140 Tenn. 623 | Tenn. | 1918
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two actions were tried together in this court and will he disposed of in this opinion. The case of Dr. Lewis is to recover of defendant damages for personal injuries to himself and for destruction of an automobile. The case of Hurt, administrator, is to recover damages for the death of his intestate, Dr. Nelson.
Drs. Lewis and Nelson were returning from the operation referred to and had not spoken for perhaps one quarter of a mile before entering upon the crossing. Dr. Lewis was giving particular attention to the automobile, because the dirt road at and near the crossing was in bad repair, and it was deemed necessary to concentrate his attention upon the automobile and the road because of the roughness of the road. There is nothing to show what Dr. Nelson was doing. He and Dr. Lewis' saw the approaching train about the same instant. Dr. Nelson cried “Look out!” about the time that »Dr. Lewis saw the train out of the ‘ ‘ corner of his eye. ’ ’
The automobile was moving at from twelve to fifteen miles per hour when Dr. Lewis discovered the approaching train. He' thinks he first tried to stop his car, but instantly concluded that he was too close to the railroad track, and then tried to rush across the track. The engine struck the automobile about the rear wheel, and projected Drs. Lewis and Nelson down the track and over an embankment about thirty feet high. The automobile was carried on the pilot of the engine about three hundred feet and was totally wrecked. Dr. Nelson received injuries from which he died in about one month, after much pain and suffering. Dr. Lewis received serious injuries to his
The plaintiffs' proof is that the train was seen by them as soon as it could have been seen. It also, shows, or tends to show, that the whistle was not, sounded and the bell was not rung; at all events, Dr. Lewis says that he did not see or hear the train until he was within twenty feet of the track. The engineer says he did not see the automobile until he was in the act of‘ striking it. The fireman did not see the accident at all. He says he was engaged about his duties.
Drs. Lewis and Nelson approached the crossing from the side opposite to the side occupied by the engineer. The engineer testifies that the nose of his engine obstructs his view so that the nearest point he can see the left rail of the track is ninety-five feet. He says he was on the lookout ahead and did not see the occupants of the automobile until after it had entered upon the track and just at the instant of the collision. He put on his emergency brakes, but did not reverse his engine or sound the stock alarm. He says he did not have time to do more than was actually done. His evidence is not contradicted except as it may be insisted that he is contradicted by the physical circumstances shown in the proof. He stopped his train within about its length, which was about four hundred feet. There was no statutory
The learned trial judge submitted the ease to a jury, which returned a verdict for $30,000 for Hurt, administrator, and $2,000 for Dr. Lewis. He overruled the motion for a new trial, and afterwards granted a motion for a directed verdict, stating at the time he was not satisfied that plaintiffs were entitled to recover under the law, or that they had sustained their case by a preponderance of the proof.
The defendants insist that the case is controlled by Graves v. Railroad, 126 Tenn., 148, 148 S. W., 239, and Whittaker v. Railroad., 132 Tenn., 576, 179 S. W., 140.
The Graves Case is the leading case on the subject, and holds, in substance, that the engineer of a railroad locomotive is under no obligation to give warning of the approach of his train at the crossing of a railroad and dirt road, unless the crossing is marked by a statutory sign prescribed by section 1574, Shan. Code. Sections 1574, 1575, and 1576 are construed in
These sections are as follows:
“Sec. 1574 (1) The overseers of every public road crossed by a railroad shall place at each crossing a sign marked: ‘Look out for the cars when you hear the whistle or bell;’ and the county court shall appropriate money to defray the expenses of said signs; and no engine driver shall be compelled to blow the whistle or ring the bell at any crossing, unless it is so designated. (2) On approaching every crossing so distinguished, the whistle or bell of the locomotive shall be sounded at a distance of one-fourth of a mile from the crossing, and at short intervals until the train has passed the crossing.”
“See. 1575. Every railroad company that fails to observe these precautions, or cause them to be observed by its agents or servants, shall be responsible for all damage to persons or property occasioned by, or resulting from, any accident or collision that may occur. ’ ’
“See. 1576. No railroad that observes, or causes to be observed, these precautions, shall be responsible for any damage done to person or property on its road. The proof that it has observed said precautions shall be upon the company.”
