825-JR; withholds, during position party who Pats., Sys. Innovatit v. Comm’r interference, in his the office evidence then Seafood 06-cv-00822-JR; control, estopped possession and is thereafter Dudas, 05-cv-02426-RBW; Hickman v. equity present that evidence in an suit.... HK; Dudas, Hyatt v. 05-cv-02310-H Probably ruling only such a would be made if Dudas, Dieterich Inc. v. 05-cv-02296- Stnd. withholding the court considered *19 RBW; during proceeding bad the оffice constituted 05-cv-01796-LFO; Dudas, Putman v. to, faith, amounting approximating, or 'un- Dudas, 05-cv-00834-EGS; Hyatt v. ”) added). (emphasis clean hands.’ 05-cv-00310-HHK; Dudas, Hyatt v. Doll, 08-cv-01242-RWR; SD3, 05-cv-00309-EGS; LLC v. Dudas, Hyatt v. 04-cv-02222-JR; Dudas, Dudas, Corp. v. 08-cv- Galbreath v. Aldor Solutions 04-cv-01802-HHK; Dudas, 00897-ESH; Hyatt v.

1266 presented the district court must rule not due to minated before was PTO bad admissibility on the of evidence not before gross negligence faith or and sometimes if See, v. e.g., the PTO. Novo Nordisk A/S present negligent. the failure to it was Dudas, 06-cv-01896, slip op. at 2-3 No. sum, general it has been the 2007) by consent 3, (dismissing case (July of federal courts for practice eighty over of parties). years certain circumstances to exclude practice uniform in the Dis is no There party which a could and should regarding district court trict Columbia have introduced before Patent Office governing exclusion from the standard despite obligation but did not to do so. of evidence that was not actions 145 adopted own cases likewise have not Our during proceedings. PTO See submitted de novo standard for trial. have said We (after 5569663, II, 2005 WL at *4-7 Hyatt “[cjlearly, not applicant does start objection, excluding evidence Director’s to prosecute application over before the failure to submit it to PTO was because happened district unfettered what Dudas, “negligent”); Hitachi Koki Co. v. Fregeau, in the PTO.” 776 F.2d at 1038. (D.D.C.2008) 41, F.Supp.2d (flatly 47 hand, beyond question On the other it is rejecting negligence standard II Hyatt in appropriate circumstances new evi admitting evidence over Director’s ob dence be submitted to the district jection because failure to it was present least, (subject, court in a 145 action “fraud, faith, gross not due to bad or ” Evidence). added)); the Federal Rules of negligence (emphasis Takeda See Dudas, (Fed. F.Supp.2d Quigg, Pharm. Co. v. v. Gould (D.D.C.2007) Cir.1987) (“[Ajdditional (admitting new evidence over permit evidence is objection Director’s because failure to sub in a ted civil action under section ” 'negligent (empha mit it to PTO was “mt allowing the district court to make de novo Watson, added)); sis Killian v. findings.”); fact Quigg, Newman v. (D.D.C.1958)(after U.S.P.Q. Com (Fed.Cir.1989) (“A district objection, excluding missioner’s new evi court action under 35 U.S.C. 145 is a de grounds dence on alternate that failure to novo patentability. determination of It is it to “grossly submit Patent Office was limited to the record before the ” negligent applicant gave and that no ex PTO.”); Stringham, Emerson Patent In added)); planation (emphasis for the failure (1930) (“The Equity terference eq Suits Co., see also Dev. Shell Co. v. Pure Oil 111 uity suit offers distinctive advantages (D.D.C.1953) (in F.Supp. 146 way hearing presenta of a fresh and the case, admitting objection evidence over be tribunal.”). testimony tion of direct to the failure to during cause submit it interfer “any ence not due to faith, sup bad B. ” pression, gross negligence (emphasis added)). noted, However, Supreme As the Court has “[o]ne preceding as the cases show, purpose” Congress in enacting the District of the APA Columbia district always court will greater uniformity exclude evidence that “was to introduce Dudas, 04-cv-01496-EGS; Hyatt Regents Rogan, v. Univ. Cal. v. 03-cv- Dudas, 04-cv-01222-EGS; 01133-RWR; Hyatt v. Dudas, 04-cv-01139-HHK; Dudas, HK; Hyatt Hyatt v. v. 03-cv-00901-H Dudas, 04-cv-01138-HHK; Dudas, 03-cv-00108-EGS; Hyatt v. v. 03-cv-01375-EGS; Protechna, Godici, Hyatt Rogan, v. SA. v. 02-cv-02524- 03-cv-01283-EGS; RBW; Hyatt Rogan, v. 03-cv-01280-EGS; Dudas, Hyatt Rogan, Galbreath v. 02-cv-02354-JR.

