*1 OF EDUCATION et al. v. BOARD HUNTER ROSS J. OF COUNTY MONTGOMERY al. et Term, 32, September 1981.] [No. January 1982.

Decided *2 J., argued The cause was before Murphy, Smith, C. JJ. Digges, Eldridge, Cole, Rodowsky, Davidson Kooken, Dukes, L. with whom were Charles A. Jr. Browne brief, appellants. and Dukes & Kooken on the for Education Baltimore Amicus curiae brief ofthe Board of Solicitor, Jacobson,County Arnold County filed. Leonard S. Solicitor, Jablon, County William B. Somerville Assistant Mudd, Case, H. H. Thomas John Smith, & Somerville Semmes, Bowen Preston, Winay Nora Howell, T. Susan on the brief. & Semmes McCormick, were McCormick, with whom

Paul V. brief, appellees. on the & Talbott Sullivan Digges, J., opinion delivered the of the Court. Davidson, J., part part, opinion and dissents and filed an concurs infra, dissenting part. at page concurring part and troubling case primarily presents This but important question, nevertheless has previ which not been Court, ously addressed an can whether action be successfully asserted board and various employees individual for improperly evaluating, placing or teaching Montgomery student. Circuit Court for J.) County (Shearin, of Special Appeals and the Court negligence concluded an educational action could not be agree maintained. We with this and will determination portion affirm judgment, but will reverse with respect petitioners’ allegations concerning the commis sion of an intentional tort by employees certain individual the board.

As this case before on an appeal is us from order sustaining amend, in demurrer without to leave accord with familiar principles, pleaded we take as true all well material facts well reasonably as all inferences based upon them.2 The Hunters filed this six count declaration on child, Ross, behalf of their naming as defendants the Montgomery County corporate body, School Board as a the of principal Hungerford Elementary young School where education, Hunter received his primary employee a board diagnostic who engaged testing of the student second grade, boy’s and the grade sixth at Hungerford. teacher The October, action 1977, was instituted shortly after Ross’ sixteenth birthday. As can gather best we from the decla here) ration, parents (petitioners complain that school system negligently evaluated the learning child’s abilities caused him repeat grade to first materials while being physically placed in the second grade. It is 709, 425 Montgomery County, App. 1. Hunter v. Bd. of of Ed. 47 Md. A.2d (1981). 681 Key 33-34, Loan, 28, 2. See Hoffman v. Fed. & Md. 416 Sav. 286 A.2d 1265, 1268 (1979); Carafides, 375, 382, 384 729, Arnold v. 282 A.2d Md. 733 (1978). 484 at least which continued misplacement,

alleged that to feel school, caused the student generally grade through deficiencies,” and to "learning "embarrassment,” develop fur- petitioners strength.” ego experience "depletion educators, inten- acting individual ther claim false information maliciously, furnished tionally and altered disability, learning concerning the student’s them actions, and demeaned their up records to cover child. clear, however, gravamen petitioners’

