66 So. 2d 504 | Fla. | 1953
Like most tragedies this one had its beginnings innocently enough. Some timé after good dark on March 8, 1952, Thomas C. Huntley and Samuel Huntley, his brother, who will be referred to" as appellants unless the situation indicates otherwise, were passengers in an automobile driven by James Wilson, accompanied by two others whose names are not material, all of whom were Negroes. James Wilson attempted to turn on Peter Brown Lane on their way to The Gay Jook Joint further on down the lane, and while attempting to negotiate the turn his car slid into the ditch on the north side of the lane as the car was headed in an easterly direction. James Wilson and appellant Thomas C. Huntley proceeded on up the lane to the jook where they prevailed upon one John Henry Graham (Negro) to get his truck and pull their car from the ditch, which he proceeded to do. Thereafter, the decedent, Mr. Jim Chancey (white) driving an old army surplus weapons carrier without a cab or body, turned into Peter Brown Lane, stopped at a position where the rear of his truck was approximately opposite the rear of the truck of John Henry Graham, who had left it there after pulling the car of James Wilson from the ditoh. This truck (after having pulled the Wilson car from the ditch, to the west side headed east, same being on the north side of the lane) was left on the right side, the north side of" the lane, headed west. The decedent Chancey inquired why the road was blockaded which his great uncle had put there. John Henry Graham started over toward Chancey’s truck and Chancey told him to stand back. Appellant Samuel Huntley started toward Chancey who reached' down and got his gun, a single barrel shotgun, and told him to stand back. At this juncture a Mr. Fred Brumley, a white man driving a similar truck to that of the decedent Chancey, appeared on the scene and parked immediately behind the Chancey truck headed east. All lights on all vehicles at the scene were burning at all times. Brumley got out of his truck and asked decedent Cliancey, “What’s going on here,” and the decedent Chancey replied that he was “going to kill four or five of these damn niggers.” At the time he voiced these words decedent Chancey was standing in the road on the left hand side of his truck by the steering wheel. During the conversation between decedent Chancey and Brumley, appellant Samuel Huntley appeared, who came back to the scene in an automobile driven by unidentified persons from a place where he had gone to seek help to get the Wilson car out of the ditch, which automobile approached from the east, from which Samuel Huntley disembarked and then, the car turned around and returned in the direction from which it had arrived. Samuel Huntley walked onto the scene from the east on decedent Chancey’s right. He walked down the, middle of the road and when he reached a spot about opposite the rear wheels of the truck of James Henry Graham, which would place him some 8 to 12 feet from decedent Chancey, the decedent Chancey made a motion with his gun and ordered Samuel Huntley to stand back, which he did. Shortly after this occurred, another automobile driven by a Negro, Wise Blake, arrived on the scene loaded with three other Negroes who later became state’s witnesses. Their names were O. B. Blake, Connell Huggins and Arthur L. Huggins. They parked their car on the right side of the road immediately behind the truck of Fred Brumley. At this juncture when the Wise Blake automobile
The sheriff of Jefferson County, where this tragedy occurred, testified after appellants were arrested, that appellant Thomas C. Huntley admitted striking decedent with the. standard, that appellant Samuel Huntley told him he had struck decedent with the gun. This sums up the facts of this most unfortunate occurrence.
The appeal here is from a conviction of appellants of murder in the second degree for which the trial judge sentenced them each to a lifetime of servitude in the state penitentiary. It is contended by appellants and set forth in two questions, (1) that appellants are entitled to a new trial because as a matter of law the facts resulting in their conviction do not evidence a killing perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to another, and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life as second degree murder is defined; (2) that the facts reflect the killing to be justifiable homicide.
This compels us to evaluate the evidence which was presented to the trial court, and after a careful reading of it we conclude that the verdict was amply supported thereby.
