96 Wash. App. 398 | Wash. Ct. App. | 1999
Seeking class certification, several of Frito-Lay’s employees sued the company for breach of contract and violations of the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA).
The employees voluntarily dismissed their breach of contract claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for Frito-Lay, ruling that the wage and hour claims were preempted by federal labor law. The court compelled arbitration of the statutory overtime claims under the arbitration provision of the CBA. The court declined to reach the employees’ motion for class certification.
The employees appealed, and Frito-Lay filed a motion to
I
The MWA provides for enforcement of minimum employment standards and outlines the strong public policy of this state to provide overtime pay to promote employment opportunities.
We recently held that independent, nonnegotiable, state-law based employment rights are not preempted by federal law.
federal labor law does not preempt claims that are based on state laws when those laws grant employees nonnegotiable, substantive rights and when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon a collective bargaining agreement.[16 ]
As is the case here, Ernst claimed that it was necessary to interpret the CBA to decide the state law claim.
Disputes over the right to overtime under the MWA are specifically nonnegotiable, independent, state-law based employment rights which are not preempted by federal
Mr. Ervin could assert his state-law claims under RCW 49.46 without reliance on the collective bargaining agreement. The rights he attempts to assert under the state statute are independent of the agreement or the employer’s practices and procedures, and resolution of the statutory claim will depend on the agreement only to determine the appropriate regular rate of pay.[22 ]
Further, we held that the MWA rights “may not be waived or altered by a collective bargaining agreement, and that employees are not required to arbitrate these ‘nonnegotiable’ claims.”
Columbia also argued that Mr. Ervin was an exempt “outside salesman.”
RCW 49.46.010(5)(a) provides: “ ‘Employee’ includes any individual employed by an employer but shall not include: ...(c) Any individual employed ... in the capacity of outside salesman as those terms are defined and delimited
The term “individual employed in the capacity of outside salesman” in RCW 49.46.010(5) (c) shall mean any employee:
(1) Who is employed for the purpose of and who is customarily and regularly engaged away from his employer’s place or places of business, as well as on the premises (where the employee regulates his own hours and the employer has no control over the total number of hours worked) in the following alternative activities:
(a) In making sales; including any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale or other disposition; or
(b) In obtaining orders or contracts for services or for.the use of facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer; or
(c) In demonstrating products or equipment for sale; or
(d) In the sale of services and performance of the service sold when the compensation to the employee is computed on a commission basis; and
(2) Whose hours of work of a nature other than that described in (l)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section do not exceed 20 percent of the hours worked in the work week by nonexempt employees of the employer: Provided, That work performed incidental to and in conjunction with the employee’s own outside sales or solicitations, including incidental deliveries and collections, shall not be regarded as nonexempt work; and
(3) Who is compensated by the employer on a guaranteed salary, commission or fee basis and who is advised of his status as “outside salesman. ”[27 ]
In this case, the trial court does not need to interpret the
Were we to hold otherwise, employers and unions could waive employees’ basic rights under the MWA without their consent and without effective redress. This would contradict the clear public policy in this state to provide and enforce basic minimum employment rights.
Our decision is consistent with Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., where the CBA at issue required a specific grievance procedure for employment disputes.
The Supreme Court held in Wright that the CBA at issue
Reversed.
Agid, A.C.J., and Ellington, J., concur.
Reconsideration denied September 3, 1999.
Review denied at 140 Wn.2d 1003 (2000).
RCW 49.46.
29 U.S.C. § 185.
Commissioner’s Ruling at 8.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 1001 v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 84 Wn. App. 47, 925 F.2d 212 (1996), review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1021 (1997).
Ervin v. Columbia Distrib., Inc., 84 Wn. App. 882, 930 P.2d 947 (1997).
Commissioner's Ruling at 8.
We are aware of Schneider v. Snyder’s Foods, Inc., 95 Wn. App. 399, 976 F.2d 134 (1999), a Division Three case which was published by postdecision order and is in full accord with our holding herein.
RCW 49.46.005.
RCW 49.46.130, ROW 49.46.010.
RCW 49.46.010(5)(c).
29 U.S.C. § 185; United Food, 84 Wn. App. at 50-51.
See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Monroe, 88 Wn. App. 113, 119, 943 P.2d 1134 (1997), review denied, 134 Wn.2d 1028 (1998). Compare Swinford v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 82 Wn. App. 401, 404, 409, 918 P.2d 186 (1996), review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1024 (1997) (CBA dependent state law breach of contract claim preempted by section 301); Commodore v. University Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 120 Wn.2d 120, 839 P.2d 314 (1992) (independent tort claims not arising out of CBA not preempted by section 301).
84 Wn. App. at 48.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
See Ervin, 84 Wn. App. at 890-91.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 891 (footnote omitted) (citing United Food, 84 Wn. App. 47, and Local 246 Utility Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Ervin, 84 Wn. App. at 894.
Id. at 895.
Ervin, 84 Wn. App. at 894.
WAC 296-128-540.
Ervin, 84 Wn. App. at 895 (“Mr. Ervin’s statement that his sale activities were only ‘incidental’ to his delivery responsibilities creates at least a genuine issue as to whether Mr. Ervin was an outside salesman. Summary judgment is not proper on this question.”).
RCW 49.46.005.
525 U.S. 70, 72-73, 119 S. Ct. 391, 393, 142 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1998).
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 78.