It is asserting damages negligence, claim in this case sounds edu system properly failure of the school alleged for the on this Hunter, focus our attention and we first young cate "educa note that these so-called aspect doing, of it. In so we unanimously rejected been claims have malpractice” tional See D.S.W. considering topic. jurisdictions those few (Alaska Dist., 628 P.2d 554 No. Star Bor. Sch. v. Fairbanks Agency, 90 1981); Cty. Soc. Serv. Smith v. Alameda (1979); Peter W. v. San 929, 712 Rptr. 153 Cal. Cal.App.3d 814, District, Cal.App.3d Francisco Unified School City of Ed. of (1976); Hoffman v. Board Rptr. Cal. 376, 400 N.E.2d 317 121, 424 N.Y.S.2d N.Y., 49 N.Y.2d Dist., 47 Union Free School (1979); v. Copiague Donohue (1979).These N.E.2d 1352 418 N.Y.S.2d N.Y.2d seeking dam- of action that a cause hold generally decisions process in the educational negligence for acts of ages among them policy, by considerations precluded against which rule of care a workable being the absence of measured, inherent may be conduct the defendant’s any nature of the cause and determining uncertainty in *4 imposed which would be burden and the extreme damages, system public the school resources of already the strained on W., Thus, Peter judiciary. the those of say nothing recovery in tort sought graduate high supra, where court, education, the California inadequate a claimed care duty of an actionable problem the as whether viewing injuries and conduct existed, "wrongful the noted that neither were malfeasance” in educational allegedly involved judicial nor assessable within comprehensible explained framework and as follows: or activity highway Unlike the no marketplace, methodology classroom affords cause, care, or readily acceptable standards of or injury. pedagogy fraught The science of itself is and theories of how or conflicting with different any layman and taught, what a child should be — — commonly does have his own might subject. "injury” views on the claimed emphatic inability here to read write. plaintiffs Sub- professional authority stantial attests schools, failure, literacy achievement of or its is influenced a host of factors which affect the pupil subjectively, from teaching outside the formal process, beyond the control of its ministers.

They may emotional, be physical, neurological, cultural, environmental; they may present be but perceived, not recognized but not identified.

We find situation no conceivable "workability of a rule of care” which defen alleged may dants’ conduct be measured ... no rea "degree certainty sonable plaintiff ... suffered injury” within the meaning of the law of negligence...., and perceptible no such "connection between the injury defendant’s conduct and the suffered,” alleged, which would establish a causal link between them within the same mean ing. Cal.App.3d 824-25, [60 at Reptr. 131 Cal. at (citations omitted).] 860-61

Although just-articulated policy considerations alone sufficed negate legal duty W., care Peter the court aptly additional, identified practical consequences of imposing duty upon persons such a agencies who public administer our educational system: institutions, Few of our if any, have aroused the controversies, dissatisfaction, or incurred the public which operation have attended the of the *5 during Rightly

schools the last few decades. or they wrongly, widely, charged outright but are in failure the achievement of their critics, they objectives; according to some bear responsibility many of the social and moral society large. Their problems public plight of our at media, respects daily in these is attested in the in elections, governing bitter board in wholesale rejections proposals, survey and in of school bond survey. "duty To hold them to an actionable upon care,” functions, discharge in the of their academic — expose would them to the tort claims real or — imagined parents of disaffected students and They already countless are numbers. beset social problems gone major and financial which have litigations, permanent but for which no solution has yet . . . ultimate appeared. consequences, The public money, terms of time and would burden them — — society beyond calculation. Cal. App.3d [60 (citation omitted).] at 131 Cal. at Reptr. Dist., In Copiague Donohue v. Union Free School supra, New York Appeals Court of addressed the identical proposi W., tion as that presented Peter but viewed the issue as solely presenting question public policy: complaint alleging fact that a "educational malpractice” might pleadings on the state a cause of action within traditional notions of tort law does not, however, require that it be sustained. The whether, heart of the matter is assuming that such stated, cause of may action be the courts should, as a matter public policy, entertain such they claims. We believe should not. [391 N.E.2d at 1354.]

