37 Cal. 475 | Cal. | 1869
Lead Opinion
The questions arise upon demurrer to the complaint. The following and other subordinate facts are alleged. The allegations, for the purposes of our decision, must be assumed to be true.
On the 24th of March, 1862, the claim to the Soscol Bancho, under the Mexican grant to Vallejo, was rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States, and thereafter, till the passage of the Act of 1863, hereinafter considered, the lands embraced in said rancho, for the purposes of this decision, will be regarded as a part of the public domain of the United States to which the pre-emption laws applicable to the State of California extended. On the 16th of November, 1862, the plaintiff entered upon the Southwest Quarter of Section Twenty-five, Township Four North, Bange Four West, of Mount Diablo meridian and base, being in the County of Napa, and a part of said Soscol Bancho claimed under said grant. He claimed a pre-emption right under the laws of the United States, and, being competent to acquire such right, performed and offered to perform all the conditions prescribed by those laws, so far as they could then be performed. Some two weeks afterward, on the 1st of December, 1862, he was ejected from said premises by force by the defendants, who are purchasers under Vallejo, and he has. since been deterred by threats from continuing his settlement and improvements.
On the 3d of March, 1863, Congress, at the solicitation of defendants and other purchasers from Vallejo, the grantee in said rejected grant, passed a special Act, entitled “ An Act to grant the right of pre-emption to certain purchasers on the Soscol Bancho in California.” Under this Act, the Begister and Beeeiver of the Land Office took testimony as to the settlement and right of pre-emption of the several parties, including plaintiff, and determined their rights; and, on appeal the Secretary of the Interior finally decided, that
The plaintiff, claiming to have acquired a pre-emption right under the general pre-emption laws before the passage of said Act of 1863, thereupon brought this suit, particularly setting forth in his complaint the foregoing and other minor facts, and asked that defendants might be restrained from selling or conveying any portion of said land; that he be adjudged to hold the same in trust for the benefit of plaintiff, and required to convey the same upon payment of the purchase money required by law, and that plaintiff be restored to the possession, etc.
The contest, therefore, arises under the general pre-emption laws of the United States, under which the plaintiff claims, and the said special Act of March 3d, 1863, giving a .special right of pre-emption for a period of twelve months after the return of the surveys to the bona fide purchasers from Vallejo, and their assigns, to the extent of the land which they have reduced to possession.
Two questions arise: Firstly—Does the Act of 1863 attempt to withdraw from the operation of the general pre-emption laws those lands upon which other parties after the rejection of the grant and before the passage of said Act had entered and made pre-emption claims, in accordance with the general pre-emption laws of the United States, and confer the pre-emption right to such lands upon the purchasers from Vallejo ? And secondly—If so, has Congress the power to so withdraw such lands, and cut off the pre-emption right after its inception, but before perfected by payment, and confer the right upon the purchasers from Vallejo ?
The circumstances under which the Act of Congress in question was passed are perfectly notorious, and constitute a part of the history of the State. Eighteen square leagues of land, known as the Soscol Rancho, were claimed under a Mexican grant to Vallejo. It had been divided up and conveyed and reconveyed in numerous parcels to large numbers of citizens of California, who had, to a large extent, reduced it to possession, cultivated it, placed upon it extensive and valuable improvements, and made it the permanent homes of themselves and their families, under the idea that they had a good title. Within its limits were the United States Uavy Yard at Mare Island, and the depot and extensive works of. the Pacific Mail Steamship Company; and two considerable cities had grown up on it, each of which had successively been the capital of the State of California—the inhabitants being purchasers and claimants under Vallejo. A large portion of the inhabitants of one populous county ando of portions of another claimed under, and relied on, title derived from Vallejo, After said lands had thus been occupied and improved, and large portions of them been conveyed and recouveyed for upwards of fifteen years, and the value been largely enhanced by the labor and money of those who thus claimed, in good faith, the grant, after having been confirmed by the Board of Land Commissioners, and the decree of confirmation affifmed by the District Court of the United States on appeal, was in 1862 rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States, which rejection had the effect, in the sorrowful, but forcible, and unfortunately too true language of Mr. Justice Grier, “to confiscate the property of some thousands of our fellow citizens who have purchased under this title and made improvements t.o the value of many millions, on suspicion first raised here as to the integrity of a grant universally acknowledged to be genuine in the country where it originated.’' (United States v.