The opinion in that case is a well-reasoned and able one. The conclusions reached are inevitable upon a construction of this statute. This is not disputed
“See. 8. That the board of county commissioners shall have full power and authority to regulate the crossings of county roads by steam railroads, electric railroads, or any other public service corporation; and they shall have the right to grant a right of way to such railroads for the purpose of crossing the country roads, where it can be done safely to the traveling public. It shall be within their power to require said railroads to make every safeguard necessary and appropriate for the safety of the traveling public, and to provide the grade at which they shall work said roads, or whether they shall go over or under the same, and to provide the safeguards and regulations as to said crossings; all of which must be at the expense of said railroads; and in cases where crossings are made by the railroads, it shall be the duty of said railroads to keep and maintain said crossings and fifty feet of the public road on either side of said railroad at their (the railroad’s) expense. It is not intended by this act, however, to give the county commissioners the right to grant franchises to railroads, electric light companies, telephone companies, etc., to run their tracks or lines along and upon the public highways of the*633 county, but this right shall only be granted by the county court. ”
The Graves Case was decided at the April term, 1912, and this statute was passed in February, 1913.
This act does not provide for a county overseer; and, in fact, there has not been an overseer of roads in Shelby county since the act of 1883, chapter 167. There is an insistence by counsel for plaintiffs that the statutory precautions under consideration were repealed alike by Acts of 1883, chapter 167; 1893, chapter 177; 1895, chapter 74; 1903, chapter 365; 1905, chapter 74; 1907, chapter 370; 1909, chapter 499; Private Acts 1911, chapter 237; and the act just quoted.
The argument in support of this contention is that the various acts referred to abolish the office of road overseer in Shelby county, and place the control of the roads, and the appropriation of money for the support and maintenance of roads, in another authority than the quarterly county court; therefore, it is said, it was impossible for the overseer to erect the sign prescribed by the Code, and for that reason the statutory precaution did not apply.
"We do not think that the acts referred to accomplish this result; however, we think the Act of 1913, section 8, does.
By chapter 237, Private Acts of 1911, the county court of Shelby county was practically abolished. The jurisdiction of roads of every class in the county was taken from the county court and vested in the
We think this is wholly inconsistent with the provisions of the Code upon this subject. The Code of 1858 directs specifically what shall be done and who shall do it, and provides the liability of the railroad company for noncompliance with its provisions, and completely exonerates it in cases where it does comply. The act under consideration gives to the board of county commissioners “full power and authority to regulate the crossing of county roads by steam railroads.” Under this act they can provide such crossings as they may deem proper, and such safeguards for the public as their judgment approves. We think this wholly inconsistent with the provisions of the Code requiring a sign to be erected by a particular official, and specifying the words that shall be placed on it, and the public officials that shall pay the expense of the sign. The Code requires the county
We are not unmindful of the rule of law that repeals by implication are not favored, and that a statute will not he held to have repealed a preceding statute by implication when the two can stand together; hut, of course, where the two statutes prescribe different and inconsistent rules of action about the same thing, and are in conflict, the later statute must prevail. Frazier v. Railroad, 88 Tenn., 183, 12 S. W., 537; Monroe County v. Hudson 90 Tenn., 741, 18 S. W., 405; Fisher v. Baldridge, 91 Tenn., 418, 19 S. W. 227; Lowery v. Railway, 117 Tenn., 515, 101 S. W., 1157; Durham v. State, 89 Tenn., 723, 18 S. W., 74; Coal Co. v. Steel Co., 123 Tenn., 428, 131 S. W., 988, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.), 278.
