Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ____________________________________
TARSHA WOOD, )
Plаintiff, ) v. ) Civil Action No. 11-154 (AK) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )
Defendant. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is pending before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for [summary judgment on the issue of] Fees and Costs (“Fee Motion”) and Memorandum in support thereof (“Memorandum”) [10]; Defendant’s opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”) [11]; and Plaintiff’s reply to the Opposition (“Reply”) [12]. Plaintiff Tarsha Wood (“Plaintiff’) has requested $2,084.10 in legal fees. Defendant District of Columbia (“Defendant” or “the District”) contests Plaintiff’s prevailing party status and asserts that Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery of any legal fees or costs. (Opposition, Exh. 1 [Defendant’s chart of proposed allowable fees and reasons for fee reductions].)
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the parent of a minor child who was the subject of an administrative action brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Improvement Act ( collectively “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B), a court may award attorney’s fees to a parent who prevails in an IDEA proceeding. Prior to filing this civil action, the Plaintiff рarticipated in a February 19, 2008 due process hearing wherein the Hearing Officer identified the following issue to be *2 considered: [w]hether DCPS denied the student FAPE and failed to convene a compensatory education meeting following the Petitioner’s request.” (March 5, 2008 Hearing Officer Determination (“HOD”) at 2, attached to Notice of Removal [1].) The Hearing Officer concluded that:
1) Pursuant to the Blackman-Jones Consent Decree, members of the class may file а due process complaint when they are dissatisfied with the resolution of a request for compensatory education at an IEP meeting or by Central Administration Personnel. 2) Petitioner met the burden to establish that DCPS failed to satisfy the Petitioner’s request for an IEP meeting but Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the alleged procedural violations impeded the child’s right to a FAPE; significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to rights afforded by thе IDEA 2004, or caused a deprivation of educational benefit.
(March 5, 2008 HOD at 2-3.) The Hearing Officer inter alia ordered DCPS to “provide written notice to [counsel for Plaintiff], proposing at least three separate dates and times to convene an IEP/compensatory education meeting within ten days . . . .” (March 5, 2008 HOD at 3.) The Hearing Officer further ordered that “if DCPS fails to convene an IEP/compensatory education meeting pursuant to this HOD, then DCPS shall fund the Petitioner’s compensatory education plаn.” ( Id. )
Plaintiff originally filed her complaint for legal fees and costs with the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Defendant removed this and other simultaneously filed cases to this Court and the parties subsequently consented to the referral of all such cases to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes. The parties were directed to brief the issues in these cases in the form of motions for legal fees and respоnses thereto.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Prevailing Party
The IDEA gives courts authority to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the parents of a
child with a disability who is the prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B). An action or
proceeding under IDEA includes both civil litigation in federal court and administrative
litigation before hearing officers.
Smith v. Roher
,
The Supreme Court has indicated that the term “prevailing party” does not include a
plaintiff who “fail[s] to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.”
Buckhannon Bd & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t Health & Human
Resources, 532
U.S. 598, 606 (2001). The Supreme Court therefore rejected the “catalyst theory” whereby a
plaintiff would be a prevailing party if the lawsuit brought about the desired result through a
voluntary change in the defendant ‘s conduct.
B. Fee Requests
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of any fee requests.
See
In re North
,
20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(C) states that “[f]ees awarded under this paragraph shall be based
on rates prevailing in the community in whiсh the action or proceeding arose for the kind and
quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(C). To demonstrate a reasonable hourly
rate, the fee applicant must show: an attorney’s usual billing practices; counsel’s skill,
experience and reputation; as well as the prevailing market rates in the community.
Covington
,
A party moving for summary judgment on legal fees accordingly must demonstrate
prevailing party status and the reasonableness of the fees requested in terms of hours spent and
hourly rate. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), summary judgment shall be granted if the movant
shows that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”
Accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
,
III. ANALYSIS
A. Prevailing Party Defendant argues that the Plaintiff in the instant case is not a prevailing party because the Hearing Officer did not find a denial of FAPE and allegedly awarded only de minimus relief. (Opposition at 7-9.) Plaintiff’s underlying administrative complaint asserted that “DCPS had *6 failed to meet to determine compensatory education as required by law.” (Reply at 2; see HOD at 2.) Whilе the Hearing Officer indicated that Plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof “to establish that the alleged procedural violations impeded the child’s right to a FAPE[,]” he did order DCPS to convene an IEP/compensatory education meeting “to discuss and determine the amount, form and delivery of compensatory education due to the student.” (HOD at 2-3.) The Hearing Officer further noted that, if DCPS failed to convene the IEP/compensatory education meeting, it would have to fund a plan developed unilaterally by the Plaintiff. (HOD at 3.)
Plaintiff argues that “the IDEA explicitly allows for relief for a parent in the absence of a
finding of denial of FAPE.” (Reply at 3);
see
20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(3)(E)(iii) (hearing officer may
order procedural compliance with law regardless of whether FAPE has been denied). This court
has previously held that statements by a hearing officer are not determinative of prevailing party
status.
