76 Tex. 195 | Tex. | 1890
There is no error, we think, in the judgment rendered in the court below.
The allegations of the petition showed that the plaintiff’s cause of action grew out of a contract, by the terms of which the appellee undertook and contracted to deliver the stock at the city of Chicago, Illinois, to the
And the fact alone that it received goods marked for a place beyond its own terminus does not import an agreement to transport to the destination named as a common carrier. Laws, on Carr., sec. 240.
Those cases which hold that such fact alone is to be regarded as showing that the railroad had contracted for the delivery of the freight at the point of destination, and as showing that it had made arrangements with connecting lines, concede that this is not so where it expressly limits its liability. Ala. S. S. R. Co. v. Mt. V. Co., 84 Ala., 173; Falvey v. Railway, 76 Ga., 597.
The reason a railroad is not liable beyond its own line as a common carrier, in the absence of an express contract, is because it is not a common carrier beyond its own line. The law attaches to it no liability as a common carrier beyond the terminus of its own line, and does not compel it to act as common carrier over other lines not within its control. Railway v. Baird, 75 Texas, 256.
Hence, when this liability does attach, it must be by virtue of some contract assuming it.
In the case under consideration the stipulation excepted to expressly releases it from such liability. It was lawful for the defendant in the contract of shipment to so decide. Railway v. Baird, supra.
The appellant’s exceptions thereto were properly overruled, and as the evidence failed to show that plaintiff had any such cause of action against the appellee as was alleged in the petition, there was no error in rendering judgment for the defendant.
We think the judgment should be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Adopted February 11, 1890.
