OPINION
This special action is from a determination by the Industrial Commission closing petitioner’s industrial claim with a finding of no permanent disability. Specifically, the issue is whether an industrially caused condition known as “meat wraрper’s asthma,” which prevents petitioner from continuing her employment as a meat wrapper, *60 constitutes a permanent impairment within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation statutes. We find thаt the evidence does not support the administrative determination of no permanent impairment and, therefore, set the award aside.
Petitioner, Geraldine Hunter, worked as a meat wrappеr for approximately nine years when she developed a bronchial hypersensitivity known as meat wrapper’s asthma. She filed a workmen’s compensation claim for benefits. Her claim was accepted by the carrier and she was eventually discharged by her treating physician. The carrier issued a notice of claim status closing the claim. Petitioner requested a hearing alleging that she had sustаined permanent physical impairment. After a hearing, the administrative law judge entered an award finding petitioner’s condition to be stationary with no permanent impairment and no disability. After the award was affirmed on administrative review, petitioner brought the case to this court by special action.
On review, petitioner contends that, although her lung condition is not ratable under the American Medical Association guides to rating impairments (AMA guides), the medical testimony shows that her industrial injury renders her unable to return to her former employment. Therefore, she asserts she has sustained a permanent functional impairmеnt and is entitled to proceed to a loss of earning capacity determination.
The basic compensation statute, A.R.S. § 23—1044, provides in part as follows:
(C) ... [W]here the injury causes permanent partiаl disability for work, the employee shall receive during such disability compensation ... but the payment shall not continue after the disability ends. . . .
(G) The commission may adopt ... reasonable and proper rules tо carry out the provisions of this section.
The Industrial Commission has promulgated a rule, A.C.R.R. R4-13-113, which provides in part as follows:
******
D. If upon discharge from treatment the physician finds that the employee has sustained an imрairment of function as the result of the injury, he shall so state in his report. Any rating of the percentage of functional impairment shall be in accordance with the standards for the evaluation of permanent impairment as published by the American Medical Association in “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment”. It shall include a clinical report in sufficient detail to support the percentagе ratings assigned.
The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the adoption of the rule quoted above in
Smith v. Industrial Commission,
(1) Permanent Impairment. This is a purely medical condition. Permanent impairment is any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved, which abnormality or loss the physician considеrs stable or non-progressive at the time evaluation is made. It is always a basic consideration in the evaluation of permanent disability.
(2) Permanent Disability. This is not a purely medical condition. A patient is “permanently disаbled” or “under a permanent disability” when his actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of “impairment” which, in turn, may or may not be combined with other factors. . . .
Id.
at 305-06 n.l,
These dеfinitions make it clear that the determination of whether an injured worker has sustained a “permanent disability,”
i. e.,
a loss of earning capacity, is a two-step process. Only after a permanent physicаl
*61
or functional impairment has been found does the question of loss of earning capacity arise.
1
“Determination of permanent impairment is a medical question while evaluation of a permаnent disability is a law question.”
Alsbrooks v. Industrial Commission,
We first consider the effect of a statement made by Irvin Belzer, M.D., that petitioner had suffered “no permanent reaction to her previous employment.” A thorough reading of Dr. Belzer’s testimony reveals that this statement was not based upon his specific medical findings pertaining to petitioner, but upon his personal view that medical science has not yet determined the long-term еffects of meat wrapper’s asthma. He stated:
... I am not aware of any long term studies that have shown that that kind of exposure of itself continued over a long period of time leads to a permanently disabling situation. There are statements of literature that would imply that.
Medical opinions not based on medical findings should not form the basis of an award.
Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission,
The uncontroverted testimony of both medical witnesses, Dr. Belzer and Dr. Engelsberg, M.D., was that petitioner had developed a bronchial hypersensitivity known as meat wrаpper’s asthma and caused by her industrial exposure to fumes from polyvinyl chloride, which is contained in the material used to wrap meat for sale in markets.
2
Further, both doctors agreed that petitioner’s industrially caused physical condition
permanently
precludes her from functioning in any employment which would expose her to polyvinyl chloride or other lung irritants. The industrial commission may not arbitrarily disregard the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from uncontradicted testimony.
Ratley v. Industrial Commission,
Nеither doctor was able to rate petitioner’s condition under the AMA guides.
3
However, the AMA guides apply only to the extent that they cover the specific impairment and the percentage thereof.
Smith v.
*62
Industrial Commission,
The court’s opinion in
Alvarado v. Industrial Commission,
Because the uncontroverted medical testimony in this case is that petitioner’s industrially-сaused condition has permanently restricted her functional ability to return to work as a meat wrapper, the award finding no permanent impairment was in error. Our disposition of the matter makes it unnecеssary to reach the other arguments raised by petitioner, including those regarding the fairness of the proceedings.
The award is set aside.
WREN and FROEB, JJ., concur.
Notes
.
See, e. g., Sims v. Industrial Commission,
. For another case discussing meat wrapper’s asthma in greater detail,
see Matter of Compensation of Bracke,
. The AMA guides relating to pulmonary function state:
There are many tests of pulmonary function which have value and interest as guides to therapy and prognosis. Fоr the great majority of patients, however, most of these are neither practical nor necessary for the assignment to a particular class of impairment. Judicious interpretation of the rеsults of tests of ventilatory function combined with the clinical impression gained from weighing all the information gathered should permit the physician to place the patient in the proper class of impаirment.
A classification based on clinical and laboratory observations is provided in the text. Each class has both subjective and objective findings and percentage values for impairment of the whоle man. Since there is a wide variation in the results of tests of venti-latory function among normal individuals, no *62 percentage of impairment of the whole man is said to exist until the functional impairment has progrеssed to such a state as to meet the criteria set forth in Class 2.
American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, p. 67 (1971).
. At any loss of earning capacity hearing, petitioner must prove a loss of earning power generally. It is not sufficient to prove an inаbility to perform the particular work petitioner was doing at the time she developed her meat wrapper’s asthma.
See Alsbrooks v. Industrial Commission,
.
Langbell v. Industrial Commission,
Any single injury or disability listed in subsection B of this section which is not converted into an injury or disability compensated under subsection C of this section by operation of this section shall be treated as scheduled under subsection B of this section regardless of its actual effect on the injured employee’s earning capacity.