See Artis ex rel. S.A. v District of Columbia
,
“[N]either a hearing officer’s conclusion that DCPS was a prevailing party, nor his
determination that DCPS did not deny the student a FAPE, requires this court to consider DCPS
the prevailing party.”
Bush ex rel. A.H. v. District of Columbia
,
Compare Robinson v. District of Columbia
, Civil Action No. 06-1253, 2007 WL
2257326 at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2007) (If the [hearing officer] does not find a denial of a
[FAPE], this does not necessarily mean that the plaintiffs cannot seek attorney’s fees, but
recovery is limited.”);
A.S. v. District of Columbia
, Civil Action No. 10-1670,
“The essential test for prevailing party status is whether a party successfully obtains a
‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’ with the imprimatur of an
adjudication.”
Skrine
,
This Court finds that Plaintiff did accomplish her primary objective at the administrative hearing, demonstrated by Hearing Officer’s order that DCPS convene an IEP/compensatory education meeting “to determine the amount, form and delivery of compensatory education to the student.” (HOD at 3.) [2] Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is a prevailing party and further, that she is entitled to recover fees and costs. While the Hearing Officer did not find a denial of FAPE, the Court notes that such determination would be premature in the instance where a petitioner is moving for an IEP/compensatory education meeting, which necessarily precedes the determination of compensatory education due to a student.
B. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates [3] Plaintiff seeks fees for the services of one lawyer and three paralegals, to be paid at the following rates: $268.00 рer hour for Zachary Nahass, an attorney with approximately 1-2 years experience during the relevant time period, and $146.00/$150.00 per hour for Patrick Meehan, *9 Camille McKenzie and Yanet Scott, who were paralegals with the firm Tyrka & Associates during that same period of time. [4] (Plaintiff’s Itemization of Fees/Expenses, attached to Notice of Removal [1]; Fee Motion, Exh. 2 [Verified Statement of Douglas Tyrka (“Tyrka”)] ¶¶ 8 -11, 15.) According to Tykra’s Verified Statement (“Verified Statement”), “[t]he hourly rates in the itemization arе the rates Tyrka & Associates has customarily charged.” (Exh. 2 ¶4.)
Tyrka further asserts that “clients have retained Tyrka & Associates with the
understanding and agreement that the client would retain full responsibility for all fees regardless
of what was reimbursed by third parties, at rates consistent with ‘the
Laffey
[M]atrix’ as adjusted
per the finding in
Salazar v. District of Columbia
,
Plaintiff asserts that in order to demonstrate prevailing market rates, she may “point to
such evidence as an updated [enhanced] version of the
Laffey
Matrix or the U.S. Attorney’s
Office [“USAO”] Matrix, or [her] own survey of prevailing market rates in the community.”
(Memorandum in support of Fee Motion (“Memorandum”) at 8 (citing
Covington
,
Plaintiff additionally relies upon Rooths v District of Columbia , Civil Action No. 09- 0492, Report and Recommendation of March 31, 2011, and Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Suggs , Civil Action No. 06-1284, Motion fоr Attorneys’ Fees of July 10, 2008 and Memorandum Opinion of March 30, 2009 at 5-8. (Fee Motion, Exhs. 5-7). According to practices are contingent fee based and therefore compensated at an hourly rate they never charge and none of their clients could pay”). Plaintiff relies on Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Suggs , Civil Action No. 06-
1284, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees of July 10, 2008 and Memorandum Opinion of March 30, 2009 at 5-8, but this case is inapposite because there was no challenge to the reasonableness of the hours expended by counsel or the hourly rates in that case.
Plaintiff, in these two IDEA cases litigated in this United States District Court, the firm’s clients received an award of fees “based on rates exactly in line with those presented here, . . . ” (Memorandum at 8.)
As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the mere showing that a high hourly rate
was approved in another case does not in and of itself establish a new market rate or prove that
the new rate is reasonable. Furthermore, Plаintiff’s reliance on
Rooths v District of Columbia
,
Civil Action No. 09-0492, Report and Recommendation of March 31, 2011 at 10-11 (Fee
Motion, Exh. 5), is misplaced because the trial court ultimately rejected the application of
enhanced
Laffey
rates, applied
Laffey
Matrix rates as a starting point, and then reduced those
rates by 25%.
Rooths v District of Columbia
,
In
Rooths
, the Honorable Paul L. Friedman noted that “[i]n this circuit, the rates
contained in the
Laffey
Matrix are typically treated as the highest rates that will be presumed to
be reasonable when a court rеviews a petition for statutory attorneys’ fees.” 802 F Supp. 2d 61.
The trial court declined “to approve as reasonable the inflated rates contained in a proposed
alternative fee matrix.”
Id.