1267 Park, Inc. v. such Volpe, Preserve Overton of adminis- and standardization procedure agen- the diverse in among de novo review is authorized two situa- practice trative widely departed first, had adjudicato- cies whose customs tions: “when the action is Sung v. Wong Yang each other.” from ry agency factfinding nature and the 445, 41, McGrath, 33, 94 70 S.Ct. 339 U.S. or, second, procedures inadequate,” are statute, (1950), superseded by 616 L.Ed. “when issues that were not before the 1951, Act of Appropriation Supplemental agency proceeding are raised in a to en- 1048, Marcello v. recognized in 64 Stat. nonadjudicatory agency force action.” 401 757, 302, 311, 75 99 U.S. S.Ct. Bonds 349 402, 415, 814, U.S. 91 S.Ct. 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1955). explained The Court L.Ed. 1107 (1971) 3, (citing H.R.Rep. (May No.1980 to the APA finding exceptions lightly 1946)). exceptions apply These do not Id. purpose. would defeat its cases; patent application pro- (whether adjudicatory cess is not and new issues by a district Court review appeals) a court of adminis cannot be raised 145 action. court or See presumptively Newman, agency trative decision (citing 877 F.2d at 1579 DeSev- 858). under the APA. See U.S.C. (and final) deferential ersky, 424 F.2d at A third judicial §§ The usual rule is that 701-06. exception to the limited review under the agency action should be on review APA explic- exists: where another statute record, regardless whether agency itly for provides de novo review. See or in appeals action is in the court of Co., United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Natural court. See Marsh v. Or. district 709, 714-15, 1409, 83 S.Ct. U.S. L.Ed.2d 375-78, Council, 360, Res. 490 U.S. (1963). (1989); 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 Chan S.Ct. Even before the 1946 enactment of the 862, Roudebush, 840, dler v. 425 U.S. APA, 1946, 11, see Act of June 60 Stat. (1976) (“[I]n 1949, S.Ct. 48 L.Ed.2d 243, Supreme had Court held authorization, statutory specific absence of for court provisions district review—even generally not to be a de novo review is in a in equity suit not be read to Pitts, 138, Camp v. 411 U.S. presumed.”); —would imply power go agency 141-42, outside the 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d (1973) curiam) (“[T]he point example, Tagg record. For Bros. & (per focal States, judicial [by court] review the district Moorhead v. United Court dis- al should be the administrative record although cussed that the Packers and existence, not some new record ready §§ Stockyards Act of 181— U.S.C. court.”); initially reviewing made to be provided brought suits Stein, al., et Adminis generally see Jacob enjoin court federal district the enforce- (2006). Law 51.04 trative orders, agency imply ment of this did not 4,n. trial de novo. 280 U.S. 444-45 & states specifically While the APA (1930). 220, 74 L.Ed. 524 Judicial 50 S.Ct. reviewing court shall decide all that “the Secretary of orders of the was “re- review law,” questions of 5 U.S.C. relevant statutory lan- by following stricted” fact-finding gen agency court review of “If, guage: hearing, after that court deter- erally Under 5 U.S.C. deferential. regularly mines that the order was 706(2)(F), reviewing “set served, duly and that the carrier is in action, agency findings, and conclu aside same, the court shall disobedience of facts[,] if “unwarranted sions” Bros., Tagg enforce obedience.” 280 U.S. subject facts are the extent that the (quoting at 444 n. 50 S.Ct. 220 49 U.S.C. reviewing court.” As trial de novo 16(12)). explained: in Citizens to Court Supreme Court stated *21 of the the Wunderlich Act were not trials de proceeding A under section 316 judicial novo, Act Stockyards agency Packers and but were limited to the rec- review, validity The 713-15, not a trial de novo. ord. 373 U.S. at 83 S.Ct. 1409. Secretary, order of the like that of of an The that “the Court noted standards of an order of the Interstate Commerce adopted review in the Act— Wunderlich Commission, upon must determined be ‘arbitrary,’ supported and ‘not ‘capricious,’ him proceedings the record of the before by frequently substantial evidence’—have certain constitu- [except regard by Congress used have been consis- tional On all other issues his claims].... tently limit- been associated with review accepted by must be the court findings ed to the administrative record.” Id. at conclusive, if before him as the evidence 715, gave 83 S.Ct. 1409. The Court legally to sustain them sufficient following general rule: in the irregularity and there was no reviewing ordinarily function is [T]he proceeding. findings To to be allow limited consideration of decision supported in court attacked agency or court below and evidence would substitute the court for In- which it was based. the administrative tribunal as the rate- deed, Congress in cases where has sim- making body. it is believed that Where review, ply provided setting without Secretary findings erred in his be- the standards to be used or the forth important cause evidence was not procedures followed, to be this Court has attention, brought appropriate to his held that is to be consideration confined remedy apply rehearing is to for a be- to the administrative record and that no proceedings. fore him or to institute new de novo proceeding be held. 420, 443-45, 220, U.S. S.Ct. 714, at Id. 83 S.Ct. 1409. (1930) added; (emphasis L.Ed. 524 foot- Previously, rejected this court the notion omitted). note APA applied fact-finding by disposed argu- The Court of similar PTO when reviewed on direct here. ments context of district court ac- Zurko, (Fed.Cir.1998) In re F.3d 1447 judicial tions authorized pro- review (en banc). reversed, Supreme The Court vision of the Act Communications holding the Federal Circuit must re- 402(a).20 Broadcasting 47 U.S.C. Nat’l fact-finding by using view the PTO States, 190, 227, Co. v. United 319 U.S. framework set forth in the APA. Dickin- (1943). S.Ct. 87 L.Ed. 1344 Zurko, 150, 165, son v. 527 U.S. 119 S.Ct. Court held that such suits were not de (1999). 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 The Court novo, and the review was limited to the noted that for a statute excep- to create agency correctly record: “The court below APA, tions to the clearly. must do so inquiry held that its was limited to review Id. S.Ct. 1816. And the cir- of the evidence before the Commission. cumstances under which the APA provides Trial de novo the matters heard by the for de novo review of factual issues are Report Commission and dealt with in its Park, “narrow.” Overton 401 U.S. at would have been improper.” Id. 91 S.Ct. 814. S.Ct. statute, here, Similarly, pro in Bianchi Where the the Court held that brought review, suits in the Court of Claims under vides for district court a de novo States, 407, 415, previously 20. The Court had characterized an United 316 U.S. 62 S.Ct. plenary (1942). action based on this statute as "a suit 86 L.Ed. 1563 equity.” Broadcasting Sys. Columbia *22 1000, (Fed.Cir.2003) gan, 323 F.3d 1004 appropriate unless generally trial (“[A] court, for it. provides whether specifically reviewing statute this court the merely court, not. Section 145 145 does applies Section or the district the ‘substan applicant dissatisfied “[a]n states that tial evidence’ standard of review to find may “have rem- of the Board” the decision [BJoard.”). ings by of fact made Of in against action the Director edy by civil course, actions, § in review is not for the District Court the United States strictly agency confined to the record. This is in contrast District of Columbia.” Zurko, 164, U.S. S.Ct. 1816. explicitly provide other statutes that do proceedings wholly But neither are de novo review the district courts. for de novo; admission of evidence is clear; very are when Con- Such statutes Mazzari, by limited the APA.22 323 F.3d at trial, by de novo Con- gress intends review Zurko left The Supreme 1005. Court trial.21 explicitly authorizes de novo gress open question apply of how to the APA Zurko, to our of PTO decisions various review light In of we determined circumstances, § including subject § actions. actions under 145 are that 164, 119 the APA. See Mazzari v. Ro See U.S. S.Ct. 1816. strictures of See, Act, 1592(e) 21. explicit language § e.g., Stamp 7 U.S.C. even of should Food 2023(a)(15) ("The interpreted narrowly providing § in the United States suit for de novo de court shall be a trial only district court or State aspects of certain review of the customs by determination, the court in which court shall novo “permit importer not to validity questioned ad of the determine the protest provisions”). end-run the issue...."); v. action in Ibrahim ministrative Only very Supreme rare cases has the 52, States, (2d Cir. 53-54 United Court held that a new be made in record 1987) ("The Stamp de review Food Act’s novo specific the District Court absence of and broader provision embodies a different statutory Douglas McDonnell authorization. under the scope of review than that available Green, 792, 798-99, Corp. v. 411 U.S. 93 S.Ct. [Camp point. on That ] ... v. Pitts is not APA 1817, (finding private- 36 L.Ed.2d 668 that by of a decision case involved review employees sector are entitled to trial de novo Currency denying a na Comptroller of the Chandler, VII); under Title accord 425 U.S. at charter, regula and no statute or tional bank 845, (for public employees un 96 S.Ct. 1949 The APA provided for de novo review. tion However, VII). statutory der Title Here, contrast, governed. therefore "Title scheme makes clear that VII does not Stamp specifically provides that re Act Food provide powers with direct of [EEOC] determinations 'shall be trial view of FNS adjudicate The cannot [EEOC] enforcement. 2023(a).”); § 7 U.S.C. 7 U.S.C. de novo.' impose claims or administrative sanctions. that, repa 499g(c) (providing § review of Rather, responsibility final for enforcement of by Department Agriculture, rations orders VII vested with federal courts.” Alex Title by entry party adversely "Either affected Co., 415 U.S. 44- ander Gardner-Denver Secretary may reparation order (1974). appeal 94 S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d 147 ... therefrom to the district court.... shall be a trial Such suit in the district court 22. A central flaw of the dissent is that it respects proceed in all like de novo and shall § evidence in 145 actions is limited believes damages, except that the other civil suits for only by See the Federal Rules of Evidence. findings or orders of the of fact and order Contrary Dissent at 1280. to the dissent’s Secretary prima-facie evidence of the shall be however, enough argument, is not stated”); see also 19 U.S.C. facts therein ap- § or that an 145 is silent about evidence that, 1592(e) (providing for review cus peal See dissent at is available under fraud, penalties negligence or "Not toms Supreme recently 1280-81. The Court has law, withstanding any provision of other lightly de- law should not stated any United proceeding commenced accepted legal general part principles from Trade for in the Court of International States MercExchange, applicability. eBay See Inc. v. penalty recovery any monetary claimed L.L.C., 388, 390-94, S.Ct. 547 U.S. issues, including the under this section ... all (2006). ambiguous si- 164 L.Ed.2d 641 penalty, be tried de amount of the shall Co., admissibility on the of evi- ”); lence of v. Ford Motor novo United States (Fed.Cir.2006) high the Su- (finding dence does not meet the bar hybrid Supreme nature of 145 the one reference to 145 in a light

actions, light that in the absence Court decision sheds little on the we have held evidence, question a district court must re issue. Zurko involved the of new proper Board for substan what was ‍​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍the view the decision of the standard review evidence, questions tial but for factual direct to the Federal Circuit under Supreme new evidence is before the district although where Court *23 court, § court makes de novo “present the district noted that a 145 claimant can How findings. Fregeau, 776 F.2d 1034.23 applicant to the court evidence that the did ever, without re admitting PTO,” new evidence present not to the the Court said purpose striction would defeat nothing about when or under what circum- APA, always could then sub applicants as such stances evidence could be introduced. they Zurko, whenever desired mit new evidence See U.S. S.Ct. 1816. review; allowing novo new evidence de Supreme As the Court stated Overton unnecessarily will convert deferential re Park, “agency where factfinding proce- effectively “into de novo review.” view inadequate,” dures are the APA allows States, Mgmt. Axiom Resource United district court to take additional evidence. (Fed.Cir.2009). 1374, 1380 example, For the PTO does not take oral § Nothing language 145 re- testimony in an examination of a quires a de novo trial. The dissent makes application. In credibility some cases de- phrase much of the “a civil action” in the very important will terminations be to the statute, arguing requires that it a de novo case, example, resolution of the where despite general action rule that review there is a question about the date of reduc- agency is оn the record. It should be tion practice which will determine what noted, however, language that the is, not, or is In prior art. such circum- predecessor to a in stances, statute referred “bill permit it makes sense to the dis- APA, equity.” Even before the the Su- trict court to testimony hear live under preme repeatedly general Court held that credibility Overton Park to resolve issues language authorizing judicial review does procedures because the PTO are inade- novo, not create a trial de and that much quate. See, specific required.

more language ability Some restrictions on the of an e.g., Nat’l Broadcasting, 319 U.S. applicant introduce new evidence in a 997; Bros., Tagg at 444- S.Ct. 280 U.S. § required 145 action are therefore under 4,n. 45 & 50 S.Ct. 220. APA, although certainly there is not a Nor do the cases addressing sup- evidence, blanket exclusion of new either.24 port the dissent’s de novo standard. As C. above,

discussed Supreme Court has directly never scope Hyatt considered the argue and the dissent evidence, (or be) regard 145 with proceedings new under 145 are should However, preme implying Court has set for availability trial de live direct testi- novo. mony and would cross-examination make a quite section 145 action different from sec- Zurko, Supreme In Court noted that we appeal, regardless tion 141 of whether some adjust need to standards review evidence available to the but not APA, prevent anomalous results under the submitted to the PTO would be excludable. citing Fregeau apparent approval. See proceedings Just because two sec- Zurko, 527 U.S. at 119 S.Ct. 1816. they tions are does not mean should different possible; be as the dissent complains 24. The dissent lacks that we "blur[] different convincing support require appeal pursuant specific line between 141 and dif- event, the civil any action of 145.” Dissent at 1289. ference it wishes to create. de evidence.”); missibility certain kinds of plaintiff if the so wishes. entirely de novo Conservolite, Widmayer, Inc. v. However, in favor of de arguments of. (Fed.Cir.1994) (“While 1098, 1102 the ex- unpersuasive. are proceedings novo is often used to describe pression ‘de novo’ by this and isolated statements focuses on action, §a the statute does use is a “de that a 145 action courts other language or that new issues can state ignores the context but proceeding, novo” authorizes freely be raised. Section 146 on—such state- qualifications of—and accept court on review to the district ac- Circuit Although the Seventh ments. testimony, normally only as to issues but could be exclud- knowledged that evidence proceed- parties during raised presented it was not ed because decision.”). the Board’s ings below Office, referred to a the court still Patent argues testimony given The dissent under Revised Statutes brought case *24 Congress compels in 1926 the con- before Globe-Union, trial.” as “a de novo 4915 a trial is clusion that de novo available at 728. As the district in all circumstances. Dissent under 145 has Hyatt’s is taken from which During hearings proposed at 1926 on 3-7. noted, § 145 actions aptly en- patent statute reforms similar those denominated “trials de are sometimes 1927, acted in Commissioner Thomas E. some- novo”, but use of this term is Robertson, such attempt persuade in an Con- is altogether equity loose.... Additional evidence bills in gress what to eliminate in patents, plaintiffs ad- to obtain stated support in of contentions admissible such suits could in the Patent Of- by parties vanced testimony bringing in evidence that has led to file It is this feature that fice. brought in they could have before but appellation inaccurate use of the before, drag- and after bring did not actions. There “trials de novo” these all ging through procedure a man admissibility of is a limitation on the said so you complicated which have is evidence. Such evidence supplementary burdensome, court, start de novo but was parties, available to the as was testimony not taken the bring Office as a from the Patent withheld time. first fraud, faith, gross negli- bad result Code and To Amend Section 52 Judicial the trial. gence, may be excluded Affecting Procedure in Pat- Other Statutes 818, F.Supp. Kamp, v. 269 Monsanto Co. Hearings on H.R. 6252 and ent Office: (D.D.C.1967); also Killian v. Wat 822 see H.R. 7087 the House Committee Before (D.D.C.1958) son, 507, U.S.P.Q. 121 507 (“H.R. Patents, Cong., 69th 1st Sess. 81 (“It pro well settled that equally is ”) added). Hearing (emphasis How- under ceedings of the District Courts ever, by of- characterizations Patent Office novo, 145, wholly ig are not though de necessarily are not indicative of the ficials before.”); Mac gone of what has norant particularly where the Congress, intent of 567, F.Supp. Quigg, v. Kay opposed legislation.25 As witnesses (“For (D.D.C.1986) reason, despite the Bryan v. Supreme Court has noted States, and doubts of judicial accorded review the “the fears ‘de novo’ label United guide are no authoritative opposition the ad- courts have limited under Hearing parte at 78- ex ones. H.R. 6252 proceedings are disallowed than under novo by the APA. appear comments 25. Commissioner Thomas’s on interference cases rather to be focused legislation. equity parties may their into a court of use