The New York court concluded that the action not be should permitted because to do so would "constitute blatant inter- ference with the for the responsibility administration of the system lodged by school [State] Constitution and stat- ute agencies.” administrative 391 N.E.2d at 1354. cases, more somewhat subsequent presenting Two *6 circumstances, New York provided respective the appealing to revisit opportunity courts the and California In Hoffman Peter W.decisions. strengthen the Donohue and 121, Y., 424 N.Y.S.2d 49 N.Y.2d City v. Board of Ed. of of N. (1979), of normal 376, plaintiff, the who was 400 N.E.2d 317 for the special in classes intelligence, negligently placed was years. ten where remained for over mentally retarded he Divi- Appellate reversed the Appeals The New York Court of sion, "[t]he recovery, which had allowed and declared in our decision policy prompted considerations which malpractice’ force to 'educational apply equal Donohue with misfeasance allegations of educational upon actions based Likewise, in Smith v. 400 N.E.2d at 320.3 nonfeasance.” 929, Agency, Cal.App.3d 90 153 Cty. Alameda Soc. Serv. (1979), that the school plaintiff alleged Cal. 712 the Reptr. mentally him in classes for the negligently placed district circumstances either where the district handicapped under retarded. knew or should have known that he was not in Smith was Declaring duty sought imposed that the to be one for Peter basically "indistinguishable argued from the W.,” against the court held that no cause of action was stated D.S.W. v. Reptr. the school district. 153 Cal. at 719. See also (Alaska Dist, Fairbanks No. Star Bor. Sch. 628 P.2d 1981) decisions, York (following the California New negligent for court held that there exists no cause of action of remedial diagnose dyslexia failure to classes). and termination We agreement find ourselves substantial with Donohue, reasoning employed the courts in Peter W. and view, money an award of damages, represents our singularly inappropriate remedy for errors in the asserted process.4 misgivings expressed educational in these 3. The intermediate characterized the school board’s New York court retesting placement through failure to detect as an "affirmative error negligence, actionable, distinguished act” it an of which was from malpractice negligent upon instruct action based failure to (1978). properly a student. 64 A.D.2d 410 N.Y.S.2d pass question 4. this case indicates We do not here on the of whether suit, merely subject professionals, normally bar to an action other legal of cause and concerning the establishment

cases is involved immeasurability damages inherent sys against the school negligence actions such educational Moreover, petitioners’ to allow founded. are indeed well tems posi in effect would proceed claims negligence asserted of both overseers as of this State the courts tion as well process our educational day-to-day operation responsibility This governing policies. itsof the formulation have courts. Such matters impose on our are loath to we Assembly General by the entrusted properly been boards and the local Education Department State Md. Code them. See authority over are invested who 4-101, 2-205, 2-303, (1978 2-106, §§ Supp.), & Cum. Article Educational 4-304 of the 4-107, 4-110, 4-204 and responsibility supervisory broadly delineates which *7 boards, Education, school the local Department the State regard, In this we superintendents. respective and their totality of the var- context, "the in another have stated [of Board concerning the State statutory provisions ious Board with the ... ... invests plainly 'quite Education] or the policy concerning educational any on matter last word ” Resetar education.’ public system administration of 537, 556, A.2d Education, 284 Md. v. State Bd. of (1979). however, imply that does not point, Our conclusion on this educators aggrieved by public feel an action of parents who (1) example: recourse. For affecting their child are without scheme Assembly provided comprehensive has General child handicapped of a reviewing placement decision (1978, court, Md. Code including an to the circuit appeal (2) Article; § of the Education both Supp.) 8-415 1981 Cum. educational right have the to review parent and child the documents be and, if insist appropriate, records 4-205(c) (3) amended, seq.; et section 13A.08.02.01 COMAR (3) county that each of the Education Article commands issue system. this is not an by As they employed the educational because are appropriate here, to an by allegations leave its resolution presented case. we superintendent, charge parties "without to the concerned. . . (i) all [t]he shall decide controversies that involve: rules and (ii) board; regulations county [t]he of the admin- proper county istration of the system,” with the deci- being county sion appealable to the board and then to the (c) education, (4), § further, state board of 4-205 if appropriate, through proce- to the courts the administrative act, (1957, Repl. dure Md. Code Vol. & 1981 Cum. (4) 255, 256; §§ county Art. boards of Supp.), educa- required tion are to establish "at least one” citizen commit- tee "to advise the board and its to facilitate activities and programs public schools,” in the and similar committees § may Thus, be established for an individual school. 4-111. view, it is preferable, legislature’s disputes to settle concerning placement classification and of students and the by like resorting to these and similar informal measures than through post remedy hoc of a civil action. With this for, we quarrel, aptly by have no noted the Alaska Supreme regard, Court "[p]rompt administrative and judicial may review correct erroneous action in time so that any shortcomings suffered a student may be hand, Money damages, corrected. on poor, the other are a only tenuously related, substitute for a proper educa- tion.” Dist., D.S. W. v. Fairbanks No. Star Bor. Sch. supra, 628 P.2d at 557. Consequently, we will affirm the judgment of the Court Special Appeals concerning the dismissal of I, III, IV, counts petitioners’ V and VI of amended declar ation.5 This leaves the claim set forth in count II to which we now address our attention. *8 Although counts, are, essence, 5. the declaration contains six there in — only presented injury. contract, negligence, three theories breach of and inten presents petitioners’ tional infliction of Count II intentional tort incorporates prior allegations claims and count V and asserts breach of an "implied I, III, expressly negligence contract.” Counts and VI state claims respondents, alleges the Board or the while count IV individual statutory "provide duty plaintiff quality breach of a the minor preclude education.” damage The same considerations which act to claim negligence preclude

