65 Fla. 202 | Fla. | 1913
Hunter, the appellant, filed his amended bill in the Circuit Court of Duval County against The State Bank of Florida and John H. Pope of Duval County, and alleged substantially that the orator is now and for many years past, viz. twenty years, has been continuously seized and possessed and in actual possession of a half-lot of land in the city of Jacksonville, which is definitely described and his claim of title is set out; that in January, 1910, the orator consulted the defendant John H. Pope in order to borrow certain money with which to improve the lot of land; that Pope was then and is now an attorney at law and also engaged in procuring loans of money secured by real estate mortgages; that in order to borrow the money Pope had orator execute a fee-simple deed to him of the lot; that orator is an uneducated ne
We do not think it necessary to discuss the effect of the recording acts upon the facts of this case, except in so far as the filing and recording of the mortgage to Hirsch
Section 1600 of the General Statutes of 1906 provides that judgments and decrees of the Circuit Courts “shall create a lien and be binding upon the real estate of the defendant in the county where rendered.” Section 2480 of the General Statutes provides that “no conveyance,
The lien of a judgment attaches only to “the real estate of the defendant.” The statute makes the judgment lien effective only as to the actual beneficial interests of the defendant. Jacobs v. Scheurer, 62 Fla. 216, 57 South. Rep. 356; 23 Cyc. 1368. But if the record shows a beneficial interest in the defendant and there are no circumstances to rebut such showing or to put interested parties upon enquiry, when in fact the defendant has no beneficial interest or only a partial or qualified beneficial interest, those who have the beneficial interest not shown of record may be estopped from asserting it against a tona fide judgment creditor or subsequent purchaser of the judgment debtor, when the judgment creditor or a purchaser at a judicial sale under the judgment reasonably may have acquired substantial rights on the faith of or by reason of the record showing an interest dn the judgment debtor when in fact such interest belongs to another.
The registry statute does not operate to convey title or to create a lien upon property; but records made under such statute may operate as an estoppel where persons, without actual knowl edge and without circumstances to put them upon inquiry reasonably may have taken substantial steps relying upon the record; and those who by their conduct or neglect in permitting the record to mislead others must bear any consequent loss rather than the one who in good faith may have acted with reference to the record as being in accord with actual facts.
In Mansfield v. Johnson, 51 Fla. 229, 40 So. Rep. 196,
In this case a conveyance to the judgment debtor by Hunter, who remained in actual and continuous possession, was recorded after the record of a mortgage executed subsequent to the conveyance which mortgage executed after the conveyance contained a warranty that tíie mortgagor owned the legal title. The record of the mortgage prior to the record of the conveyance with the warranty contained in the mortgage was sufficient to put the judgment creditor upon inquiry and such inquiry would have developed the invalidity of the conveyance through which the judgment creditor claims.
Under these circumstances the mere record of the conveyance executed long after the date of the judgment could not by any possibility operate as an estoppel against the grantor, mortgagor or the mortgagee.
Decree reversed.