the construction bill, they understandably they the record that have in the Patent zeal to defeat by reach.” 524 supplement tend to overstate its U.S. Office additional evidence.”). (1998) 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 But none of the cited 118 S.Ct. Con- (citations, brackets, quotation gressional testimony specifically marks addresses omitted). Stray applicant sought comments other wit situations where an legislation consequences are also overcome supporting nesses his oum re- distinctly unpersuasive. dissent prosecuting adhere to the rules fusal Indeed, quotes Representative patent application. Albert H. Vestal as absent from legislative history any saying bill Revised Statutes discussion of appeal. bring admissibility “is not an It is the of evidence being prof- ing (quot objections of a new suit.” Dissent at 1281 fered or to evidence. 36). Hearing H.R. Even state ing Furthermore, the “evaluation of con- ments members floor debate are gressional action ... must take into ac- weight. entitled to little Garcia United contemporary legal count its context.” States, 70, 76, 469 U.S. 105 S.Ct. Chicago, Cannon v. Univ. U.S. (1984) (“In surveying legisla L.Ed.2d 698-99, 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 560 history repeatedly tive we have stated that (1979). “Congress presumed to be *25 authoritative source finding judicial aware of an administrative or in- Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee terpretation of a statute and to adopt that Reports bill.... We have eschewed interpretation when it re-enacts a statute passing reliance on the comments of one Pons, change.” without Lorillard v. and casual Member statements from the 575, 580, U.S. 98 S.Ct. 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (citations omitted)). floor debates.” (1978).26 Although issued several months While not irrelevant to the extent that Congress’ patent after 1927 revisions to Congress § existing enacted 145 based on laws, predated Barrett the 1952 Patent Act practice § under Revised Statutes which, by quarter century, of a combined legislative history this hardly can be said Congress’ statement 145 and dispositive, particularly to be or even pro- change 146 made “no fundamental bative, case, present of the issue in the as various appeals and other review of Patent majority clearly in Fregeau, concluded (1952) action,”27 S.Rep. Office No. 82-1979 776 F.2d at 1037-38. And even to the added), (emphasis suggests that Congress legislative history extent is consid- approved of the holding cases ered, only much of it supports the undis- applicants present could not to a district puted general applicants may rule that they court evidence should have but did submit certain evidence previously not be- present not to the Patent Office. And this See, fore the e.g., PTO a 145 action. legislative history predated the 1946 enact- (Paul) (“If H.R. 6252 at Hearing go we ment of the APA two decades.28 County equivalent But see Catron making Bd. Comm’rs v. 27. This is not "no sub- 26. Serv., U.S. Fish & 4915,” 75 F.3d changes stantive as the dissent Wildlife (10th Cir.1996) ("Although proponent asserts. See Dissent at 1281. congressional acquiescence need not show acquiescence 'specifically that the embod- heavy legisla- 28. The dissent's reliance on the mandate,’ statutory ied in a he bears the bur- history tive of the 1927 revisions to the Patent showing den of 'abundant evidence that Con- Act, 1280-82, see Dissent at is therefore ana- gress contemplated both and authorized' the chronistic. previous noncongressional interpretation in acquiesces.”). which it now action is them for abuse of argument a de novo review discretion. Gen. Hyatt’s Joiner, 136, 141, precedent with our Co. v. also inconsistent Elec. U.S. (1997) must apply court deferential the district L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (“[Ajbuse Mazza- fact-finding. to PTO See standard discretion proper is the stan “Clearly, the ri, at 1004-05. 323 F.3d of a dard of review district court’s eviden prosecute not start over to does applicant Conservolite, rulings.”); see tiary also court before the district application (noting at 1102 court’s discre F.3d district the PTO.” happened what unfettered testimony to admit on new issues tion Indeed, at 776 F.2d 1038. Fregeau, certain circumstances in action under there would be Supreme Court assumed 146). 145 in which “the brought cases Congress pro created this court no judge does more than review district interpretation pat a uniform mote Zurko, factfinding.” 527 U.S. PTO Bard, Schwartz, 716 laws. C.R. Inc. v. ent Therefore, in the absence 119 S.Ct. (Fed.Cir.1983). 874, 878 The cases evidence, the district court of new regional repeatedly that the circuits show by the accept the facts as found obliged to excluded, circumstances, in some supported by not substantial unless PTO had presented that an not to the Mazzari, 1005; see evidence. discretionary In making Patent Office. 162-65, Zurko, 527 U.S. at S.Ct. also decisions, lightly courts should disre admitted, the new evidence is 1816. When practice. eBay historical Inc. v. gard See makes novo factual find- de district L.L.C., 388, 395, MercExchange, 547 U.S. to the See only as new evidence. ings, but (2006) 1837, 164 126 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 641

Mazzari, In other 323 F.3d at 1004. C.J., (Roberts, concurring). And the Su words, court must defer the district has that “courts preme Court warned us fact-finding appropri- except where PTO’s *26 changes cautious adopting must be before conflicts with ately admitted evidence disrupt the settled of the expectations a new presents the or a fact found PTO inventing community,” if this means even that the did not consid- factual issue PTO “bright-line Corp. Festo rejecting rule.” id. er. See Co., Kogyo Kinzoku Kabushiki v. Shoketsu III. 722, 739, 122 S.Ct. 535 U.S. (2002). L.Ed.2d 944

A. excluding long history There is had ruling If the district court’s PTO, and of evidence submitted to evidentiary ruling, conventional we been a may that evidence be excluded a consensus apply would the standard of review not submitted PTO at least if it was to the regional circuit. See Ad appropriate fraud, faith, gross bad negligence, due to Medtronic, Sys. v. vanced Cardiovascular See, suppression. e.g., intentional Cal. or (Fed.Cir.2001). Inc., 265 F.3d Research, at (excluding 356 F.2d n. However, challenged evidentiary ruling evidence not submitted to Patent Office partly interpreta tied issues of here is Velsicol, “negligence”); merely due to extent, law. To this we tion of (excluding F.2d at 1046 evidence not sub review these apply Federal Circuit law and merely Patent to lack mitted to Office due legal de novo. interpretation issues of Watson, 121 “diligence”); Killian v. N.V., A.G. Picanol Sulzer Textil (Fed.Cir.2004). U.S.P.Q. (excluding at 509 new evidence To F.3d failure to submit it Patent Of evidentiary rul because that district court extent standard, The Di- “grossly negligent”). correct we ings apply legal fice argues negligence in favor of a stan- ing production rector the burden of to the appli- dard, cant, although argues Hyatt’s he also simply by identifying specific claim gross negligence. conduct amounts to See stating despite limitations and review- Hyatt Br. Appellee’s at 28-53. himself ing specification, he could not find argues “prevailing that the in the Dis- law support those limitations. 76 trict of Columbia” is that evidence not 1175; Wertheim, see also re only (CCPA submitted to the PTO. can be excluded 1976) (“[T]he 263-64 PTO hаs if “gross negli- the failure was due to the initial of presenting burden gence.” Hyatt Br. at Appellant’s 27. also why persons reasons skilled the art if states that we exclude some evidence in recognize would not in the disclosure a actions, gross negligence should be description of the invention defined applicable standard. Id. claims;” so, if the PTO does bears the burden of rebutting this show- note, however, terminology We that the ing.); Manual of Patent Examining Proce- (and negligence gross negligence) is (“MPEP”) 2163.04(I)(B) (reiterat- dure inapposite somewhat to the issue of admis- Alton). ing holding of (which sibility. Negligence roughly diligence) implies duty. absence of 7,1997 Any January time from the office patent applicants While do have certain rejecting Hyatt’s action new claims for PTO, including duties duties of dis- Hyatt’s failure “specifically point out the closure,29 beyond a point, certain how support pursuant for” the claims much more evidence to submit in large reading examiner’s of MPEP up 714.02 part a patentee determination for which a Hyatt through when filed his initial agents good and his must use judgment.30 brief before the September Board on certainly While there are many factors 1998, Hyatt could have declared where decision, which could go duty into such a specification description written the PTO not necessarily be one of support for each of disputed limitations them. We believe a semantic away shift resided. After the examiner stated that from negligence will help focus attention he through had read specification on the factors that are pertinent to wheth- could find no support for certain claim er an applicant should be allowed to intro- limitations, all needed to do was duce evidence before the district court *27 show the specifica- examiner where in the objection by over an the Director. support tion something that existed — him, should Hyatt simple have been for obligated per- was to respond to the son specification. most familiar with the description rejection examiner’s written by Alton, (Fed.Cir. noted, re Board “It is far easier for 1996),by explaining appellant in to describe specifica- where where the limitation tion support for each of he wrote is these limitations disclosed than for the Office to could be prove found. We held in that the Alton limitation is not disclosed.” after studying specification, an J.A. Rejection examin- 11600-01. per as Alton was prima er can make out a facie case of lack in essence the examiner telling Hyatt to of adequate written description, thus shift- point to written description support in the 29. "Each filing individual associated with the individual patentability to be material to 1.56(a). prosecution application of a defined in this has a section.” 37 C.F.R. duty good dealing candor and faith in Information “cumulative to information al- Office, duty which includes to disclose ready patenta- of record” is not “mаterial to all Office information known to that 1.56(b). bility.” 37 C.F.R. many clearly appear limitations do not ver- Hyatt, for his claims. howev- specification though he er, cooperate, to even in specification. refused batim Before the necessarily possessed the information Board, showing Hyatt submitted table the time he filed his sought by examiner some, all, of where but not the substituent application. found, words these limitations could be many but this table was for limitations of facts, court’s exclu- the district