Soon after the rejection of the grant a multitude of people rushed upon the lands which their neighbors had bought, paid for, improved, occupied, and cultivated for many years, and set up claims to one hundred sixty acres each, under the pre-emption laws of the United States. It "was in view of this condition of things, which is notorious in the political, civil, and judicial history of the State, that the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1863, was passed, and in the light of these surrounding circumstances must it be construed. The Act is entitled “An Act to grant the right of pre-emption to certain purchasers on the Soscol Rancho in California.” Section one provides for extending the lines of the public surveys over the rancho. Section two, “that after the return of such approved plats to the district office, itnnay and shall be lawful for individuals, bona fide purchasers from said Vallejo, or his assigns, to enter, according to the lines of the public surveys, at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, the laud so purchased, to the extent to which the same had been reduced to possession at the time of said adjudication of the Supreme Court, joint entries being admissible by coterminous proprietors to such extent as will enable them to adjust their respective boundaries.” Section three provides for the municipal claims of the two cities situate on the rancho. Section four, for presenting the claims to the Register and Receiver within twelve months after the return of the surveys, “accompanied by proof of bona fide purchase under Vallejo, of settlement, and the extent to which the tracts claimed had been reduced into possession at the time of said adjudication.” Section five provides that such claims as shall not be presented within twelve months “ shall be
We shall freely admit, that, where the language of a private Act is doubtful or ambiguous, or admits of different meanings, that construction will be adopted which is most favorable to the public interests. We do not question the authorities cited on that point. But, in this case, we fail to perceive wherein the meaning of the statute in question, viewed in the light of the condition of things which induced its passage, is doubtful or ambiguous, or how the public interests will be promoted by allowing strangers, under the cloak of a law, the general letter of which, but not the spirit, by accident extends to a case which it would be a libel upon Congress to intimate, or for a moment suppose was ever intended to be embraced in its provisions, to intrude upon lands which others have cultivated and improved for many years, under the belief that they had a good title, protected by the solemn treaty of the Federal Government, and for which they have paid the full value, and to enter the same at a very small fraction of the present value given to it by such labor of others, rather than the party who has honestly labored upon and improved it, and by his labor and money imparted to it by far the greater portion of that present value. Nor do we question the rule adopted in Chotard v. Pope, 12 Wheat. 587, and Lytle v. The State of Arkansas, 9 How. U. S. 333, to the effect that when a party is authorized by an Act of Congress generally to enter “in any land office,” etc., “a quantity of land not exceeding,” etc., he must be limited in his selection to lands subject to location, and cannot take lands already sold, or reserved from sale, or upon which a pre-emption, or some other right, has attached under a law, which is still in force, and which “ covers ” and protects it. The rule is obviously sound. It cannot for a moment be supposed that Congress, by such general Acts,
The object to be accomplished, was, to give those parties who had once paid for their lands the first right to purchase from the Government, at the usual price the lands which they had before actually purchased and paid for in good faith, to the extent to which they had reduced them to possession before their title had been declared void by the Supreme Court. To this end it was provided, that, “it may and shall be lawful for individuals, bona fide purchasers from Vallejo or his assigns, to enter, according to the lines of the public surveys, at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, the land so purchased, to the extent to which the same had been reduced to possession at the time of said adjudication,” etc.