;
see Blackman v. District of Columbia
,
Recognizing the difficulty courts encounter in determining what are reasonable legal fees, this Court agrees with the rationale set forth in Rooths, and finds that the Plaintiff’s reliance on an enhanced Laffey Matrix is unsupported because such Matrix does not provide an accurate representation of District of Columbia legal fees applicable to IDEA cases. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated that IDEA litigation involving administrative hearings is the type of “complex federal litigation” encompassed by the Laffey rates. See McClam v. District of Columbia , Civil Action No. 11-381 (RMC), September 6, 2011 Memorandum Opinion at 8 (declining to apply Laffey rates in part on grounds that “IDEA cases are generally not complex [and in that сase,] Plaintiffs . . . pointed to no novel issue or other complexity that turned this, particular IDEA case into a complicated piece of litigation.”)
Defendant’s argument against imposition of
Laffey
rates primarily focuses on the
Rooths
and
McClam
decisions,
supra.
but the Defendant also asserts that “Plaintiffs have made no
serious attempt to show that rates under the
Laffey
Matrix are appropriate in this case or, more
specifically, that
Laffey
rates were necessary to attract competent counsel in the underlying,
*13
special education matters.” (Opposition at 13.)
[9]
Defendant further argues that there is no
“inherеnt right to
Laffey
rates.” (Opposition at 13 (citation omitted));
see Lively v Flexible
Packaging Assoc
.,
This Court follows the reasoning of the Rooths case and other cases declining to apply enhanced Laffey rates. Considering that this is a straightforward case seeking IDEA legal fees, this Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the hourly rates set by her counsel, which are based on enhanced Laffey rates, are reasonable. [10] Such enhanced rates do not reflect what the local legal market will bear in terms of legal fees for IDEA litigation. Using the [USAO] Laffey Matrix as a starting point for determination of a reasonable hourly rate, this Court determines that the hourly rate for Zachary Nahass [attorney with 2 years experience] would be $215.00 instead of $268.00, while the ratе for paralegals Patrick Meehan, Camille McKenzie and Yanet Scott would be $125.00/$130.00 instead of $146.00/$150.00.
*14
These rates should be further reduced however because the
Laffey
Matrix rates are the
presumed maximum rates appropriate for “complex federal litigation,”
Covington v. District of
Columbia
,
C. Costs
Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $67.10 for expenses arising from copying ($.10 per
*15
page) and faxing ($1.00 per page). Costs for copying, faxing and postage are customarily
included in fee awards in IDEA litigation.
Kaseman v. District of Columbia
,
D. Fees and Costs Awarded
The amount of fees and costs requested by Plaintiff is $2,084.10. The legal fees claimed were based on 3.5 hours billed at $268.00/hour, 1.0 hour billed at $146.00/hour and 1.0 hour billed at $150.00/hour. This Court has determined that hourly rates based on 75% of the Laffey Matrix rate are applicable, which means that 3.5 hours are billed at $161.00/hour, 1.0 hour is billed at $94.00/hour and 1.0 hour is billed at $98.00/hour. Total fees thus equal $755.50 and *16 total costs equal $67.10, rеsulting in an award of $ 822.60.
DATED: May 22, 2012 ____________/s/_____________________
ALAN KAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Notes
[1] This same Fee Motion is filed in multiple cases involving claims for attorneys’ fees and costs; the Plaintiff in this action is Tarsha Wood.
[2] The Hearing Officer also ordered that DCPS would fund the Petitioner’s compensatory education plan if it failed to convene the meeting. (HOD at 3.)
[3] The District did not specifically question the reasonableness of the counsel’s hourly rates on its Chart attached as Opposition, Exh.1 because it was relying on its argument that Plaintiff was not a prevailing party. The District’s Opposition does however contain argument that the hourly rates applied by Plaintiff’s counsel in IDEA cases are excessive.
[4] The law firm’s hourly rate for paralegal charges occurring after May 31, 2008 increased from $146/hour to $150/hour, even though the “enhanced” Laffey Matrix rates increased from $146/hour to $152/hour during that same time
[5] The
Laffey
Matrix is “a schedule of charges based on years of experience” developed in
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
,
[6]
See generally MacClarence v. Johnson
,
[8] The McClam court acknowledged that “[f]ederal district courts in this circuit disagree whether Laffey rates should be applied in IDEA cases.” McClam Memorandum Opinion at 6 (citations omitted).
[9]
See Kenny A. v. Perdue
,
[10] By statute the Court determines the reasonableness of the hourly rate for the legal fees. The negotiated legal fee hourly rate between the attorney and his client may be more or less than the hourly rate set by the Court.
[11] Defendant notes that a 25% reduction in Laffey Matrix rates brings these fees in line with its DCPS Fee Guidelines (Opposition at 15); however, it is not the intent of this Court to mirror the DCPS Fee Guidelines but instead to apply a percentage reduction that represents the fact that most IDEA litigation [involving administrative proceedings] is not complex federal litigation warranting the application of Laffey Matrix rates.
[12] According to Plaintiff’s counsel, Ms. Millis “worked for parents full-time as an agent of Tyrka & Associates, primarily attending school meetings, at which she assisted parents and school officials in interpreting evaluations, developing individualized education programs, developing compensatory education plans, and related tasks.” (Verified Statement of Douglas Tyrka (“Tyrka”) ¶17.) The Court notes that Millis billed time for two file reviews prior to MDT meetings and attendance at both meetings.