24 Vt. 327 | Vt. | 1852
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The questions in the case arise upon a general demurrer to the declaration.
The action is in case upon the statute, in which the. defendants are sought to be charged, in consequence of the negligence and default of the town clerk of Windsor, previous to its division by act of the Legislature in 1848.
The particular matter of default or negligence, of which the # plaintiff complains, is the neglect of the clerk to make and keep an alphabet or index, annexed to the book of records, and referring to such deeds or instruments as are on record therein. And for the neglect of the clerk in this particular, this action is brought.
It is insisted by the defendants that it was no part of the official duty of the clerk to make such index, and that in this case, his duties as town clerk were fully discharged; in recording at length upon the records of the town, the mortgage deed of Edgerton and wife to George and Edward Curtis, although he did neglect and omit to enter the same on any alphabet or index, belonging to the book of records. And the question presented on this demurrer is, whether that is an official neglect on the part of the town clerk, for which the town is responsible.
The act of 1797, Slade’s Comp. 414, Sec. 20, provides “ That a “ book or books with an index or alphabet to the same, suitable for “ registering deeds and other evidences of title to lands, and 'a
Two different set of books are to be kept; one exclusively for recording evidences respecting titles to lands, with an index or alphabet to the same, the other for recording the proceedings of town meetings, &c. and with .which no index is required. It may with propriety be asked, for what purpose is the clerk required to procure an alphabet or index, in connection with the book of records for recording evidences of title to real estate. Certainly it wras not for the purpose of effecting constructive notice of the execution and record of deeds, for that object is accomplished by recording the deeds at length upon the records, although there has been a neglect and omission to index or alphabet the same. This was so ruled by this court in the case of Curtis v. Lyman, on a bill of foreclosure brought on this same mortgage deed ; and the plaintiff and others, who subsequently became interested in the premises included in the mortgage deed, were charged with constructive notice thereof, and their title was held subject to that incumbrance.
Evidently, therefore, that whole provision is a singular instance of idle legislation, if the Legislature did not intend that the index or alphabet should be kept in each town, for the definite object and purpose of furnishing an easy and accessible facility, by which any person in the exercise of reasonable diligence, can discover and obtain actual notice of the existence of any deed, or mortgage, or evidences of title to real estate thereon, so that all persons who may become purchasers thereof, or who may wish to make advances on such security, may obtain actual knowledge of the title and condition of the property. That such an index or alphabet is of practical importance, that it contributes, and is even rendered essential, as a facility for such discovery and notice, must be within the experience of every one conversant with such records. And it is not to be presumed, that such an important facility for the discovery of the true condition of real estate was overlooked or disregarded by the Legislature.
The statute imposes the duty upon the town clerk to record all deeds, conveyances, writs and executions, and to keep such boohs within his town, and to record the proceedings of town meetings. It is true that in the specific enumeration of matters to be recorded, no mention is made of the index or alphabet. But the general provision is in these words, ■“ It is made the duty of each town “ clerk in this State, to keep such books within his respective town.” The words “ such boohs” evidently refers to all those which it was made the duty of the town clerk to procure at the expense of the town. And in specifying those books, the index or alphabet is particularly mentioned.
On this subject the intention of the Legislature is too obvious to be mistaken, and we conceive it would be a great departure from judicial duty to defeat that intention by an illiberal or technical construction. To carry into effect an intention so manifestly spread upon the face of the act, the court, if necessary, would be warranted in departing from the ordinary meaning and use of words, and would disregard the grammatical construction, for the object of the act is salutary, and necessary for the safety of those who are interested in the evidences of title to real estate.
We have no hesitancy, therefore, in deciding that it was the duty of the town clerk, to provide such an alphabet or index, and to keep and preserve the same for inspection and use, with the same truthfulness and care, that he is required to exercise in keeping the books of record.
To enable the plaintiff, however, to sue for such neglect, it must appear that he has sustained a damage thereby, or in other words, it must appear that the neglect to keep an alphabet or index, was the cause of the damage he has sustained, and as this matter arises upon demurrer, such averments should be made in the declaration.
The declaration contains the following statement of facts, and
The sufficiency of these averments and statement, it should be observed, arises upon general demurrer; and it is sufficient, if those facts are substantially stated, which will give a right of action, without regard to the form of statement, for if the statement is informally alledged, that can only be reached by special demurrer. On this demurrer therefore, we think the fact is sufficiently stated, that the damage of the plaintiff was the result of, and caused by that neglect of the clerk. It is not stated that the plaintiff made a
Another objection has been urged on this demurrer to this declaration, and equally effecting the right of action. It is insisted that whatever may have been the former liability of Windsor on this matter, that liability was removed and lost by the division of ■ the town under the act of 1848. ' This we can but feel, is giving rather a severe effect to the operation of that act, particularly as it regards third persons, who were not as inhabitants of l lie town interested in such division. And that no court would fed disposed • to give such effect to the act, unless compelled so to do, by most unequivocal legislation, even if there were no constitutional objections in the way. It is also insisted, that by that division, the corporate existence of Windsor, as it existed when this cause of ac- * tion accrued, has been lost and its charter vacated ; and that with it were lost all claims and causes of action, except such as have been particularly excepted from its operation.
The statute making that division, saves the liability for debts notv due from, the town of Windsor and specifies the manner and proportion to be paid by each town respectively.
In this provision, the Legislature were evidently settling the terms of that division, and disposing of matters that might be in controversy between them after the division was effected. And it is not reasonable to suppose that they were simply providing
That clause of the act, saves all such liabilities of the town of Windsor, as it then stood, from the operation and effect of the division, and those liabilities still rest upon the territory, and inhabitants of Windsor and their successors, the same as if that division had not been made. •
We are not therefore, called upon to investigate the question whether for any purpose that division vacated the old charter of Windsor and created two new towns, with new charters, as by an express saving clause the matter for which this suit is brought, is excepted from its operation, and unaffected by the division.
The result is, that the judgment of the county court is affirmed.