100 So. 321
Ala.
1924
SOMERVILLE, J.

Several witnesses testified that the deceased stated just bfefore he made the written statement which was received in evidence as his dying declaration that he was going to die, and the declaration itself was prefaced by the statement that he believed it to be his dying statement- . On this predicate the statement was properly admitted as a dying declaratiоn. 14 Michie’s Digest, 114, § 182.

The trial court admitted in evidence, ■over defendant’s objection, the shirt, trousers, and belt worn by deceasеd at the time he was killed. Such articles should' never be offered or received in evidence unless they “have some tеndency to shed some light upon some material inquiry.” Rollings v. State, 160 Ala. 82, 86, 49 South. 329; Pearson’s Case, 97 Ala. 2l9, 12 South. 176; A. G. S. R. R. Co. v. Bell, 200 Ala. 562, 76 South. 920.

There was a controversy in this case as to the positiоn of the deceased when defendant fired the second shot — that is, whether he was facing defendant, or had turned to fleе. Necessarily the lethal bullet penetrated the clothing of deceased,' and so far as the record shows it may have passed through both shirt and trousers. If so, these garments were properly admitted in evidence. Terry v. State, 203 Ala. 99, 82 South. 113, and cases cited supra.

It may be that thеre was no justification for the introduction of the belt, but in any case it could do no harm when viewed in connection with the other clothing, and can furnish no ground for a reversal of the judgment.

The homicide was' committed in August, and the state was allowed tо show that one night in the preceding May defendant went to the witness’ house and said he was down there “to have a reckоning with Black [the deceased].” It is insisted for defendant that this language does not import a threat, and was not admissible as such. The primary ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‍meaning of “reckoning” is a counting or computing; but it is also used figuratively in the sense of an “adjustment of reward or pеnalty on the basis of merit.” New Standard Dictionary. In the latter sense it is commonly and frequently used as a prophecy or a threat of punishment, and it was for the jury to say what defendant meant by its vae on this occasion, in the light of the evidence before them. We think the statement was properly admitted.

Complaint is made of other rulings on the evidence. We have examined all of them, and find no prejudicial error.

Refused charge 3 sought to exclude a conviction of murder without excluding the existence of malice, and was also argumentative.

Refused charges 5 "and ■ 12 correctly distinguished between murder and manslаughter in the first degree, but they were specifically covered by given charge 5, and also by the oral charge.

Refused charge 6 was fully covered ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‍by the oral instructions.

Refused charges 8, 9, and' 11, are based on the theory that deceased mаde a second dying declaration in writing which was in the possession of the prosecution, and sought to instruct the jury that the failurе of the prosecution to offer that statement in evidence authorized them to presume that it was less favorablе to the state than the dying declaration in evidence. There was no evidence, however, that the solicitor had аny such statement in his possession, or had ever even heard of its existence, or, indeed, that it was made in writing. One witness stated merely that “an officer came to the hospital and took his [deceased’s] testimony in regard to the matter while we wеre preparing for the operation.” Who the officer was, or what kind of an officer, or at whose instance he came, does not appear. Under such circumstances no presumption could arise as to the charаcter of the statement referred to. Jackson v. State, 77 Ala. 18 (4). Moreover, if the solicitor had had such a statement in' his pоssession, defendant could have required its production by a rille of the court if he thought it was favorable to him.

Refused charge 10 was purely argumentative.

Refused charge 14 was faulty in several details, but its entire substance and principle were fully and fairly covered by the oral charge.

Refused charge 15, on the law of self-defense, omits the predicate of a necessity, apparent or'real, for the killing, and assumes the existence of peril.

Refused charge 16, on self-defense, instructs that the matter “is entirely with the jury under ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‍the lаw as the court has given it to you.” It omits a consideration of the evidence.

Refused charges 15, 16, and 17, in so far as they invokеd the principles of self-defense, were fully, fairly, and correctly covei’ed by the oral charge.

Refused charge 18, on the mode of considering dying declarations, was an argument based on selected and partial facts, *277 properly to be made by counsel, and not by the trial judge.

Refused charge 19, that “the law requires dying declarations to be considered with great caution,” is not a proper instruction, as wаs expressly held in Brown v. State, 150 Ala. 25, 43 South. 194. The same ruling has been made as to the consideration of admissions by a defendant. Carwile v. Stаte, 148 Ala. 576 (B), 39 South. 220. This does not deny the existence of the factors which weaken the reliability of dying declarations, and impair their ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‍value as evidence, and which have been often pointed out by courts and text-writers. See, especially, Shell v. State, 88 Ala. 14, 17, 7 South. 40; 1 Greenl. on Ev. (16th Ed.) 253, § 162; 30 Corp. Jur. 261, § 503; Id. 279, 280, § 521. And it has often been said that dying declarations should be received and weighed with caution. Shell v. State, supra; Kennedy v. State, 85 Ala. 326, 331, 5 South. 300; Justice v. State, 99 Ala. 180, 181, 13 South. 658; Parker v. State, 165 Ala. 1, 10, 51 South. 260. The jury should, of course, be instructed that a dying declaration should be considered in the light of the circumstаnces under which it was made, and should be given such credence as in their judgment it is entitled to receive; but the impeachment of its credibility and the impairment of its. weight are matters for argument by counsel, and not for instruction by the trial judge. The objectiоn to the instruction under consideration is that it singles out particular evidence for suspicion, and its tendency is to mislead the jury.

It is to be observed, however, that the principle invoked was in fact given to the jury in charge 20, viz. “that dying declarations arе admitted in evidence out of necessity, but should be admitted and considered with real* caution in connection with all the evidence.”

Eor the reasons stated, all of the charges above reviewed were refused without error.

We find no prejudicial error in the record, ‍​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‍and the judgment will be affirmed.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, O. J., and THOMAS and MILLER, JJ., concur.