We cannot presume that Congress was unaware that others had, before the passage of the Act, entered upon the former possessors with a view of acquiring the lands by pre-emption. We must presume that that body performed its great public duty, and informed itself fully of the true condition of things before taking final action upon a matter of so great public, as well as private, concern. Is it possible to doubt, in view of the condition of things which called for such legislation, and of the language of the Act passed, so well adapted to the exigencies of the case, that it was intended to give to the bona fide purchasers from Vallejo, and nobody else, the right to enter the lands so purchased to the full extent to which they had reduced them to possession at the time of the adjudication by the Supreme Court, provided they proceeded to perfect their right in the mode and within the time prescribed? Or could Congress, with any show, of
If Congress, instead of describing the land with reference to these defendants, in the language used in the Act, had said it may and shall be lawful for John B. Frisbie to enter, at one dollar twenty-five cents per acre, the southwest quarter of Section Numbered Twenty-five, in Township Numbered Four North, Range Numbered Four West, of Mount Diablo meridian and base, in the County of Napa and State of California, we apprehend that it would not have been contended that Congress did not intend to allow Frisbie to enter that particular piece of land, even if somebody else had, before the passage of the Act, gone upon it with a view of acquiring a pre-emption right. There would have been no possible room for doubt, because the equities in his favor entitled Mm to the consideration of Congress, and he was authorized, in accordance with such equities, to enter that specific piece of land. There would be no chance for selection. He must enter that and nothing else, and it would only be necessary to apply the description to the land to ascertain what specific tract of land was intended. But the description in the Act is just as specific as it is. The party who is entitled to enter the land must be a “ bona fide purchaser from Vallejo, or his assigns,” and the land which he
Of course if Congress intended to give to the bona fide
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the Act in question withdraws the lands which were purchased bona fide from Vallejo and reduced to possession prior to the rejection of the Mexican grant from the operation of the general preemption laws, and confined the right to purchase within the restrictions prescribed in the Act upon such purchasers from Vallejo, or his assigns. We have expressed this view several times before, and should now have been content to refer to the cases of Hastings v. McGoogin, 27 Cal. 85 ; Page v. Hobbs, 27 Cal. 487; Page v. Fowler, 28 Cal. 609, and People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 650, had not eminent counsel elaborately argued the question with great earnestness and apparent confidence, and fortified their position by a more recent decision, which seems to support their view, of a highly respectable Federal tribunal—the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia—in the case of Whitney v. Frisbie, arising under the same Act, involving the same questions, and decided since the publication of our own decisions in the cases cited. But, after a careful review of the question, we are satisfied with our conclusion before attained.
The only other question made by counsel is, did Congress have the power to withdraw these lands from the operation of the general pre-emption laws after a competent party had entered with an intent to claim a pre-emption right, and before the right could be perfected by payment or entry, but while the party was not in default? This presents the naked question of powef, not of the propriety of its exercise, conceding the existence of the power, nor of mere good faith. It is nothing less than a question of power. Congress having determined the question of policy, we have nothing to do
On this point, after stating the withdrawal of the lands of the Soscol Banclio from the operation of the general preemption laws, we said in Page v. Fowler, 28 Cal. 609: “And there can be no doubt, that Congress had the power to thus withdraw the lands from pre-emption and sale, under the general laws, at any time prior to the acquisition by the settler of a right to the lands that he could maintain against the United States, so as to secure ultimately the legal title.” And in People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 650, in ascertaining the character of the interest which a pre-emption claimant has in the land, we expressed the opinion that the land in the occupancy of a pre-emption claimant, and to which a pre-emption right has attached, may be withdrawn from the operation of the preemption laws of Congress at any time before payment has been made for the same to the United States, and referred to Hastings v. McGoogin, and Page v. Hobbs, supra, in which the question was directly made, and, by implication at least, determined. "We also there expressed our approval of the opinion of Mr. Attorney General Speed on this point, given to the Secretary of the Interior for his guidance in disposing of the conflicting claims under the same Acts of Congress now under consideration, and in pursuance of which the Secretary of the Interior acted in making the decision which has given rise to this suit. (11 Opins. Attorneys General, 491.) Upon further consideration we find no reason to modify our views upon the question, but, on the contrary, we are fully satisfied of their entire soundness. Ho proprietary interest in the land, as against the United States, is acquired till payment. The parties embraced within the purview of the general pre-emption laws are simply authorized to enter the lands in preference to others, when the proper time comes, and the lands are thrown open for sale,
The case of Delassus v. United States, 9 Pet. 133, is the case of a Spanish grant protected by the treaty of purchase of Louisiana. It was the case of an inchoate title in the grantee himself, as against the Government, which had already made an incipient grant—a very different thing from a pre-emption right under the pre-emption laws of the United States, in which case the Government has not taken the first step toward making a grant. It has only prescribed a general rule for the government of all persons, and all its officers in the disposition of the public domain. Smith v. The United States, 10 Pet. 330, was a similar case, and Rice v. Railroad Company, 1 Black, 360, was, also, a case of grant for railroad purposes. Neither of these cases therefore affords any aid in the solution of the question now under consideration. If these cases were supposed to lend any support to the conclusions attained by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, with due deference, we are compelled to think their scope and bearing entirely misapprehended.
