[¶ 1] In this case we are asked to decide whether passengers are liable for the injuries and deaths caused by an intoxicated driver. We are also asked to decide whether false testimony may create civil liability. We affirm the summary judgments of dismissal, concluding that absent a special relationship, not present here, there is no basis for liability on the part of passengers of an intoxicated driver, and there is no basis for civil liability based on the claimed false testimony.
I
[¶ 2] As reported in
Hurt v. Freeland,
[¶ 3] Meyer, the Olsons, and Freeland had been consuming alcohol. The Olsons spent part of Christmas Eve drinking in the Lud-den Tavern. After they left the tavern, they went to Freeland’s trailer in Ludden. In the early evening, the Olsons, being too intoxicated to drive, asked Meyer for a ride to Oakes, where Traci Olson’s mother lived. Meyer *554 agreed, even though Oakes was somewhat beyond his destination, his parents’ farm south of Oakes. While traveling north to Oakes from Ludden, the pickup hit a patch of ice and crossed into the southbound lane. Tim Olson told Meyer how to move the pickup off the ice and back into the northbound lane. Just before impact, Tim Olson told the occupants of the vehicle to “Brace yourselves.”
[¶ 4] Edwin Hurt’s wife, Alice Hurt, and Eric Hurt, and Ernie Mathias on behalf of Brady Hurt, a minor, sued the Olsons and Tyler Freeland on traditional negligence grounds.
1
On the Olsons’ motion, the court granted partial summary judgment on those grounds, but allowed the Hurts to amend their complaint. The Hurts’ amended complaint alleged passenger negligence, civil conspiracy, state RICO, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and prima facie tort. The Olsons again moved for summary judgment. The district court granted their motion, dismissing the amended complaint against them. Freeland did not appear in the action or answer the complaint. Because Freeland did not answer the complaint and was neither dismissed from .this case nor had judgment entered against him, we dismissed the appeal for lack of Rule 54(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., certification, because of the unresolved claim between the Hurts and Freeland.
Hurt,
[¶ 5] Following our dismissal of the appeal, the Hurts moved the district court to reconsider its grant of summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. On March 15, 1998, the district court included Freeland in its orders granting summary judgment nunc pro tunc. Judgment was entered on March 20, 1998. Alice Hurt appealed, 2 on the grounds of passenger liability and civil conspiracy to commit perjury.
[¶ 6] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. Hurt’s appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.
II
[¶ 7] Summary judgment is a procedure for the prompt and expeditious disposition of a controversy without trial if either litigant is entitled to judgment ás a matter of law, if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving factual disputes would not alter the results.
Swenson v. Raumin,
[¶ 8] In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may examine the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, interrogatories, and inferences to be drawn from that evidence to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
Matter of Estate of Otto,
*555
[¶ 9] Although negligence actions are ordinarily not appropriate for summary judgment, whether a duty exists is generally a preliminary question of law for the court to decide.
Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Ill
[¶ 10] Hurt argues the Olsons, as passengers, negligently breached a duty owed to the Hurts when they arranged for Meyer to give them a ride.
A
[¶ 11] To establish a cause of action for negligence, Hurt must demonstrate the Olsons owed the decedents a duty of care, which the Olsons breached. In
Diegel v. City of West Fargo,
B
[¶ 12] Hurt has not cited, nor have we found, any North Dakota authority stating vehicle passengers owe a duty to a third party for injuries caused by a driver’s negligence.
[¶ 13] In analyzing when a duty exists, Professors Prosser and Keeton have said:
The court must balance the following factors when determining the existence of duty in each particular ease: (1) foreseeability of harm to plaintiff; (2) degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury; (3) closeness of connection between defendant’s conduct and injury suffered; (4) moral blame attached to defendant’s conduct; (5) policy of preventing future harm; (6) extent of burden to defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and (7) availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on.the Law of Torts § 53, at 359 n. 24 (5th ed.1984) (citations omitted). A generally accepted rule is passengers owe no duty to injured parties. Brian Shipp, Note, Price v. Halstead: Liability of a Guest Passenger for the Negligence of his Drunk Driver, 42 Okla. L.Rev. 159, 162 (“passengers are not liable for the negligence of the driver in the absence of a special relationship between passenger and driver”).
C
[¶ 14] North Dakota has established a statutory duty for persons providing alcohol to a person under twenty-one years of age, an incompetent, or an obviously intoxicated person. North Dakota’s dram shop law provides “for fault resulting from intoxication”:
Every spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured by any obviously intoxicated person has a claim for relief for fault under section 32-03.2-02 against any person who knowingly disposes, sells, barters, or gives away alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, an incompetent, or an obviously intoxicated person, and if death ensues, the survivors of the decedent are entitled to damages defined in section 32-21-02.