On these help support must af- no locating be whatsoever Hyatt’s new evidence sion court found that The district claim limitations at If the firmed. issue.32 failing to submit “negligent” was Hyatt wrong, Hyatt Board was was because Hyatt in the disclosed decla- the evidence kept by it in the not purposefully dark obligat- he was to the PTO because ration possession within presenting evidence his so, opportunity he a fair to do ed to do had rejections to overcome the examiner’s so, adequate give expla- he failed description. lack of written This blatant Hyatt it. for his failure to submit nation non-cooperation Allowing was willful. *3, II, 5-7. 2005 WL Howev- consequences Hyatt escape the of his er, Hyatt it is clear from the record his timely refusal submit own informa- in his provide refused to evidence willfully required by tion to the PTO that he was by a valid action possession response requested by law and the examiner to provide a refusal to the examiner. Such hardly submit would be with the consonant grounds possessed which one evidence legislative purpose APA or the 145.33 evi- in Barrett exclude withheld Similarly, that in light we hold dence. B. here, the non-cooperation willful Hyatt’s Hyatt arguments why its discretion court did not abuse makes four as to district excluding declaration.31 responsive present refusal to evidence not bar from pre- PTO should him pri- rebutting Instead of examiner’s (1) senting his declaration district court: case that the claims were not ma facie presented the Board’s decision description, written supported adequate grounds rejection beyond those digging Hyatt argued that the burden examiner thus he was on notice specification re- through 238-page (2) examiner, he though required; even that such evidence was mained on "weight” pages through appears on leave to cases consideration of 31. We future "processor” pages through may be on 98. To excluded whether suggest helpful determining type grounds of refusal at issue Table-1 is other than the specification support where for these here and Barrett. limitations be found borders on insolent. example, could no 32. For the examiner find *28 Hyatt’s specification distinguishable 33. The case is from support in for "block instant Burlington Quigg, up- language. we boundary smoothing” claim J.A. Industries where Table-1, a According ap- held district court's reversal to “block” 20-21. rejections by pages through 83 action claim the PTO. 822 pears and 128 on 164; 1581, 1582, (1987). "boundary” pages We noted that through on 14 and once, 41; largely decision "smoothing” page on 232. district court’s was based and (which testimony "boundary” on live was unavailable dur- words and J.A. if, PTO) by ing proceedings “smoothing” separated two before and are almost Similarly, reached pages. stat- such circumstances district court hundred examiner PTO, specifica- different from of the support in the conclusion ed he could find no legislative purpose contrary "quantization weighting "that not for the claimed tion Indeed, Table-1, it is According “quantiza- of section 145 de novo review. processor.” purpose.” through of that Id. at 1584. appears pages 231 fulfillment tion” on prior was unaware to this court’s decision that the gone beyond Board have Hyatt I that he bore the burden of scope rejections of the examiner’s explanation or producing regard to rebut to the claim limitation “making a rejec- description examiner’s written product in response image information.” (3) tions; since the Board reversed the II, Hyatt See 2005 WL at *6. rejections examiner’s for 38 of the 117 However, correctly as the district court claims, rejected providing his efforts at ruled, the Board’s rationale as to these evidence to the Board must also have been claims not a ground rejection was new claims; remaining reasonable as to the simply because it was response argu- (4) expertise he relied on the of the by Hyatt ments raised briefing reasonably PTO thus believed that the Thus, the Board. See id. at *5-6. he had require PTO did not this evidence. We to, did, the opportunity argu- make argument address each in turn. ground. ments as to this Hyatt argued for the first time to the Board that written First, agree we with the district court description support existed in specifi- that the Board decision did not any include “signal” cation because a “prod- could be a II, ground rejection. new Hyatt See uct,” rejected and the Board that view. WL *6. The district court Therefore, reject Hyatt’s argument we correctly noted applicant that an must that the declaration must be admit- have an opportunity respond to new ted to him opportunity afford to re- grounds rejection relied on spond to grounds the Board’s new for re- Kronig, Board. See In re (CCPA 1976). jection because we hold that 1302-03 the Board did But whether a present any not grounds. new ground rejection depends is “new” on whether had a “fair opportu Second, reject we Hyatt’s argument that nity to react to rejection.” the thrust of the the timing of our in Hyatt decision I in Here, Id. reviewing after the Board deci 2007 provide excuses his failure to sion rejections examiner, and the we Hyatt I, declaration to the In Hyatt PTO. agree with the district court the we held that an examiner can shift the rely any Board did not ground new proof burden of showing adequate writ- rejection. fifty-nine For of the seventy- description by ten identifying specific issue, nine claims still at both the Board claim limitations clearly stating and the exаminer relied on the same ratio despite reviewing specification, he nale, namely that one or more claim limita could not find support for those limita- they tions—which expressly identified— tions. 492 F.3d at 1370-71. We relied are not adequately disclosed or supported directly Alton, on our 1996 decision in description. the written While the which very stated the same rule a decade often, Board’s explanations though were earlier. See 76 F.3d at 1175. We then always, detailed, more the “thrust” of compared the Alton rule to MPEP rejections these was identical to that of the § 2163.04(I)(B), which we held was a law- examiner’s corresponding rejections. The ful I, articulation of the Alton rule. Hyatt Board cannot be said to presented have a 492 F.3d at 1370-71. Both Alton and ground rejection simply by elabo 2163.04(I)(B) MPEP were effect at all rating rejection on the examiner’s application times the '702 pending be- *29 using Oetiker, different words. See In re Thus, Hyatt fore the clearly PTO. (Fed.Cir.1992). 1443, 1445-46 notice of obligation provide his to claims, For the remaining twenty or explanation claims to the examiner to rebut the 153 through the district court noted description rejections. written His failure that, expertise, his he could not despite thus cannot be to from 1997 to 2002 do so I Hyatt identify description the had not for support to fact that written nu- attributed yet decided. then been merous claim limitations. It was in- Hyatt to cumbent on either cite where

Third, district court agree we with the support could be found in the written de- thirty-eight Board’s reversal that the it to scription required or amend add the description rejec- written the examiner’s I, support. Hyatt at 1371. Hyatt acted rea- not establish tions does regard seventy-nine sonably to the with sum, Hyatt presents acceptable In no II, Hyatt not See rejections reversed. present failure to properly excuse for his As the at *6. district 2005 WL his declaration to the PTO. observed, the correctly Board’s re- Hyatt willfully respond That refused own solely based on its inde- versals were description rejec- to the written examiner’s pendent analysis of the claims and written specifi- out in the pointing tions where expressly Id. The Board stat- description. his support cation claims could be not, not, rely on it did and could ed that primary found reason we affirm the Hyatt, specifically provided by anything Hyatt district court’s exclusion of the dec- provide any Table-1 not noting that did Hyatt, laration. failure of who This information. 11600-01. helpful J.A. a patent agent time had been for over assessments of the agree We twenty perform simple task years, court; Ta- the district neither Board and that it burden is inex- perform was his *30 1278

The majority (Fed.Cir.1998). dissent also characterizes the Corp., 149 F.3d opinion standing something as it context, that In the in the absence of does not: that evidence must be excluded evidence, new the district court must enter simply because it could have present- been judgment for the Director if the Board’s ed to the PTO. Dissent In- See at 1284. findings regarding adequate the lack of stead, merely we have reached the unre- written description are supported by sub- markable conclusion that it is unreasonable Curtis, stantial evidence. See re Congress believe intended to allow a (Fed.Cir.2004) (whether 145 action to intro- written description adequately supports duce regard new evidence with no whatso- fact); Mazzari, claims is issue of PTO, ever as to his before conduct (absent evidence, at 1004-05 PTO that, specifically, Congress did not intend fact-finding reviewed under substantial ev- owed,34 requested and will- actions). idence standard in fully withheld from the PTO must never- Hyatt argues that the Board’s decision theless be admitted in a 145 action. supported by was not substantial evidence appears dissent also to misappre- because the record before the Board cited is, import hend the of Alton. There and contained adequate written description Alton, only one acceptable response to a for all rejected claims the Board. description rejection: written showing the When closely, however, examined more examiner where column and line num- Hyatt’s arguments rely entirely almost ber in the specification may he find written earlier, Table-1. As noted simply Table-1 description support disputed for each claim lists certain individual words used within Here, limitation.35 only Hyatt’s limitations, various multi-word the number response to the written description rejec- of times each appears such word completely tions wholly inadequate, specification, and “representative” pages in was willfully so. He simply refused to the specification where each word appears respond required as by Alton to the re- (or, many cases, simply states that the quests of the examiner for citations to the appears word “throughout” specifica- specification, and clearly he did so deliber- tion). For example, certain claims were ately, impeding thus the examination the rejected lacking description written PTO legally required to conduct. support for a “processor responsive to an