So the case of McAfee v. Keirn, 7 S. & M. 780, is a case where the pre-emption right, like that in Lytle v. State of Arkansas, was covered by a law then in force, and the patent to the other party was, therefore, issued by the officers of the Government without the authority of any law whatever.
We are at a loss to understand, also, how that learned tribunal could come to the conclusion that the Act of 1863 limited the bona fide purchasers from Vallejo to an entry of one quarter section in one tract in case' of an interference with the claim of some pre-emptioner under the general preemption laws, in the face of the express provision that they might “ enter according to the lines of the public surveys * * * to the extent to which the same had been reduced to possession at the time of the adjudication of said Supreme Court,” and that they were to make proof of the “ extent to which the tracts claimed had been reduced to possession at the time,” etc. To our minds it seems clear enough that the bona fide purchasers under Vallejo and their assigns were authorized to enter all the lands purchased, to the full extent to which the same had been reduced to possession at the time of the rejection of the grant, be it more or less, and without regard to intruders on such possessions. Where a man had in good faith purchased and paid for a thousand acres, reduced it to possession, cultivated and improved it, till he had by his labor, money and inhabitancy increased its value two, three, four, or tenfold, as the case might be, the equities were just as strong in his favor as to the whole as though he had only purchased, improved, and thereby enhanced the value of one hundred sixty acres; and there would be just as little equity in allowing him to be deprived by a stranger of the fruits of his labor and expenditures, under the cloak of the general pre-emption laws, wtiich could never have been intended to embrace such a case, of the excess ovar one quarter section; and the language of the statute, it seems to us, authorizes an entry of all which had been reduced to possession. The object was to relieve what Mr. Justice Greer so feelingly calls a confiscation, and this object could only be accomplished by allowing the purchasers
We are unable to derive from these provisions any support to the idea that each purchaser from Vallejo must be •limited to a quarter section in case of any interference with an intruder upon his possession claiming a pre-emption right under the general laws. On the contrary, they seem to us to support the opposite view, so far as any argument bearing on the point can be derived from them. It shows that nothing purchased and possessed in good faith was intended to be lost to them.
These are the great questions in the case upon which the rights of the parties to this action must turn, and the only points presented by appellant’s counsel for our consideration, and on these points we should have entertained little doubt
It is understood that the case of Whitney v. Frisbie, has been taken to the Supreme Court of the United States for review, on a writ of error. As the decision of that tribunal upon the questions involved would be authoritative and binding upon us, we were in hopes that there would have been an early decision, and we have delayed the decision in this case on that account. But we have satisfied ourselves that a decision in that case' cannot be expected for a long time to come, and we do not feel justified in any longer delay. As both parties claim a right under a statute of the United States, the decision in any event must be against a right claimed under a law of Congress, and our decision can doubtless be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Since we entertain a different view from that taken by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and two of our associates, it is gratifying to know that there is an arbiter between us in the Supreme Court of the United States, and that, if we are in the wrong, our error can be corrected and justice be awarded by that august tribunal.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
On the facts as presented by the record in this case, there are two questions for our consideration, to wit: First—
The second question for our decision is not only more difficult of solution, but is one of unusual gravity and of great practical importance. It involves a consideration of the relations which are established between a qualified preemptioner and the Government, after the former has entered upon a portion of the public domain, which is subject to pre-emption, and is proceeding in good faith to perform the conditions which, by law, will establish his right to pre-empt the land.