N.D.C.C. § 5-01-06.1.
[¶ 15] Dram shop laws are sui gen-eris.
Stewart v. Ryan,
At common law, there was no tort liability for selling or giving liquor to an able-bodied person, because drinking the liquor, not the furnishing of it, was the proximate cause of any subsequent injury. 45 Am. Jur.2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 553, 554 (1969). In Feuerherm [v. Ertelt], supra [28Q N.W.2d 509 (N.D.1979)], this court said that our prior dram shop law created an entirely new cause of action in which liability was imposed upon a finding of a violation of the statute and not upon a finding of fault in the sense of wrongful intent or negligent conduct. See Iszler v. Jorda,80 N.W.2d 665 (N.D.1957). Dram shop laws were enacted for remedial purposes, and as this court indicated in Iszler, supra, should be construed to advance those remedial purposes and to suppress the mischief of dram shop violations. See also Feuerherm, supra.
Stewart,
[¶ 16] Although Meyer was under twenty-one years of age at the time, nothing in the record indicates the Olsons provided Meyer with alcohol. As the district court stated, “plaintiffs have absolutely no evidence — admissible competent evidence showing ... [t]hat any of the[ ] passengers furnished alcohol to Mr. Meyer. There has been absolutely no assertion of that. There’s no factual basis for it, in fact, plaintiffs haven’t even asserted it in their brief.”
Compare Born v. Mayers,
[¶ 17] There is no basis to find a statutory duty under North Dakota’s dram shop law.
D
[¶ 18] Hurt argues the Olsons are jointly liable with Meyer under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, which deals with comparative fault and allocation of fault in North Dakota. Hurt claims the Olsons acted in concert with Meyer and actually encouraged and gave substantial assistance in the commission of the tort, and are therefore liable under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02.
1
•[¶ 19] Contrary to Hurt’s claims, neither the original nor the amended complaints allege the Olsons or others acted in concert with Meyer, aided or encouraged Meyer, or ratified or adopted his actions.
2
[¶ 20] The 1987 Legislature enacted the comparative fault provisions in N.D.C.C. Chapter 32-03.2. See 1987 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 404. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 provides:
Modified comparative fault. Contributory fault does not bar recovery in an action by any person to recover damages for death or injury to person or property unless the fault was as great as the combined fault of all other persons who contribute to the injury, but any damages allowed must be diminished in proportion to the amount of contributing fault attributable to the person recovering. The court may, and when requested by any party, shall direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each person, whether or not a party, who contributed to the injury. The court shall then reduce the amount of such damages in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the person recovering. When two or more parties are found to have contributed to the injury, the liability of each party is several only, and is not joint, and each party is liable only for the amount of damages attributable to the percentage of fault of that party, except that *557 any persons who act in concert in committing a tortious act or aid or encourage the act, or ratifies or adopts the act for their benefit, are jointly liable for all damages attributable to their combined percentage of fault. Under this section, fault includes negligence, malpractice, absolute liability, dram shop liability, failure to warn, reckless or willful conduct, assumption of risk, misuse of product, failure to avoid injury, and product liability, including product liability involving negligence or strict liability or breach of warranty for product defect.
“The effect of the enactment of the comparative fault provisions was to significantly revise tort liability in this state to shift the focus from traditional doctrines to the singular, inclusive concept of fault.”
Stewart v. Ryan,
[1121] Hurt claims N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02 establishes liability if the Olsons and Meyer were acting together or if the Olsons gave assistance or encouragement. In support of this argument, Hurt cites
Kavadas,
E
[¶ 22] We next look at the substantive law to consider whether the parties “acted in concert.” “A person is deemed to act in concert when he acts with another to bring about some preconceived result.” Black’s Law Dictionary 289 (6th ed.1990). To find concerted action, the substantive law applied in other jurisdictions follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876. This section, in part, states:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement....
[¶ 23] The Minnesota Supreme Court in
Olson v. Ische,
In the tort field, the doctrine [of section 876] appears to be reserved for application to facts which manifest a common plan to commit a tortious act where the participants know of the plan and its purpose and take affirmative steps to encourage the achievement of the result.... “[T]he mere presence of the particular defendant at the commission of the wrong, or his failure to object to it, is not enough to charge him with responsibility.” [Citing Prosser.]
Here there is not the kind of situation where it can be said the driver and passenger were acting “in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular result.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, comment (a) (1977). Nor is there the kind of “substantial encouragement” by the passenger of the driver’s conduct needed to impose joint tort liability. Fritz was with Ische, partying with others, each doing his own drinking voluntarily, and *558 Fritz voluntarily accompanied Ische on his return trip to Norwood in a guest-host driving situation. We hold that, as a matter of law, plaintiff-appellants do not have a cause of action against defendant Fritz under section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Id.
