4 Rand. 104 | Va. Ct. App. | 1826
This is a bill filed by Jett, to injoin proceedings on a delivery bond, executed by him, as surety for General Henry Lee to Hunter’s administrators. There are various matters in the bill, to which it will not be necessary to advert; as it is admitted that the only proper subjects ef controversy now remaining to the parties, are those which grow out of the arrangement made between Lee and Hunter’s administrators, subsequently to the delivery bond.
The bill states, that immediately after the service of the execution, and the proceedings thereon, Lee waited upon Henry St. George Tucker, the agent of Hunter’s administrators, and obtained a letter from him to their attorney, stating that as the agent of Hunter’s administrators, he had made an arrangement which would suspend for the present, all proceedings on the judgment and delivery
The answer of Tucker refers to the arrangement aforesaid, and exhibits a copy thereof. It appears from the arrangement, as I understand it, that Tucker- did propose to receive from Lee, good Augusta bonds, taken to P. R. Beverley, to the full amount of General Lee’s debt; or, if such bonds could not then be procured, that he would receive P. R. Beverley’s note to deliver such bonds to the full amount of the debt, by some certain day. These bonds were to be payable in one, two, three and four years.
B. R. Beverley's note is filed, bearing date the 29th of March, 1806, and binding himself to deliver bonds to the amount of 2500/. on or before the succeeding Chancery Court.
A copy of the judgment on the delivery bond, also filed, shews that the bond, after deducting an error, amounts te more than 2700/.
But a previous question presents itself: Is it competent to the appellee to insist on that ground, under the pleadings in this case?
I entirely concur with Judge Green as to the law in relation to the discharge of sureties, as laid down hy him in the case of Norris v. Crummey, 2 Rand. 328, that if a creditor, by agreement or any other act, precludes himself at law from proceeding against the principal, after the debt is due, even for a moment; or if the agreement be such as would induce a Court of Equity to prohibit the creditor from proceeding at law, the surety is discharged, and I also entirely concur with him, that the true ground or principle on which a surety is relieved in such cases, is, that the creditor, by his act or agreement, has injured the surety, by impairing his rights and remedies.
But this principle does not apply to a case, where the arrangement was made with the knowledge and assent of the surety; for, in such case, it cannot be said that the surety is injured. Volenti non fit injuria. It is not the mere circumstance of the creditor’s binding himself to give time to the principal, that will discharge, the surety. It is the binding himself to give such time, without the knowledge or assent of the surety; for, it is then only, that it is injurious to the surety. The surety, therefore, who seeks to discharge himself on the ground of time given to the principal, must state that which is essential to make it a discharge. He must state that the arrangement was made without his knowledge, or against his assent. This is the clear result of general principles, and is proved by the following, among other cases. Nesbit v. Smith, 2 Bro. Ch. Cas. 579. Rees v. Barrington, 2 Ves. jun. 540. Ex parte Smith, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 1. Samuel v. Hawarth, 3 Meriv. 272.
Let us apply these principles to the case before us.
It does not appear from the case as stated in the bill, nor from any exhibit filed with the bill, that Hunter's administrators had bound themselves not to proceed on the judgment. The bill states, that Lee brought a letter from Tucker to the attorney, stating, that as the agent of Hunter’s administrators, he had made an arrangement which would suspend, for the present, all proceedings on the judgment and delivery' bond; and directing him to proceed no farther, until farther advised. But there is nothing in the letter, to shew that this suspension was obligatory. From any thing that appears in the letter, it may have been mere indulgence granted as a favor, and revocable at pleasure. Nor is that part of the bill which professes to state the arrangement, more satisfactory on this point. It says nothing about the suspension of the proceedings. All that it says about the arrangement, is, that P. R. Beverley undertook to settle the debt, provided Hunter’s administrators would receive bonds to the amount; without alleging that bonds to the amount had been given. There is no allegation in the bill, that the arrangement (even admitting it tied up the hands of Hunter’s administrators) was without the knowledge or against the consent of Jett, nor is there even a general allegation, that the arrangement was of a character to discharge Jett.