IV. accessed block of video pixel image infor- ¶ mation.” J.A. 10643 15. Table-1 indi- Hyatt Since did not any offer oth cates that “block” was used over 80 times er action, evidence in his the district on at pages least 25-83 and 128-164 of correctly reviewed the Board’s deci specification; sion “information” solely on the was used over record before the Board. “throughout” We review a times grant specification; district court’s of sum mary judgment novo, de “video” was applying exactly eight used times on at same 77, 166, standards pages 168-71; the district court. least etc. J.A. Ethicon ‍​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical not, however, 10832. Table-1 does explain 34. The dissent's claim that we hold that complains Hyatt's The dissent about bur- " to, responding 'owed' the den of possesses PTO all evidence as the dissent he calculates it, separate rejections.” "2546 responsive Dissent at rejection,” to a Dissent at 1279- acknowledge 1288. The dissent does not added, (emphasis omitted), citation is over- proportional Hyatt’s prosecution this is broad and illustrates the dissent’s misunder- application containing pending claims standing holding. of our spanning pages. See J.A. 10411-89.

1279 withholding willful or findings indicating individual occurrences any of these how fact, suppression; the dis- “pro- discloses a intentional substituent words these not even conclude that Mr. accessed trict court did responsive block cessor gross negli- image information.” The same conduct amounted pixel Hyatt’s video Hyatt’s arguments each of rather excluded the evidence gence, exists in but defect we are not and so a have” standard. relying negligence on Table-1 “could any by stage them. the even persuaded argue, Nor did PTO Hyatt’s con- proceedings, these that Mr. addition, Hyatt points to repeatedly in this case was willful or intentional. duct printed specifica- raw source code Nonetheless, majority the concludes that of his disclosing as various features tion “owed,” Maj. Op. at self-serving attorney from claims. Aside possesses he re- PTO all evidence that is points to no Hyatt evidence arguments, rejection to a and that failure to sponsive the district court or this that would enable duty” created newly fulfill this “affirmative source to determine whether withholding as matter amounts willful these actually does disclose features. code only possible ways are of law. There two Moreover, unsupported he made the same majority’s interpret willful withhold- PTO, and its despite arguments ing majority determination. Either is them to be un- expertise the PTO found engaging appellate finding fact or it is determining whether the written helpful determining newly that breach of its creat- supported description adequately duty withholding is ed affirmative willful agree We therefore claims issue. matter law. latter as a The leaves no that the Board’s decision the district court finding room for fact in individual cases supported substantial evidence. completely away takes the discretion error in the district court’s There was no Ultimately, from the trial court. the ma- summary judgment. grant jority’s sweeping exclusionary' rule far is CONCLUSION anything argued by par- broader than ties. above, stated the dis- For reasons summary grant judgment is

