50 Mo. App. 300 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1892
Lead Opinion
— This action is for personal injury received by plaintiff. He recovered below and defendant appealed. The evidence tended to show, and, since the verdict it may be said to have shown, that plaintiff was a section man on defendant’s road, and that he received his injury at the hands of the section foreman. Three or four men including plaintiff and the foreman were endeavoring to pull a switch tie out from under the rails. All four had their picks stuck in
It is established law of this state, now well understood since Judge Heney’s opinions in the cases of Moore v. Railroad, 85 Mo. 588, and McDermott v. Railroad, 87 Mo. 285, that a section foreman, or boss, is not the fellow-servant of the men under his charge, control and direction. That he is, notwithstanding his inferior standing in the official scale of the corporation, a vice-principal is clearly demonstrated in the Moore and McDermott cases. But in this case we have the unusual fact that the injury was directly inflicted by the foreman himself while engaged in the work as a co-laborer with plaintiff. Does this fact alter the relation of the parties, or interfere with the master’s liability? Our opinion is that it does not. If in the case at bar the section foreman had ordered one of his hands to strike his pick down between the heads of the two others, it would not be contended that defendant was not liable for the injury resulting from such imprudent order. There is no just or logical distinction between the act of the vice-principal in negligently ordering a servant to do an imprudent thing, and in doing the thing himself. In each case it is the act of the vice-principal; in one, he wills the servant shall do the act, in the other, he wills that he, himself, shall do it. This position is sustained by authority. Gormley v. Iron Works, 61 Mo. 492; Dayharsh v. Railroad, 103 Mo. 570; Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio St. 287;
The servant assumes the risk of the negligence of" his fellow-servant, but does not assume the risk of the-negligence of the master himself, or, what is the same thing, of a servant placed over and in control of him by the master or his superior, and under whose orders and directions he must act. The foregoing disposes of defendant’s objection to plaintiff’s instructions on the' question of fellow-servant.
We think there was sufficient evidence of the foreman’s negligence to submit to the jury. The stroke with the pick, between the heads of plaintiff and his comrade, under the circumstances and in the position of the parties, may well be considered negligence.
It is insisted that the judgment should be reversed, on account of the court permitting one of the plaintiff’s-witnesses to state how the defendant’s hospital is supported. The witness said that “ there is twenty-five-cents taken off every man’s check that is paid to the-hands, and this goes to the hospital to pay for taking care of the men that get injured. It is taken from the-section men and from all the employes of the railroad.” This testimony was preceded by the cross-examination of the plaintiff in which defendant had him state that-he was sent to defendant’s hospital, and that defendant charged him no board and no fee for the physician at the hospital. If it was proper for the defendant to-show this to the jury, it was no more than fair that the testimony complained of should also be heard. Plaintiff had not attempted to show as items of his damage the payment of board or a physician.
The judgment is affirmed.
Rehearing
— The foregoing opinion is asserted to be unsound law. We have re-examined the question presented and feel satisfied with what we have said. The question with us is, not what the courts in some of the states may have decided, not what some text-writers may have written, but what is the rule adjudged in Missouri. The question has met with different answers in different jurisdictions and at the hands of different authors. In Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio St. 287, it is said: ‘‘Where the master, or one placed by him in charge of men engaged in his service, personally assists or interferes in the labor being performed under his direction and control, and is, while performing such labor, or interfering with its performance, guilty of negligence resulting in an injury to one engaged in such service, there is no sound principle of law that will excuse or exonerate the master from liability.” Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, sec. 89; Wharton on Negligence, sec. 205. The same rule is announced in Missouri. Gormley v. Iron Works, 61 Mo. 492; Dayharsh v. Railroad, 103 Mo. 570.
It is insisted that the plaintiff and the. foreman were fellow-servants. This cannot be allowed to be good. They were each servants of a common principal, it is true, but they were not fellow-servants in a sense which would limit defendant’s liability for the injury inflicted upon plaintiff. “No service is common that does not admit a common participation, and no servants are fellow-servants where one is placed in control over the other.” Railroad v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201; Chicago & Milwaukee Ry. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, “Where one servant is placed by his employer in a position of subordination to, and subject to, the orders and control of another, and such inferior servant
The Dayharsh case cannot be distinguished from this case. It is true that in stating master’s duties, it is said in that case that he must furnish his servant with a safe place to work. But the facts of that case were that the plaintiff; was at work for the railway company under the direction and supervision of the roundhouse foreman. That he was shoveling ashes from an ash pit in the track running into the roundhouse, and while so engaged the foreman ran an engine over his leg. This ash pit was not of itself an unsafe place to work. It became unsafe for the reason, only, that the foreman ran an engine over it. The place was as safe a place to work as a farmer’s field. It was not a bog in which the laborer would sink, nor was it near dangerous machinery or explosives, nor near caving embankments or unsteady walls; nor was it a place where rapidly moving trains passed. Any place can be made unsafe by bringing to bear upon it dangerous appliances or contrivances. In the Dayharsh case the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the foreman in running the engine over the place where he was working, and the place became unsafe from this negligent act. So, in this case, the place where the tie was being removed was a safe place to work, and it only became unsafe by the foreman negligently striking his pick in between the heads of plaintiff and his fellow-workmen. We refer to the point made as to the master’s duty to furnish a safe place to work, for the reason that such language is used in the Dayharsh case, not that we consider it necessary -in this case to say that the supreme court, in the Dayharsh case, placed
We are told that the decision in this case is in conflict with Moore v. Railroad, 85 Mo. 588, wherein it is said to have been decided that a vice-principal may occupy at the same time a dual capacity. That is, if the vice-principal be one whose duty it is, when necessary, to assist in the manual work, and, while so engaged in the manual work, he negligently injures a servant, the negligent act would be the act of a fellow-servant, and not the act of the vice-principal. This was not decided in the Moore case. No such point was in the case, though Judge Henry does, parenthetically, give utterance to such view. The paragraph was doubtless inserted to show that, notwithstanding the recognition of such law, it would not affect that case. But, be this as it may, “the last previous rulings of the supreme court on any question of law or equity shall, in all cases, be controlling authority” with this court, and, in compliance with this mandate of the constitution, we follow the Day harsh case. If that and the Gormley case are not good law, it is the prerogative of the supreme court to overrule them, and not ours. We are all agreed that the motion should be overruled.