(emphasis added).
See also Welc v. Porter,
[¶ 24] There are numerous cases where no duty on the part of passengers was found and liability did not attach. Gregory G. Sar-no, Annotation,
Passenger’s Liability to Vehicular Accident Victim for Ham Caused by Intoxicated Motor Vehicle Driver,
[¶ 25] There is nothing to indicate the Ol-sons aided or encouraged Meyer. They did not provide alcohol to him before or during the drive to Oakes. Simply stated, the Ol-sons needed a ride, and Meyer provided one.
1
[¶ 26] In the case where a passenger actively furnishes alcohol to the driver, however, the situation is different, and some courts have used § 876(b) to create passenger duty to third parties.
See
[¶ 27] For instance, in
Price,
[¶ 28] There is no evidence the Olsons furnished alcohol or encouraged Meyer to drink alcohol. The evidence does not show the Olsons knew Meyer was intoxicated. Hurt has established no basis for liability.
2
[¶ 29] Hurt argues the advice given by Tim Olson to Meyer immediately before the crash indicates control or interference. Liability may attach where the passenger has substantially interfered with the operation of the vehicle, because a passenger has a duty not to interfere with the operation of the vehicle.
See Lind v. Slowinski,
A passenger who interferes with his driver’s operation of the motor vehicle, for instance by grabbing the steering wheel, may be liable to others, and a passenger *559 who is the owner of the car may be liable, at common law, for negligent entrustment to an incompetent driver. This ease ... is different. We hold that a passenger has no duty to members of the public to control the operation of a motor vehicle by its intoxicated owner, where, as under the circumstances here, there is no special relationship between the driver-owner and the passenger.
Olson v. Ische,
3
[¶ 30] Because Meyer went somewhat past his destination and toward Oakes at the Olsons’ request, Hurt argues the Olsons owe a duty. In
Fugate v. Galvin,
[¶ 31] The Illinois Court of Appeals noted the passenger’s request alone is not enough when the driver makes his own decision:
The decision to take the road in an intoxicated condition remained the driver’s alone. Because [the driver] alone could make the decision, [the driver] alone had to bear the consequences of a bad decision. No duty should be placed on the passenger who has neither the legal right to require a person to drive nor to prevent him from driving. The relationship of Mends riding together in an automobile does not place upon the passenger the duty to install a capable driver in the seat of his friend’s car.
Id. (citations omitted). This is echoed by Prosser and Keeton, who say:
[W]henever the automobile driver should, as a reasonable person, foresee that his conduct will involve an unreasonable risk of harm to other drivers or to pedestrians, he is then under a duty to them to exercise the care of a reasonable person as to what he does or does not do.
Keeton, supra, § 53 at 358.
[¶ 32] The Olsons’ request that Meyer give them a ride home, although somewhat past his destination, is insufficient to create liability-
F
[¶ 33] The responsibility belonged to Meyer, not to the Olsons. In the absence of some special relationship imposing a duty or causing the negligence of the driver to be imputed to the passenger, there is no duty upon a guest passenger to a person outside the vehicle to exercise any control or give any warning to the driver of the vehicle. The district court appropriately granted summary judgment on the negligence claim.
IV
[¶ 34] Hurt claims a conspiracy to testify falsely. In detail, Hurt describes factual inconsistencies between the criminal trial testimony of Cory Meyer, the driver, and depositions given in this case. For purposes of summary judgment, the district court deemed certain facts to be true and correct. Most of these facts are related to inconsistencies in the parties’ testimony from two different trials. The district court was aware of the inconsistencies when granting the summary judgment.
A
[¶ 35] Hurt acknowledges in her brief, “[t]he general rule is that no civil action for damages lies for perjury.” Other courts have echoed this proposition. See
State v. Cardenas-Hemandez,
B
[¶ 36] Hurt contends “courts have long allowed an action for civil conspiracy to commit fraud where the fraud perpetrated takes the form of giving of false testimony under oath,” citing two old cases,
Verplanck v. Van Buren,
[¶ 37] Although North Dakota has not directly confronted the issue of a civil action for perjury, we have ruled regarding a civil conspiracy. A civil conspiracy is “a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another and an overt act that results in damage[s].”
Burr v. Kulas,
C
[¶ 38] While there may have been inconsistencies in the testimony of the Olsons and Freeland and Meyer, there is no evidence of damages caused by the alleged conspiracy, and thus no basis for liability in any case. The district court appropriately granted summary judgment on the conspiracy claim.
V
[¶ 39] The summary judgments of dismissal are affirmed.