It is not a sufficient answer to this conclusion to say that the provisions of the Code are a general law, intended to regulate road crossings throughout the State, while the act under consideration is a local law, applicable only to Shelby county. While such a law is local in its application, it is general in its characteristics, and it has been held by this court that such a law is valid, and must be given force and effect in the territory to which it applies. Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn., (24 Pick.), 82, 65 S. W., 871; Archibald v. Clark, 112 Tenn., (4 Cates), 534, 82 S. W., 310; Murphy v. State, 114 Tenn. (6 Cates), 533, 86 S. W., 711; Hall v. State, 124 Tenn. (16 Cates), 239, 137 S, W., 500.
All of the authorities agree that the legislature has complete power, as a proper police regulation, to prescribe the manner of giving warning at crossings. Graves v. Railroad, supra. ■ It may well be that the legislature passed the act in question to obviate the holding in the Graves Case. The accident in that case and in this case happened at the same crossing.
The Horn Lake road is a well-traveled thoroughfare, and, while it is not proven, we know judicially that the environs of the city of Memphis are thickly populated, and there is must travel on the county roads.
The effect of the repeal of the sections of the Code is to restore the common-law liability of the defendant. Therefore it was the duty of the defendant to give proper warning of its train’s approach to this crossing. The features of the Code provisions which repealed the defendant’s common-law liability were the provisions which required the overseer, to erect
“If this statute had simply provided that the road overseer should mark these crossings in a particular way, and that railroad companies should cause the locomotive bell or whistle to be sounded on approaching such marked crossings, then it might be argued that, inasmuch as the statute contained no provision for unmarked crossings, railroad companies would he held to their common-law duties with respect to them. Such a result cannot he reached here, however, hy reason of the explicit provisions of the Code. No means of warning, save hy the hell or whistle, are in common use hy the railroad companies, and it is not suggested that they could give warning of the approach of their trains in any other way. The statutory provision here is couched in positive, negative terms, and is that no engine driver shall be required to sound the bell or whistle on approaching a crossing, unless such crossing is marked by a sign put up by the road overseer, with the inscription prescribed. There is an absolute repeal of the common law on the subject, and there is no room for speculation about the matter.”
This appears to have been the practical construction placed on the road law applicable to Shelby county,
It is said for defendants that Drs. Lewis and Nelson were guilty of such contributory negligence as would bar tbeir right of recovery as a matter of law. We think this contention is not well made. Tbe proof does not show tbe height of tbe embankment along which they drove tbe automobile for a distance west of tbe railroad track, but it does show tbe height of tbe embankment upon which tbe railroad is located near tbe crossing to be about thirty feet. From tbe photographs in tbe record it would appear that tbe county road is upon an embankment which gradually inclines from approximately nothing to about thirty feet. This is an estimate from circumstances in tbe record, and is not directly proven. It is proven, however, that tbe embankment is so high that, if tbe automobile bad skidded so as to run off tbe embankment,
The plaintiffs’ proof tends to show that the train entered upon the crossing without sounding the whistle or the bell, or taking any other steps to give warning of its approach. This, of course, nothing else appearing, made a question for the jury against the. defendant under the common law. The question is whether the conduct of Drs. Lewis and Nelson is such that, notwithstanding defendant’s negligence, bars their right of recovery.
Some courts have laid down the dogmatic formula that the driver of an automobile cannot enter upon a railroad track without first stopping, looking, and listening at a point where stopping, looking, and listening will avail to discover the presence of a train on the track, if such be the case. The learned trial judge seemed to think that plaintiffs should have flagged themselves across the railroad. However, it must be admitted that plaintiffs had the same right
The true rule which applies to this as all other questions of negligence is whether plaintiffs and defendants were in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence at the time of the accident.