This question has been several times decided by this Court in actions growing out of the special proceedings which have
The same views have been expressed by Attorney General Cushing, (8 Opins. Attorneys General, 72,) and by Attorney General Bates, (10 Opins. Attorneys General, 56,) and by Attorney General Speed (11 Opins. Attorneys General, 490.) The Supreme Court of Missouri, in several cases, has acquiesced in this view of the law. (Bower v. Higbee, 9 Mo. 259; O’Hanlon v. Perry, 9 Mo. 804.) The Supreme Court of the United States, in dealing with inceptive titles under the preemption laws, has intimated in several cases that until the pre-emptioner has not only performed the conditions required by law, but has obtained the certificate of the proper officers of the Land Department to that effect, he has no title which a Court of justice will recognize; that this is the only evidence of that fact which is admissible to establish even an equity in the claimant, and until he obtains the certificate he has no standing in Court.
In Hale v. Gaines, 22 How. 144, the plaintiff claimed under the alleged pre-emption right of one Percival, who settled on the land in 1812, but took no steps toward entering it until after the land was reserved from sale by an Act of Congréss passed in 1832. In commenting on this claim (page 161) the Court says: “When the Act of April, 1832, was passed, reserving the hot springs from sale, .Percival had no vested interest in the land that a Court of justice could recognize. Then the United States Government was the
In deference to these authorities I acquiesce in the conclusion at which the Chief Justice has arrived, notwithstanding the fact that the reasoning by which the conclusion is reached appears to me to be altogether unsatisfactory. 1 yield to the weight of authority only, and not to the reasoning by which it is supported. But it has almost grown inte an axiom in the law that a long established error is often less pernicious than the change which would be necessary tc correct it; and the rule of stare decisis should not be often or lightly departed from.
It is entitled to especial weight in all questions affecting the titles to real estate, and particularly in a new country, which is rapidly improving, and where large sums are being constantly invested in lands and buildings. The question now uuder consideration was first decided by this Court in the case of Hastings v. McGoogin, at the October Term, 1864. and again in Page v. Hobbs, at the January Term, 1865, and in Page v. Fowler, at the October Term, 1865. In all these cases the question arose uuder contests growing out of conflicting claims to portions of the Soscol Pancho. We know as a part of the current history of the times that there are several considerable towns on this rancho-, one of which (Vallejo) is rapidly improving, and has become a point of considerable commercial importance; that a railroad from Sacramento to Vallejo now traverses this rancho, which is situate in one of the most rapidly improving portions of the State. It cannot be doubted that large sums have been invested in lands and buildings on this tract on the faith of the decisions to which I have adverted. They-should therefore be considered as having become a rule of property in respect to that rancho. In this view of the case I yield to their authority, and acquiesce in the conclusion to which the
It cannot be successfully controverted, I think, that the pre-emptioner belongs to a favored class of purchasers; that he enters on the invitation of the Government with an assurance that on the performance of certain conditions and on the payment of a specified sum of money he shall receive a title to the land; that after he has entered and has expended his money and labor in improving the land, and is proceeding in good faith to fulfill the conditions, he has acquired an equity which, in sound morals and by the rules of law, the Government is bound to respect, and which Courts of equity will enforce, as against a subsequent grantee of the Government who wrongfully acquires the legal title.