founded on common law for educational will likewise upon Statutory a claim based the various educational statutes. claims sim presented rejected ilar to that No. here in count IV were in D.S.W. v. Fairbanks (Alaska Dist., 554, 1981); Star Bor. Sch. 628 P.2d 556 Peter v. San W.

490 II represents parents’

Count amorphous somewhat respondents intentionally claim that maliciously injure acted to their child. Research reveals that none of prior discussing cases educational malpractice have squarely question confronted the of whether educa may tors responsible be held for their intentional torts .6 arising in the In declining educational context to entertain actions, negligence and breach of contract way we in no intend to shield individual educators from liability their intentional torts. It is our view that where an individual engaged process the educational is shown to wilfully maliciously injured have a child entrusted to care, outrageous his educational such greatly conduct any outweighs public policy considerations which would liability otherwise preclude recovery.7 so as to authorize It may usually well be true that a claimant will face a in attempting produce formidable burden adequate evi tort, dence to establish the intent requirement of the but plaintiff that factor alone cannot prevent instituting from District, 814, Cal.App.3d 826-27, Francisco Unified School 60 131 Cal. 854, (1976), Reptr. Copiague 862 Dist., Donohue v. Union Free School 29, 874, 880-81, 440, 64 A.D.2d 407 N.Y.S.2d aff'd 47 N.Y.2d 418 N.Y.S.2d (1979). 375, respect 391 N.E.2d 1352 With to the contract claim asserted in V, opinion concerning uncertainty count what we damages, have said difficulty cause, determining legal public policy and the precluding negligence factors allegations claims remains true whether the state breach of contract or tort and we discuss it no further. Smith v. Cty. Agency, Cal.App.3d 929, 943, Alameda Soc. Serv. Reptr. 90 153 Cal. (1979). 712, claim, remaining II, count we discuss the text infra. W., plaintiffs’ 6. In Peter the California court dismissed claim of misrepresentation specificity plaintiffs intentional amend Court of for lack of after failed to Hoffman, however, complaint. their In Donohue and the New York Appeals imply liability might did in dicta that exist for those charged responsibility with educational where their actions constituted "gross City public policy.” violations Hoffman Ed. of defined v. Board of N.Y., 121, 424 376, 400 317, 320 (1979); 49 N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d N.E.2d Donohue Dist., 440, 375, Copiague v. N.E.2d Union Free School 47 N.Y.2d 418 N.Y.S.2d (1979). 1352, recognized based on 7. This is not the first time that this Court has suits public policy generally outrageous conduct in areas where malicious or precludes liability. 85-86 outrageous 352, 77, 334, Lusby Lusby, v. 283 Md. 390 A.2d See (1978) immunity applied (interspousal intentional not (1951) 923, acts); Moore, v. 197 Md. 77 A.2d Mahnke wrongs). (parent-child immunity abrogated for malicious and wanton

491 Thus, petitioners are entitled to make such action.8 an attempt here. Special of the Court of

Judgment Appeals in part affirmed and in part case reversed remanded to that for the Court entry judgment in of a accordance opinion. with this equally Costs divided to be between parties. Davidson, J., concurring dissenting:

I agree with the majority that individuals engaged process who intentionally injure a child entrusted to their educational care should be held liable. petitioners allege any 8. We note do not individual members of intentionally maliciously the Under the young schoolboard acted toward Hunter. respondeat superior, only doctrine Board can held liable be employees acting torts of intentional its committed while within the scope 591, 595, employment. Lepore Corp., of their Oil v. Gulf 237 Md. 207 451, (1965); Roch, Company 189, 192, 22, A.2d 453 Tea v. 160 Md. 153 A. (1931); Rasche, 126, 130, 991, 23 993 941-42 Union Western Tel. Co. v. 130 Md. 99 A. (1917); Pierce, Ry. 495, 502, 940, Consolidated Co. v. 89 Md. 43 A. (1899). scope employment An intentional tort is within the where it part is carried out in furtherance ofthe master’s business or is intended Lepore 595, 207 Corp., supra, for the master’s benefit. v. Gulf Oil 237 Md. at 453; Roch, Company 192, 23; A.2d supra, at Tea v. 160 Md. at A. at 153 (1880). Davidson, 245, 249 James, Evans v. 53 Md. Harper See also 2 F. & F. Torts, (1956); Prosser, § § The Law of 26.9 at 1391 W. Law of Torts 70 at at (4th (Second) 1971); Agency, 235, a, § 464 ed. 1 Restatement comment (1958); Casualty Co., 520 accord Park Transfer Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. (1944); Luttrell, 56, 812, 142 F.2d Tenn.App. 100 Averill v. 44 311 S.W.2d (1957); 814 Cary 980, Rueger, 421, (1954); v. Hotel 195 Va. 81 S.E.2d Betts, 549, 113 34, (1941); City Brazier v. Co., 8 Wash.2d P.2d Linden Car. v. (1941). Where, here, alleged 239 Wis. 300 N.W. isit wilfully maliciously injure that the individual educators have acted public school, a student enrolled in a such actions can never be considered purposes to have in Since such of the been done furtherance of beneficent system. alleged educational abandonment of intentional torts constitute an employment, liability the Board absolved of for these purported employees. Consequently, acts of its individual not called we are upon here to consider whether or to extent the what board has another governmental See, immunity. defense however, it available to under the doctrine (1978 Supp.), § Md. Code & 1981 Cum. 4-105 Education of the governmental immunity Article which waives to a limited extent. *10 Accordingly, I agree with the majority’s holding peti- that tioners are entitled to maintain an action against the indi- vidual defendants for injuries the intentional alleged. however,

I not with agree majority, do the that individ- uals engaged who, the educational process profes- through sional malpractice, injure a negligently child entrusted to their educational care should not be my held liable. In view a cause of against action such individuals should exist for negligent injuries. such Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding the petitioners are here not to an entitled maintain action the against individual defen- dants for negligent injuries alleged. the long ago Little,

As as 1889 in Cochrane v. 71 Md. 331-32, (1889), 18 A. 700-01 Judge Alvey Chief stated the following respect to actions lawyers for negligent their acts: any

"Apart special from mere or objec technical tions, the declaration would seem to all the contain averments essential to entitle plaintiffs maintain their by action. This is best shown brief principles statement of upon which the action by maintainable. It is well many now settled deci of high authority, sions courts of England both of country, every and of this client an employing attorney exercise, right has a to the on part attorney, ordinary care and diligence in the him, execution of the business intrusted to and to fair average degree professional skill and knowl if edge; attorney not has as much of these qualities ought which, by as he to possess, and holding employment himself out for he impliedly if, represents them, possessing, having himself as or neglected them, he has employ the law makes responsible him or damage the loss has which accrued to his client deficiency from their or failure application. Or, said Lord Chancellor Cottenham, in delivering opinion in Hart v. Frame, 193, 209, 6 Cl. & Fin. a client who has employed attorney an right diligence, has a to his skill; knowledge, his and his and whether he had not much of qualities so these as he was bound to have, them, having them, or neglected employ properly law makes him liable for the loss which has accrued to employer. his And in another part of the same opinion the learned Chancellor men, said: Professional possessed of a reasonable portion skill, of information and according to the they duties perform, undertake to and exercising they what so possess with reasonable care and dili- gence in the affairs of their employers, certainly ought not to be held judgment, liable for errors in *11 whether matters of Every case, law or discretion. therefore, ought depend to upon peculiar its own circumstances; and injury when an has been sustained which could not have arisen except from the want of such reasonable skill and diligence, or the absence of the employment of either on the part of attorney, the the law holds him liable. In undertaking business, the client’s he undertakes for the existence and for employment the due of these qualities, and price receives the of them. Such is the principle ofthe law of England, and that of Scotland does not vary from it. ...”