In the case of crossing a railroad track, the look and listen rule is the proper measure of plaintiff’s duty under ordinary circumstances; however, circumstances often exist which make the rule inapplicable. We think such may be true of the circumstances of this case. It is not reasonable to expect one to stop, look, and listen before entering upon a railroad crossing when he is not conscious, for an adequate reason, that he is approaching such a crossing. In such case the inquiry should be whether the reason for his not realizing the approaching danger is such as would probably excuse him. We cannot say as a matter of law that Dr. Lewis should have known that he was
Our cases are in accord with this holding. Some of them are reviewed in the case of Railroad v. Parks, 136 Tenn., 370, 189 S. W., 695. In that case the exception to the look and listen rule is declared to be well established, and the belief was expressed that there had been no deviation from the rule, with its exceptions, in any of our cases. The cases referred to in that case were cases in which some faculty of the deceased, or plaintiff, was impaired so that all could not be used, or that it would have been useless to stop, look, and listen because of other circumstances attending upon the accident. The rule that it is negligence per se to enter upon a railroad track without looking or listening has been applied to the ordinary case in which the plaintiff, or the deceased^ was not prevented from seeing or hearing by any other circumstances, and had the use of his faculties. In such case an ordinarily prudent man is deemed, under the law, to be guilty of such negligence as would bar a recovery if he entered upon the track without doing so. And
It is insisted that Dr. Nelson should have seen the train before Dr. Lewis saw it. It is in proof, however, that Dr. Nelson did see it at the earliest point at which it could have been seen, and when the train was two hundred feet away, and gave warning to Dr. Lewis. If the train was two hundrd feet way, and if the engineer could have seen plaintiffs approaching the track, and if he had applied his emergency brakes, it is probable that the accident would not have occurred. It is true he was not driving the car, and that he was under the duty of exercising due care for his own safety; but it is also true that he could not see the train until he approached within twenty feet of the track, and he did see it at that point. It was for the jury to determine his negligence, if any,
As heretofore stated, Drs. Lewis and Nelson were partners in the practice of medicine; they had gone to this place to perform a surgical operation; it was Dr. Nelson’s case, and he performed the operation, hut Dr. Lewis assisted him, and carried him to the patient’s residence in his own automobile as a guest and without charge. They were jointly interested in the success of the operation, and in that sense they were upon a joint enterprise. The interest they had in the journey would doubtless continue until they had returned to their offices at Memphis, or until they had declared the journey at an end by act or word. The question of imputable negligence does not really arise in the case. The proof shows that Dr. Nelson saw the train at the same instant Dr. Lewis saw it, and gave the alarm. His negligence, if any, is as great or greater than that of Dr. Lewis, and therefore there is no basis for the contention that Dr. Lewis’s negligence is imputable to Dr. Nelson.
We think that Dr. Nelson was under the duty of exercising due care for his own safety, notwithstanding that Dr. Lewis was driving the automobile. This would be true whether he was k guest of Dr. Lewis, or whether they were engaged upon a joint enterprise in which they were both interested. Dr. Lewis was not a common carrier, and was in the exercise of a friendly act in which he had an interest in transporting Dr. Nelson in his automobile.
The facts that plaintiffs were riding in an automobile, and that Dr. Nelson was the guest of Dr. Lewis, cannot change their duty to exercise due care for their own safety. This duty is personal to each one. A wide discussion will be found in the following eases: Dale v. Tramway Co., 173 Fed., 787, 97 C. C. A.,
The fact that plaintiff and deceased were in an automobile cannot change the rnle of ordinary care as discussed in this opinion. Our eases cited above recognize that a railroad is an admonition of danger, and that ordinarily it is negligence per se to enter upon it without looking and listening. Some of the eases above cited from other jurisdictions hold that the driver of an automobile must stop, look, and listen before entering upon a railroad track because of the control which the driver has over, and the absence of nervousness, upon the part of the machine. These are facts to be considered in determining whether the driver was in the exercise of reasonable care at the time he entered upon the railroad track, but we think that our cases without exception cannot be relied upon as authority for the proposition that the driver must stop, look, and listen under all circumstances. The same exceptions which have been noted heretofore would apply to the driver of an automobile. The control he has over his machine, and the fact that it is a machine* which cannot become nervous, are circumstances to be considered in determining the standard of care which must govern him, and the degree of care which he must exercise. But when the
We cannot approve the verdict of the jury because the trial judge did not do so. His remarks show that he was dissatisfied with the verdict because he believed the law and the facts were against the plaintiffs. We cannot affirm such a holding. Hamburger v. Railroad 138 Tenn., 123, 196 S. W., 144.
Accordingly the case will be reversed and remanded for trial.