On the other hand, it is contended that a pre-emptioner is but a pensioner on the bounty of the Government; that he acquires no title, either legal or equitable, until he has actually paid for the land; that even though he has performed all the other conditions, and as the final act tenders payment of the purchase money, the Government is not bound to accept it; but may repudiate his claim and sell the land to another, who will thereby acquire a valid title, charged with no equities in favor of the pre-emptioner; that there is nothing in the nature of a contract between the Government and the pre-emptioner who enters with notice that the Government reserves the right to withhold the title from him and confer it on another, and at the last moment to decline to accept payment from him, even though he has performed all the other conditions prescribed by law. This last proposition is urged chiefly on the theory that, inasmuch as the preemptioner is under no obligation, either legal or moral, to perfect his claim and pay the purchase money, the Govern
If it be assumed that the relative rights of the pre-emptioner and the Government are to be tested by the rules strictly applicable to contracts, in their legal sense, between private individuals, it is doubtless true that until performance and payment there is no executed contract. In all cases where the rights of a party are to depend on the performance of conditions precedent, the right is not complete until the conditions are performed. ¡Nevertheless, it would not be accurate to say that the party, whilst faithfully engaged in performing the conditions, had acquired no rights in the subject matter of the contract. On the contrary, so long as he is in no default he has acquired the right to compel the other party to the agreement not to obstruct him in the performance of the conditions, and, after a full performance of them, to comply with the other side of the contract. But, it is said that, until the purchase money is paid, there is no contract between the pre-emptioner and the Government; that there is nothing obligatory on either side until the land is paid for; that the pre-emptioner may abandon his claim at the last moment; and, in like manner, the Government may withdraw its offer, even after payment is tendered and all the other conditions are performed. In matters of contract the Government stands upon the same footing as a private individual. Whatever would constitute a contract between two private individuals would be equally a contract if the Government was a party to it. If the relations between the pre-emptioner and the Government do not constitute a contract in any just or legal sense, the same result would follow if the same relations existed between two private persons. For example, if that which is now the public domain was the property of a private person, some great landed proprietor, who desired to have his vast estate cut up into small farms, improved, settled upon, and cultivated, and to that end should proclaim in the most solemn manner that if any
I have adverted to these general propositions, not because they are either novel or difficult of solution, but, on the contrary, because they embody only familiar and well settled principles, which, I apprehend, will not be questioned. I propose now to inquire to what extent, if at all, these principles are applicable to the relation existing between the pre-emptioner and the Government.
It is said, and this Court has intimated in several cases, that the right of pre-emption, secured to the settler by the general pre-emption law of 1841, is in "the nature of a bounty voluntarily offered by the Government to its citizens, and may be withdrawn at any time before the purchase money is paid; and that until payment is made, the pre-emptioner has acquired no proprietary interest in the land which is capable of enforcement either at law or in equity. In the solution of this question, it must be borne in mind that the Government is simply the owner in fee of the public domain, with a plenary power to manage, control or dispose of it as it sees fit. It holds it in trust, it is true, for the people, whose agent and trustee the Government is, but with plenary power as to its control and disposition. In dealing with purchasers, touching the sale of its domain, the Government is only a great landed proprietor, holding immense bodies of wild land, which the public interest demands should either be sold for the best price it will bring, or awarded to actual settlers at a very low price. The latter has been for many years a favorite policy with the Government. It was deemed advisable to sell the lands to
My conclusion is, that if the Government, through its duly authorized agent, had entered into an express covenant to
“It is a well established jarincrple that where an individual in the prosecution of a right does everything which the law requires him to do, and he fails to attain his right by the misconduct or neglect of a public officer, the law will protect him. In this case the pre-emption right of Cloyes having been proved, and an offer to pay the money for the land claimed by him, under the Act of 1830, nothing more could be done by him, and nothing more could be required of him, under that Act. And subsequently, when he paid the money to the Receiver, under subsequent Acts, the surveys being returned, he could do nothing more than offer to enter the lands, which the Register would not permit him to do. This*513 claim of pre-emption stands before us in á light not less favorable than it would have stood if Cloyes, or his representatives, had been permitted by the land officers to do what, in this respect, was offered to be done.”
In the case at bar, before the time for payment had arrived, and, indeed, before payment was possiblé, Congress, by the Act of March 3d, 1863, attempted to deprive "the plaintiff of the equity ho had acquired by a part performance of the conditions, and to award to the defendants a prior right to purchase the lands. The plaintiff has been in no default, and has done all that the Government would permit him to do toward performing every act, including payment, required of him by the law under which he entered. If he has been prevented by the Government from making a complete performance, the omission is excused, and the equity is as complete as a full performance would have made it. The fact of payment or the omission to pay, tinder the conditions stated, is wholly immaterial, and in no degree impairs the plaintiff’s equities. If Congress can defeat the title by refusing to accept the purchase money when tendered, or by placing it out of the power of the party to perform the remaining conditions, I can imagine no reason why it could not annul his claim after accepting the purchase money, and it is conceded this could not be done. But it can do neither, and for the same reason. After a full performance of the conditions, it is admitted the plaintiff’s equity would have been complete and beyond the "reach of hostile legislation. After a partial performance, if he was hindered by the act of the Government and: without any fault of his from performing the remaining conditions, the non-pérformance is excused for the reasons already stated; and his equity is as secure from invasion as though all the conditions, including payment, had been performed.
