Hunter v. StateHunter v. State
Gregory Hunter appeals his convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a controlled substance, MDMA. On appeal, Hunter contends the trial court erred by admitting his booking photograph in evidence, by allowing testimony that it is not unusual for suspects to consent to search their vehicles even though drugs are then found in them, and by admitting in evidence a Miranda rights warning form showing that Hunter refused to sign the form. He also contends his trial defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to object during the prosecution’s closing argument when the prosecutor stated that the police had tried to find DNA on the drugs when the evidence did not support this statement. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
The principles applicable to appellate review of a criminal conviction are stated in
Taylor v. State,
1. Hunter contends the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to introduce the booking photograph taken following his arrest
on these charges because he alleges that this placed his character in issue and deprived him of a fair trial. Hunter relies upon
Webb v. State,
The state’s argument that the photographs were relevant to show the appellants’ height at the time of the incident and thereby to establish that their fists were deadly weapons is quite strained in view of the fact that both appellants were present in the court-room and presumably had not shrunk during the period following their arrest. We further agree with the appellants that the photographs were potentially prejudicial in that they were obviously mug shots and thus could easily have giventhe jury the impression that the appellants had been in trouble with the law on some previous occasion. [Cits.]
Relying on
Rittenhouse v. State,
2. Hunter also contends the trial court erred by allowing officers to testify that it is not unusual for suspects to consent to search their vehicles even though drugs are then found in them because this information was not beyond the ken of the average juror, and thus not a proper subject of expert testimony. Review of the transcript, however, shows that the first time this testimony was presented Hunter did not object at all, and on the second occasion, Hunter’s objection was, ‘Tour Honor, I’m going to object unless she’s specifically addressing questions related to this particular witness here.” Under this
record, the issue Hunter raises is not properly before us. To preserve an issue for appeal, an objection must be made at the time it is actually offered; it is too late to urge objections as to the admission of evidence after it has been admitted without objection.
Glisson v. State,
3. Hunter also alleges that the trial court erred by admitting in evidence a
Miranda
rights warning form that showed he refused to sign the form. Hunter moved for a mistrial, but his motion was denied. The evidence shows, however, that Hunter was warned of his rights and that he made a statement to the police. Nevertheless, Hunter now contends that admitting the rights waiver form showing that he refused to sign it violated his right against self-incrimination. We find no merit to this argument because “refusal to sign a waiver form does not constitute an invocation of the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.”
Aldridge v. State,
4. Hunter contends his trial defense counsel was ineffective within the meaning of
Strickland v. Washington,
When reviewing a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, we need not address both components of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the appellant makes an insufficient showing of one, and the components need not be addressed in any particular order.
Thompson v. State,
Judgment affirmed.