trict court’s has Supreme Court character- While that proceeding ized the 145 action as AFFIRMED. fact, necessarily, part “in is MOORE, dissenting. Judge, Circuit patent,” the hallmark of application for proceeding 145 in the district court majority away ap- takes “all competent evidence” shall be to a ac- right “civil plicant’s fundamental subject ordinary only to course heard “the patent” granted by tion to obtain [a] equity practice procedure.” Gandy Today U.S.C. Congress 35 Marble, 432, 439, 122 7 S.Ct. U.S. patent applicant that a majority decides (1887); L.Ed. see also Butterworth not introduce the invеntor’s declara- may Hoe, ex rel. v. United States U.S. the dis- proceeding tion in a before (1884). L.Ed. be 5 S.Ct. To inventor had an trict court because the clear, argue Mr. does not duty” “obligation” to dis- “affirmative entirely are are actions de novo trials that PTO. failure close this His evidence separate proceedings. from PTO Mr. duty, not dis- to fulfill his affirmative only Hyatt argues he have closing evidence could disclosed §a action. ac- PTO, be admitted in He being results such evidence (sub- knowledges that deferential pro- review from the district court excluded evidence) given to Board fact no fact stantial ceeding. The district court made *32 § findings pro- absent new evidence in to a right civil action the district pertaining also that ceedings and evidence right distinct from appeal. court their to new issues cannot be See introduced. obligation It protect is our to the distinc- 1/5, 8, 14-15; 10-11, Appellant’s Br. see Congress § tion codified in not to Conservolite, Widmayer, 21 also Inc. v. reweigh the virtues of decision. that The (Fed.Cir.1994) (holding that in a § proceeding is a civil action and action, § to new pertaining ought governed to be by the same Federal that the PTO issues were raised before Rules Evidence govern that other civil excluded). may be need, actions. Patent cases do not nor majority’s decision to affirm the they have, special should rules of evidence. district court’s exclusion of the inventor’s Section titled action to “Civil obtain § own action declaration a 145 civil se- patent,” provides: verely rights Congress restricts the that applicant An dissatisfied the deci- patent, making afforded this applicants, sion Board of Appeals Patent proceeding more of an than the new appeal Interferences in an appeal under section contemplated civil action and enacted 134(a) of this title unless may, Moreover, Congress. by concluding that has been taken to the United States an an duty” inventor has “affirmative of Appeals Court for the Federal Cir- response submit his to a own declaration cuit, have remedy by action against civil PTO, rejection by the prevented he lest be the Director in the United States Dis- admitting any from the material in subse- Court trict for the District of Columbia quent major- court proceeding, district if commenced within such time after ity impossible makes it for inventors to decision, such sixty days, not less than testify ever in a 145 action unless their testimony as the Director proffered appoints. had first been The court agree PTO. I cannot that was what may adjudge applicant this that such is enti- Congress contemplated when it enacted patent invention, tled receive a for his I and therefore dissent. specified any of his claims involved in the decision of the Board of Patent Hyatt’s I. Mr. Declaration Not Should Be Interferences, Appeals and as the facts Excluded may in the case appear adjudi- and such Congress permit- enacted a statute that cation shall authorize the Director to gave ted “civil action” and patent appli- such issue on compliance with the right present cants the new evidence requirements of expenses law. All the a trial in district despite that this of the proceedings paid by shall be right would allow applicant to intro- applicant. duce they “evidence that could have added). (emphasis 35 U.S.C. brought PTO, in before” the potentially distinguishes The statute itself the ap- resulting in “dragging opponent an peal pursuant be brought to 35 through a second time.” To Amend Sec- § 141 U.S.C. because a 145 action is not tion 52 Judicial Code and Stat- Other appeal; is a “civil action.” The stat- utes Affecting Procedure in Patent Office: obligates ute adjudi- district court to Hearings H.R. on 6252 and H.R. 7087 Comm, cate the facts in this civil action. Because Patents, the H. 69th Before limitations (1926) statute affords no (statement on the Cong., 1st Sess. 80-81 Robertson, type Hon. E. of evidence that to be ought admissi- Thomas Commissioner Patents) To ble in a civil brought [hereinafter Amend Section action Congress granted patent applicants 52]. the standard Federal Rules of Evidence bring allows the in evi- ought gov- which all civil actions govern brought of 145 he could have legislative histories dence ern. The before statute, the PTO, 4915 of Congress adopt ap- section decided to predecessor its Statutes, Paul, and without repeatedly Revised proach. Mr. A.C. Chairman the intent indicate contradiction the Legislation Patent Section of Commit- patent applicant permit Congress was Association, the American Bar made tee of *33 upon a new bring a new suit built to that understood section clear he too leading to the Pat- testimony In record. introduction of new evidence: permit the Pat- the of ent Act of Commissioner our committee would have the While as one to a section suit ents referred start novo the of case de after decision proceed “de applicant an would where and the the board ... difference would ” court, right “to in with novo district ap- be then if we went the court of in “fur- up bring new and build a record” an decision must be peals in might put that ther evidence I have the same If upon go based record. we trail drag you through another before and equity parties may into a court of To at 79- court.” Amend Section [sic] they that have in the use record of Patents was The Commissioner may supplement Patent Office and statute, this opposition in testifying additional evidence. in court. He this civil action the district Similarly, Congressman at 81. Id. Albert this permits this that testified that statute party H. Vestal that “if a stated feels oppo- “dragging results in an “new record” bring he can his suit in the aggrieved, a time.” Id. at 80. through nent second court, it is equity appeal. but not It is fact, a these he articulated concerns bringing of a new Id. at 36.1 suit.” time, al- noting that statute second Howson, E. Chairman of Charles Com- testimony а to “file lowed patent on mittee Patent Law Revision for the they in that could have bringing evidence Association, American Bar who was the not but did brought [the PTO] in before that “chairman of the committee drew before, a man bring dragging in and after bills” explained: these have through procedure you which all is advantage The of section 4915 that it just complicated so and burden- said is interest, some, court, bring party desiring enables the start de novo in and first Id. at a testimony patent, not taken the time.” obtain to take evidence in a (statement 81; Karl see id. at 76 of also or business it is to court tribunal whose Fenning, Commissioner Former Assistant wp facts and make a try issues of record Patents) thing to (arguing that “the best he in addition to has been enabled entirely cut for ex do be to out 4915 would the examiners in the Patent to furnish encourage appli- parte applications” to a Office, get therefore before court and testimony pertinent cant to in all “put jurisdiction competent everything PTO). to his ease” before the rights every connected with his and fact patent; connected other Despite being presented policy with the action, words, permitting everything not have him reasons for civil before Walker, was before the Patent Of- Albert H. The Law Pat- consider whatever 1. See also 1917) ("In (5th ed. proceedings ents Inventions resulted in the fice in which a bill in order to decide issues such grant patent.... proceeding, refusal court, section, equity is treated in this however, revisory of the Patent Office pending, testimony, where will take the bill original equi- proceeding, but is an suit in evidence, according any other admissible ty...."). equity; will also to the course of courts of country them prior courts in the have that excluded evidence before infringement cases. act did so a hodgepodge (diligence, different standards intentional added); at 21 (emphasis Id. see also To faith). suppression Congress bad could Amend the Statutes the United States implicitly adopted not have all of these as to Procedure Patent Office Comm, Indeed, differing Congress standards. Hearing the Courts: did S. Before Patents, Cong., type 13-14 not limit the 69th 2d Sess. (1926) Barnett) (statement (Pur- of Otto R. patent applicant may precisely introduce 4915, you may suant to section file an because it civil intended for a action under - want “you action the district if now upon to be based a new bring things out new record to new devel- evidence, if record even that new oped your patent, you in lieu of that *34 could brought evidence have been before Now, may it file a new suit.... when came Congress PTO. that the intended the dis- cases, parte to ex comparatively § trict in a every- court 145 action have simple say to that the individual inventor that a thing court would have in in- may may he his appeal, or start new fringement standard, suit. this Under ‘Well, somebody suit.... may want to certainly Congress intended for an inven- start a and bring new suit out other and tor, as Mr. Hyatt, permitted such to be to said, things.’ right, new we ‘All So take in § introduce own declaration a 145 your choice; suit, on go with a new or action.2 ”). appeal.’ Moreover, to applicants deter from ex- These numerous confirm statements actly type the procedural gaming that Congress that statute, when enacted this § the majority, imposes concerns 145 on which limit does not the that evidence heavy the the economic applicant burden be in introduced this “new suit” or “civil of paying expenses the pro- “[a]ll action,” did Congress purpose so with this ceedings.” 35 U.S.C. 145. This burden and intent. The majority attempts to encourages applicants present their best (as sweep away of the legislative history all responsibility case to PTO to avoid “anachronistic”) claiming that mere ex- expenses all in a proceeding. 145 To istence of “suggests Congress Barrett that type this allow of evidence these civil approved of cases holding patent was a policy actions decision committed applicants present not could to a district to the solely Congress, discretion of which they court evidence but should have did it duly made. present Maj. to the Patent Office.” only majority Not does the decision con- Op. at prob- 1271-73. There are several interpretation flict with the proper theory. First, lems with parties this 145, but it is agree also conflict with and Su- Congress clearly stated preme jurisprudence Court patent point. 1952 act made no substantive Supreme changes 16; The Court repeatedly 4915. See Br. has Appellant’s and 45; Appellee’s S.Rep. spoken Br. without limitation to an applicant’s No. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted “present right 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. evidence that 2394, Second, 2400. even the few courts did not present the PTO. 1303, 2. The sup- Federal Rules of Phillips Evidence do not Corp., AWH 415 F.3d 1317 v. port majority's (Fed.Cir.2005) (en (claim banc) construction); exclusion of inventor state- 1321, testimony ments. regularly Goldfarb, (Fed. Inventor is Cooper admit- v. 154 F.3d 1330 Cir.1998) (reduction infringement ted in cases practice); Symantec for various reasons: Labs., Wang Int’l, Inc., v. Corp., Computer Inc. Toshiba 993 F.2d Corp. v. Assocs. 858, (Fed.Cir.1993) (written 1279, (Fed.Cir.2008) description); 866 (conception). jurisdiction original equity different under presence of such laws, of the district according ordinary makes factfinder Zurko, 527 U.S. judge.” Dickinson v. equity practice procedure. course of 144 L.Ed.2d 143 S.Ct. It not a appeal technical from the (1999). re- Supreme jurisprudence Court patent-office, like that authorized in sec- §a strong distinction between flects tion confined to case as made per- is not appeal, in which new evidence office, record pre- but is mitted, its precur- 145 action and pared upon competent evi- heard all sors, freely evidence is ad- which new adduced, upon dence the whole mer- 145—like mitted. A civil action its. been the uniform and Such has it and unlike an equity the bill before practice in the circuit correct courts. original, “the аppeal exercise —is Miner, v. F. Whipple In jurisdiction.” re appellate, other (C.C.D.Mass.1883); parte Squire, Ex Hien, 432, 438, 17 166 U.S. S.Ct. Shaw, 133; Ban. & A. Butler 21 F. (1897). defining A difference L.Ed. 1066 equity and the bill in between an Butterworth, 112 U.S. S.Ct. of new evidence: the introduction added). (emphasis rights It is that alternative evident Butterworth, Supreme *35 Court held an applicant, review are accorded —one that a section 4915 action should be heard the by to United States Court of appeal evidence,” competent gov- “all which is Appeals, the and Patent other Customs ordinary the “according erned to course of in by equity bill in filed one the procedure.” equity practice and Id. The In the first the federal district courts. majority explains competent that evidence summary solely and on the hearing is evidence, synonymous is with admissible Office; in in made the Patent the record 12, Maj. Op. see at 1260 n. but suggests proof trial is afforded on other a formal Supreme that the Court was silent on what pre- may evidence not which include (admissible). competent evidence was sented in the Patent Office. fact, in preceding the sentence Butter- Coe, 83, 79, Hoover v. 325 U.S. 65 S.Ct. Co. explained admissibility that the or worth (1945) (citation 955, 89 L.Ed. omit- competence “according is to determined 87, ted); (explaining id. 65 S.Ct. 955 ordinary equity practice the course history makes legislative that the clear (i.e. Rules of Evi- procedure” the Federal to “liti- Congress that intended save Procedure). Butterworth, and Civil dence new gants option producing the evi- 61, Evidence is U.S. 5 S.Ct. 25. court, retaining equity in the by dence in a 145 civil action limited admissible Wooster, v. procedure”); see Hill also only ordinary the by rules of evidence and 693, 697, 10 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. procedure that to all civil actions. apply (1890) (“The opinion of the circuit court majority reading The claims Butter- ... and states that considerable discusses holding worth as that evidence is admissi- produced the court evidence was before only by ble in a 145 civil action limited patent-office.”). which not before the ordinary proce- the rules of evidence distinguished And has Supreme the Court apply all civil actions con- dure that is in equity from the bill 145): trary (the Supreme to the Court’s decision precursor section 4915 However, very quote in Gandy. Gan- thereby provided [in It is section 4915] dy proposi- cites majority that the remedy applicant may by that the have tion, Maj. Op. at reaffirms this hold- equity. proceeding bill in This means a ing The fact that having in a of Butterworth. court the United States is, “proceeding, necessarily, fact and a 145 actions which courts district con- part application patent,” sidered evidence could new have been contrary. not to cases presented The endorsed to the was only PTO but first Butterworth, by Supreme See, Court in like presented e.g., district court. itself, Supreme Court hold that Fregeau Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d section action in which any (Fed.Cir.1985) is one (applicant submitted be admitted: expert setting new declaration forth аddi- seem, therefore,

It that the theory would course tional data and new to the district elear-viz., proceeding either case is court); Corp. Titanium Metals Am. v. equity.” (Fed.Cir.1985) “according Banner, (new course 778 F.2d 775 Even in explicit the absence of these court); expert testified district Gould v. terms it be that a apparent (Fed.Cir.1987) would suit in (both Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074 equity governed have to would be its and the PTO offered proceedings equity rules.... expert testimony); new v. Rogan, Mazzari provisions of the congress, acts of al- (al- (Fed.Cir.2003) 323 F.3d 1004-05 to, ready allowing party referred large lowing a volume of new evidence bill, failing application, in his file do applicants offered the PTO court, the hearing, restrict in this to including experts prior art refer- testimony used before the commis- ences); also Royalty see Winner Int’l therefore, sioner. Either party, is at Wang, Corp. v. 202 F.3d 1346-48 liberty evidence, to introduce additional (Fed.Cir.2000) (allowing new evidence of rather, speak accurately, more commercial success to be introduced in the altogether hearing independent Genentech, of district proceedings); commissioner, and takes before Inc. Corp., v. Chiron *36 place testimony parties on such as the (Fed.Cir.2000) four (permitting new ex- may produce see to agreeably to the fit perts testify despite to fact that the none rules practice equity. and a court of any testimony by them had offered dec- parte Squire, Ex 22 F. Cas. 1017 laration, affidavit, or during pro- otherwise (C.C.E.D.Mo.1877) (No. 13,269) (emphasis PTO). ceedings at the have repeated- We added).3 case, This which on very ly a applicant held that 145 is “entitled” point Supreme the Court held was “cor- to and “choose” may to introduce addition- rect,” that only holds the limitations on Mazzari, al evidence. See 323 F.3d at may evidence that be introduced in these (“A 1004-05 section ... 145 review affords proceedings are those limitations that arise the an applicant present to opportunity under the normal rules—in this case the additional argue previous evidence or the Federal Rules Evidence. See id. afresh,” evidence the parties and “[i]f