Here we find a white man participating in a controversy with these Negroes. That he was in the wrong is beyond doubt and he continued to be so until he broke off the
Moreover, the knocking out of the lights óf the decedent Chancey’s truck is another truthful indication of the state of mind of both appellants. Although there is some conflict in the evidence, it is reasonable to say, that after the gun had been taken from the decedent, there could be no further ground of fear of apprehension of bodily injury on the part of appellants. Therefore, these facts could not support a verdict of justifiable homicide because danger to themselves had long since passed and the dominance and control of the situation had changed to their hands when the killing occurred. See Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, 11 So. 550, 17 L.R.A. 705; Lightbourn v. State, 129 Fla. 43, 175 So. 857; Rowe v. State, 120 Fla. 649, 163 So. 22. This is proven -by the testimony of the state’s witnesses, some of whom even testified that decedent never did use curse words and only aimed the gun at appellants one time, the rest of the time it being held by his side pointed toward the ground.
Whatever view is taken of the testimony in the record, there is no question that it reflects on the part of the appellants a situation “evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life.” These words were never meant to be used in a strict technical sense and is well stated by this Court in Ramsey v. State, 114 Fla. 766, 154 So. 855, 856: “It is obvious, therefore, that the phrase ‘evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life,’ as used in the statute [F.S.A. § 782.04] denouncing murder in the second degree, was not used in the legal or technical sense of the word ‘malice’ as above defined. The phrase conveys the idea of ‘malice’ in the popular or commonly understood sense of ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent. It is the malice of the evil motive which the statute makes an ingredient of the crime of murder in the second degree. See Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530.”
The decedent, a white man, it is true precipitated the conflict. He was in error and had no right nor authority to act as he did and his whole attitude can not be deplored too much. Racial clashes of this kind should be a thing of the past. Every man, regardless of color or creed, is entitled under our Constitution and laws to equal treatment. That this has not been accomplished is not the fault of the law, but of the individual who refuses to recognize such. ' The decedent was “dead” wrong, and he practically invited his own destruction. But on the other hand, we must accept the facts as we find them, as the jury heard them, and as the trial judge evaluated them. The decedent was not wrong enough all the way through the controversy to have to pay with his life for what he did. He was rendered powerless to carry out his threats and intent of “killing four or five niggers,” by the swift protective action of appellant Samuel Huntley, and there it should have stopped. Here the decedent realized (and there was no evidence of alcoholic drinking at all by anyone engaged in this fracas) he was unarmed and rendered helpless, with only one white man with him (Fred Brumley, who as the record discloses, fled as fast as any of the Negroes and was certainly of no aid to
Under the instructions of the court as given, and the facts as outlined, the jury could have brought in a verdict of murder in the first degree. In these words the jury could have found such a verdict which the trial court properly instructed the jury: “ * * * the law does not prescribe the exact period of time which must elapse between the formation of and the execution of the intent to take life in order to render the design a premeditated one. It may exist for only a few moments and yet be premeditated, if the design was formed a sufficient length of time before its execution to admit of some reflection on the part of the party entertaining it, and the party at the time of the execution of the intent was fully conscious of a settled and fixed purpose to kill and of the consequences of carrying such purpose into execution; where such state of mind exists, the intent or design is premeditated within the meaning of the law although the execution followed closely upon the formation of the intent.”
The taking of the standard from the truck by appellant Thomas C. Huntley (and some witnesses say that he held it behind his back for some time before using it); the assaulting - of decedent and striking him with it not once, but twice and maybe three times; the pursuing decedent around the front of his truck to deal the death blow; all of that coupled with the action of appellant Samuel Huntley, who already having possession of decedent Chancey’s gun which he had taken from decedent (and there the entire matter should have ended), the pursuit of decedent to the left side of his truck after decedent had fallen into it and after his -brother, Thomas C. Huntley, had hit decedent a second or third time with the standard, after which the said appellant Samuel Huntley struck decedent over the head with the butt of the gun, with sufficient force to knock decedent from out of his truck on to the ground, and both appellants’ callous conduct in leaving decedent to die without aid of any kind, all of these facts with their cumulative force and effect compel us to the conclusion that there was within that period, however short it may have been, and regardless of the rapidity of the events then taking place, sufficient time to form the intent and premeditation necessary for murder in the first degree, as to both appellants.
This savage physical personal encounter solved nothing; took the life of a young white man; and practically did the same for his two youthful assailants.
As it is with individuals so it is with nations at war. Nations will never live in peace, nor will the world enjoy such blessedness until we as individuals learn to live in peace with all our neighbors.
O ! Lord when will we ever learn ?
Affirmed.