[¶ 1] Tоdd Hanson appeals from a divorce judgment entered in the District Court (Belfast, Worth, /.), which ordered, in part, that Kristin (Hanson) Hutt would receive the first $325,000 in net proceeds upon the sale of any of five parcels of real estate owned by the parties to compensate Hutt for her nonmarital interest in one parcel and her investment of her nonmari-tal funds to pay off a marital debt. See 19-A M.R.S. § 953(l)-(3) (2015). Hanson argues that the court erred in not specifically addressing each factor listed in sectiоn 953(1), clearly erred in its findings of fact, and abused its discretion in its division of property. Because the record supports the equitable division of. marital property ordered by the court, we affirm.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶ 2] After a contested hearing regarding property division and spousal support issues, the court made the following findings, which are supported by the trial record. See Ehret v. Ehret,
[¶ 3] When Hutt commenced this action, the parties had been married for about seventeen years. They have two minor children together; parental rights issues were resolved and were not contested at trial. The parties own or have an interest in six parcels of real property: (1) a pаrcel in Northport containing the marital home; (2) a parcel in Northport next to the marital home consisting of forty-eight to fifty acres of land and containing а garage with an apartment over it (“the carriage house lot”); (3) property in Old Town owned by a limited liability company (LLC), “of which the parties collectively оwn 51%”; (4) property in Bucksport owned by a second LLC, which the parties wholly own; (5) property in Lincoln owned by a third LLC, which the parties wholly own; and (6) an undeveloped рarcel in Northport, which was a gift to Hutt alone.
[¶ 4] Hutt’s mother and stepfather conveyed the carriage house lot as a gift to Hutt alone during the course of the marriage. Her stepfather intended that Hutt alone would own the parcel, which was unimproved land when it was transferred. The land, without improvements, is worth $75,000. Hutt and Hanson improved the land with earthwork and by constructing the garage and apartment.
[¶ 5] During the marriage, Hutt received $250,000 in life insurance proceeds upon her mother’s deаth. Hutt paid off a marital debt related to the property in Bucksport with those funds.
[¶ 7] The court set aside to Hutt the undeveloped Northport parcel as her nоn-marital property and ordered the parties to sell the remaining five properties, consistent with their agreement at mediation. The court ordered that “[a]fter sale of one or more properties and payment of ordinary closing costs, [Hutt] shall receive the first $325,000 of the net proceeds.” The court determined that such an award was “equitable under the circumstances,” citing Hutt’s contribution of $250,000 of inherited funds to the marital estate and Hutt’s $75,000 nonmarital interest in the carriage house lot. The court ordered the parties to “equally divide the remaining net proceeds from each sale.”
[¶8] The court ordered neither party to pay child support to the other and ordered that each party would claim one child for tax purposes. Although Hutt argued that she should be paid spousal suрport, the court declined to make any such award “now or in the future.” Neither party was ordered to pay the other’s attorney fees.
[¶ 9] Hanson filed this timely appeal.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶ 10] The statute governing disрosition of property, 19-A M.R.S. § 953(1), directs that the court “shall divide the marital property in proportions the court considers just after considering all relevant faсtors.” This direction requires that marital property be divided equitably, though not necessarily equally. Thus, in Doucette v. Washburn,
[¶ 11] The governing principle of an equitable, though not necessarily equal, distribution of marital property is emphasized by the factors that section 953(1) lists as included among the relevant factors the court is to consider:
A. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital рroperty, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
B. The value of the property set apart to each spouse; and
C. The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of prоperty is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live in the home for reasonable periods to the spouse hаving custody of the children.
[¶ 12] In its application of section 953(1) the trial court need not “specifically enumerate [its] findings on each factor,” Shanoski v. Miller,
[¶ 14] “Wе defer to the trial court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility-” Violette v. Violette,
[¶ 15] We review a marital property distribution for an abuse of discretion. Viola v. Viola,
[¶ 16] Section 953(1) requires the court to set aside to the parties their nonmarital assets prior to dividing the marital property. Violette,
[¶ 17] Further, contrary to Hanson’s contentions, the court was under no obligation to order that the funds be distributed to Hutt only upon the sale of any particular property. The court’s order was well “within the bounds of reasonableness.” Charette,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Although the court was imprecise in its terminology—finding that Hutt had reduced the indebtedness on a ‘‘mortgage” on certain property when the evidence was that she had paid off a loan that she and Hanson had borrowed for thе down payment on that property—the error was harmless. See M.R. Civ. P. 61; Gordon v. Cheskin,