164 S.E. 334 | N.C. | 1932
CLARKSON, J., dissents. On or about 1 July, 1929, the defendant, Betts, a contractor, entered into an agreement with his codefendant, Mrs. Ella T. Percival, agreeing to build a dwelling-house upon a certain lot of land owned by Mrs. Percival. The plaintiff began furnishing certain material to the contractor on 1 July, 1929, continuing through 19 November, 1929, which said materials were duly used in the construction of the building. The contract price was $4,350. On 23 November, 1929, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the owner, Mrs. Percival, as follows: "This letter is to notify you that we have furnished and are furnishing goods to Mr. G. E. Betts, contractor, for the use in the construction of the building for you on Russell Street, in this city. The bill now amounts to $636.06, and he is still purchasing a few items on the account. We shall be glad to furnish you with itemized statement covering the account. We thus notify you in compliance with the laws of this State which make it incumbent upon us to thus advise you and requires you to see that our bill is paid before any payments are made to the contractor." There *7 was evidence tending to show that, at the time the letter was written by the plaintiff and received by the defendant, Mrs. Percival, she had in her hands approximately $1,100 due the contractor. It was alleged that on 5 February, 1930, the plaintiff filed a notice and claim of lien in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court of Cumberland County. The summons was issued on 4 April, 1930, and served on 6 April, 1930.
The following issue was submitted to the jury: "Did the plaintiff, in due time, and before settlement by defendant owner with the defendant contractor, notify the defendant, Mrs. Ella T. Percival, of the amount due and unpaid it by said contractor, according to law, as alleged in the complaint?"
The trial judge instructed the jury to answer said issue "No."
From judgment upon the verdict the plaintiff appealed. Was the letter of 23 November, 1929, sufficient "notice" to the owner to support a lien upon her land?
A lien upon a building is a creature of statute, and the right thereto is based upon notice to the owner before settlement is made. The nature of the notice contemplated by the pertinent statutes is described inConstruction Co. v. Journal,
The plaintiff relies upon Bain v. Lamb,
Affirmed.
CLARKSON, J., dissents. *8