39 Ga. App. 522 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1929
The accusation in this case alleges that the defendant, Henry Hurst, did “run into the wagon of one Everett King, and cause an accident thereby, while he, the said Henry Hurst, was operating a motor-vehicle on said highway, and did fail to render to the said Everett King such assistance as was reasonable or necessary, contrary to the laws,” etc. The defendant demurred to the
It will be noted that the accusation does not allege that the defendant knowingly, or intentionally, or negligently, or recklessly, or wantonly, or wilfully, or maliciously ran into the wagon of Everett King; and running into the wagon is not made the basis of the prosecution. The basis of the action is that, after running into the wagon, the defendant failed to render King “such assistance as was reasonable or necessary.” The language last quoted is too vague, indefinite, and uncertain to be capable of enforcement, and therefore can not properly form the basis of a criminal action; and for this reason the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the accusation.
In the case of Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App. 371 (2) (75 S. E. 523), this court held that “So much of the act approved Aug. 13, 1910 (Acts 1910, p. 92), regulating the use of automobiles, as undertakes to make penal the operation of an automobile on one of the highways of this State ‘at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the traffic and use of such highway, or so as to endanger the life or limb of any person or the safety of any property,’ is too uncertain and indefinite in its terms to be
Applying the reasoning in the Hayes case to the case under consideration, we would ask, who is to determine whether or not assistance is necessary, and, if so, how much assistance would be reasonable ? There would be a diversity of opinion among men on these questions where no- rule is laid down to guide them. In Carter v. State, 12 Ga. App. 432 (78 S. E. 206), this court said: “In so far as the General Assembly attempted to penalize the operation of automobiles at an unreasonable rate of speed, the act of 1910 is void, because there is no measure by which the unrea
It is not amiss to say, even though it be obiter, that while we are impelled by the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court, and the fundamental principles of our law to hold -that the language in question can not be the basis of a criminal prosecution, yet such language is humanitarian in its nature and salutary in its inception; and where, under a proper accusation or indictment,
Since the accusation was null and void, the further proceedings were nugatory, and it is unnecessary to decide the other issues presented for consideration.
Judgment reversed.