It is said, however, that great evils will result from this 3onstruction of the law; that it will deprive Congress of all
But, if it be otherwise, a simple remedy for it may be found in the future by an amendment of the law, reserving to the Government the right to cancel a pre-emption claim when the land is needed for public use. This would become a part of the contract, and would completely remedy the supposed inconvenience; but, if the inconvenience to result from my construction of the law were even greater than it is supposed to be, it would still be insignificant in comparison with the greater evil of permitting the Government to violate its engagements to its citizens. The stability of all republican government rests upon the confidence of the people in its fidelity to its pledges; and it is the duty of the Courts, as far as practicable, to promote this confidence by exacting from the Government, in all cases which come before the judicial tribunals, a faithful performance of its contracts.
I have thus far discussed the grave question under consideration upon such general well known principles of law as I have deemed pertinent to the subject. But there are, also, some authorities to support the views I have indicated. That a pre-emption claim, whilst the proceedings to perfect it are in fieri, is recognized by the Government as property, is established by the second section of the Act of March 3d, 1843, (5 Stats, at Large, 620,) which provides that if the preemptioner shall die whilst the conditions are being performed his claim may be perfected by the heir at law, to whom the patent shall issue. That he is not a trespasser, but, on the contrary, that he enters and expends his money and labor on the land, on the invitation of the Government, and on the assurance that he will acquire the title by the performance
In the subsequent case of Barnard’s Heirs v. Ashley’s Heirs, 18 How. 43, the Court say:
“In Lytle’s Case we declared that the occupant was wrongfully deprived of his lawful rights of entry under the preemption laws, and the title set up under the selection of the Governor of Arkansas was decreed to Cloyes, the claimant, this Court holding his claim to the land to have been a legal right, by virtue of the occupancy and cultivation, subject to be defeated only by a failure to perform the conditions of making proof and tendering the purchase money. There the facts were examined to ascertain which party had the better right.”
This language admits of no doubtful interpretation. If Cloyes obtained .“a legal right by virtue of the occupancy and cultivation” prior to payment, why did not the plaintiff in this action obtain a “legal right” under the same circumstances? The cases appear to me to be strictly analogous.
In McAfee v. Keirn, 7 S. & M., Miss., 780, Mr. Justice Sharkey, who delivered the opinion of the Court, defines with clearness and force the nature and legal effect of a preemption right. He says: “We cannot question the right of Congress to confer this privilege on the actual settler, and the fact that it was a gratuity makes no difference—the right is as valid as though it had been founded on a valuable consideration. It amounted to something more than a mere right to enter the land at Government price; that right every citizen had, and if the Act of Congress did no more, it was useless. But it did more; it gave a preference to the actual settler, the effect of which was to exclude the right of all others so long as this preference could be claimed. * * *
This right of pre-emption, then, constituted an equity in favor of the occupant. Hot an uncertain, indefinite equity;
In Isaacs v. Steel, 3 Scammon, 97, in commenting on the time allowed by law to the pre-emptioner to make his proofs and pay the purchase money, the Court says that “to protect them from the rapacity of those who might desire to appropriate their soil and labor to themselves, one and two years of time was granted them. The settler was thus made secure in his possession for that time; and if, before its expiration, he made the required proof and paid the money, he acquired a right against all the world.” (See, also, Bruner v. Manlove, 3 Scam. 340.) It would be an abuse of terms to say that the settler was “made secure in his possession,” if, at the last moment, after he had expended his money and labor on the land, and when he was proffering payment for it, Congress could annul his claim, deprive him of the possession, and grant the land to another.
In the case of Whitney v. Frisbie, which involved precisely the same questions which ai’ise in this case, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has recently decided them, explicitly, in accordance with the views above set forth.
For these reasons I cannot but conclude that the former decisions of this Court on this point are at variance with the principles of reason and equity. Nevertheless, so far as they affect the title to the Soscol Eancho, the question has been so often decided during the last five years, and such important interests have grown up on the faith of these decisions, that I think they are justly to be regarded as a rule of property in respect to that rancho, and ought not to be disturbed.