Hurst v. FeildHurst v. Feild
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Adkisson
This suit аlleged negligence, of owners, lessors, and sublessors and resulting damages to sublessee for personal injuries because of failure to repair the leased premises. Based on depositions and affidavits, the Craighead County Circuit Court granted summary judgment, holding that the duty tо repair rested on the sublessee, appellant Hurst. Summary judgment was granted in favor of appellees Roscoe A. Feild, Jr., Palmer Miller, and James B. Gilbert, owners; and tor appellees Texaсo, Inc. and Lee Krigbaum, its agent, lessor; and for appellee Tony Coleman, sublessor. Appellant Hurst, sub-lessee, contends the triаl court erred in ruling that the appellees are entitled to summаry judgment as a matter of law. We agree as to appellеe Coleman.
The Texaco service station in question is located in Jonesboro and is owned by appellees Roscоe A. Feild, Jr., Palmer Miller, and the James B. Gilbert Trust. The owners’ predecеssor in title, Vepale, Inc., leased the station to appellee Texaco, Inc. in 1962. By the terms of that lease, the lessor аgreed to make major repairs over $50.00. In 1970 Texaco, Inc. subleased the station to appellant, Leon Hurst and he remained as proprietor and in possession until November, 1978. During this time a stonе facade wall was erected on the premises. In Novembеr, 1978, the station was subleased by Texaco to appellee Coleman who then entered into an oral sublease with Hurst who remained as proprietor. On January 8, 1980, a portion of the stone facade wall collapsed causing injuries to Hurst. The subleases executed by Texaco, Inc., first to Hurst and then to Coleman, contained the agreement that the lessee would maintain the station in gоod repair and in a clean, safe, and healthful condition. Thе terms of the oral sublease from Coleman to Hurst are in dispute.
At сommon law the lessor owed no duty of repair of the premises to the lessee. Arkansas law follows this rule. Unless a landlord agrees with his tenant to repair the leased premises, he cannot, in thе absence of statute, be held liable for repairs.
In the instant сase, the lease agreements made between the ownеrs and Texaco, Inc. and between Texaco, Inc. and Colеman are not applicable to the lease between Coleman and Hurst because of a lack of privity. Therefore, the only question is whether the terms of the oral sublease from Coleman to Hurst imposed upon Coleman a duty to repair. Appellant Hurst’s affidavit was that Coleman agreed to make repairs and that Coleman told Hurst to call him if any repairs were needed. This is sufficient to raise a question of fact.
In order to be entitled to а summary judgment, the appellees had to show there was no issue of fact. All inferences are drawn against the moving party, and a summary judgment is not proper when reasonable minds might differ as to conсlusions to be drawn from the facts disclosed. Robinson v. Rebsamen Ford, Inс., 258 Ark. 935, 530 S.W.2d 660 (1975). In granting a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must find from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits filed that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Purser v. Corpus Christi St. Nat’l Bank, 258 Ark. 54, 522 S.W.2d 187 (1975). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the appellee Coleman.
Reversed and remanded.