The majority importance present discusses the choose to additional evidence to of preserving settled expectations. Our the district court ... the district court own precedent replete is examples of would de findings.”). make novo factual Shaw, 3. See jurisdiction also Butler v. F. ordinary "a suit the within (C.C.D.Mass.1884) (distinguishing between equity courts statute of the ... the contains patent applicant's right the appeal to where provision requiring no the case to be heard strictly appeal “that court acts as a court of upon produced the evidence before the com- hearing summary, the matter ... is and is missioner ... as has been in this held specific appeal, confined to the reasons circuits, other the court receive new evi- produced to the evidence before the commis- dence, powers and has the same as in other patent applicant's right sioner” and the to file equity”). cases in equity” “bill in under section which is (citation omitted). (Fed.Cir. These Id. at 1579 cases 877 F.2d 1575 Quigg, Newman great magnitude of the ma- illustrate 1989), could intro held that PTO we departure practice from decades of jority’s declarations, reports, new duce several in which believed such evi- parties both during PTO not submitted affidavits majority’s dence admissible. The decision explaining: proceedings §in excluding to start evidence 145 ac- statute, legislative contrary tions is to the action under 35 U.S.C. A court district precedent, history, Supreme Court and the of pat- is a de novo determination long-standing practice considering such It to the rec- entability. is not limited in our cases.4 evidence a party PTO. Unless is ord before the II. New for Excluding The Alton Rule thereby process or prejudiced due Evidence denied, justice is better expeditious lengthy hodge- After discussion by avoiding artificial restrictions served podge applied of standards that were authority to district court’s re- on the regional circuits that had few excluded reasonably raised all issues solve proceedings, evidence from district court proceeding. majority affirms the district court’s authority, exclusion of evidence.5 The ac- credibility majority Although or raised or resolve issues as the 4. not considered below parties appeal, majority argued by Maj. Op. on asserts. at 1270-71. requires "[s]ome that APA re contends regional 5. To the extent circuits or lower that ability applicant of an strictions actions, evidence courts excluded 145 action.” evidence introduce disagreement as there is considerable that, Maj. Op. doubt at 1270. There little govern ought standard the exclusion of matter, applies to general the APA PTO as a (gross negligence, such evidence intentional Zurko, U.S. at 119 S.Ct. actions. faith, negligence/dili suppression, bad acknowledged But Zurko See, Int'l, Inc., gence). e.g., Case v. CPC applicants "present allows 1984) ("We (Fed.Cir. are aware present did presence provision varying new or differ that this has received inter the PTO. such view, pretations ent evidence makes a factfinder of district in the circuits. In our since judge.” Id. at S.Ct. 1816. And in a hy an action under 35 U.S.C. 146 has the applicability considering the of Zurko to novo, case a trial de brid nature *37 145, § "[a] we stated section 145 review that the the authorizes district court to statute appeal in is from a section 141 that distinct proffered testimony accept all on issues raised applicant opportunity pres the to affords by during parties proceedings the the below previous argue ent additional evidence or the (emphasis by or the board’s decision.” add Mazzari, at afresh.” F.3d evidence 323 1004. fact, ed)). negligence/diligence In the stan the While Zurko concerned stan Mazzari recently applied rejectеd dard in this case was review, the cases APA dard of both considered by very from which this the proceeded cases on the uncontrover and both comes: applicant premise sial that the can "choose” matter, a the Court must As threshold present to "new or different evidence” in a may, plaintiff determine whether under Further, explained § as in detail 145 action. 145, Section offer the four new declarations supra, legislative history language and the previously submitted to the Board.... not support admissibility § resoundingly the 145 that Court Defendant contends should Chandlery § evidence in 145 actions. of new Cf. new not consider these declarations be- 862, Roudebush, 425 U.S. 96 S.Ct. v. they previously submitted to cause were (1976) (“Here, by 48 L.Ed.2d 416 con There is no indication here the Board.... trast, statutory 'specific is a authoriza there plaintiff's failure to introduce the four action,' a district court 'civil which tion’ of fraud, to the rises level bad declarations faith, plain language of and the both the the statute gross negligence. or legislative history reveal be a trial de to Defendant, however, points novo.”). to a handful new evi The APA does not limit Court, testimony adopted proceeding § cases in this which have in a to live dence 145 1286 Alton, majority, to

cording majority is In re The uses to Alton create an (Fed.Cir.1996). The ma duty” “affirmative with which appli- jority failing holds that to offer comply. cants must does not justify Alton PTO, testimony Hyatt has failed to duty. propo- this new Alton stands for the affirmative satisfy duty.” “an and specific sition when the examiner makes a Maj. In Op. way, at 1248. this this new prima facie case for his written description prosecution to duty affirmative seems rejection, coming burden of forward conduct, though inequitable resemble here (burden argument with evidence or of pro- applicant penalized regardless is duction) Alton, shifts to applicant. majority explains: their intent. The And, F.3d at 1175. true whether “Hyatt obligated to to respond was rejecting examiner is claim on the description rejection by examiner’s written obviousness, anticipation, basis of enable- Alton, (Fed.Cir. In re 76 F.3d ment, any written or description other rea- 1996),by explaining where in specifica Oetiker, son. See re support tion each of these limitations (Fed.Cir.1992) (“[T]he examiner Maj. Op. could be found.” at 1274.6 The burden, bears the initial on review of the majority “Hyatt clearly continues: on prior art or on any ground, other of pre- obligation provide notice of his to evidence prima senting unpatentabili- facie case explanation or examiner rebut met, ty. If that burden is the burden of rejections,” description Maj. Op. written coming forward with argument evidence or required “he was law” to applicant.”); shifts to see also Manual provide Maj. Op. it. all 1275. due With Patent Examination Procedure of ¶ respect majority, I do not believe (8th ed., 2008); I.A (pat- rev. id. duty” new “affirmative is war disclose subject matter), § entable (utility), 2107.02 ranted, nor I believe Hyatt do was “re (inherent (ob- anticipation), quired by “obligated” provide or law” viousness), (written description), 2163.04 his declaration to the PTO. Mr. While (enablement), § 2164.04 (equiva- Hyatt may have failed to overcome the lents). rejections Once the prima examiner makes a or to convince the Board based case, upon facie then PTO, his submissions to the he has the bur- did not fail to fulfill an “obligation” coming “affir den of forward evidence to duty” majority mative alleges. prima showing. rebut that facie stringent an even more majority suggests standard for the only there one new way respond consideration of description evidence. Defendant rejec- to a written Dudas, ("There is, primarily relies Maj. Op. in which tion. at 1278 Judge Kennedy only declined to acceptable response consider Alton one to a writ- "negligently description rejection: showing submitted after the *38 ten the exam- end of proceedings.” by administrative This iner where column and line number in the articulation of the "new specification may evidence” standard description he find written represents significant departure limitation.”). a support disputed from the for each claim and, guidelines plaintiff argues, PTO’s respect, With all due not this correct. Writ- would "render an description rejections 145 ... ten by can be addressed nearly indistinguishable ap- arguing, example, from a direct the that examiner failed Circuit, peal case, to the Federal prima by would ren- to forth a set facie amend- ment, claim, der the purpose duplicative adjusting statute priority a or meaningless.” pointing The Court de- therefore out common alternative definitions adopt Hyatt clines to the standard for con- claim ordinary for a term known to one of sidering new evidence in this simply case. skill in the art. way There is not one Dudas, Hitachi v. Koki F.Supp.2d respond, Co. an can or must and we (D.D.C.2008) (citations omitted). micromanage prosecution. should not majori- at If shifting other. Id. 34-35. burden occurs Because the same every rejection an regard type ty withholding to would like willful stan- with makes, duty this new affirmative examiner fact applied findings dard be and for to to description to the written is not limited must accordingly, be made vacate and if in Alton. Hence reviewed issue court to remand for the district do so affirmative shifting creates “an burden the first instance. Because willful with- duty comes into duty” then this affirmative parties argued by not or holding was every time examiner makes existence court, by the district we as an considered I rejects claims. facie case prima simply court cannot know the appellate per rule that an agree se cannot that on the volume of evidence exist willfully to with- applicant is deemed have judge to Mr. position issue nor are we during prose- possessed he anything held credibility. Hyatt’s rejection responsive to a that was cution troubling majority’s I charac- find applicant’s actual intent. regardless of See, Maj. Hyatt. е.g., terizations of Mr. always requires intent and is Willfulness (Mr. Op. “Hyatt purposefully kept at 1275 majority’s compatible with the simply (his dark”); in the id. “bla- [the Board] liability approach. strict (Mr. at noncooperation”); tant id. Hyatt’s Mr. Evidence provide III. “Hyatt willfully refused evi- “re- possession”); (Hyatt dence in his id. case, found that In this the district court (“Hyatt’s fused willful cooperate”); id. proffer his declara Hyatt’s Mr. failure (“Hyatt at 1277 non-cooperation”); id. merely negligent. PTO was tion to the refused”); at 1274 Dudas, 03-0901, willfully (providing id. No. WL Hyatt 2005) (D.D.C. simple his have been Sept. 30, *7 declaration “should at II”) (that (“Hyatt’s explain him”); Hyatt’s failure {“Hyatt id. failure earli why he didn’t submit his declaration simple perform “to task it was court and the district need negligent, er is inexcusable”); perform id. burden to submit negligently not consider evidence (“Hyatt’s unhelpfulness”). perverse pro after the end of administrative ted appears in the district court None of this finding has no ceedings.”). There been or the proceedings, proceedings, PTO faith, fraud, withholding, inten willful bad findings ought fact to be left record-these negli or suppression gross tional even court which is the best district argue did not gence this case. PTO contradictory evi- position weigh court or to either the district dence. in this would establish facts case Contrary finding of will- appellate suppression intentional or willful withhold withholding, ample ful the record contains Rather, ar ing by Hyatt. Mr. PTO withholding. a lack of willful evidence of gued that the facts established Mr. Here, rejected all of Mr. the examiner negligently acted alterna de- Hyatt’s 117 claims for lack written negligently. Appellee’s Br. grossly tive enable, scription, obviousness- failure to fact, argues that Mr. 51-53. PTO (over separate ref- type patenting double or deliberate Hyatt’s focus on “intentional erences), pat- Schneller-type double point.” Appellee’s Br. conduct misses the *39 references). (over enting the same 8 present the case to Scher Analogizing rejected claims antici- examiner also as Marzall, F.Supp. Corp. v. ing reference) and 7 obvious pated {Hill (D.D.C.1951), distinguishes the PTO be references). (over of three a combination hand on the one and suppression tween appealing Mr. Technically, Hyatt without sufficient excuse evidence withheld separate helpful” majority alleges. separate totaling issues re- as the With all facts, jections arguing and no of his claims to the Board. these one willful finding should 129-page withholding, brief we be the He wrote a address- I rejections.7 And, first instance? believe the court ing all of these different is clear, wrong newly to hold breach the to be the reversed all Board the i.e., duty, produc- created affirmative rejections obviousness, an- examiner’s PTO, ing to willful is with- ticipation, obviousness-type patent- double holding as matter law. ing, Schneller-type patenting, double and many description written and en- It helpful compare is to these facts to rejections. regard ablement to the With only one of willful examples with- description rejections in particular, written holding, a court where excluded evidence rejections the Board reversed the of 38 practice assignee of reduction to where rejections claims and sustained the of 79 corporation expressly to refused disclose Hyatt prevailed claims. Mr. on 92% of all and to allow their to witnesses answer rejections the examiner’s Board lev- questions order before PTO in to main- success, el. Despite Hyatt’s Mr. the ma- Barrett, tain a advantage. commercial jority Hyatt’s response Mr. declares to be (“[T]he Company F.2d at 396 Barrett for- “completely wholly inadequate” and answer.”). bade them to Barrett repre- Hyatt Mr. have perversely unhelp- been sents an posi- extreme and unwarranted 1277,1278. ful. Maj. Op. at tion, and majority go chooses to far beyond even that Mr. Hyatt’s standard. With respect description the written hardly conduct here rises to the level of issue, Hyatt responded rejec- Mr. Company. the Barrett There is no evi- majority tions—as the explains' thir- —with Hyatt intentionally dence that Mr. with- ty pages argument six and Table-1. held information to retain some commer- Table-1, While the Board criticizes Rather, cial advantage, as Barrett. Board thirty-eight reversed of the examin- majority concludes that an applicant where rejections er’s for lack of descrip- written fails to position, convince PTO of his he tion and in some upon exactly cases relied is foreclosed from bringing new evi- the information referenced Table-1. dence to further that position §a For example, the support Board found action, regardless of he whether believed “a decompressed data image input video he had adequate submitted evidence to the circuit generating decompressed data im- i.e., regardless applicant’s of in- (in claims) age thirty-three information” on PTO — tent. page 23 the 236-page specification, only