Whether the arrangement was or was not of such a character as to discharge Jett, was not, therefore, a matter to which the administrators of Hunter were bound to answer; nor could it, under this bill, be a matter in issue between them. There was nothing in the bill to apprize them, that Jett sought to be discharged. They could not, therefore, be required either to deny, or disprove those facts, which might constitute a discharge. If he had chosen to put that matter in issue, Hunter’s administrators might have been prepared with full proof, to shew that he was not entitled to a discharge. To permit him to take them by surprize, and to rely upon it at the trial, would be contrary to justice and the established practice of Courts of Equity.
If it be said, that Jett’s calling upon Hunter’s administrators, by his bill, to disclose the arrangement alluded to in the letter, and to set forth the securities and money received, or to be received under it, is tantamount to an allegation on his part, that the arrangement was made without his knowledge or against his assent, I reply, that a man may be well supposed to be ignorant of the details of an arrangement, and yet be perfectly acquainted with its general character. Considering Jett’s situation, exposed to all the inconveniences of an execution on a delivery bond for so large an amount, he may be presumed to have anxiously desired some arrangement for time and counter-security; and it is evident, from his bill, that he knew that time had been given, although it is not stated whether it was given as mere indulgence, or otherwise. When, under these circumstances, he files his bill, asking information as to the
Even if Jett had been ignorant of the precise character of the arrangement, until he saw the answer, surely, if he then intended to shift his ground and go for a discharge, he should have insisted on it, and put it in issue, by an amended or supplemental bill.
I am therefore of opinion, on this ground, that the decree perpetuating the injunction is erroneous.
Even admitting the arrangement to have been made without the knowledge or against the consent of Jett., I do not consider it such as to discharge him, because, in fact, the hands of Hunter's administrators never were tied up. The proposition was, that Lee should deposit, as. collateral security, good Apgusta bonds, taken to P. It. Beverley; or Peter R. Beverley's noté, binding himself to make such deposit, to the amount of the debt. The Only stipulation as to time was, that in case Beverley's note should be given, he should bind himself to deliver the bonds by a day certain thereafter. As to the deposit to be made by Lee, viz: of bonds taken to P. E. Beverley, or of Beverley's own note to deliver such bonds, no time is mentioned. Lee enters into no obligation whatever to make such deposit.
' Did General Lee comply with the terms of the arrangement, according to the evidence in this cause? He did not. Availing himself of the alternative afforded by the proposition of Hunter's administrators, instead of depositing “Augusta bonds taken to Peter R. Beverley," he chose to deposit Beverley’s note to make a deposit of such bonds. But the note of Beverley was for bonds to the amount of 25001. only; which was considerably less than the amount of the debt. As there was not, then, a compliance on the part of General Lee with the terms of the arrangement, the arrangement did not bind Hunter's administrators to suspend farther proceedings.
If the arrangement did not bind them, did the letter bind them ? The letter was no contract; and if it were, Lee was no party to it. It contained a mere direction to the counsel, for a temporary suspension of proceedings; but whether that suspension was granted as a favor, and liable to be revoked at pleasure, or not,_does not appear from the letter. Regarding the letter only, we cannot say that the suspension was the result of obligation incurred by Hunter’s administrators. Nor will the reference, in the
jf ¡t be said, that although Lee did not fully comply with the terms of the arrangement, yet Hunter's administrators accepted what he did, as full compliance; I answer that such acceptance is neither alleged in the bill, admitted by the answer, nor established by the proofs.
It is true that Lee went far towards complying with the arrangement; and that thereupon, Hunter's administrators suspended the proceedings. But, although this partial compliance was regarded by Hunter's administrators, as a motive sufficient to induce indulgence, it cannot be regarded by us as a legal consideration, sufficient to impose obligation. I therefore think the decree is erroneous on this ground also.
I am of opinion that the decree should be reversed, and the injunction dissolved, except for 1694Í. 10 8, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum, from March 29th, 1806, on 798i. 8, and with the like interest from March 31st, 1807, on 8961. 2 8; but that, as to the said sum of 1694/. 10 8, with the interest as aforesaid, there should be a reference to a commissioner, in order that Hunter's administrators may have the opportunity to shew, if they can, that that credit should be reduced, either as to principal or interest; and that the cause be remanded to be proceeded in, accordingly, to a final decree.