12 F. Cas. 1066 | U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of Georgia | 1876
It is claimed by proctor for libelant that the horse, having been delivered to the ship in apparent good health and condition, and me ship having delivered him to the libelant, on the termination of the voyage, in á dying condition, the burden of proof is upon the respondent to show that the illness and death of the horse did not result from the act or neglect of the respondent, but from causes beyond its control. The rule of law is, that when the carrier fails to deliver goods, or when he delivers goods in a damaged condition, the onus is cast upon him to show that he is not in fault. In other words, loss or injury is sufficient proof of negligence or misconduct, or of the intervention of human agency, and when shown, the burden is on the carrier to exempt himself. Ang. Carr. § 202; Story, Bailm. § 329; Code Ga. § 2Q66. But the shipper must show an injury to the article shipped before the burden is cast upon the carrier to exonerate himself. Is an injury shown when the article shipped is a horse or other live stock, which is proved to have been delivered to the carrier in good health and condition, and to have been re-delivered to the shipper in a sick and debilitated condition, but without any fractures, wounds, abrasions, or other external or visible injury? I think not. As-well might a passenger who embarks in good health claim to support an action for damages against the common carrier, by simply showing that when he disembarked at the end of his voyage he was in a sick and debilitated condition.
The liability of a common carrier of animals is not in all respects the same as that of a carrier of inanimate property. For instance, he is not an insurer against injuries arising from the nature and propensities of' the animals and which diligent care could not prevent. He is not liable for injuries by disease contracted without his fault after the stock is delivered to him. On the same principle, proof of the decay of perishable fruit committed to a common carrier, would not of itself be sufficient to charge him. Boyce v. Anderson, 2 Pet. [27 U. S.) 150; Clarke v. Rochester & S. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 570; Smith v. New Haven & N. R. Co., 12 Allen, 531; Hall v. Renfro, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 51; Story, Bailm. § 492a. When the damage to the thing shipped is apparently the result of its inherent nature or inherent defects, the shipper must show something more than its damaged condition before the carrier can be called on to explain. He must show some injury to the thing shipped which can not be the result of .its inherent nature or defects, before the burden is cast upon the carrier to show that he is not in fault. But without applying this rule in this case, we are satisfied from the weight of evidence that the horse of libelant was not injured by the careless handling of the respondents, but that he died from natural causes, and that he would have died if he had never been put on board the Saragossa. Libel dismissed.
