As to the first point, it is unquestionably the rule, in actions for verbаl slander, that the complaint must show that the words were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff, in the presence or hearing of some person or persons ; but, in this case, we think that the terms employеd by the pleader, “ conversations,” “ discourses,” “ publish,” imply the presence of hearers, and sufficiently indicate that the declаrations were public and notorious. This point is not, •then, well made.
As to the second point, it was contеnded in the argument that the averment “ referring to a сertain dwelling house ” that had “ caught fire and burned,” taken with the words charged to have been spoken, shоw that no arson was or could have been chаrged, and consequently the words spoken are not actionable; and also that the words used, takеn with the averment, are capable of an innocent construction, and.therefore a slanderous meaning should not be attached to them.
It is conceded that the inuendo cannot extend or enlarge the meaning of the words charged to have been published ; but we are of the opinion that thе words charged in the complaint, taken with the avеrment, do, of themselves, convey a clear and direct imputation of a slanderous character.
Formerly, the rule prevailed, in actions of this kind, thаt words are to be innocently construed if possible; but the rule is now held to be, that words are to be takеn in that sense in which they are generally understood; аnd when that puts upon them a guilty sense, it is incumbent on the defendant to show that they were innocently used. (Pike v. Van Wormer, 6 Howard Pr. R., 101; Goodrich v. Walcott, 3 Cow., 239.)
The defendant, by failing to answer, admits all the allegations of the complaint to be true. Now the words chargеd are not ambiguous; there is no uncertainty in regard tо the subject matter to which they relate, or the person to whom
Judgment is affirmed.