It is the settled rule of the authorities, that instruments payable in any thing beside money are not negotiable. Such instruments, however, are made negotiable by Bevision, section 1797 : “ Whenever it is manifest from their terms that such was the intent of the makers, but the use of the technical words 1 order ’ or ‘ bearer ’ alone will not manifest such intent.” A note payable to order in currency, in Rindskoff Bros. & Co. v. Barrett, 11 Iowa, 172, was held, under this statute, to be non-negotiable. Applying the doctrine of that case to those before us, we must hold that the instruments which are the foundation
The rule, it is contended, is different in New York and Ohio. See Keth v. Jones, 9 Johns. 120; Judah v. Harris, 19 id. 144; Morris v. Edwards, 1 Ohio, 203; Howe v. Hartness, Hill & Co., 10 id. 203. But see upon this question, Lubee v. Goodrich, 5 Cow. 186; Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend. 71; Little v. Phœnix Bank, 2 Hill, 425; S. C., 7 Hill, 359.
It is probable that competent evidence would have been admitted, if offered, to prove that the word “ currency” used in the instrument describes that which, by custom or law, is money, and thus the certificates would have been shown to be commercial paper. Pilmer v. Branch of the State Bank, 16 Iowa, 321. And it may be that under Rindskoff Bros. & Co. v. Barrett supra, it would have been competent to prove the existence of a custom having the force of law, or of a local custom, known to the parties, under which the instruments are negotiable. But the record does not show- that any such evidence was offered.
The questions, therefore, growing out of demand of payment and notice of dishonor, do not arise in these cases. No other questions being presented in either case, the judgments are
Affirmed.