Huntley v. StateHuntley v. State
At approximately 6 p.m. on January 8, 1990, in a “very high drug area” of Orlando, a uniformed officer in a marked police car observed the defendant standing close to a young black male who was holding out his right palm in a cupped position. The officer observed for twenty to thirty-five seconds that defendant was “going in and out of [the young black male‘s] hand picking something up.” He then saw defendant “exchange a piece of paper” which the officer “thought might have been money“, even though he could not see whether it was green. This situation “appeared” to the officer “as a drug transaction” and he started walking up to “find out what was going on.” As he approached, he yelled “stop“, whereupon the youth ran inside the adjacent building and defendant “took off running on foot.” The officer chased defendant “to conduct an investigation.” As he ran, defendant fell to the ground. The officer jumped on the defendant to subdue him. Defendant stood up with the officer on his back and tried to push the officer off. The officer then “conducted a head restraint“, whereupon defendant grabbed the officer‘s testicles. The officer concluded he was losing the physical contest and began to tell the defendant that “all [he] want[ed] to do was arrest him, find out what was going on, if he was doing what [the officer] thought he was doing.” At that point, the defendant stopped resisting, went down to his knees and allowed himself to be handcuffed. No drugs were found on defendant and the officer acknowledged that during the five to fifteen second chase of defendant, no drugs were observed to be dropped. Defendant was charged with battery on a police officer and, for fleeing when told by the officer to stop, resisting an officer without violence. He was convicted of both offenses.
At trial, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on the charge of resisting an officer without violence, contending that the element of “lawful execution of any legal duty” was missing because the officer did not have a founded suspicion to order the defendant to stop.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
COBB, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.