"... In the course of the trial exceptions several were by taken the defendant rulings to of the court. The first two of these were taken to the admissibil- ity of testimony the of lawyers, examined the plaintiffs, for purpose the proving of to jury, the that, in their opinion, the given by advice the defen- Korns, dant to under the facts and circumstances proved by case, other witnesses in the was not such as prudent, lawyer, careful ordinary of capacity and intelligence, would given, have ought or given. have it, As we understand this was not an 494 the the

attempt part plaintiffs prove on of to the jury by lawyers, principle the abstract given by involved in the advice defendant was law, not for that would have been an of usurpation court; simply functions of the but advice, in view of all the circumstances and condi- given, tions under which it was not as a was such prudent, lawyer, ordinary capacity, careful would cases, given. testimony, have Such in this class of allowed, furnishing jury, aid to the in con- question or sidering negligence want of skill. many There are in which testimony cases such has received, necessary been but it is not deemed Dalton, Godefroy 460; refer than Bing. to more v. 6 69; Caldwell, Q. Hunter 10 v. B. Swinfen v. Chelmsford, 5 & N. 897. was Hurl. There on rulings excep- therefore no error in the these tions.” recently v. Hopkins

As as 1975 in Raitt Johns Hospital, 489, 498-99, 336 90, 95 (1975), Judge Md. A.2d Levine stated duty to the of the following respect nature care against physi and the applicable standard care actions negligent cians their acts: 380-81, Griffith, "... Dashiell v. Md. (1896), A. our stated: '... predecessors cases generally agreed upon proposition, are *12 care, diligence that the amount skill required of is highest only not such is greatest, or but as ordinarily profession gen exercised others in the by added). erally. /(emphasis .. There had been a hint State, of v. Janney this standard use 162, (1889), 172, 70 A. Housekeeper, Md. 16 382 degree where Court '... care this held required and skill degree is that reasonable of care physicians ordinarily and skill and surgeons which exercise in the of their patients. treatment . . .’ rule, no to

"This which makes reference whatever community, the defendant-physician’s was consis-

495 See, e.g., 1962. Lane v. tently prior followed to (1958) 457, 462, Calvert, Md. 138 A.2d 902 (standard by ordinarily exercised of care 'such as McClees generally.’); in the v. profession others (1930). Indeed, Cohen, 60, 66, 148 it 158 Md. A. 1962, quoted occasionally been even since has 534, Dillon, 516, 276 A.2d 36 v. 261 Md. Nolan (1971) (standard ordinarily exer of care 'such as is by profession generally.’); others in the cised 348, Hosp., 260 Md. Hopkins Anderson v. Johns (1971) ('... the standard of skill 272 A.2d 372 ordinarily by surgeons in cases and care exercised kind....’); Genda, Hopkins Hospital v. of this Johns (1969) ('.. 616, 620, . the 255 Md. A.2d 595 ordinarily by standard of skill and care exercised ..’).” surgeons in cases of this kind ..

