203 F. 998 | 2d Cir. | 1913
It is unnecessary to recite the history of the litigation under this patent or to set forth in detail the facts of this case. Reference may be made to the opinion in the court below and to our certification of questions to the Supreme Court in the suit of the same plaintiff against Seim and Reissig, December 7, 1911. 191 F. R. 832, 112 C. C. A. 346. The questions certified have not yet been reached for argument in the Supreme Court.
We fully concur with Judge Ray in the finding that the defense of laches is not made out by the proofs.
On.the question of infringement, we think the District Judge did not quite correctly appreciate what was held by this court and by the Supreme Court as to the differences between the Grant patent and the prior art. No court has held that in the Grant structure the tire must be held so loosely that it will rise from the metal channel to any appreciable extent, so that “dust, dirt, and mud” would enter the channel with the natural results of such action. All that is held is that it must yield sufficiently when it strikes a lateral obstruction to prevent being broken and injured by the blow. It is distinguished in this regard from tires of the prior art which were held in the channel by cement, and which were destroyed after a short period of use because they would not yield. There is a model of the alleged infringing tire in this- case, the accuracy of which, as we understand it, is conceded. It is .covered absolutely by the language of both claims; to us it looks like a Chinese copy of the structure we found to infringe in an earlier case. That Goold thinks he has drawn -his wires so tight that there will not be any tilting is of no moment. There is concededly a layer of elastic rubber under the two wires, and, however tightly they' may be drawn, the degree of tilting will necessarily depend on the direction and force of the blow. On the record now before us, we are satisfied that infringement is shown.
For the reason, however, expressed at the outset of this opinion, we think that this order should be reversed, without prejudice to any other application for relief, should complainant be advised to make one, after the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been announced, with costs of this appeal to appellant.