exact and location says where table-1 In hindsight, perhaps Hyatt Mr. should “data compressed” terms and “decom- have submitted his declaration or that of pressed” See, appeared. e.g., Ex Parte any prosecution other expert earlier (B.P.A.I. Hyatt, No. 2000-2049 July process. hindsight But misleadingly 2002) at Although Hyatt 19-20. Mr. expert acute. Declarations reports have failed overcome all of the written consuming are expensive time to pre- rejections description upon based his pare. sub- hardly It is reasonable even de- PTO, missions to he did not require patent fail sirable to applicants put fulfill “obligation” duty,” or “affirmative massive declarations into the record at an certainly and he “perversely was not early stage prosecution, un- weighing the prosecuted Hyatt application 7. Mr. patent patents several to his credit pro suggest se. is not This that Mr. agent. unsophisticated, as he is an inventor with *40 exactly problem gress PTO. foresaw this and the the applicant to cost both Lemley, providing ap- Rational it with Mark A. ameliorated generally See Office, Nw. to a civil plicants way initiate action and at the Patent Ignorance (2003) that (arguing pro- introduce new evidence after Board U.L.Rev. the PTO to overin- are much ceedings inefficient for when the issues more would be patents so few is because consolidated. This illus- vest examination succinct and enforced). case, example, here, perfectly this the applicant are trated where many rejected claims on rejections the contending the examiner with 2546 on was (double on 8 dif- patenting different bases bases the Board. many different before references, obviousness, anticipa- nearly ferent all After the Board overturned etc.), enablement, tion, description, written them, only rejections— a small number of rejections. The separate totaling 2546 on description/enablement— written based It is nearly all of them. Board overturned maintained. Hence district were say hindsight the benefit of to easy with proffer could much more have introduced Hyatt Mr. should more extensive evidence because the uni- description to evidence on written was greatly verse issues narrowed. facing was not Hyatt Board. But Mr. approach Congress This is the sensible he merely description rejection, a written places enacted. The statute the cost even rejections on facing separate was proceeding party on the better posi- majority The many, many different bases. of the applica- tioned know value re- separate asserts that 2546 implausibly majority’s applicant. tion—the The new Hyatt’s jections “proportional prose- is exclusionary upon rule based its new affir- application containing cution of an duty upsets mative balance. Maj. spanning pages.” claims pending CONCLUSION An of 21 average at 1278 n. 35. Op. rejections hardly proportional. claim per ease, majority In this blurs the line appeal inde- was forced to Hyatt Mr. pursuant an between Board when the pendent issues admissibility civil of 145. The action Crouch, average two. D. Under- Dennis exactly of new evidence is what distin- Role the Board Patent standing the § 141. “We guishes 145 from must be 4, available Appeals, in Ex Parte Appeals applicants preserve patent vigilant at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? procedures alternative the law Despite this chal- abstract-id=142392295. preserve and to historical provides, Hyatt largely successful lenge, Mr. Fregeau, 776 distinction between them.” Further, Mr. length appeal. (Newman, J., coneurring-in- at 1041 that his ef- application suggests Hyatt’s history legislative and Su- part). containing certain pinpoint pages forts to make clear that preme precedent Court helpful good faith. Mr. terms was admissibility hallmark is the distinction especially Hyatt’s responsе may have been evidence,” up a competent “all “to build in the time before searchable valuable court,” record,” novo in “to start de applications. electronic testimony file bringing “and evidence they in before brought [the could have Mr. had an affirma- say To This bring but in before.” PTO] did all evidence to the duty tive to introduce action, evidence, civil 1278) in this admissible (Maj. Op. he Board or that “owed” Supreme Court governed be should put he is to possessed all practice proce- by “equity indicated on the and undesirable burden enormous i.e., dure,” Rules of Evidence the Federal one that will foreclose patentee, and Civil Procedure. many inventors. Con- protection for small *41 only presence Since evidence

invokes de novo standard review

(otherwise will give the district court findings

Board fact substantial evidence

deference, Fregeau, 1038), F.2d at see majority’s decision in this case makes virtually indistinguishable 145 action

from an This version contrary

of a “civil action” under 145 is Congressional intent and to the Su-

preme rulings. Court’s While is sound

policy encourage full disclosure to ad- PTO,

ministrative tribunals such as the we body

are not makes decision Congress

of how best do this. held hearings legislation,

numerous over this

considered the concerns permitting over action,

civil and decided the legis- to enact

lation these despite concerns. Hyatt

Mr. did not fail fulfill an affir- duty obligation

mative and he should penalized.

not be I Congress gave believe

Mr. right have own decla-

ration part considered as court, 145 civil action at the district I therefore must dissent from the

majority’s patent appli- constriction of this rights.

cant’s

Philip CUSHMAN, E. Claimant-

Appellant, SHINSEKI, Secretary

Eric K. Affairs, Respondent-

Veterans

Appellee.

No. 2008-7129. Appeals,

United States Court of

Federal Circuit.

Aug. 12, 2009. notes its indicate accompanying ble-1 nor cusable in the circumstances of this case. support can be description written where However, consideration all the facts any of claim limitations at found for including this absence of ade- case— The fact that the substituent words issue. quate Hyatt’s failure explanation individually limitation are used of a claim earlier, present the evidence the form of explain not how specification does (documentary the evidence instead of testi- the claim limita- specification discloses monial), objection the Director’s to the itself, pur- not even tion Table-1 does Hyatt rehearing and his brief declaration all claim port to address of the limitations court, Hyatt’s per- before the district lacking the examiner identified as written unhelpfulness only verse reinforces this Thus, description support. neither — hold conclusion. We that the district court thoroughly ana- laudable efforts to Board’s any legal not did commit error ‍​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍or abuse its lyze in the specification even absence excluding Hyatt’s declaration discretion Hyatt, from nor the limited assistance Hyatt’s present because of failure to provide did Hyatt information Board, evidence earlier. Hyatt provided the indicates that it needed to PTO with information C. his properly patentability assess the fact, anything, claims. if Board’s incorrectly our dissent describes de- of Table-1 demonstrates consideration promulgating “sweeping cision exclu- opportunity properly had sionary at 1279. rule.” See Dissent We provide helpful information to Board “per have adopted “sweeping” se but, identify, for reasons we need not did 1279-80, rule.” 1287. We ex- See id. not. press opinion admissibility as to evi- no variegated dence in the multitude of factu- Lastly, Hyatt’s alleged reliance on the al scenarios that arise future support also fails to expertise PTO clearly today. which dissent claims are decided case. The examiner indicated

Case Details

Case Name: Hyatt v. Doll
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date Published: Aug 11, 2009
Citation: 576 F.3d 1246
Docket Number: 2007-1066
Court Abbreviation: Fed. Cir.
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