Thus, consistently Court recognized, has notwithstanding myriad intangibles, the existence of a a multiplicity quantities variety of unknown and a of other any profession, profes uncertainties attendant that a duty person receiving professional sional owes a of care to a services; upon customary that a standard of based con care appropriate; possible duct is and that it is to maintain a professional professional viable tort action a for mal Vance, practice. Finally, recently as v. Vance 490,408 (1979), Md. A.2d 728 this Court has recognized that under recovery certain circumstances there can be mental or resulting emotional distress from non-intentional negligent The application principles acts. of all of these this case leads me to the conclusion that there should be a viable cause of action on alleged the facts here. view, my

In professionals. They educators are have special training prerequisite and state certification is a employment. They their possessing hold themselves out as certain knowledge skills and not shared noneducators. As result, people who utilize their services have right expect them to use skill knowledge with some mini- addition, degree mum In competence. profes- like other *13 sionals, they must often make educated in judgments their applying knowledge specific individual needs. As professionals, they professional duty owe a of care to chil- dren who a receive their services and standard care based upon customary appropriate. conduct is can be There no question that the negligent part conduct on a edu- public may by cator child damage inflicting psychological damage Moreover, and emotional from distress. the fact that purport educators to teach it follows that some causal relationship may exist between the conduct of a teacher and Thus, the failure of a child to learn. it should be possible maintain viable tort action such professionals for malpractice. Here the alleges, pertinent declaration in that part, individual "owed a duty defendants to the minor plaintiff to comport themselves within the standards of their profession, and degree ordinarily to exercise that of care and skill exer- by similarly cised those profession;...” situated in the declaration alleges further that the defendants breached duty by, that other among things, placing the child grade requiring second him to repeat grade first materials even he though satisfactorily had completed these year school, materials his first subsequently placing him in a grade ahead of the actually material he was studying, testing inadequately the child so incompletely result in total failure of problems, evaluation insulting and demeaning private public. the child Finally, alleges declaration that defendants’ acts in of their breach duties were the proximate injuries cause of included, to the child which among things, other substantial learning deficiencies, psychological damage and emotional alleges stress. This declaration defendants owed a professional duty to child to act in with conformity an appropriate upon conduct, of care customary standard based that there duty, was a breach of that and that unforeseeable injuries were proximately caused Mani- breach. it festly, states a cause action that comports traditional notions of tort law. *14 policy public that does my colleagues, I believe

Unlike It is being from entertained. claims prohibit not such majority recognizes, and indeed the knowledge, common objectives to achieve educational failure of schools that the widely recognized is It proportions. massive has reached deprived of that, result, only many persons are a not as life, enhances materially spiritually learning that both moral by social and a whole beset society that but also change mandate a changed circumstances problems. These remedies must be New and effective in the common law. viable. if the to remain vital and devised law is Moreover, colleagues adequate that agree my I not with do designed procedures for internal administrative goals are available within achievement of educational system. my proce- In view of the available none educational teaching provide with or adequately incompetent dures deal for injured A cause action adequate relief to an student. meets social individual malpractice educational these needs. majority addition, agree

In I not do recognition of a cause of action will result a flood such on the edu litigation imposing impossible an burden system arguments Similar cational courts. recognized rights the constitutional appearing cases that by subsequent empirical of students have not been validated (1975) 565, 600 n.22 Lopez, evidence. See Goss v. 419 U.S. (Powell, J., dissenting). agree majority I with the

Finally, do not recognition position a cause action "would effect such the day-to-day the courts of State as overseers of both operation process of our educational as well as the formula- its have been governing policies”, "properly tion of roles that by Assembly Department entrusted the General to the State That Legisla- of Education and the local boards.” administer delegated authority particular has a area ture agencies preclude judi- to certain not administrative should responsiveness injured unqualified cial to individuals In of action functioning. recognizing administrative cause nothing would do malpractice, this Court more than what courts have traditionally done from time — namely provide remedy immemorial to a person harmed by the act negligent of another. Our children deserve nothing less.

MICHAEL P. De BLEECKER v. MONTGOMERY

COUNTY, MARYLAND et al. Term, September

[No. 1981.] *15 January Decided 1982.