delivered the opinion of the court:
In September, 1861, the appellee, Keller, instituted suit against the administrator and the heirs of the said Isaac Hurn, for a settlement of the estate, and for the sale of the real estate in the hands of the heirs, of whom the appellant, Luther Hurn, was one. At the September term, 1868, a decree was rendered for an account of the estate, real and personal, and an account of the debts. At the September term, 1869, the appellant, Luther Hurn, was appointed a special commissioner to make sale of as much of the real estate as was necessary to pay the debts.
The appellant was a party to the suit instituted by the appellee, Keller, in 1867, both as administrator and as heir. Pending these proceedings to subject this real estate, and before the debts were paid, and after decree for sale of the same—he being directed to sell the said real estate as special commissioner—he erected these improvements. Has he any valid claim for compensation for these improvements so erected by him ?
The suit in question to subject the real estate of Isaac Hurn was brought by the appellee, Keller, to subject the same to the satisfaction of his debt. The appellant claims that as this debt was paid the said suit was no notice to him of the debts of
In the case of Ewing v. Ferguson, 33 Gratt. 558, this court said, that although the original bill was not filed as a creditors’ bill the county court did not err in allowing the other creditors, on their motion, to file their petitions and to be made co-plaintiffs with the complainants, and in the reference to a master to take an account of all liens on the real estate of Ewing, deceased; that when a decree is made for an account of outstanding claims against the estate, it operates a suspension of all other pending suits of creditors, who must come in under the decree, which is considered a decree in favor of all the creditors, citing the case of Stephenson v. Taverners, 9 Gratt. 398; and that from the time the decree for an account was rendered it was no longer a separate creditor’s suit, but was a general creditors’ suit.
The hill in this case prays for discovery of both real and personal assets, and for accounts showing what disposition has been made of them, and it may be brought by the creditor complainant alone, or for himself and the other creditors of decedent. Carter v. Hampton’s Adm’r, 77 Va. p. 637, citing Adam’s Equity, 257; 1 Story’s Equity Juris. secs. 54, 56-7; 1 Spence Equity Juris. 579, and Duerson’s Adm’r v. Alsop, 27 Gratt. 229.
In the case of Easley v. Barksdale and others, 75 Va. p. 279, this court said: “The first question to be decided is, whether the land purchased by Womack from one of the heirs, is liable in his hands for a ratable share of the debts. It was certainly liable under sec. 3, chap. 127, Code 1873, before alienation by the heir.” In that case the purchaser bought from the heir after suit brought, and was a purchaser pendente lite. He bought after the creditors had commenced their suit, and while that suit was pending, to which the heir from whom he pur
The appellant claims, also, that if he has no valid claim to the land purchased, he has a valid claim for the value of the improvements there erected by him under chapter 131, §§ 30 and 34 of the Code.
In the case of Grœme v. Cullen, 23 Gratt., Judge Moncure, speaking of this statute, said that it introduced a new principle into the law of Virginia, having been taken substantially from the laws of New York and Massachusetts, but that it was confined to cases of ejectment, or cases in which a decree or judgment is rendered against any defendant for land; but that these statutes apply only to a case against a defendant for land, which he bona fide claims as owner thereof, under a title believed by him to be good, and upon which he has made improvements under such belief. See also Krebs v. Woods, 33 Gratt. 693.
Decree affirmed.