Hurrell-Harring v. StateHurrell-Harring v. State
KIMBERLY HURRELL-HARRING et al., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants, v STATE OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants, and COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Respondent. [977 NYS2d 449]
Peters, P.J. Appeals (1) from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.), entered December 16, 2012 in Albany County, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to compel certain discovery from defendant County of Suffolk, and (2) from from that part of an order of said court, entered January 30, 2013 in Albany County, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to renew.
The underlying facts of this class action lawsuit challenging the adequacy of defendant State of New York‘s public defense system are fully documented in our prior decisions (81 AD3d 69 [2011]; 75 AD3d 667 [2010]; 66 AD3d 84 [2009], mod 15 NY3d 8 [2010]).1 Following extensive discovery, plaintiffs moved to compel defendant County of Suffolk (hereinafter defendant), among others, to provide complete responses to their discovery requests and to produce knowledgeable witnesses in response to their deposition notices. Supreme Court, noting that defendant had attested to having produced all relevant and material documents in its possession and that depositions had been scheduled for several of its representatives, denied plaintiffs’ motion as it pertained to defendant. Shortly after that order was entered, depositions were conducted of three witnesses produced by defendant in response to plaintiffs’ demands. Plaintiffs thereafter
moved for
Supreme Court did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel as it pertained to defendant. Plaintiffs’ initial discovery demands requested that defendant produce all documents concerning contracts related to its provision of publicly funded legal representation, the funding and resources available to prosecution and public defense services, and the monitoring, oversight and supervision of the public defense system. They also subsequently sought all documents in defendant‘s possession, custody or control related to the four named plaintiffs prosecuted within the county. Defendant produced certain responsive documents, stated that it did not possess information responsive to several of plaintiffs’ other requests and, in opposition to the motion, counsel affirmed that defendant had complied with its disclosure obligations. There was no evidence presented on the motion that defendant had access to or was withholding any of the requested documents. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Supreme Court abused its broad discretion in determining that defendant had complied, to the extent possible, with plaintiffs’ document demands (see Matter of Scaccia, 66 AD3d 1247, 1250 [2009]).
We do find, however, that Supreme Court erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion to renew in certain respects. To be entitled to renewal, plaintiffs were required to provide new facts that would change the prior determination as well as a justifiable excuse for not providing such facts earlier (see
In support of the motion to renew, plaintiffs proffered, among other things, portions of the deposition testimony of three witnesses produced by defendant subsequent to Supreme Court‘s
These newly discovered facts would have changed the prior determination denying in its entirety plaintiffs’ motion to compel as it related to defendant. Because such documentation was requested by plaintiffs in their discovery demands and is material and relevant to their claims attacking the adequacy of indigent legal representation in the five counties at issue, it was subject to disclosure (see
Renewal of that part of plaintiffs’ motion which sought the
Plaintiffs requested production of individuals most knowledgeable about various topics. Defendant produced Corso, McCarthy and Joseph Jerger, a representative from defendant‘s Probation Department, in response. We find that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Jerger possessed insufficient knowledge concerning the subject matter raised in the deposition related to the Probation Department, or that he was otherwise inadequate. As to Corso and McCarthy, while they were able to testify regarding some of the noticed topics, they had little —if any— knowledge as to several critical topics, such as: the allocation of, and the policies and procedures relating to, funding and other resources for the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases (District Attorney‘s Office Notice, Topics 4 and 8); the training, supervision and case loads of attorneys prosecuting criminal cases (District Attorney‘s Office Notice, Topics 5, 6 and 7); and policies and procedures relating to legal services available to, and attorney visitation and communications with, incarcerated indigent criminal defendants (Sheriff‘s Office Notice, Topics 7, 9 and 11). Like the documents that were requested —but not provided—by defendant, these matters bear upon several material and relevant issues in this case related to plaintiffs’ claim that indigent criminal defendants in the county are constructively denied counsel, such as the alleged lack of parity between the funding and resources available to criminal legal defense providers and criminal prosecutors, and the purported lack of access that indigent criminal defendants have to their attorneys. Accordingly, plaintiffs must be given the opportunity to depose witnesses possessing sufficient knowledge on the aforementioned topics (see McNeill v City of New York, 40 AD3d at 825; Ramos v New York City Hous. Auth., 202 AD2d 563, 563-564 [1994]; JMJ Contract Mgt. v Ingersoll-Rand Co., 100 AD2d 291, 292 [1984]).
Lahtinen, Spain and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order entered December 16, 2012 is affirmed, without costs. Ordered that the order entered January 30, 2013 is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied that portion of plaintiffs’ motion to renew as sought to compel defendant County of Suffolk (1) to produce, for deposition by plaintiffs, witnesses possessing sufficient knowledge as to (a) the allocation of, and the policies and procedures relating to, funding and other resources for the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, (b) the training, supervision and caseloads of attorneys prosecuting criminal cases, and (c) policies and procedures relating to legal services available to, and attorney visitation and communications with, incarcerated indigent criminal defendants; and (2) to diligently search for and produce (a) all budget documents relating to the provision of public defense including, but not limited to, (i) annual call letters soliciting budget requests from county agencies, (ii) data from said defendant‘s budget computer system, (iii) budget modification requests submitted by the Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County, Inc., and (iv) policies and procedures used by said defendant‘s comptroller‘s office to determine which expenses are eligible for reimbursement from said defendant, (b) inmate records related to the named plaintiffs who were prosecuted in said defendant, and (c) attorney visitation logs recording visits with incarcerated clients from January 1, 2006 to present; motion granted to said extent; and, as so modified, affirmed.